Pillalamarri Venkatapathi Somayajulu v. Pillalamarri Punnamma

The question in this appeal is whether the next reversioner improperly refused his consent to the adoption. In reply to a request for his consent he wrote Exhibit VI, in which he stated that the widow was actuated by a desire to prevent the property from devolving on him and his heirs, that he was a proper person and was ready to perform the duties which would secure heavenly bliss, and he then went on: “there is no necessity to adopt now only, without waiting till I get a son. For these and other reasons it is not possible to grant you permission to adopt.” It is contended before us by Mr. Venkatarama Sastri that this was a reasonable ground of refusal. It is said that the next reversioner, who was only 32, had already had six children, some of whom alive and three of them were sons who had died shortly after their birth, and, therefore, had a reasonable expectation of having a male child. On the other hand it is shown that the widow, who is now about 35, had waited for a great many years subsequent to her husband's death for making the adoption, and was at the time in bad health. In these circumstances, Mr. Venkatarama Sastri relies upon a dictum of Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., in Subrahmanyam v. Venkamma where the learned Judge observes: “Assuming, as the first defendant says, that some five years before the adoption the plaintiff wanted her to take one of his sons in adoption, there is nothing improper in a sapinda promising to give his assent to the widow adopting his own son, if such son be the nearest sapinda, and refusing to give his assent to her adopting a stranger or a distant sapinda, if there be no reasonable objection to the adoption of his own son.” Assuming this to be so, the circumstances of the present case are very different, because, here, the next reversioner has no son and if a son were born to him, the widow would be entitled to object that the adoption of an only son was improper, and, therefore, it would be necessary to wait for a second son to be born to him, before he could, with propriety, insist upon this condition. We think that, even assuming that refusal under the circumstances mentioned by Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., is justifiable it cannot be said, in the circumstances of the present case, the refusal was justified. The ground for the reasonableness of the refusal in that case appears to be the fact that according to Hindu notions an adoption of a near sapinda is preferable to the adoption of one more remote. But we think it would be going too far to say that a widow should be required to wait until the nearest sapinda has two sons, a possibility which may never occur. The most recent case which has been quoted to us, Venkatrama Raju v. Bapamma, lays down that in giving or refusing his conseut a sapinda is not entitled to proceed upon grounds personal to himself but must act with a deliberate consideration of what is for the benefit of the family. We do not think that the ground put forward in the present case is a proper one; and we therefore agree with the lower Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.

Appeal dismissed.