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Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal

Madras High Court
Nov 5, 1919
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns succession to an archaka (temple priest) office and related emoluments. Gangadara (the father) held an archaka service; after his son Subbiah reached majority the father became insane and the son performed the archaka duties. Subbiah predeceased Gangadara (the son is said to have died in 1874; the father died in 1880). Subbiah left a widow, Kuppammal (died 1911). Gangadara's widow, Pappammal, died in 1912. The plaintiff sues as reversioner of Subbiah (the son). The defendants are Gangadara's daughter and grandsons (who are the sister and sister's sons of Subbiah).

Procedurally, the District Judge's judgment proceeded on the assumption that the son predeceased the father and that the father had been insane for years. The appellate bench directed that a distinct inquiry be held on specified issues (concerning whether Gangadara was insane, duration and nature of his insanity, whether it disqualified him from holding property under Hindu law, and whether the son's widow enjoyed the office after her husband's death). Fresh evidence was allowed; time-limits for findings and objections were fixed. The appeal was ultimately remanded for further findings and for disposal of an issue on prescription concerning the widow's alleged enjoyment of a half-share in the office.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Was Gangadara insane?
  2. If so, for how long and until when?
  3. Was the insanity of such a nature as to disqualify him from holding property under Hindu law?
  4. Was the son's widow in enjoyment of the office and emoluments after her husband's death as his heir?
  5. Principal question framed by the Court: whether by Gangadara having become insane Subbiah (the son) became the sole owner by survivorship to the exclusion of his father.
  6. Subsidiary question: whether the two widows (the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law) enjoyed the property in such a manner and with such intention as to have prescribed for a half-share each (i.e., a question of prescription and the nature of enjoyment).

Arguments of the Parties

Mr. K. Srinivasa Ayyangar (for the plaintiff / appellant)

  • Contended that if the District Judge's assumption (that the son predeceased the father and the father was insane for years) is well founded, the District Judge's view of the law is wrong.
  • Argued doctrinally that a Mitakshara son has only a potentiality of taking a share; that potentiality is lost if the heir becomes subject to a disqualification (insanity) before partition — i.e., the right ripens and is enforceable only if the heir has full mental capacity at the date of partition.
  • Maintained that if the potentiality is defeated (e.g., heir dies or is disqualified before partition), the heir is treated as if not born for the purposes of share allocation (subject to the maintenance rule).

Mr. Venkatarama Sastriar (for the respondents / defendants)

  • Argued that unless the nature of the father's insanity is distinctly found, the legal question would not arise — prompting the Court to direct a distinct factual issue on the nature and duration of insanity.
  • Contended that insanity must be congenital to produce exclusion from inheritance (i.e., a contention that exclusion applies only when insanity is from birth).
  • Presented the contrary theoretical position that a son is a share-taker from birth and that any exclusion during incapacity is only temporary (the right is in abeyance, not extinguished), with provision for maintenance in the meantime.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash (also cited as Deo Kishen v. Rudh Prakash) Authority holding that insanity need not be congenital for exclusion to apply (Full Bench decision). The Court treated this Full Bench decision as direct authority and accepted its view that insanity need not be congenital; it relied on it in rejecting the opposite contention that exclusion requires congenital insanity.
Murarji Gokuldas v. Parvatibai Expresses the same view (that insanity need not be congenital). Cited as supporting the view that non-congenital insanity may suffice for exclusion in prior decisions.
Baboo Bodhnarain Singh v. Baboo Omroo Singh Accepted the position that insanity need not be congenital (before the Judicial Committee the position was taken for granted). Cited as another authority indicating that insanity need not be congenital.
Sanku v. Puttamma Decision taking a contrary view (summarily dealt with the question); in that case the surviving insane female was held owner. Noted as inconsistent with other decisions; the Court observed it was summarily dealt with and not discussed with the texts; the Court compared and distinguished it from other authorities.
Raghava Mudaliar v. Narayanasami Mudaliar (also referred to as Baghava/Baghava Mudaliar) Cited as a later decision of the Court that is not consistent with Sanku v. Puttamma. Used to note inconsistency among Madras authorities and to justify examination of the texts rather than blind reliance on a conflicting precedent.
Krishna v. Sami Case relating to sons of a deaf and dumb member; discussed vesting of property at birth. Noted as not directly affecting the present question (it concerned a different factual issue), but referenced in surveying authorities.
Balgobinda v. Lal Bahadur Early Calcutta decision relating to lunacy of one Ramsahai; impliedly supports that insanity did not deprive birthright and a committee was appointed to manage his share. The Court regarded it as implying support for the view that lynchpin rights remain though management may be exercised by committee.
Ram Sahye Bhuhaut v. Lalla Laljee Sahye Related to the same individual's lunacy; contains conflicting dicta. Described as having conflicting dicta that render it valueless as authoritative guidance on the point.
Ram Soonder Roy v. Ram Sahye Bhugut Another Calcutta decision dealing with the lunatic Ramsahai; discussed in later Calcutta cases. Considered along with other Calcutta decisions and used to show a trend that the right to property was recognized though enjoyment could be unenforceable.
Abilakh/Adilahh Bhagat v. Bhekhi/Bhehhi Mahto (spelling variants appear in the text) Held that the right to property exists although the right to its enjoyment may be unenforceable. Cited as supporting the proposition that disqualification may suspend enjoyment but not extinguish the right; the Court referred to it and followed its reasoning in parts of its analysis.
Tirbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar An Allahabad decision on succession and insanity; the judges spoke of succession opening on the father's death. Noted as a direct decision from Allahabad but the Court observed that its language about succession "opening on death" would not be correct when applied to Mitakshara sons.
Ram Singh v. Mt. Bhani Case of pure inheritance (cited in the list of authorities). Referenced among authorities on the point; cited without extensive discussion as part of the survey of cases.
Man Singh v. Musammat Gaini Decision taking the view enunciated in Abilakh Bhagat v. Bhekhi Mahto. Cited to show that subsequent cases adopted the Abilakh Bhagat position.
Baghava/Baghava Mudaliar v. Narayanasami Mudaliar (Madras authority) Contains an obiter dictum suggesting a son insane at his father's death might not take property (obiter only). Referred to as containing an obiter; the Court noted that Sanku v. Puttamma (which took a contrary view) was not considered in that judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two linked strands: (A) an evidentiary/factual strand concerning the existence, duration and nature of Gangadara's insanity; and (B) a legal/analytical strand concerning the effect of that insanity on succession under Hindu law (principally Mitakshara and related Smriti texts and commentary).

Factual/inquiry strand:

  • The appellate Court observed that the District Judge proceeded on the assumption that the son had predeceased the father and that the father had been insane for years. Counsel for the parties were at odds about whether the father's insanity preceded the son's death.
  • The Court directed a distinct inquiry and framed four factual issues to be returned by the District Judge: (a) Was Gangadara insane? (b) If so, for how long and till when? (c) Was the insanity of such a nature as to disqualify him from holding property under Hindu law? (d) Did the son's widow enjoy the office and emoluments after her husband's death as his heir?
  • Fresh evidence was allowed. After remand and further evidence the appellate bench (through the judge delivering findings) concluded: (i) Gangadara was insane; (ii) the duration was longer than the plaintiff claimed—preferring defence evidence that he was insane from 10 to 20 years before his own death (that is, before the father's death); (iii) the nature of insanity was of a mild, non-virulent type: wandering and talking at random, doing no harm—court expressly disbelieved late evidence suggesting dangerously violent conduct (stones, tearing clothes, chaining), noting that such evidence would likely have emerged earlier if true; (iv) on facts the judge held Gangadara was effectively in possession of the office until his death though his son acted as deputy; and (v) the son's widow did not, on the balance of credible evidence, enjoy the office and emoluments after her husband's death as his heir.

Legal/textual strand:

  • The Court examined relevant Smriti texts (Manu, Yajnavalkya) and Mitakshara commentary (Vijnanesvara/Vignaneswara), and considered the rule in Mitakshara, Ch. 2, S.10 (as arranged by Colebrooke) and the definitions and placita relating to "udmatha" (a madman) and the consequences of disqualifications.
  • The Court emphasized interpretive cautions: that the rules in the chapter are exceptions and should be strictly construed; that Vignanesvara's commentary sometimes adapts or reconciles texts to address perceived social needs; and that analogies (e.g., of after-born sons) were introduced as remedial devices by commentators and should not be overextended.
  • The Court set out and compared two competing doctrinal theories advanced by counsel: (a) Srinivasa Ayyangar's theory that the son's right is only a potentiality which is lost if the disqualification manifests before partition (i.e., the right ripens only at partition); and (b) Venkatarama Sastriar's theory that the son is a share-taker from birth and the right subsists though enjoyment may be suspended during disqualification (right is in abeyance, with maintenance provided).
  • In analysing the texts the Court examined the commentator's definitions (e.g., "udmatha" includes various forms of insanity, not necessarily congenital), rules about disqualification arising before division, and placita on sons of disinherited persons. The Court applied principles of textual interpretation (including Mimamsa rules) to reject the argument that an adjectival qualifier attached to one category (jathi, "from birth") necessarily governs another (unmatha, "mad").
  • The Court surveyed authorities (Madras, Calcutta, Allahabad) and found a mix of dicta and decisions. Relying notably on Deo Kishen (Full Bench) and other authorities, and on treatises such as Saraswati Vilasa and the view expressed in Steel's Law of Custom, the Court concluded that the better view is that the right to a share comes into existence at birth and subsists even during a period of disqualification (though enforcement of enjoyment may be suspended and maintenance provided). The Court thus favoured the theory that the heir's right is not altogether extinguished by supervening insanity.
  • Applying these legal conclusions to the facts as found (mild, non-disabling insanity and continuing possession by the father), the Court held the father's insanity was not of such a nature as to disqualify him from holding property under Hindu law; accordingly the question presented was whether he had been divested by subsequent insanity (a matter of fact and timing).
  • On the point of prescription and alleged joint enjoyment of the service by the two widows (which had not been fully presented to the lower courts), the Court found that the District Judge had not adequately dealt with evidence on prescription and remanded for determination whether Subbiah's widow had prescribed for a half share and, if so, whether she acquired a right to it at her death; fresh evidence might be necessary to determine whether any enjoyment by the widow was in lieu of maintenance or permissive allowance by Gangadara's wife.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is remanded for factual findings and further adjudication; the decree of the District Judge is reversed in part and the matter remitted for disposal on the question of prescription and for further findings as directed.

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • If Subbiah (the son) is found to have been the owner, then the plaintiff (suing as reversioner of Subbiah) would exclude the defendants (who are the sister and sister's sons of Subbiah).
  • If Gangadara (the father) is found to have been the owner at his death, then the defendants (as daughter and daughter's sons of Gangadara) would exclude the plaintiff.
  • The Court directed that a distinct inquiry be undertaken on the four specified issues (insanity, duration, disqualification under Hindu law, and widow's enjoyment). Fresh evidence may be taken; the Court fixed timelines for submission of findings and objections and ordered costs consequences for the plaintiff because he failed earlier to raise the issue.
  • On the point of prescription and the widow's alleged half-share enjoyment, the appeal was remanded to the lower appellate Court for disposal; the Court observed fresh evidence may be necessary and reversed the District Judge on that aspect.
  • Costs directions: the opinion directs that the plaintiff should pay the costs of the defendants in the Court of first instance and the costs of the inquiry ordered; in respect of the present Court the parties will pay and receive proportionate costs and the costs in the lower appellate Court will abide the result.

Broader legal implications: the Court, in its textual analysis and survey of authorities, adopted the position that an heir's right comes into existence at birth and subsists during periods of disqualification (with enjoyment suspended). The opinion resolves tensions in prior authority for the purposes of this case by following Full Bench and other cited authorities and textual interpretation; the decision remands the matter for factual findings and adjudication rather than purporting to lay down a completely novel precedent.

Case status (as stated in the opinion): Case remanded.

Show all summary ...

1. The judgment of the District Judge proceeds on the footing that the son predeceased the father; and then he discusses the question of law on the assumption that the father was insane for years and died a madman. Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar argues that if the assumption is well founded, the view of the law taken by the District Judge is wrong. Mr. Venkatarama Sastri on the other hand argues that Unless the nature of the father's insanity is distinctly found the question of law would not arise. The plaintiff ought to have asked for an issue on this question but however as the judgment appealed against proceeds on the assumption that the father was insane, we think it desirable that a distinct issue as to the nature of the insanity should be tried, before dealing with the question of law. As it was the fault of the plaintiff that such an issue was not raised earlier, we think he ought to pay all the costs of the defendants in any event in the Court of first instance, as well as the costs of the inquriy we are now directing. We must ask the District Judge to return findings on these questions:

(a) Was Gangadara insane? (b) If so, for how long and till when? (c) Was the insanity of such a nature as to disqualify him from holding property under the Hindu law? (d) Was the son's widow in enjoyment of the office and emoluments after her husband's death as his heir?

2. Fresh evidence may be taken. Three months will be allowed for submission of the findings and seven days for objections.

FINDINGS

3. The appeal is remanded for four findings:

Was Gangadara insane? It is admitted by both sides that he was insane. The defence case was that he was insane for between 10 or 20 years before death, whilst the plaintiff's case was he was insane only after his son's death. D.Ws 1 to 6 and P.Ws 2, 6, 7, 8 all speak to his having been insane.

4. My finding on issue 1 is that Gangadara was insane.

5. Issue 2.—If so, for how long and till when?. All are agreed he was insane till his death but for how long is not so clear. I prefer the defence evidence that he was insane before his son's death and from 10 to 20 years of his own death.

6. Issue 3.—Was the insanity of such a nature as to disqualify him from holding property under the Hindu law?

7. The evidence before remand was that the for a long time did the Archaka work himself and then he became insane and his son did the work and that he was insane at the time of his son's death and continued insane till his death.

8. He was said in the earlier depositions before remand to have wandered about and talked at random. Even plaintiff's witnesses said no more than this but when the suit was remanded, plaintiff let in the evidence of P.Ws 6, 7, and 8 that he was dangerously insane, and threw stones at people, tore his clothes, covered himself with ordure and had to be chained up.

9. I may candidly say I do not believe a word of this. If it had been so, it would have been elicited at the first hearing of witnesses and such valuable witnesses as to insanity as P.Ws 6, 7, 8 would have been then produced.

10. I hold that his insanity was of a mild type of mental collapse and not a virulent form and that he wandered aimlessly about doing none any harm. Had it been otherwise, I think it is certain that it would have been elicited at the very first.

11. As to whether he could hold property under Hindu law, I am of opinion that he could, for he was not insane till long after he entered on the archaka work, and it was only his insanity that caused his son to do the duties. I hold that he was really in possession of the office till his death but that owing to his mental defect his son was his deputy.

12. The law is, I think, clear that if he was not insane when the succession opened he would not be barred. Deo Kishen v. Rudh Prakash(1), Tirbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar(2), Ram Singh v. Mt. Bhani(3), Adilahh Bhagat v. Bhekhi Mahto(4), Sanku v. Puttamma(5), all seem to indicate this position.

13. Of course if he is regarded as having lost the post by his insanity and his son was the successor, then as he was insane at his son's death he could not succeed if it was then that the succession opened; but as I see the case it is rather a question of whether he was divested by his subsequent insanity.

14. My finding therefore is that his insanity was not of such a nature as to disqualify him from holding property under the Hindu law.

15. Issue 4.—Was the son's widow in enjoyment of the office and emoluments after her husband's death as his heir?

16. The evidence is meagre, P.Ws 4 and 3 and D.W 1: but I think the evidence on plaintiff's side is enough to enable me to hold that she did not so hold.

17. P.W 3 says that Pappammal, the stepmother, was looking after the morai and the pujah morai was allotted to Pappammal as maintenance and she enjoyed it 15 or 20 years. Later he said that she and the son's widow both enjoyed it.

18. Plaintiff as P.W 4 said that morai was enjoyed by the daughter-in-law and stepmother. In an earlier deposition filed as Ex. 12 in the suit plaintiff had clearly deposed that the widow of the father (i.e, stepmother Pappamal) succeeded to the office and did service through an agent.

19. This, I think, is the most reliable statement of all, as it is prior to this suit.

20. P.W 1 has been recalled, and he produces temple accounts and is very emphatic that the widow enjoyed the office and exercised her right of one day per mensem. He filed Exs. T and Z series to show this.

21. P.W 1 however has such a very unsavoury reputation in this suit, as set out already in my previous judgment, that I cannot credit anything he says or any document he files, for he undoubtedly filed forgeries before, which he pretended to have got from the temple records. He had every reason to depose against defendants owing to a Sessions case against himself.

22. I certainly would not believe him in the face of the early admission on this issue made by plaintiff.

23. My finding therefore is that the widow did not enjoy the office and emoluments after her husband's death as his heir.

24. (After the receipt of findings, the Court delivered the following:)

Seshagiri Aiyar, J.:— The facts on which we have to give our decision are now undisputed. Gangadara was entitled to an archaka service in a temple. He was sane at birth, but subsequently became insane. He had an only son, Subbiah. After the son attained majority, the father became insane and died in 1880 without recovering sanity. Subbiah, during this period, was in sole possession of the archaka office. He predeceased his father. (It is said that he died in 1874.) Subbiah left a widow Kuppammal who died in 1911. Gangadara's widow Pappammal died in 1912. Plaintiff sues as reversioner of Subbiah, the son. Defendants are the daughter and grandsons of Gangadara. They are sister and sister's sons of Subbiah. If the property belonged to Subbiah, the defendants, being only the sister and sister's sons of the owner, will be excluded by the plaintiff. If, on the other hand, Gangadara was the owner at the time of his death, the defendants as his daughter and daughter's-sons would exclude the plaintiff. The principal question for decision is whether by Gangadara having become insane, Subbiah became the sole owner by survivorship to the exclusion of his father.

25. A subsidiary question is whether the two widows, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law enjoyed the property in such a manner and with such intention as for have prescribed for a half-share each.

26. The main point for consideration is-practically one of first impression. We have to examine the texts of Hindu law for arriving at a decision. The case was argued with conspicuous ability on both sides, as may be expected of the learned vakils engaged on either side.

27. I shall first dispose of the extreme contention put forward by Mr. Venkatrama Sastriar for the respondent. He contended that unless insanity is congenital, there is no exclusion from inheritance. On this question there is direct authority. In Deo Kishen…(Defendant); v. Budh Prakash…(Plaintiff)*., a Bench of five Judges, after examining the texts of Hindu law, decided that insanity need not be congenital. In Murarji Gokuldas v. Parvatibai(6) the same view was expressed. Before the Judicial Committee in Baboo Bodhnarain Singh v. Baboo Omroo Singh(7) the position was taken for granted that insanity need not be congenital. As against these decisions, we have Sanku v. Puttamma. The learned Judges, one of whom was Muthuswami Aiyar, J., very summarily dealt with the question. They do not quote the cases I have referred to, nor do they discuss the texts of Hindu law, Raghava Mudaliar v. Narayanasami Mudaliar(8), a later decision of this Court is not consistent with Sanku v. Puttamma. However as there is a direct decision of this Court on the point, I shall deal with the texts relating to it. Mr. Venkatrama Sastriar conceded that the word in Manu's text, Ch. 9, Sloka 201, “unmatha” (mad) was not qualified by the word “jathi” (from birth) which governs (antha vadhiran), the blind and the deaf. This is indicative of the view that other defects considered in the text need not be congenital. Sadasiva Aiyar, J., has held regarding blindness, mentioned in the same text, that the rule is obsolete, I am unfortunately unable to apply that principle to the present case. Courts here and the Judicial Committee have regarded this injunction of law as a living principle. I must perforce give effect to it. The argument of the learned vakil for the respondent was directed to showing that of the three disqualifications mentioned together under this head namely idiocy, insanity and dumbness, the first and the last must necessarily be congenital, and that consequently the middle one must have been included by the sage as partaking of the same character. In the first place, it is not clear that mukatva (dumbness) would operate as an exclusion, only if it is congenital.

28. It is true that it has been held in some cases that the text under discussion must be restricted to congenital dumbness. From a decided case to impute to the text writer that he regarded that dumbness can never be anything but congenital is not an easy process. The learned vakil suggested that a dumbness that supervenes was not really what Manu meant; such supervening dumbness may not exclude the person from inheritance, but I am not prepared to say that it cannot be permanent if it is not congenital. I must therefore hold that it has not been proved that all the three instances classed together by the author are examples of congenital defects. No doubt idiocy is not a supervening disease. We have therefore this situation. Three dis qualifications are enumerated. One of them is prima facie congenital; another need not be: the second, is more often than not a supervening disease. In these circumstances can it be contended that the author by referring to them as a class intended to indicate that as these disqualifications ex necessitate must relate to what exists from birth; it was superfluous to prefix them with the adjectival clause jathi, “from birth” as he did with regard to another category of disqualifications? I am not prepared to take this view. According to Mimamsa rules of interpretation, an adjective qualifying one clause should not by implication qualify a different clause. In this view the word “jathi” does not govern “unmatha.” The learned vakil for the respondent quoted the opinion of Sarbhadikari at p. 962 of his book in favour of his contention. The author does not express any definite conclusion. Nor Colebrook's Digest Vol. 2, p. 432 is a considered opinion. I am not prepared to disagree with the view of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, Deo Kishen…(Defendant); v. Budh Prakash…(Plaintiff)*. on this question.

29. I shall now deal with the main question. The portion relating to exclusion from inheritance finds a place in Ch. 2, S. 10 of Mitikshara. It need hardly be mentioned that chapters, sections and placita owe their existence to Mr. Colebrooke's labours and not to any arrangement by the commentator himself. Vignaneswara only makes a running commentary on the texts of Yagnavalkya which he quotes as he proceeds. The whole discussion on this part of the subject, begins with a discussion of the meaning and attributes of Daya. I shall not attempt its definition here. The preamble to S. 10 (which has been described as placitum 1) states:

“The author states an exception to what has been said by him respecting the succession of the son, the widow and other heirs, as well as the reunited parcener.”

30. Then follows the Yagnavalkya text, sloka 140. Then definitions of the various expressions in the text are given, Udmatha, “a madman,” is thus defined: “affected by any of the various sorts of insanity proceeding from air, bile, orphlegm, from delirium or from evil spirits.”

31. This is in placitum 2. Placita 3, 4 and 5 further explain the text. Then we come to plaeitum 6…

“They are debarred of their shares, if their disqualification arose before the division of the property. But one already separated from his coheirs is not deprived of his allotment.”

32. Placitum 7 refers to cases in which the disqualification subsequently disappears. The commentator says that such cases will be regulated by the same principle by which sons born after a partition are provided with a share. Placitum 9 is important. The commentator begins the examination of the next text of the Smrithi by this preamble. The disinheri son of the persons above described seeming to imply disinherison of their sons, the author adds and then quotes the text which is in these terms:

“But their sons, whether legitimate, or the offspring of the wife by a kinsman, are entitled to allotments if free from similar defects,”

33. And comments on it in the placiturn 10 onwards. Placiturn 10 says:

“The sons of these persons, whether they be legitimate offspring or issue of the wife, are entitled to allotments, or are rightful partakers of shares, provided they be faultless or free from defects which should bar their participation, such as impotency, etc.”

34. This corresponds to Manu, Ch. 9, sloka 203. These are the only citations relevant for the purpose. A few general observations may be made here before examining the contention of the learned vakils.

(a) The rules enunciated in this chapter are exceptions to the general principles of inheritance. Consequently they should be construed strictly. As far as possible deducing by analogy a class of exceptions not clearly covered by the words should be avoided. The Hindu law is no exception to the rule that it would lead Courts into a false position to hold that every rule must be given its logical extension. This caution is specially necessary in regard to suggestions to multipy exceptions.

(b) The rules are expositions, partly from usage and partly from an attempt to reconcile conflicting Smrithi texts, of the views of the commentator. He found a state of society which demanded change. To satisfy this demand, while doing lip service to the inviolability of the written word, he not infrequently takes liberty with the text. Therefore care should be taken not to confuse the original injunction with its subsequent emendations. For example, the analogy of the after-born son is not in the particular text of Yagnavalkya relating to this subject. What Vignaneswara did was to find a pretext for obviating an injustice. He found in sloka 123 of the Smrithi a rule relating to after-born sons. He introduced that as a good and reasonable solution of the problem relating to the recovery of normal health by the disqualified heir. This anology in some cases has been pushed too far in some decisions and by some writers on Hindu law. It is at least doubtful whether Vignaneswara intended that his rule should be subjected to a searching examination by the importation of all the difficulties with which the rule about the share of the after-born son bristles.

(c) Ideas which we find imported into the discussion of this question by speaking of the inheritances “vesting,” “of being divested,” “of the succession opening on the death of the father, etc.,” which may have meaning when applied to Jeemutho Vahana's exposition of Hindu law, are not correctly applied to Vignaneswara's School of law. The reiteration by the latter that property is by birth should be carefully borne in mind. This last observation is specially applicable to dicta in some of the decided cases. It appears to me that in these decisions instances relating to survivorship have been considered as if they were cases of pure inheritance and of collateral succession.

35. Now, I shall proceed to consider the two theories advanced. Mr. K. Srinivasa Ayyangar's contention amounts to saying that a son of a Mitakshara father has only the potentiality of taking a share, and that the potentiality is lost by his being subject to any of the disqualifications enumerated. The moment that the disqualification, patent or latent, exhibits itself, he must be put aside subject only to his having the right of maintenance; on his emerging free from the disqualification the potentiality revives; and if he is alive at the time of partition in this reformed condition, he will take a share.

36. Mr. Venkatarama Sastriar's contention on the other hand, is that the son is a sharer or share-taker from the moment of his birth. He ceases to be the share-enjoyer when he is subject to the disqualification. His right is not lost, but is only in abeyance; and the provision for maintenance is not a deprivation of the inherent right but a beneficent provision for management of the property so long as the disqualification lasts.

37. A great deal has been said and can be said in favour of either of these contentions, I do not think that an examination of the reasons for the exclusion would help us much in deciding the question. I might briefly refer to it as it has some bearing on the point. Visvarupa, a commentator of the Yagnavalkya Smriti (and who wrote his dissertation before Vignaneswara) seems to have been very skeptic about the reasonableness of the process of exclusion. He refuses the idea that the exclusion is based on the theory of sin in the previous birth, and cites instances to show that heirs of whom it can safely be predicted that they were sinners are among those to whom it can unqualified inheritance is given. He also rejects the theory that inability to perform religious rites in this birth might have been the ground for exclusion. Here again he quotes instances. His view seems to be: “We find the exclusion there and we must perforce accept it.” If the exclusion is not based on original sin or subsequent incapacity to offer oblation and the like, the suggestion that it was due to a belief in the inability of the heir to manage temporal affair appears more plausible. Very likely the rule is an outcome of a hazy notion that the property should be preserved for the disqualified person by those who are related to him. The law as to guardianship has developed much is later days. Even now it is not perfect. It looks as if the old law-givers by providing for maintenance did not intend to deprive the heir of his inheritance, but only to provide for its management during incapacity.

38. Mr. Srinivasa Ayyangar in analyzing the placita relating to the periods of partition contended that the right to a share is only predicated on the contingency of the heir existing in a normal condition at the time partition is made. It is true that if the sharer diet undivided before the actual partition takes place the property will be distributed as if he was not born at all. In answer to the suggestion that this theory is inconsistent with giving rights to his son or grandson in the father's share, the learned vakil argued that these persons are specially mentioned. It seems to me that the rule in placitum 6, S. 10, that a person is excluded if he is disqualified at the time of partition is not a pronouncement that the right ripens and is capable of enforcement only then, but a principle indicating who all should be allotted shares at the division. The principle, of right by birth which Vignaneswara insistently enunciates would become nugatory if a bare potentiality is assigned to that right.

39. The other view receives considerable support from Saraswati Vilasa, a treatise which is a binding authority in this part of India. The author quotes Manu in placitum 148 and then comments on it in placita 149 to 157. He says:

“From this coupling together it follows that they have shares at that they should, though having shares be supported as they could marry.”

40. The view is that if any of the excluded persons is capable of marriage and of begetting children their shares should be managed for their benefit and they should be given maintenance. This seems to follow from Manu, Ch. 9, Sloka 203. The professors of the science of eugenics may rightly protest against this tacit assumption by the ancient sages that an insa he person can marry; but so long as the State does not prohibit such marriages the law cannot be abrogated. The ancient law-givers even provided for the begetting of children on the wife of the incapacitated person. They seem to have been as anxious for giving facilities for the procreation of children as some of the sanest publicists in these days and the heads of States are after the great war, to recognize and encourage the rearing up of offspring, however begotten. However that may be the view of the author of Saraswati Vilasa is more in consonance with the view that the right exists, but is only obscured for the time being. Mr. Srinivasa Ayyangar suggested that the parenthetical clause about capacity for marriage suggested by the author of the Saraswati Vilasa does not destroy the root doctrine that the right is enforceable only if and when there is full mental capacity at the date of partition. But the author distinctly says that the share should be managed because of the possibility of marriage thereby indicating is that it exists and is not lost altogether. My conclusion, therefore is that the right comes into existence at birth and subsists all through although it is incapable of enforcement at the time of partition because of the disqualification then existing.

41. Mr. Srinivasa Ayyangar drew our attention to the statement in Steel's Law of Custom, in which the author says that the custom is to regard the insane man as entitled to a share, although he is not given the enjoyment of it.

42. Coming to the decided cases in Baghava Mudaliar v. Narayanasami Mudaliar there is an obiter dictum to the effect that if a Hindu father dies leaving ancestral property and a son insane at the time of his death, the son is not entitled to take the property. The dictum was not necessary for the case and curiously enough, Sanku v. Puttamma, where a contrary view was taken, was not considered in this judgment. In this latter case which relates to the inheritance of an Aliyasantana family in South Kanara it was decided that the surviving member, who was a female and was insane, was the owner of the property. I have dissented from this judgment in so far as it relates to the question that insanity should be congenital; Krishna v. Sami(9) does not affect this case directly. That was a case relating to a right of the sons of a deaf and dumb member. It was held that the fact that the father was disqualified and that the sons were born after the death of their grandfather did not disentitle them to take their father's share. The learned Judges after examining the texts seemed inclined to hold that property vested on the birth of the heir. However the present question was not considered in that case. These are all the Madras authorities. There are some cases in Calcutta which are not quite reconcilable with each other. The earliest of them is in Balgobinda v. Lal Bahadur(10). The case related to the lunacy of one Ramsahai. He seems to have given his name to a number of cases on this point. It is clear from this case that a committee was appointed to manage his share, This decision impliedly supports the view that insanity does not operate as deprivation of the birthright. The next case in which also the insanity of the same individual was in question, is Ram Sahye Bhuhaut v. Lalla Laljee Sahye(11). There are conflicting dicta in that judgment which render it valueless as authority. The suit was brought to recover property on behalf of the lunatic.

43. The learned Judges, while holding that he had a right to the property, refused to disturb the alienees on the ground that if he was to recover the property, he would not be in a position to have it partitioned. Another decision in that same volume relating to the insanity of the same individual is Ram Soonder Roy v. Ram Sahye Bhugut(12). Both these cases were considered in Abilakh Bhagat v. Bhehhi Mahto, which again was a case relating to the insanity of the same individual; it was held that the right to property existed although the right to its enjoyment was unenforceable. Prinsep, J., was of opinion that the earlier decisions in 8 Cal. were not good law. These are the Calcutta decisions. In Allahabad; there is a direct decision in Tirbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar, but the learned Judges speak of succession opening on the death of the father which would not be right in the case of a Mitakshara son, Ram Singh v. Mt. Bhani was a case of pure inheritance. In Man Singh…(Petitioner); v. Musammat Gaini…(Opposite Party).*(13) the learned Judges took the view enunciated in Abilakh Bhagat v. Bhekhi Mahto. These are all the cases on the point.

44. None of them deals with the exact question we have to decide. The dicta, in some of them however support the view I have taken. The next point which Mr. K. Srinivasa Ayyangar pressed upon us is that the lower appellate Court has not given a correct finding on the question of prescription which we asked him to decide. The question arises in this way. After the death of Subbiah, the son, his widow and the wife of Gangadara were doing the puja service in the temple. There is evidence on both sides which indicates that they were enjoying the worship in equal turns. The District Judge has not discussed this evidence. For example there is the written statement, para. 3, which suggests this; para. 4 also may be referred to. There are Ex. 1 and Exs. 3, T and J. There is the deposition of D.W 1. Although there was no issue about prescription in the first Court as the question there was as to who died first, whether Gangadara or Subbiah, the point is one which does require adjudication having regard to the view I took of the case. I must therefore reverse the decree of the District Judge and remand this appeal to him for disposal on the question whether the widow of Subbiah had prescribed for a half share in the property after the death of her husband and if so, whether she acquired a right to it at the time of her death. It may be necessary to take fresh evidence in the case, because it is possible that the enjoyment of Subbiah's widow was in lieu of maintenance or it may be that Gangadara's wife out of affection allowed her to enjoy the turn of worship. These matters have not been elucidated because there was originally no issue on this question. With these observations I must remand the case for disposal to the lower appellate Court. The parties will pay and receive proportionate costs in this Court and the costs in the lower appellate Court will abide the result.

Moore, J.:— I agree.

S.N/R.K

45. Case remanded.