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Emperor v. Sheo Dayal And Others Accused.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal brought by the Local Government against the acquittal, by the learned Sessions Judge of Cawnpore, of certain persons prosecuted for offences arising out of the Cawnpore riots of March 1931. The police originally prosecuted 41 persons on charges of riot, murder, dacoity and arson dated 25 March 1931. Twenty-four of those were committed to the Sessions Court and the Sessions Judge acquitted all 24. The Local Government appealed against the acquittal of nine persons; three of those appellants subsequently absconded, leaving six respondents before the appellate Court: Sheo Swarup, Chhote, Ram Narain, Gobardhan, Manohar Singh and Puttu Singh Kayastha.
The substantive allegations relate to violence in a locality called Bengali Mahal in Cawnpore, where a predominantly Hindu mahalla contained a number of Mohammedan houses. The prosecution's evidence described multiple assaults on specific houses (Fakhruddin, Yasin, Mahbub) in which numerous Mohammedan occupants—mostly women and children—were killed, and many Mohammedan houses were looted and set on fire. A Deputy Magistrate, M. Abdur Rauf, gave an account of injured persons found and statements taken at hospital (statements recorded on 28th March are referenced), an inspection of Bengali Mahal on 3 April where human remains and bloodstained items were discovered, and the existence of a number of early reports (the police prosecuted those named in reports dated not later than the first week of April).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution is required to prove the precise part taken by each accused in the commission of murders and other offences arising out of a riot, or whether it is sufficient to prove the existence of an unlawful assembly which committed the offences and that each accused was a member of that assembly (invoking S.149 Penal Code).
- What is the legal effect and appropriate treatment of early statements and reports made soon after the riots (including hospital statements and statements to the Magistrate and police) — i.e., the weight to be attached to such contemporaneous reports when many of them agree on main facts.
- What is the burden of proof where an accused is alleged to have been present among rioters but claims innocent presence — the relevance of Section 142 Penal Code and Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
- What are the functions and scope of this Court on an appeal by the Local Government against an acquittal (the application of Section 418 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as amended) — whether the appellate Court is restricted to testing perversity of the trial Judge's verdict.
- How and when the statements made to police or investigating officers (under Section 162 of the CrPC) should be used and placed on record by a trial Court, and what procedural steps are required when such statements exist.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Prosecution (Local Government)
- The prosecution relied on early contemporaneous reports and statements (hospital statements, statements to the Magistrate on or about 28 March, and multiple reports made up to the first week of April) identifying persons implicated in the attacks in Bengali Mahal.
- The prosecution maintained that there was an unlawful assembly which committed riot, looting, arson and murder in Bengali Mahal, and that the prosecution had proved that fact beyond reasonable doubt; the remaining issue was membership of each accused in that assembly (invoking S.149 Penal Code).
- The prosecution treated agreement between multiple early reports and statements on main facts as furnishing reliable evidence (and contended that the reports were not the product of collusion or coaching).
- The prosecution relied on the trial and appellate procedures available under Section 418 CrPC (as amended) to have the acquittals reviewed on matters of fact as well as law.
Respondents / Defence
- The learned Sessions Judge (and defence counsel) discounted the value of the early reports/statements, treating them as of little value in several instances.
- The defence suggested that witnesses who gave statements had assembled at Mahalla Patkapur and had been coached, leading to collusive, unreliable identifications. The Sessions Judge accepted this suggestion as possible.
- The defence argued that the prosecution should be required to prove the specific part each accused took in the various murders and assaults (i.e., individual participation in each specific act), rather than merely proving membership of an unlawful assembly.
- The defence contended that Section 162 CrPC applied only where a prosecution statement was used to contradict the witness's testimony, and did not apply where the witness agreed with the earlier statement.
- The defence argued the appellate Court's functions in an appeal against acquittal should be similar to the Court's role on a reference from a Sessions Judge disagreeing with a jury verdict (i.e., that the appellate Court should only interfere if the verdict is perverse).
- Some defence submissions included suggestions of alibi and the improbability that local Hindus would join a riot against their Mohammedan neighbours; however, no defence witnesses or evidence to substantiate alibis were placed before the Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hardayal Singh v. Emperor | Cited by defence (context implied to concern proof of individual culpability). | The Court observed that this ruling was not on a riot but on a case where three persons were accused of murder and therefore held it had no application to the present case involving an unlawful assembly and riot. |
| Queen-Empress v. Gaya Din | Early ruling on scope of appeals against acquittal (as referenced by defence). | The Court noted that this and a companion case were earlier rulings relied upon by defence but stated they have been overruled by a later decision (Queen-Empress v. Pragdat). |
| Queen-Empress v. Robinson | Early ruling on appeals against acquittal (as referenced by defence). | As with Gaya Din, this earlier ruling was cited by defence but the Court records that later authority has overruled it. |
| Queen-Empress v. Pragdat | Clarification of the right of appeal against acquittal: no real distinction between an appeal against an acquittal and an appeal against a conviction under the CrPC. | The Court relied on this decision to reject the defence submission that the appellate Court's role on an appeal against acquittal is limited in the manner suggested; the Court stated the language of Section 418 CrPC supports appeal on matters of fact where the trial was by a Judge (with or without assessors). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis constrained to the evidence and legal provisions referred to in the opinion:
- Value of early reports and statements: The Court rejected the Sessions Judge's dismissal of early reports and Magistrate's statements as valueless. It explained that the chaotic conditions in Cawnpore immediately after the riots (police and troops engaged in maintaining order, stray assaults, curfew) explained delays in formal reporting. Where a large number of reports and statements independently agree on main facts, such documents are of value rather than necessarily the product of collusion. The defence theory of coaching at Mahalla Patkapur was examined and rejected because the accused named varied from one report to another, inconsistent with the idea of a single coached list.
- Factual findings on the events: The Court summarized the prosecution evidence identifying three principal attacks (on the houses of Fakhruddin, Yasin and Mahbub) in which multiple persons—mostly women and children—were killed (a total of 17 murders in Bengali Mahal is reported). The Court noted evidence of skeletons, skulls, bloodstained clothes and other indicia of violent death and burning discovered on inspection.
- Standard of proof and relevant offences: The Court considered what the prosecution must prove. It rejected the defence's contention that the prosecution must prove the exact part played by each accused in each murder. Instead the Court held that the prosecution must prove (a) the existence of an unlawful assembly which committed the offences (riot, looting, murder, arson); and (b) that each accused was a member of that unlawful assembly. Once those are proved, Section 149 Penal Code makes each member guilty of offences committed in prosecution of the common object.
- Membership of unlawful assembly — S.142 Penal Code and burden: The Court cited Section 142 (defining membership of an unlawful assembly as joining or continuing in it when aware it is unlawful) and concluded that mere physical presence in the crowd, once aware of the crowd's unlawful character, suffices for membership. The Court rejected a special or narrower reading of the word "continues." The Court also referred to Section 106 of the Evidence Act (and Illustration (a)) to place the evidential burden on the defence where an accused claims innocent intention for being present among rioters. Because the defence had not led evidence to show innocent intention (and had in fact pleaded non-presence), the defence could not successfully rely on the argument of innocent presence.
- Functions of the appellate Court on appeal by the Local Government: The Court explained the scope of appeal under Section 418 CrPC, as amended by Act 18 of 1923. It held that where the acquittal was by a Judge (with or without assessors), Section 418 permits appeals on matters of fact as well as law. The Court rejected the submission that its role was limited to testing perversity (as in an ordinary reference from a Sessions Judge disagreeing with a jury verdict). The Court relied on Queen-Empress v. Pragdat to show there is no distinction between an appeal against an acquittal and an appeal against a conviction.
- Use and recording of statements to police — Section 162 CrPC and Section 145 Evidence Act: The Court examined the correct procedure under Section 162 CrPC for the trial Court's use of statements made to the investigating officer. It held that Section 162 is comprehensive in barring use of such statements or records for any purpose except as permitted. The Court said that when a prosecution witness's statement to police is relied on and is the subject of cross-examination, the trial Court ought to refer to the written statement in the record and make a note of what it says rather than relying on the witness's memory months later. In the case before it the Sessions Court had only directed that copies be furnished to the accused and had not made the requisite reference to the writing on the record; the appellate Court therefore examined the statements itself to see what each said.
- Assessment of identity and opportunity to observe: The Court emphasized that the riots occurred in broad daylight over several hours (from about 9:30/10 a.m. to 2 or 3 p.m.), providing prolonged opportunity for identification; no evidence was offered that rioters came from a distance, and no defence witnesses were called to support alibi or innocent presence explanations.
- Conclusion of analysis: After applying the legal principles (Sections 142 and 149 Penal Code; Section 106 Evidence Act; Section 162 CrPC; Section 418 CrPC), and having examined the statements and evidence in each case, the Court concluded the prosecution had proved the unlawful assembly and the membership of the accused in that assembly and therefore allowed the appeal by the Local Government.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appellate Court allowed the appeal by the Local Government (the opinion records that the Court "allowed the appeal by the Local Government" and concludes simply, "Appeal allowed.").
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appeal's allowance means the acquittals entered by the learned Sessions Judge were set aside by the appellate Court (the Court had considered the evidence against each accused and allowed the appeal).
- Legal/administrative consequences emphasized by the Court: The opinion clarifies and applies statutory provisions concerning unlawful assemblies and membership (Sections 142 and 149 Penal Code), the allocation of burden where an accused claims innocent presence (Section 106 Evidence Act), the scope of appeals against acquittal (Section 418 CrPC as amended), and the proper treatment and recording of statements made to police (Section 162 CrPC and Section 145 Evidence Act). The Court criticized the Sessions Court for not complying fully with Section 162 and noted that trial Courts should refer to and make a record of written statements to investigating officers when those statements are material.
- On precedent: The opinion relied on and distinguished earlier case law (noting that some earlier rulings were overruled by Queen-Empress v. Pragdat) and applied established statutory provisions; the opinion does not state that it is establishing a new legal precedent beyond these applications and clarifications.
This summary is limited to the information explicitly contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.
Bennet, J.:— This is an appeal by the Local Government against the acquittal of certain persons by the learned Sessions Judge of Cawnpore. Originally there were 41 persons prosecuted by the police on charges of riot, murder, dacoity and arson, the crimes being dated 25th March 1931, and of the 41 persons prosecuted, 24 were committed to the Sessions, and the learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the 24 persons. The Local Government filed an appeal against the acquittal of 9 persons, and of those 9 persons, 3 persons subsequently absconded. We therefore have the following six persons before us as respondents: (2) Sheo Swarup, (4) Ch-hote, (5) Ram Narain, (7) Gobardhan, (8) Manohar Singh and (9) Puttu Singh Kayastha.
2. The charge is that during the Cawnpore riots of March 1931, there was a not with murder dacoity and arson committed in the Bengali Mahal, a mahal of Cawnpore city where the majority of inhabitants are Hindus and there are a certain number of houses inhabited by Mohamedans. A description of what happened during the not is given in the evidence of M. Abdur Rauf, a Deputy Magistrate, who was on duty at Cawnpore during the riots, and he states that on 27th March he found some injured persons from Bengali Mahal at Patkapur Mahal, that is, Mt. Bibbo, Mt. Bismillah, Mt. Hafizan and Nur Muhammad alias Munne Khan. The women were injured and burnt, and one of them was pregnant, and he took them away to the hospital. The next morning he took their statements in the hospital, and he had not previously told the women that he was going to take their statements. When he saw them on the previous night of 27th March they were not in a fit state to make statements. The statements of these four persons taken on 28th March 1931, were therefore taken at a very early stage after the occurrence of 25th March. It is in evidence that at that period the whole city of Cawnpore was ill a state of turmoil and it was not possible for persons who desired to make reports to the police to make reports because the police were engaged in an endeavour to maintain order, and the usual machinery of recording reports was not available. It is to be noted that in the statement of Nur Muhammad recorded on 28th April the names of all the six respondents before us, with the exception of Chhote, are contained. The Magistrate M. Abdur Rauf proceeds; to state that he visited Bengali Mahal on 3rd April, and he had met certain witnesses Wajid Ali and Muhammad Yasin before that, and they had stated that the bodies of their relatives were lying buried in the debris of the house in Bengali Mahal. At Bengali Mahal the Magistrate found in the house of Yasin Khan a skull and a skeleton and an amount of debris in various houses, and he got men to excavate the debris, and in the house of Basharat two skeletons were found. In the house of Yasin there were found, bones in different places belonging to four different people apparently, and a skull in a come of the verandah, and two skeletons in the delan. On the first floor there was a bed with bloodstained pyjamas of a woman and some hair of a woman, and near the skeletons in the delan there were pieces of burnt cotton-wool on the top of the skeletons. At the time when he inspected houses in this Bengali Mahal were still burning. At that time he was unable to make any arrangements for having reports recorded as stray assaults were still taking place and the main streets were being patrolled by police and troops and there was a curfew order. There are some 24-reports printed in which different respondents before us are named, the first report being dated 29th March 1931, by Muhammad Yasin, and other reports extending to the first week in April. The principle of the police has been to prosecute only persons who were named in early reports, that is, not later than the first week in April.
3. In actual fact all the respondents before us are named on 28th March in the statement of Nur Muhammad taken; by the Magistrate, with the exception, of Chhote, and he is named in a report of 1st April by a constable Zainul Abdin, who did not himself witness the riots but received information from persons who did. The learned Judge has brushed aside these reports as of little value. At the same time he finds that it was impossible for persons to make a report until several days after the event because the police were busy and the streets were unsafe. Actually what happened to the witnesses, in the present case is that when they escaped with their lives they went to Mahalla Patkapur and eventually left Cawnpore for a few days in most cases and the reports were made on their return. We do not share the view of the Sessions Judge that the reports made in the present case and the statements of the Magistrate on 28th March are of little value; on the contrary we consider that where there is agreement between a large number of reports and statements on certain main facts, those reports and statements are of value. It has been suggested, and this suggestion has found favour with the learned Sessions Judge, that the persons who made the reports and the statements had assembled together in Mahalla Patkapur and had been coached as to what they should state in their statements and reports. If that had been so, we would find that in the statements and reports that the same persons are named as accused; but that is not so, and the persons who are named as accused differ from one report to another. It is clearly shown that the reports are not due to collusion and that the theory of the defence on this point is an incorrect theory.
4. In the evidence for the prosecution and in the reports there are three main events. The first is the assault on the house of Fakhruddin; the second is the assault on the house of Yasin; and the third is the assault on the house of Mali bub. In each of these three cases murders were committed. In the assault on the house of Fakhruddin, one Wazir and his little son Bashir of 6 or 7 years, who were tenants in the house, were caught in the yard and killed. In the house of Yasin a number of Mohamedan women and children had taken refuge and the mob broke in and killed 12 women and children. In the assault on the house of Mahbub, Mahbub himself was killed. Altogether, it is shown from the evidence that there were 17 persons murdered in Bengali Mahal, mostly women and children. All the houses of Mohamedans in this Mahal were burnt and looted. The evidence in the case consists of statements of witnesses who saw these various incidents and sacking of some other houses, such as the house of Mohammad Azim and the house of Jan Muhammad. (After discussing evidence His Lordship proceeded). Then the learned Sessions Judge was made an argument on p. 253, line 29, that if the Mohamedans did not know who were the real culprit? they would seek revenge against the local Hindus. This is merely a theory as there is nothing to show that they did not know. No defence witnesses have been called in the present case and no evidence has been placed before us to show that the rioters were persons who came from a distance. The not took place during the daytime in full daylight and it continued for several hours from about 9-30 or 10 a.m on to 2 or 3 p.m There was thus a prolonged opportunity for witnesses to see the rioters in broad-daylight and the witnesses would naturally recognise the local Hindus if the local Hindus took part in the riot. Various-suggestions of alibi have been made for the defence, but evidence has not-been called to confirm these allegations. Learned counsel for defence argued that it was improbable that the local Hindus would join in the riot. We do not think it would be improbable; on the contrary we consider that the natural course of events would be that the Hindus living in this mahalla would join in a not which was taking place against Mohamedans in their mahalla. No presumption therefore can be drawn in favour of the defence on the grounds that it is improbable that the local Hindus would not take part in the riot. Certain points of law arose in this case. One point arises as to what the prosecution has to prove in the present case. The learned Sessions Judge on p. 252 line 22, states:
“The question however is whether the offences were committed exactly in the manner described by the witnesses and whether the accused were the real culprits.”
5. Learned counsel for the defence begani on these lines and considered that the issues before us were whether different accused persons had taken part in different murders and assaults. We do not consider that the prosecution is called on to prove the part which each accused person took in the riot. The prosecution has to prove in the first place that there was an unlawful assembly and that the unlawful assembly; committed various offences of riot, looting, arson and murder. Having proved this the prosecution has to prove that each accused person was a member, of the unlawful assembly. We do not) consider that the prosecution has to prove anything further, and no authority has been shown to us that the prosecution has to prove anything further. Having proved so much the provisions of S. 149, Penal Code, apply, and every member of the unlawful assembly is guilty of offences committed in the prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly. In the: present case we consider that the prosecution have proved beyond any reasonable doubt whatever, and this was also held by the learned Sessions Judge, that there was an unlawful assembly on the date in question and at the place in question which committed the offences of riot, looting, murder and arson. The only question therefore is whether each of the accused persons was a member of that unlawful assembly. Learned counsel for the defence argued that it is possible that certain accused persons were seen in the crowd and that they may have been there with innocent intentions, as the accused persons are all either residents of this mahalla or resided close to it. But S. 142, Penal Code, lays down:
“Whoever being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly.”
6. We consider that this section shows that it is sufficient for the offence of not to be proved against an individual that individual should remain in an unlawful assembly as soon as he is aware that the assembly is unlawful. Some argument was made by the learned counsel that the word “continues” may have some special meaning. But we consider that it merely means physical presence as a member of the unlawful assembly, that is, to be physically present in the crowd. Learned counsel referred to a ruling in Hardayal Singh v. Emperor(1). But this ruling was not on a not at all but on a case where three persons were accused of murder, and therefore it has no application whatever. In the present case there is no doubt that anyone who was present in the crowd was at once aware that the crowd constituted an unlawful assembly and that the crowd were committing the offences of murder, arson and looting. We may also refer to the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which state:
“that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
and lllus. (a):
“when a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest the burden of proving that intention is upon him.”
7. Therefore in a case of riot, if the defence is that a particular person was present among the rioters with an innocent intention, then the burden of proving that innocent intention lies upon the defence. In the present case the defence have given no evidence of any innocent intention for the presence of any accused persons and, in fact, the plea of the accused is that they were not present. The defence therefore is not open to the counsel for the respondents. Another point of law, which was argued, was what are, the functions of this Court in an appeal by the Local Government against an acquittal and learned counsel for the respondents argued that the functions were similar to the functions on a reference by a Sessions Judge who differs from the verdict of acquittal by a jury. In the case of such a reference, no doubt, this Court has to see whether the verdict of the jury is perverse. But no such condition applies to Section 418 of the Cr PC, as amended by Act 18 of 1923. That section provides in Sub-S. (1) that:
“An appeal may lie on a matter of fact as well as a matter of law except where the trial was by jury in which case the appeal shall lie on a matter of law only.”
8. It is to be noted that the reference to a trial by a jury under this section means a trial where the Judge has agreed with the jury in the verdict of acquittal and that the case is not similar to a reference by a Sessions Judge where he differs from the jury. This S. 418, as it now stands, provides for an appeal on a matter of fact where an acquittal is by a Judge trying the case with assessors. No condition is imposed on this Court in an appeal of this nature. All that this Court has to see is whether the offence charged is proved against each of the accused persons and for this purpose this Court has to take the definition of “proved” given in the Indian Evidence Act. Reference was made by the learned counsel for the defence to certain early rulings of this Court contained in Queen-Empress v. Gaya Din(2) and Queen-Empress v. Robinson(3). These rulings have been overruled by Queen-Empress v. Pragdat(4), where it is stated “Indeed it is not easy to see any distinction in the Criminal Procedure Code between the right of appeal against an acquittal and a right of appeal against a conviction.” The matter is also clear from the language of Section 418 of the Cr PC. Another point which occurred in this case was the proper use of statements made by prosecution witnesses to the police. Under Section 162 of the Cr PC, a special procedure is laid down for the use of such statements. The learned counsel for the defence argued that procedure only applied where it is desired to contradict the evidence of the witnesses by the statements and that where the witness agrees with the statement, S. 162 did not apply. It is no doubt correct that Section 145 of the Evidence Act, provides that in case it is desired to contradict the witness by the statement, that statement must be put to the witness and it would follow that where the witness agreed with the statement it would not be necessary to put that statement to the witness. But it does not follow that S. 162 does not apply where the witness agrees with the statement. We consider that the language of S. 162 is meant to be comprehensive as it definitely says:
“nor shall any such statement or any record thereof… be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided).”
9. These words are perfectly general. The distinction between a statement and a record there of is a distinction between the oral statement and the written record in the diary of that oral statement. The language of S. 162 therefore covers all cases of any use of the statements to the investigating officer except as excepted by the Criminal Procedure Code. Now S. 162 provides that:
“the Court shall on the request of the accused refer to such writing and direct that the accused be furnished with a copy.”
10. In the present case the Court has merely directed that the accused be furnished with copies of statements of the prosecution witnesses and those statements have been subsequently proved by a general reference to them by the investigating officer. We consider that the Court should also have complied with S. 162 by making a reference to such writing. By these words we understand that where a witness is called and the statement to the police is made the subject of cross-examination then the Court should make a reference to that written statement and make a note of what the written statement actually says. It is not proper to rely on the memory of a witness as to what he thinks many months after wards he stated to the investigating officer. When the writing itself is available, the Court should refer to that writing and make a note on the record. The Court has not done so and therefore it has been necessary for us to refer to these statements and see in each case exactly what the statement says. This may be a small matter, but it saves a considerable amount of time of a Court of appeal if the Sessions Court carries out the pro visions of S. 162. (His Lordship then considered the evidence against each of the accused persons and allowed the appeal by the Local Government).
R.K
11. Appeal allowed.
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