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Abdus Sattar v. Mohini Mohan Das And Others

Calcutta High Court
Feb 23, 1933
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Factual and Procedural Background

On 19 June 1908 Mohammad Abru (the appellant's father) borrowed Rs. 200 by executing a mortgage bond in favour of Madon Mohan Das (the respondents' father). A decree for Rs. 1,083-9-3 was passed on 21 November 1914, and on 5 June 1917 the mortgaged properties were directed to be sold. An application for a personal decree under Order 34, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure was presented and on 29 November 1919 a personal decree for Rs. 997-11-4 was passed by a Munsif who was later found to have had no jurisdiction to pass such a decree.

On 21 November 1922 an execution case was started by the decree-holder but it was ultimately dismissed. A further application for execution was made on 19 November 1925 before the second Munsif's Court at Sylhet; at that time the Munsif presiding there had pecuniary jurisdiction only up to Rs. 1,000 (a reduction from an earlier limit of Rs. 2,000). Mohammad Abru died on 31 January 1928. On 15 November 1928 an execution petition was filed by one respondent (respondent 3) against Abru (though Abru was then dead); on 27 November 1928 the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor were substituted, it being said that not all heirs had been served notice. That execution was ultimately dismissed.

On 1 July 1931 the decree-holder launched the present execution proceeding. The judgment-debtors objected, contending that the present execution was barred by limitation, relying on the contention that the 19 November 1925 application could not be treated as having been made to the proper Court because the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court had been reduced and therefore could not be relied upon to save limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the execution application filed on 19 November 1925 (made before the second Munsif's Court at Sylhet, whose pecuniary limits had been reduced) was an application made to the "proper Court" for the purposes of limitation under Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and thus whether that earlier application could be relied upon to save the later execution application from the bar of limitation.
  2. Whether an execution application filed against a deceased judgment-debtor (here, the 15 November 1928 application presented against Mohammad Abru after his death) is invalid or a nullity in execution proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The November 1925 execution application was not made before the proper Court because the Court which received it (the second Munsif's Court at Sylhet) had, by that time, its pecuniary jurisdiction reduced (from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 1,000); therefore, the 1925 application cannot be relied upon for the purposes of limitation.
  • Having regard to the language of Section 37 CPC, the Courts below ought to have held that the 1925 application was not before the proper Court and thus the present execution is time-barred.
  • The application of 15 November 1928 was filed against a dead person (Mohammad Abru) and therefore, it was argued, that application was not in accordance with law.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The courts below were correct in holding that the 1925 execution application was made to the proper Court and therefore it was sufficient to save limitation.
  • Authorities exist (cited in the opinion) supporting the proposition that the Court which passed a decree does not cease to be the appropriate forum for execution merely because its pecuniary limits have been altered; therefore the 1925 application was properly made.
  • The rule that a suit filed against a dead person is a nullity does not apply to execution proceedings; the decree remained effective against Mohammad Abru and substitution of heirs was properly sought when the death was discovered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Iswari Prasad Singh v. Farkut Hussin, 1917 2 Pat LJ 113 Held that a first execution application made to the Court which had passed the decree remained a valid application even though the successor presiding officer lacked the earlier pecuniary jurisdiction; consequently a later application was within time. The court regarded this decision as directly in point and followed it: the 1925 application was held to have been made to the proper Court and therefore sufficient to save limitation.
Dutchman (Lutchman) Pandeh v. Maddan Mohan, 1881 6 Cal 513 Supported the view that the Court which passed the decree does not cease to exist for execution merely because it lost territorial jurisdiction over the immovable properties which formed the subject-matter of execution. The opinion treated this decision (along with Kartick Nath) as authoritatively supporting the proposition that loss of jurisdiction (in the territorial sense, and by analogy for pecuniary limits) does not deprive the original Court of its capacity to be the proper Court for execution purposes; the decision was followed.
Kartick Nath v. Tilukdhari Lal, 1888 15 Cal 667 Reinforced the principle that the Court which passed the decree does not cease to be the competent executing forum merely because it lost territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Followed with Dutchman/Lutchman Pandeh as precedent supporting the validity of the first execution application in analogous circumstances.
Seeni Nadan v. Muthusamy Pillai, AIR 1920 Mad 427 Interpreted Sections 37 and 38 CPC so that the use of the word "include" in defining "Court which passed a decree" does not, by that word alone, take away from the Court which passed the decree the power to execute the decree; emphasized a non-restrictive reading of "include". The court relied on the reasoning in this decision to support the view that S. 37 should not be read as depriving the decree-holder of the right to apply to the Court which passed the decree for execution, and to reject a strict textual exclusion based on the word "include."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the primary contention that, under Section 37 CPC, the 19 November 1925 execution application could not be treated as having been made to the "proper Court" because the presiding Munsif at that time had pecuniary jurisdiction limited to Rs. 1,000 whereas at the time the decree had been passed the presiding officer had jurisdiction up to Rs. 2,000. The judge observed that, while the question is not free from difficulty, there was binding or persuasive authority pointing the other way and the court considered itself bound to follow those decisions.

The court relied principally on the decision of Sir Edward Chamier, C.J., in Iswari Prasad Singh v. Farkut Hussin, where facts closely paralleled the present case and where it was held that an earlier execution application to the Court which had passed the decree was proper even though the successor presiding officer lacked the earlier pecuniary jurisdiction; consequently a later execution application was within time. The Patna decision itself relied upon earlier Calcutta High Court authorities (Dutchman/Lutchman Pandeh v. Maddan Mohan and Kartick Nath v. Tilukdhari Lal) which had taken the view that a Court which passed a decree does not cease to be the appropriate executing forum merely because it lost territorial jurisdiction over immovable properties that were the subject of execution.

The court considered the submission that those earlier decisions dealt with territorial jurisdiction rather than pecuniary jurisdiction, but found it difficult to draw a decisive distinction between the two in the context presented. The court also referenced the reasoning of Sir John Wallis (Madras) in Seeni Nadan v. Muthusamy Pillai, which argued that Sections 37 and 38 CPC must be read so as not to deprive the Court which passed a decree of its power to execute the decree merely by the inclusionary language of S. 37. The court adopted this interpretive approach and concluded that the Court which passed the decree does not cease to exist as the proper Court for execution simply because its pecuniary jurisdiction has been altered.

On the separate contention that the 15 November 1928 application was irregular because it was filed against a dead person, the court distinguished execution proceedings from ordinary suits: the rule that a suit filed against a dead person is a nullity does not apply in execution. The decree was valid against Mohammad Abru, and the execution petition was presented in ignorance of his death; upon discovery of the death the decree-holder sought substitution of heirs, which was done on 27 November 1928. The court found no irregularity in the November 1928 application.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The court upheld the view that the execution application of 19 November 1925 was made to the proper Court and therefore could be relied upon to save the subsequent execution application from the bar of limitation.
  • The application of 15 November 1928, though initially filed against a deceased judgment-debtor, was not irregular in execution proceedings; substitution of heirs was properly effected and that application did not invalidate the execution process.
  • The order allowing execution to proceed was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed. There were to be no orders as to costs.

Broader precedent impact: The opinion follows and applies existing authorities on the continuity of the Court which passed a decree for execution purposes where that Court's jurisdictional limits (territorial or pecuniary) have altered; the judgment did not announce a novel principle but applied the line of authority cited.

Show all summary ...

Mitter, J.:— This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor and arises out of an application made in the course of the execution of a mortgage decree. It appears that on 19th June 1908 appellant's father one Mohammad Abru borrowed a sum of Rs. 200 by executing a mortgage bond, from the respondents' father Madon Mohan Das. On 21st November 1914 a decree was passed for a sum of Rs. 1,083-9-3 and on 5th June 1917 the mortgaged properties were directed to be sold. An application was made for a personal decree under the provisions O. 34, R. 5 of the CPC, and on 29th November 1919 a personal decree for a gum of Rs. 997-11-4 was passed by a Munsif who it is found had no jurisdiction to pass such decree. On 21st November 1922 an execution case was started by the decree-holder but it was ultimately dismissed. A further application for execution was made on 19th November 1925 before the second Munsif's Court at Sylhet, the said Munsif's Court being at this time presided over by a Munsif who had pecuniary jurisdiction only up to Rs. 1,000. On 31st January 1928 the appellant's father Mohammad Abru died; and on 15th November 1928 a petition for execution was filed by one of the respondents—respondent 3 against Abru who was then dead and thereafter an execution case was started.

2. On 27th November 1928 the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor Mahammad Abru were substituted but it is said that no notice of the execution case was served on all the heirs. The execution case was ultimately dismissed. On 1st July 1931 the present execution case was launched by the decree-holder. To this execution the judgment-debtors objected on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitation.

3. The argument on this head is based on the contention that the previous application for execution, which was filed on 19th November 1925 having been made before the second Munsif's Court of Sylhet, the Court which passed decree but the pecuniary limits of whose jurisdiction had in the meantime been altered from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 1,000, cannot be regarded as having been made in the proper Court and therefore this application cannot be availed of for the purposes of limitation. This contention has been overruled by the Courts below which have held that the execution application was not barred.

4. This second appeal has been preferred to this Court against this order allowing the execution to proceed; and it is contended that, having regard to the language of Section 37 of the CPC, the Courts below should have held that the application for execution of November 1925 was an application which was not made before the proper Court, because, it is said, the Court which passed the decree has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute the decree for the Court which passed the decree, although it was the second Court of Sylhet yet at the time the decree was passed was presided over by an officer who had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, namely, a Munsif who was invested with powers to try suits up to the value of Rs. 2,000. It is contended that in view of the plain language of S. 37 the Courts below were wrong in not giving effect to the contention of the judgment-debtor. The question is no doubt of some difficulty and speaking for myself I do not know what view I might have taken of the matter if it has been res integra. The thing that matters is as has been already stated, that it seems to me to be decided in one direction and I can see nothing which would justify me in deciding this in a way inconsistent with what has been determined by the decision to which I shall presently refer.

5. The case which is directly in point and which has been cited by the learned advocate for the respondents is a decision of Sir Edward Chamier the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court and reported in the case of Iswari Prasad Singh v. Farkut Hussin . 1917 2 Pat LJ 113. There the facts were almost similar to the facts of the present case. A decree was passed in that case by the first Munsif of Gaya who was invested with jurisdiction to try suits up to Rs. 2,000 on 25th February 1911. An application for execution was made on 28th June 1913, to his successor who was not invested with jurisdiction to try cases over Rs. 1,000. A second application for execution was made to the Court on 9th June 1915. It was held that the first application was made to the proper Court and therefore the second application was not barred by limitation.

6. The learned Chief Justice with whom Jwala Prasad, J., agreed was of opinion that notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure it appeared that there had been two previous decisions of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Dutchman Pandeh v. Maddan Mohan . 1881 6 Cal 513 and Kartick Nath v. Tilukdhari Lal . 1888 15 Cal 667. which seemed to take the view that the Court which passed the decree does not cease to exist merely, because some of the properties in respect of which execution was intended to be levied had been transferred to a place outside the local limits of the Court which passed the decree. In other words it does not cease to exist merely because it has lost territorial jurisdiction over the immovable properties which formed the subject-matter of execution after the decree. The Chief Justice points out thus:

“The District Judge has taken the view that the first application for execution was not made to the proper Court apparently because at the time of the application the presiding officer would not have had jurisdiction to try the suit in which the decree was passed. This view is untenable if the decisions in Lutchman Pandeh v. Maddan Mohan and Kartick Nath v. Tilukdhari Lal are connect. The Code of Civil Procedure has been amended frequently since these decisions were pronounced and a new Code has been passed in place of the Code of 1882, but the provision which was construed in the decisions referred to has never been touched nor have either of the decisions so far as we are aware been overruled though there are cases in which have been distinguished in the Calcutta High Court. In my opinion, we ought to follow those two decisions and if we follow them we must hold that the first application for execution made on 28th June 1913, was made to the proper Court and that the present application for execution which was made on 9th June 1915, was made within time. The decision to which we have referred do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned District Judge.”

7. In effect the learned Chief Justice held that the Court which passed the decree did not cease to exist merely because the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction were altered. It is argued for the appellant that the cases on which the learned Chief Justice of Patna relied were cases which dealt with want of or absence of territorial jurisdiction in the executing Court and not in the absence of pecuniary jurisdiction in the said Court. It is difficult to draw a distinction of this kind between these cases. Question has also been raised with reference to the absence of pecuniary jurisdiction by Sir John Wallis, Chief Justice of Madras, in the case of Seeni Nadan v. Muthusamy Pillai . AIR 1920 Mad 427 and the learned Chief Justice has given cogent reasons for holding that Sections 37 and 38 of the CPC must be read in the sense that S. 37 by the use of the word include does not take away from the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree the power to execute the decree. As the learned Justice points out:

“Section 87 provides that the words ‘Court which passed a decree’ shall be deemed to include: (a) where the decree to be executed has been passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction the Court of first instance, and an argument has been based on this clause. Now it may well be that under Ss. 37 and 38 the appellate Court has no jurisdiction to execute its own decree, but that is not because it has no such jurisdiction is excluded by the use of the word ‘include’ as has been argued, but because it had no such jurisdiction under S. 362 of the Code of 1859, and it may well be questioned, having regard to the presumption already referred to, whether when that section was eliminated in re-drafting and the matter was dealt with in Ss. 649 and 123 (now 37 and 38), there we any intention to confer on the appellate Court jurisdiction which it had not till then possessed. We have however to deal with Cl. (b), and where the decree holder had a valuable right under the Code of 1859 ta apply to the Court which passed the decree at least for execution by way of transmission, and where the present Code provides expressly that a decree may be executed by the Court which passed it, the contention that this important right must be held to have been taken away because of the provision in S. 37 that these words shall be deemed to ‘include’ another Court appears to me to be altogether untenable. It may be that in some rare and exceptional instances the category of things ‘included’ in a definition may be held to be exhaustive, but ordinarily as-observed in Stroud's Dictionary, it is ‘a phrase of extensive and not of restrictive jurisdiction,’ and it cannot, in my opinion, be used here to deprive the decree-holder of the important right which he had till then of applying in all cases in the first instance to the Court which passed the decree, especially having regard to the fact that the section itself was inserted when the Code was in process of re-drafting and re-arrangement, when, as I have already said, there in presumption, against alterations by implication only,”

8. Therefore it has been held on these authorities that the Court which had passed the decree had power to execute the decree notwithstanding the provisions of S. 37 and we are of opinion that the Court which passed the decree does not cease to exist merely because the pecuniary jurisdiction of the said Court has altered. It seems to us that the Court below was correct in taking the view that the application of 1925 was made to the proper Court and it was sufficient to save limitation. Another point that was argued is that even if that is so the application of 1928 was not an application in accordance with law because it was filed against a dead person Mahammad Abru. The rule, that when a suit is filed against a dead person it is a nullity, does not apply to execution proceedings. The decree was rightly obtained against Mahammad Abru and the application for execution was presented against him at the time in ignorance of his death. The decree was a good decree against Abru and as soon as it was brought to the notice of the decree-holder that Abru was dead he made an application for substitution of the heirs of the deceased in the execution proceedings. We do not see anything irregular in the application of 15th November 1928. These two applications are in order and there is no question that the applications of the decree-holder were in time. The result is that this appeal fails and must be dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs.

M.C Ghose, J.:— I agree.

R.K

9. Appeal dismissed.