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Mohesh Chandra Shaha v. Abdul Gafur Chowdhury
Case Summary — Judgment of the Court (Mukherjea, J.; Ellis, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit was brought by the Plaintiff, Abdul Gafur Chowdhury, seeking a declaration that an order made by the District Judge of Tippera under section 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act in Revision Case No. 123 of 1941 was ultra vires and therefore null and void.
Material facts (not in dispute): In 1937 the Plaintiff applied to the Debt Settlement Board (Case No. 14 of 1937) for settlement of debts. On 6 September 1937 the Board referred a question to the Sub-Divisional Officer (then the Appellate Officer) about issuing a notice under section 34. The Appellate Officer on 22 September 1937 held that the applicant was not a debtor within the meaning of the Act and that no notice should issue. The Board reviewed that order and on 9 January 1938 concluded the applicant was a debtor; debts were determined and an award was made on 2 March 1941.
One creditor, Bissesswar Chatterjee, died during proceedings; his heirs appeared as Defendants Nos. 7 and 8. An executor's officer seeking copies of the Board's orders was refused; thereafter Atul Behari De filed two petitions to the Appellate Officer (Misc. Cases Nos. 63 & 66 of 1941): one seeking copies (allowed on 26 July 1941) and another alleging refusal to entertain a review application (dismissed as too late with the order "Heard pleader. I find no reason to review a case which has been dismissed long ago. Return the court-fees").
Revision petitions against those Appellate Officer orders were filed before the District Judge under section 40A. The District Judge, by order dated 11 November 1941, set aside the entire proceeding of the Debt Settlement Board including the award, holding the Board had no power beyond the Appellate Officer's 22 September 1937 order and that there had been a gross failure of justice.
The Plaintiff then sued for a declaration that the District Judge's order was without jurisdiction and void. The suit was resisted by several Defendants (Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12) who contended, inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable and that the District Judge's order was within jurisdiction.
The trial Court dismissed the suit, holding the District Judge's order was not a nullity and that the suit was barred by section 40(6) of the Act. On appeal the Additional District Judge reversed and remanded for determination of other issues. The Defendants appealed that remand to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the order of the District Judge made under section 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act was ultra vires of the Act and therefore null and void.
- Whether section 40A empowers a District Judge to revise any order made by the Appellate Officer, including orders which are not strictly in the form of appeals or which were made without jurisdiction.
- Whether a petition presented to the Appellate Officer (Atul Behari De's petition of 1 May 1941) amounted in substance to a memorandum of appeal under section 40(1)(d), and whether the Appellate Officer had jurisdiction to entertain a review under section 44(b).
- Whether a Civil Court can declare the District Judge's order a nullity when the District Judge acted under the revisional power conferred by section 40A.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff sought a declaration that the District Judge's revision under section 40A was ultra vires of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and therefore null and void.
Defendants' Arguments
- Certain Defendants (Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12) contended the suit was not maintainable in its present form and that the District Judge's order fell within his jurisdiction and was binding on the parties.
- The Additional District Judge (on appeal) accepted that the petition by Atul Behari De was not a memorandum of appeal but a review application, and he held that under section 44(b) the Appellate Officer was not competent to entertain such a review; therefore the Appellate Officer's order was without jurisdiction and this, the Additional District Judge held, undermined the basis of the District Judge's order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The Secretary of State represented by the Collector of South Arcot v. Mask & Co., 44 C.W.N 709 (1940) | General proposition that ordinarily a Civil Court has authority to investigate whether a special or subordinate tribunal has acted within the limits of its jurisdiction. | The Court invoked this authority as a general rule but immediately subjected it to the limitation that where the legislature has vested exclusive jurisdiction in the special tribunal, the Civil Court's jurisdiction is taken away to that extent. The precedent was used to frame the general context for reviewing tribunal actions but not to override section 40A's revisional scope. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by acknowledging the established proposition that a Debt Settlement Board is a tribunal of special jurisdiction and must act within the powers conferred by statute; ordinarily its orders can be examined by a Civil Court on the question whether the tribunal acted within jurisdiction (as illustrated by the cited precedent). However, the Court emphasised the qualification that the legislature may confer exclusive jurisdiction on the special tribunal to determine certain matters, and where that is done, the Civil Court's authority is correspondingly limited.
The Court agreed with the Additional District Judge (the Court below) on several points: section 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act enables a District Judge to revise any order made by the Appellate Officer and is not confined to orders made by the Appellate Officer strictly in the form of appeals. The District Judge's power under section 40A therefore extended to review of orders of the Appellate Officer irrespective of whether they were made on appeal or otherwise.
The Additional District Judge had held that Atul Behari De's petition (1 May 1941) was effectively a review application and that under section 44(b) the Appellate Officer lacked competence to entertain such a review; consequently, he considered that the Appellate Officer's order was without jurisdiction and that the District Judge's order based on that proceeding must also be ultra vires.
The present Court rejected that aspect of the Additional District Judge's reasoning for two primary reasons:
- Substance over form: although Atul's petition was not in the formal shape of a memorandum of appeal under section 40, in substance it was an appeal complaining of the Board's failure to perform functions under the Act. Because an appeal would lie in such circumstances, the Appellate Officer should be presumed to have acted within his jurisdiction and not in excess of it.
- Independence of revisional power: even if the Appellate Officer had lacked jurisdiction to make an order on that petition, that fact alone would not oust the District Judge's jurisdiction under section 40A. The Court relied on the settled principle that when an inferior tribunal's order is revisable by a superior authority, the revising authority's power is not confined to orders made within the limits of the subordinate tribunal's jurisdiction; orders made without jurisdiction are equally subject to revision.
The Court further observed that although the District Judge might not have followed the strict procedural prescriptions of section 40A(5) (for example, the preferable procedure might have been to remit the matter with instructions to the Appellate Officer rather than the District Judge setting aside the Board's decision himself), such procedural non-conformity does not affect the District Judge's jurisdiction. Errors in exercise of revisional power or departures from ideal procedure do not, per se, render the revisional order a nullity.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; the Plaintiff's claim for a declaration that the District Judge's order was void was rejected, the judgment of the lower Appellate Court (Additional District Judge) is set aside, and the judgment of the Court of first instance (trial Court) is restored and affirmed.
Consequences and implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Plaintiff is not entitled to the declaration sought; the District Judge's order made under section 40A is not declared a nullity. The trial Court's dismissal of the suit is restored and affirmed.
- Remedial/ procedural note: The Court acknowledged possible procedural shortcomings in the manner the District Judge exercised his power (that a remand might have been the preferable course), but held that such shortcomings do not deprive the revising Court of jurisdiction; they do not render the revisional order void.
- Costs: The Defendants will have their costs in the Courts below; no order as to costs was made in this Court.
- Precedential impact: The decision affirms that section 40A confers on a District Judge a broad revisional jurisdiction over orders of the Appellate Officer (including those made in substance on appeal or even those made without jurisdiction), and that procedural imperfections in the exercise of that power do not in themselves make the revisional order a nullity. The Court did not purport to lay down any novel general principles beyond applying established doctrine to the statutory scheme before it.
Ellis, J. concurred with the judgment.
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
Mukherjea, J.:— This appeal is on behalf of the Defendants and it arises out of a suit commenced by the Plaintiff for a declaration that an order made by the District Judge of Tippera under sec. 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act in Revision Case No. 123 of 1941 was ultra vires of the said Act and as such was null and void.
2. The material facts are not in controversy and may be stated as follows. In the year 1937, the Plaintiff Abdul Gafur Chowdhury presented an application before the Debt Settlement Board within Panchthubi Union for the settlement of his debts due to several creditors who have been made Defendants Nos. 1 to 9 in the suit. The application was registered as Case No. 14 of 1937 of the Board. On the 6th September, 1937, the Board made a reference to the Sub-Divisional Officer at Comilla, who was the Appellate Officer at that time, regarding the issue of a notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act which was prayed for by the Plaintiff. The Sub-Divisional Officer made an order on the 22nd September, 1937, holding that the applicant was not a debtor within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and consequently no notice should issue under sec. 34 of the Act. The Board, however, reviewed the said order of the Appellate Officer, and on the 9th January, 1938, held that Abdul Gafur Choudhury was a debtor and consequently was entitled to relief under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The debts were then determined and settled under the provisions of the Act, and eventually an award was made on the 2nd March, 1941.
3. There was no appeal by any of the creditors against this award. It appears that one Bissess-war Chatterjee was a creditor of the Plaintiff who died pending the proceedings before the Debt Settlement Board, and his sons and heirs figure as Defendants Nos. 7 and 8 in the suit. Soon after the award was made, an officer acting under the executor to the estate of Bissesswar Chatterjee applied to the Debt Settlement Board for copies of the orders made by it in the above-mentioned case, but his application was refused. Thereupon on the 29th April, 1941, another officer of the executor, named Atul Behari De, filed a petition before the Appellate Officer at Camilla complaining of the refusal of the application for copies by the Debt Settlement Board and praying either that the Board might be directed to grant him the copy of the order, or, in the alternative, the records might be called for and he might be informed of the order actually made by the Debt Settlement Board. This petition was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 63 of 1941. On the 1st May, 1941, Atul put in another petition before the Appellate Officer alleging that the Debt Settlement Board refused to entertain the application for review which was filed by another officer of the estate of Bissesswar Chatterjee and praying that the review petition might be accepted and the order of the Debt Settlement Board set aside. This application was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 66 of 1941. Both these matters were heard together and decided on the 26th July, 1941. The first application was allowed and the Debt Settlement Board was directed to grant copies of the order to the party, while the second application was dismissed as being filed too late. The order made on the second application is as follows:
“Heard pleader. I find no reason to review a case which has been dismissed long ago. Return the court-fees”.
4. Against both these orders a revision petition was filed before the District Judge at Tippera under sec. 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The learned District Judge, by his order, dated the 11th November, 1941, set aside the entire proceeding before the Debt Settlement Board including the award. It was held by the District Judge that the Debt Settlement Board had no powers to act beyond the order of the Appellate Officer made on the 22nd September, 1937, and there was a gross failure of justice in the proceedings of the Board.
5. The Plaintiff has now brought this suit for a declaration that the above order of the District Judge was without jurisdiction and hence null and void.
6. The suit was resisted by the Defendants Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12, and their contentions, inter alia, were that the suit was not maintainable in the present form, and that the order of the District Judge was quite within his jurisdiction and was binding on the parties to the proceedings.
7. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the order of the District Judge was not a nullity and that the suit was barred by the provisions of sec. 40 (6) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge of Tippera reversed the decision of the trial Court and sent the case back in order that the other issues which were left undecided by the Subordinate Judge might be disposed of in accordance with law. It is against this order of remand that the Defendants have come up on appeal to this Court.
8. We may state at the outset that we do not dispute the general proposition of law enunciated by the learned Additional District Judge that a Debt Settlement Board being a tribunal of special jurisdiction, its powers are limited by the statute under which it was created. The tribunal must act within its powers and so long as it does so, its orders,—whether right or wrong,—cannot be challenged except in the manner and to the extent prescribed by the statute. Ordinarily, a Civil Court would have the authority to investigate the question as to whether a special or a subordinate tribunal has acted within the limits of its jurisdiction. Vide The Secretary of State represented by the Collector of South Arcot v. Mask & Co. . 44 C.W.N 709 1940.. But this rule must be taken subject to the limitation that the special tribunal might be invested by the legislature with exclusive jurisdiction to determine its own authority in certain matters, and where it is so invested, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be, deemed to have been taken away to that extent.
9. Now, the Court of Appeal below has in the present case negatived almost all the grounds on which the order of the District Judge made under sec. 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act was challenged by the Plaintiff as being ultra, vires and without jurisdiction; and he has held,—and, in our opinion, quite rightly,—that sec. 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act enables a District Judge to revise any order made by the Appellate Officer, and that the section is not confined merely to orders made by the Appellate Officer on appeal. He has also held rightly that although the District Judge set aside not merely the order of the Appellate Officer but that of the Debt Settlement Board as well, he cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction even if his order be not in conformity with the provisions of sec. 40A (5) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act.
10. The learned Additional District Judge has held, however, that the petition presented to the Appellate Officer, by Atul Behari De on the 1st May, 1941, cannot be treated as a memorandum of appeal complaining of abuse of powers by the Debt Settlement Board as contemplated by sec. 40 (I) (d) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The application purported to be one for review of the order of the Debt Settlement Board, and under sec. 44 (b) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, the Appellate Officer was not competent to entertain such an application at all. As the Appellate Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain it, and as his order was without jurisdiction, the order of the District Judge on the basis of that proceeding must also be deemed to be ultra vires and without jurisdiction.
11. Despite the very able and careful judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, we regret to say that we cannot agree with this last portion of his judgment. It seems to us, in the first place, that though the petition of Atul Behari De-Was not in the form of a memorandum of appeal filed under sec. 40 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, it was in substance an appeal to the Appellate Officer complaining of the failure on the part of the Board to perform its functions under the Act. As under the law, an appeal would lie to the Appellate Officer in such circumstances, the Appellate Officer, in our opinion, should be presumed to have acted within his jurisdiction and not in excess of it. But even if we assume that the Appellate Officer had no jurisdiction to make any order on that petition, that by itself would not oust the jurisdiction of the District Judge under sec. 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. As the learned Additional District Judge has himself pointed out, sec. 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is not confined to orders made by the Appellate Officer on appeal. It applies to all orders made by the Appellate Officer, be they right or wrong, and within or without jurisdiction.
12. It is a settled principle of law that when the order of an inferior tribunal is revisable by a superior authority, the authority of the revising Court is not confined to orders made by the Subordinate Court within the limits of its own jurisdiction. If an order of the inferior Court is without jurisdiction, it is capable of being revised in the same way as an order made with jurisdiction.
13. The result, therefore, is that, in our opinion, the Plaintiff is not entitled to a declaration that the order of the District Judge was without jurisdiction and hence null and void. We agree with Mr. Das that the order of the District Judge under sec, 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act might not have been made in strict conformity with the provisions of that section, and instead of setting aside the decision of the Debt Settlement Board himself, the proper procedure ought to have been to send the case back for rehearing with proper instructions to the Appellate Officer, but these are matters which do not affect the jurisdiction of the District Judge, and hence a Civil Court is not competent to pronounce the order of the District Judge to be a nullity on that ground.
14. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the Court of first instance restored and affirmed. The Defendants will have their costs in the Courts below. We make no order as to costs in this Court.
Ellis, J.:— I agree.
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