Mookerjee, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiffs in a suit for contribution, which has been instituted by them as executors to the estate of the late Raja Jogendranath Ray of Nabore. The case for the plaintiffs is that on the 19th September, 1916, they satisfied a mortgage decree which was operative against the estate of their testator as also the properties of the Defendants. They consequently pray for recovery of specified sums by way of contribution from different sets of Defendants. The Defendants repudiate the validity of the claim and also contend that the plaintiffs are incompetent to maintain the action. The Subordinate Judge has dismissed the suit on the preliminary point on two grounds, namely, first, that before the institution of the snit, the executorship of the plaintiffs must be deemed to have terminated when the heir-at-law of the deceased testator attained majority; and, secondly, that even if the executorship has not terminated, the plaintiffs, who are three out of four surviving executors, are not competent to maintain the action, as the will contemplated that at least six executors should bake joint action. On the present appeal, the plaintiffs have controverted the view adopted by the Subordinate Judge on the question of the competency of the suit. We shall examine the two points raised by the appellants in the order stated above.

2. As regards the first point, it is not disputed that Raja Jogendranath Ray made a testamentary disposition of his properties on the 11th May, 1900, that after his death the will was duly proved on the 2nd April, 1902, and that on the 23rd June, 1902, the District Judge granted probate to seven persons (named as executors therein) in the form prescribed by section 76 of the Probate and Administration Act.

3. This grant is not in express terms limited in duration, and, attracts the operation of section 82, which provides that after the grant of rotate, no other than the person to whom the same shall have been granted, shall have power to sue or prosecute any suit or otherwise act as a representative of the deceased throughout the province in which the same may have been granted, until such probate shall have been recalled or revoked. The plaintiffs contend that inasmuch as the probate has admittedly been neither recalled nor revoked, no question can arise as to their competence to institute the present suit. The defendants urge that as under section 3 of the Probate and Administration Act the term “probate” means the copy of a will certified under the seal of a Court of competent jurisdiction with a grant of administration to the estate of the testator, the scope of the grant should be interpreted in the light of the provisions of the will, and, further, that if this rule of construction be applied it will be found that the grant has cased to be operative, because the clear intention of the testator, to be gathered from his will, was that the executors should cease to hold office on the attainment of majority by the hair-at-law.

4. This argument plainly raises two distinct questions, namely, first, is it open to a Court, other than the Court which granted the probate, to investigate whether a grant expressed in general terms and not explicitly limited in duration, has expired by reason of the provisions of the will, and, secondly, if such collateral attack is permissible in a Court other than the Court of rotate, bad the grant in the present case ceased to be operative before the commencement of this litigation? As regards the first of these points, the plaintiffs have maintained that where a grunt is not expressly limited in duration but is formulated in general berms, the Court of probate and that Court alone is competent to determine whether it has ceased to be operative, in other words whether occasion has arisen to recall or revoke the grant. In support of this proposition, reference has been made to Sections 50 and 82 of the Probate and Administration Act. S. 50 provides that a grant of probate may be revoked or annulled for just cause which is defined to include amongst others the contingency that the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances. The argument in substance is that a general grant made in berms of S. 76 is operative under S. 82 until the probate shall have been recalled, or revoked, for the reason, amongst others, specified in S. 50 that the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances. In our opinion, this contention is well-founded. This view receives support from the principles which underlie the decisions in Surendra Nath v. Amrita Lal (1) and Chandra Kumar v. Prasanna Kumar (2). In the former case, it was rated that the phraseology of the fourth clause of S. 50 is sufficiently general to make it applicable to cases where the circumstances contemplated have happened since the date of grant. In the latter case, it was ruled, on the authority of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Bombay Burmah Trading Co. v. Smith (3), that so long as the person entitled to the estate has not taken it out of the possession of the executors, they are entitled to continue in occupation of the estate.

5. The principle need not be affirmed in an, unqualified form that “once an executor always an executor”: it is sufficient to hold that a general grant must be deemed to continue in force until the probate or letters of administration shall have been, recalled or revoked by the Court of probate on one or other of the grounds enumerated in S. 60. We are not now called upon to consider whether an order for revocation is necessary, when a grant has been, in express terms, limited in duration, and the time specified has elapsed.

6. But we observe that even upon that question, there has been divergence of judicial opinion in other systems of law. Thus in Offley v. Best (4); Freke v. Thomas (5); Slater v. May (6); In re Metcalfe (7) and Howell v. Metcalfe (8), it appears to have been assumed that no revocation was necessary, where the grant, on the face thereof, was limited in duration and the prescribed period had elapsed. Reference may also be made to the judgment of Sir John Nicholl in the case of In the goods of Cassidy (9), where, as Judge of the Prerogative Court, he did not revoke a grant of administration with will annexed to an attorney of the executor who was abroad, but pronounced it to have ceased and expired on application of the executor for probate and on affidavit that no suits were pending. It was further directed that future grants durante absentia should be expressly limited until the executor or party entitled to administration should duly apply for and obtain a grant; see also Webb v. Kirby (10); Re Rendall (11), Hewson v. Shelley (12); Rainbow v. Kittoe (13); Suwerkrop v. Day (14). On the other hand, in Pipon v. Wallis (15); In the goods of Phillips (16) and In the goods of Newton (17), the view was favoured that even in such cases, a formal order of revocation is necessary. Substantially to the same effect is the decision of Lord Elden and Sir William Grant, M.R in Rainsford v. Taynton (18). A similar view has been adopted in the United States as appears from the decision in Morgan v. Dodge (19).

7. But whatever room for difference of opinion there may be elsewhere in case of grants expressly limited in duration or made for a specific purpose, it is fairly clear that under our statutory provisions a grant made in general terms must be deemed to continue in operation till revoked or recalled in an appropriate proceeding instituted before a Court competent to exercise jurisdiction in that behalf. This conclusion is in harmony with the elementary rule that where a judgment operates as a judgment in rem (as the decision of a probate Court does under section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act) it is not subject to collateral attack; while it remains in force, it is conclusive not only on the persons who are parties to the judgment but upon all persons and all Courts.

8. This view renders unnecessary an examination of the second point, namely, assuming that the grant can be collaterally attacked in the present suit, did it in law expire on the attainment of majority by the heir-at-law? It is manifest, however, that the construction of the will as propounded by the defendants cannot be supported. The third clause of the will floss not lay down that the executorship would terminate on the attainment of majority by the grandson of the testator. It is clear, even on the terms of that clause taken by itself, that the executorship might continue after the heir-at-law should have attained majority. But the other classed of the will leave no room for doubt on this point; referance may be made specially to the provisions of clauses 9 and 10 which deal with the expenses of maintenance and education of the grandson, or in the event of the date, of the adopted son, and also the expanses of maintenance and marriage of the grand-daughters and their sons end grandsons. We are of opinion that the testator did not intand that the executors should case to hold office immediately on the attainment of majority by his grandson. From both these standpoints. We must hold accordingly that the authority of the executors] had nob, lapsed before the commencement of this litigation.

9. As regards the second question, the Sub-ordinate Judge has held that in view of the direction in the will that there should be at least six executors acting at the same time, three executors cannot maintain this suit. We have examined the provisions of the will and we are unable to uphold the view taken by the Subordinate Judge. We are fortified in our opinion as We Had that bills vary will was so interpreted by Holmwood and Imam JJ. in another case which came up to this Court, when they ruled that three executors out of the four who had obtained probate were competent to carry on proceedings in execution of a rent decree. In our judgment, the will affords no clear indication that the tastator intended to supersede the rule enunciated in section 92 of the Probate and Administration Act, namely, that when there are several executors, the powers of all may, in the absence of any direction to the contrary in the will, be exercised by any of them who has proved the will; Satya Prashad v. Motilal (20). In the case before as, protate was granted to seven executors; three of them have died and their places have not been filled up; three others have instituted this suit and the remaining executor who refused to join as a plaintiff has been included in the category of defendants. We are not prepared to say that the provisions of the will invalidate a suit so framed.

10. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the Subordinate Judge sub aside and the case remanded to him for retrial on the merits. The plaintiffs are entitled to their costs in this Court. The casts in the Court below will be in the discretion of the Subordinate Judge. As the suit has been dismissed on a preliminary ground, We direct, under section 13 of the Court-Fees Act, that the court-fees paid on the memorandum of appeal be refunded to the appellants.

11. Case remanded.