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Debendra Narain Sinh... v. Sourindra Mohan Sinh...
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal by one of the judgment-debtors against an order permitting execution of a mortgage decree. The final decree in the mortgage suit was made by consent in this Court on 20 August 1909. One term of the consent decree provided that if Rs. 1,10,000 was paid to the plaintiffs on or before 16 April 1910 in part satisfaction, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to put the decree into execution or apply for sale of the mortgaged premises until 31 July 1911. That sum was paid. On 3 April 1912 the decree-holders applied for recovery of the balance by execution. The judgment-debtor objected, claiming that, by an alleged subsequent oral agreement, the decree-holders had agreed not to realize the decretal amount by sale of the mortgaged property for twelve years and would only take steps necessary to keep the decree alive.
The Subordinate Judge did not take evidence to determine whether the alleged oral agreement was actually made. He overruled the objection on three grounds: (1) the alleged agreement was inoperative because it had not been notified to and sanctioned by the Court; (2) oral evidence was not admissible to prove the alleged parole (oral) agreement (relying on Section 92 of the Evidence Act); and (3) the agreement was void for want of consideration. The present judgment reviews those conclusions and directs further proceedings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an agreement by a decree-holder to give time for satisfaction of a mortgage decree must be sanctioned by the Court that passed the decree in order to be effective, particularly in light of the repeal of Section 257-A of the CPC, 1882.
- Whether oral evidence of an alleged agreement varying the terms of a decree is admissible, or whether Section 92 of the Evidence Act (read with Section 91) excludes such evidence.
- Whether an agreement by a decree-holder to give time to the judgment-debtor is valid and enforceable if it is not supported by consideration.
- If the alleged oral agreement and consideration are established, whether such an agreement (if made by one decree-holder) binds the other decree-holders and whether authority existed to bind them.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Judgment-Debtor)
- Contended that after the consent settlement the decree-holders had expressly stated (in presence of men of position) that they would not attempt to realize the decretal amount by sale of the mortgaged properties within twelve years and would keep the decree alive by necessary steps; therefore execution could not proceed.
- Argued that repeal of Section 257-A CPC, 1882 indicates the legislature intended that an agreement to give time might be valid without consideration.
- Relied (in part) on Section 63 (and references to Section 68) of the Contract Act and decisions such as Davis v. Cundasami Mudali to suggest that an extension of time might be valid even without fresh consideration.
- Contended that the omission to state the consideration in the initial petition of objection was not fatal and that consideration could be proved at trial.
Respondents (Decree-Holders)
- Maintained that the alleged agreement was inoperative because it had not been notified to and sanctioned by the Court (relying on the now-repealed Section 257-A of the CPC, 1882 as the Subordinate Judge understood it).
- Argued that Section 92 of the Evidence Act excludes oral evidence to vary the terms of a decree and cited authorities (e.g., Kristo Komal Singh, Dews v. Riley, Stonor v. Fowle) in support of the contention that the terms of decrees/documents cannot be contradicted or varied by oral evidence.
- Also contended that the alleged agreement was void for want of consideration.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kristo Komal Singh v. Huree Sirdar [1865] 13 W.R. 44 | Authority relied upon by respondents for the proposition that oral evidence cannot vary terms of a decree/document. | The court noted the respondents relied on this observation but proceeded to assume arguendo that the oral agreement varied the decree and then examined Section 92; it did not adopt Kristo Komal Singh as dispositive in this case. |
| Dews v. Riley [1851] 11 Com. Bench 434 | Authority cited in support of the view that a decree might fall within matters required by law to be reduced to a document. | The court assumed, for argument, that a decree could be within that expression but ultimately concluded Section 92 did not apply to the present case. |
| Stonor v. Fowle [1888] 13 A.C. 20 | Similarly cited for the proposition that certain matters must be proved only by documents. | The court treated this authority as part of respondents' argument but rejected the contention that Section 92 excluded oral proof of the alleged agreement in the circumstances. |
| Davis v. Cundasami Mudali [1896] 19 Mad. 398 | Decision interpreted as supporting that an extension of time might be valid without consideration (invoking Section 63 of the Contract Act). | The court noted the decision but declined to decide the broader issue of whether that view correctly expresses legislative intent; it found Section 63 inapplicable because the parties were decree-holder and judgment-debtor, not promisor and promisee in the relevant sense. |
| Mathew Henry Abraham v. Lodge Good Will [1910] 6 I.C. 758 | Followed the view in Davis suggesting extension of time might be valid without consideration. | Referenced as part of a line of authorities; the court observed that this view has been questioned and did not accept it as determinative here. |
| Gopala Krishna v. Bamminenni Venhatasubba Naidu [1911] 9 I.C. 763 | Another authority adopting the view that an extension might be effective without consideration. | Noted as part of the authorities; the court did not adopt the proposition for the facts before it. |
| Trimbak Gangadhar Ranade v. Bhagwandas Mulchand [1899] 23 Bom. 348 | Authority questioning the view that an extension of time without consideration is valid. | The court cited this case as questioning the earlier decisions and relied on the existence of such doubt in refusing to accept that repeal of Section 257-A validated agreements without consideration. |
| Stead v. Dawler 10 A. & E. 57 | Authority for the proposition that original consideration may support a substituted oral promise in some contexts. | The court distinguished Stead v. Dawler as inapplicable: there a written contract was substituted by a new oral agreement; the present case involved rights defined by a consent decree, not a substitution of contract supported by the same consideration. |
| Marshall v. Lynn 6 M. & W. 109 | Followed Stead v. Dawler. | Noted as following Stead, but the court observed criticisms of that line of authority and did not apply it here. |
| Hickman v. Haynes [1875] 10 Com. Pleas 598 | Criticism of the Stead line of authority. | Referred to as part of the discussion that Stead's principle has been criticized and is not universally accepted. |
| Ogle v. Earl Vane [1867] 2 Q.B. 275 | Another criticism of the Stead approach. | Mentioned in the court's survey of authorities; the court relied on the weight of authority requiring consideration for promises to give time. |
| Williams v. Stern [1880] 5 Q.B.D. 409 | Held that a promise to give time must be supported by consideration to be operative. | The court relied on this decision to support the conclusion that an agreement to give time in the circumstances must be supported by consideration and thus the Subordinate Judge was correct on that legal point. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court reviewed each of the three grounds relied upon by the Subordinate Judge and reached these conclusions:
- On sanction by the Court (ground 1): The Subordinate Judge erred in holding that the alleged agreement was invalid because it had not been sanctioned by the Court. Section 257-A of the CPC, 1882 (which required consideration and sanction of the Court for agreements to give time) was repealed and is not reproduced in the Code of 1908. The appellate court held that repeal of Section 257-A means that an agreement to give time must now be tested like any other agreement — it may be entered into without Court sanction and given effect if otherwise valid in law. The respondents did not seriously contest that the Subordinate Judge was wrong on this point. Consequently, the first ground supporting the Subordinate Judge's order failed.
- On admissibility of oral evidence (ground 2): The court examined Section 91 and Section 92 of the Evidence Act. Section 91 deals with matters reduced to the form of a document; Section 92 bars oral evidence to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from terms of such contracts or dispositions. The court analyzed the statutory language and concluded that Section 92 is directed to documents of a dispositive character (contracts, grants or dispositions of property) and that its narrower wording (including the phrase "as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives-in-interest") prevents Section 92 from being read as covering a decree of the Court in the present circumstances. The court therefore held Section 92 did not exclude oral evidence to prove the alleged parole agreement and that oral evidence was admissible.
- On consideration (ground 3): The court examined whether the repeal of Section 257-A had the effect of making agreements to give time valid even without consideration. It rejected that contention: the repeal merely placed such agreements on the same footing as other agreements, meaning they must be supported by consideration to be valid. The court considered arguments based on Section 63 of the Contract Act (and decisions such as Davis v. Cundasami Mudali) but concluded Section 63 was inapplicable because the parties stood in the relation of decree-holder and judgment-debtor, defined by a court decree, not simply promisor and promisee. The court also distinguished authorities (e.g., Stead v. Dawler) on the ground that those involved substitution of contracts where the original consideration could be implied into the new promise — circumstances not present here. The court relied on Williams v. Stern for the proposition that a promise to give time must be supported by consideration.
- On the appropriate remedy / further procedure: Although the appellate court agreed that an agreement unsupported by consideration would be invalid, it considered it desirable in the interests of justice to investigate the factual question of whether the alleged agreement and its consideration existed. The court observed that the Subordinate Judge had assumed the matter could be resolved by pure questions of law without evidence, whereas the sum involved was very large and factual inquiry was appropriate. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the order below, and remanded the case for investigation and trial on the factual issues.
- Directions for trial and scope of inquiry: The judgment-debtor must prove the alleged agreement and the consideration. If those are established, further issues arise as to whether the agreement binds decree-holders other than Sourindra Mohan Singh, whether that person acted on behalf of the others, and whether he had authority to bind them. The court directed that, before trial, the judgment-debtor must state precisely the time and place of the alleged agreement and the nature of the consideration. The Subordinate Judge was directed to expedite the hearing. Each party was to pay his own costs in this Court.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal was allowed. The order of the Subordinate Judge overruling the judgment-debtor's objection to execution was set aside and the case remanded for investigation and trial on the factual questions regarding the alleged oral agreement and the consideration for it. The court made specific directions for the conduct of the further proceedings and for pre-trial particulars from the judgment-debtor.
Implications:
- The court clarified that after the repeal of Section 257-A CPC, 1882 an agreement to give time for satisfaction of a judgment-debt need not be sanctioned by the court that passed the decree; such agreements are to be evaluated like other agreements under general contract law.
- The court held that Section 92 of the Evidence Act did not bar oral evidence to prove an alleged agreement varying the terms of a decree in the circumstances of this case; oral evidence was therefore admissible.
- The court held that an agreement to give time must be supported by consideration; repeal of Section 257-A did not render no-consideration agreements valid.
- Practically, the direct effect is that the Subordinate Judge must now hold evidence to determine (a) whether the alleged agreement was made, (b) whether it was supported by consideration, and (c) if proved, whether it bound all decree-holders (including issues of authority). The appeal did not result in an immediate stay of execution in the opinion's terms; rather it required factual investigation.
- The court directed that each party bear his own costs in this Court and instructed the Subordinate Judge to expedite the hearing.
1. This is an appeal by one of the judgment-debtors against an order for execution of a mortgage decree. The final decree in the mortgage suit was made by consent of parties in this Court on 20th August 1909. One of the terms of the consent decree was to the effect that if a sum of Rs. 1,10,000 was paid to the plaintiffs on or before 16th April 1910 in part satisfaction of the decree, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to put the decree into execution or apply for sale of the mortgaged premises till 31st July 1911. This sum was paid and on 3rd April 1912, the decree-holders applied for recovery of the balance of the judgment debt by execution of their decree. To this application an objection was taken by the judgment-debtor, now appellant before us, on the ground that execution could not proceed, as the decree-holders had agreed not to execute the decree for a period of twelve years. The objection may be best stated in the words of the judgment-debtor himself: “After the settlement, in presence of several men of position, the decree-holders expressly stated to these judgment-debtors, and the judgment-debtors believed in their words, and the belief was strengthened by their subsequent conduct, that though only two years' time for payment was stipulated in the solenama, yet in reality no attempt would be made to realize the decretal amount by the sale of the mortgaged properties within twelve years. That is, so long as the decree could be legally kept alive, so long it would be kept (unexecuted); only, in order to keep alive the decree, the decree-holders would take such steps as would be required to keep the decree alive.” The Subordinate Judge has not taken evidence to determine whether the alleged agreement was made between the parties. But he has overruled the objection of the judgment-debtor on three grounds, namely first, that the alleged agreement was inoperative, inasmuch as it had not been notified to and sanctioned by the Court; secondly, that oral evidence was not admissible in proof of the alleged parole agreement; and thirdly, that the agreement was void as made without consideration. As regards the first ground assigned by the Subordinate Judge in support of his order, it is plain that he has taken an erroneous view of the law Section 257-A of the CPC, 1882, provided that “every agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt shall be void unless it is made for consideration and with the sanction of the Court which passed the decree, and such Court deems the consideration to be under the circumstances reasonable.” This has not been reproduced in the Code of 1908; yet the Subordinate Judge has held that R. 11, O. 20 of the Code, has substantially the same effect, although it is plain that the provision just mentioned has no application to mortgage decrees. In our opinion the effect of the repeal of Section 257-A of the CPC, 1882, is to make an agreement to give time to the judgment-debtor, an agreement the legality of which must be tested like that of any other agreement; in other words, an agreement to give time to the judgment-debtor may now be entered into between the decree-holder and the judgment debtor without the sanction of the Court, and effect may be given to such an agreement, as to any other agreement if valid in law. In fact, it has not been seriously contested on behalf of the respondents decree-holders that the Subordinate Judge has erroneously held that the alleged agreement was invalid because it had not been sanctioned by the Court. The first reason on which the order of the Subordinate Judge is based consequently fails.
2. As regards the second ground assigned by the Subordinate Judge in support of his order, it has been argued that Section 92 of the Evidence Act, excludes evidence of the alleged oral agreement. It has been contended that the effect of the agreement is to vary the terms of the decree made by this Court, and in support of this contention reliance has been placed upon the observations of Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J, in the case of Kristo Komal Singh v. Huree Sirdar . [1865] 13 W.R 44. We shall assume, for the purposes of this agreement, that the effect of the oral agreement is to vary the terms of the decree. The question, on this assumption, arises whether S. 92 excludes evidence of the alleged, oral agreement. S. 92 refers to contracts, grants or other dispositions of property mentioned in S. 91, and consequently, the terms of S. 91 must be first examined. This section provides that “when the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in case in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.” With reference to S. 91, it has been argued on behalf of the respondents that a decree falls within the scope of the expression “any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document,” and that no evidence is admissible in proof of the terms of the decree other than the original document itself or secondary evidence of its contents where such secondary evidence is admissible. In support of this view reliance has been placed upon the cases of Dews v. Riley . [1851] 11 Com. Bench 434 and Stonor v. Fowle . [1888] 13 A.C 20. Let us assume for the purposes of argument that the expression “any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document” is comprehensive enough to include the case of a decree. We must next examine the terms of S. 92 which provides as follows: “When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property (i.e, such contract, grant or disposition of property as is mentioned in S. 91) or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last S. 91, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives-in-interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms.” It is plain that the scope of this section must be determined upon an examination of all its terms and that full effect must be given to the expression as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives-in-interest.”
3. If this expression, which is applicable only in the case of documents of a dispositive character, is read along with, not only the words “contract, grant or other disposition of property” but also the words “or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document,” it becomes plain that the object of the legislature was to deal only with two classes of cases, namely, first, contracts, grants or other dispositions of property which have been reduced to the form of a document, by the act of parties, as mentioned in S. 91, and, secondly, contracts, grants or other dispositions of property which are required by law to be reduced to the form of a document; in other words, the expression, “any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document,” controlled as it is by the expression “as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives-in-interest,” has, in S. 92, a much narrower scope than in S. 91. It seems to us to be reasonably clear, that the expression, “any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document,” in S. 92, if read, as it must be read, along with the expression, “as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives-in-interest,” cannot cover the case of a decree and that the legislature did not intend that S. 92 should be applied to a case of the description now before us. This explains why in Prov. 4 mention is made only of “contracts, grants or other dispositions of property” and not also of “any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document.”
4. That proviso is in these terms: “The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents.” It has been suggested on behalf of the respondents that the Prov. 1 is of no assistance to the appellant. The obvious answer is that S. 92 has no application to the case, and, consequently, no question arises as to whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the proviso. We must accordingly, hold that the second reason assigned by the Subordinate Judge in support of his order cannot be sustained and that oral evidence was admissible in proof of the alleged parole agreement.
5. As regards ground 3 assigned by the Subordinate Judge in support of his order, the question has been elaborately argued before us, whether an agreement by a decree-holder to give time to the judgment-debtor is valid, even though there is no consideration for it. On behalf of the appellant, it has been broadly contended that the repeal of Section 257-A of the CPC of 1882 indicates that the legislature intended to validate such an agreement even though there should be no consideration to support it. In our opinion, there is no foundation for this contention. Under S. 257-A three elements have to be established to validate an agreement by the decree-holder to give time to the judgment-debtor; namely, first, that the agreement should have been made for consideration, secondly, that it should have received the sanction of the Court which passed the decree: and thirdly, that such Court should have deemed the consideration reasonable under the circumstances. The repeal of the section does not imply that the legislature intended that an agreement of this character should be valid, even though there was no consideration therefor. In our opinion, the only effect of the repeal of S. 257-A is to place such an agreement on the same footing as any other agreement, that is to say, such an agreement to be valid must be an agreement for consideration, although its validity is not affected by the circumstances that the consideration is not reasonable or that it has not received the sanction of the Court.
6. It has been argued however on behalf of the appellant that Section 68 of the Contract Act indicates that an agreement of this character is valid, even though not supported by consideration. Now S. 63 provides that “every promisee may dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the performance of the promise made to him, or may extend the time for such performance, or may accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks fit.” Reference has been made to the decision of Subramania Ayyar, J., in Davis v. Cundasami Mudali . [1896] 19 Mad. 398, and it has been argued that S. 63 validates an agreement for extension of time for the performance of a promise, even though there be no consideration for such an agreement. It is not necessary for our present purpose to discuss whether the view taken in the case of Davis v. Cundasami Mudali which was adopted in the case of Mathew Henry Abraham v. Lodge Good Will . [1910] 6 I.C 758 and Gopala Krishna v. Bamminenni Venhatasubba Naidu . [1911] 9 I.C 763. gives effect to the true intention of the legislature. But we observe that this view was questioned in the case of Trimbak Gangadhar Ranade v. Bhagwandas Mulchand . [1899] 23 Bom. 348.. Section 63 of the Contract Act occurs in Chap 4 which deals with the question of performance of contracts, and within that portion of the chapter which treats of contracts which need not be performed, and it may well be maintained that the intention of the legislature in S. 63 was only to lay down that after an extention of time has been granted by the promisee he cannot, before the expiry of the time, call for the performance of the promise. It is not necessary however to deal with S. 63 at further length, because it is plain that the parties before us do not stand in the relation of promisor and promisee.
7. The agreement into which they entered in settlement of their dispute has been sanctioned by the Court, and their relation is now defined by the decree of this Court. They stand in the position of a decree-holder and judgment-debtor, and it is plain that in a case of this description S. 63 cannot be deemed to have any application. It has been argued, however, that on general principles an agreement for extension of time may be valid though not supported by consideration; and on the authority of Stead v. Dawler . 10 A. & E. 57 it has been contended that the original consideration supports the new promise. In our opinion there is no foundation for this contention. In the case of Stead v. Dawber, there was a written agreement for delivery of goods on a particular day and a subsequent verbal agreement for their delivery on a later specific date, and the Court came to the conclusion that the parties intended to substitute the later verbal agreement for the previous written agreement. It was in these circumstances that Lord Denman, C.J, observed that no difficulty arose from the want of consideration for the plaintiff's agreement to consent to the change of days; for the same consideration which existed for the old agreement was imported into the new agreement which was substituted for it. This principle has plainly no application to the circumstances of the case before us.
8. It is not the case of either party that the rights and obligations of the parties under the consent decree have been superseded and that a new contract between the parties has taken its place. We may further observe with reference to the case of Stead v. Dawber that although it was followed in Marshall v. Lynn . 6 M. & W. 109, it has been criticized by Lord Coleridge in Hickman v. Haynes . [1875] 10 Com. Pleas. 598 and by Blackburn, J., in Ogle v. Earl Vane . [1867] 2 Q.B 275. On the other hand, it is plain from the decision in Williams v. Stern . [1880] 5 Q.B.D 409 that as agreement of this character to be valid and operative must be supported by consideration. In that case there was a promise to give time for payment of an instalment under a bill of sale and it was ruled that the promise to be operative and enforceable in law must be supported by consideration. We are therefore of opinion that the Subordinate Judge has correctly held that the agreement alleged by the judgment-debtor is not valid, if unsupported by consideration.
9. The question finally arises whether the order of the Court below should be affirmed. On behalf of the judgment-debtor, it has been urged that although the consideration for the alleged agreement was not specifically stated in para. 2 of the petition of objection dated 10th July 1912, it was not really a fatal omission, as it was sufficient at that stage to allege the agreement, and the consideration might be proved later along with the factum of the agreement.
10. We are not prepared to give full effect to this contention; but at the same time, we are of opinion that it is desirable in the interests of justice that the facts should be investigated before the objection of the judgment-debtor is overruled. The sum in controversy is very large, and the Court below appears to have assumed that the rights of the parties could be determined by the solution of questions of law alone. We are therefore of opinion that this appeal should be allowed, the order of the Subordinate Judge set aside and the case remanded to him tr investigation of the question of the alleged agreement. The judgment-debtor will be called upon to prove the agreement set up by him as also the consideration for it. If this is established, a further question will obviously arise,.namely whether the agreement is binding upon the decree-holders other than Sourindra Mohan Singh. This will necessarily lead to an examination of the question, whether if he ever entered into this agreement, be made it on behalf of himself as also of the other decree-holders, and if this is answered in the affirmative, whether he had authority to do so. We further direct, in order that the decree-holder may not be needlessly embarrassed, that the judgment-debtor should be called upon before the trial begins to state precisely the time and place of the alleged agreement and the nature of the consideration therefor. Each party will pay his own costs in this Court. The Subordinate Judge is directed to expedite the hearing of the case. Let the records be sent down at once.
V.B/R.K
11. Appeal allowed.
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