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Bomatu Bhadu Ghatole v. Govardhandas Nanabhai Gujarathi
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Instalment Decrees — Limitation)
Factual and Procedural Background
Two Second Appeals heard together raised a common question on the law of limitation applicable to decrees made payable by instalments that contained a clause making the whole amount payable on default of one or more instalments.
Second Appeal No. 568 of 1933: A consent decree for Rs. 769-2-9 with costs and future interest was payable in four equal instalments, the first due January 1928. The decree contained a clause that if any instalment remained unpaid the defendants should pay all moneys due in one sum after deducting payments already made, and if they failed the plaintiff might recover the amount by sale through Court of the property under attachment. No instalments were paid. A darkhast (execution application) was filed on 1 February 1932. The judgment-creditor initially applied to recover the whole amount but then gave up the claim for the first instalment and sought recovery of the remaining instalments.
Second Appeal No. 716 of 1933: A consent decree for Rs. 2,798 with costs and future interest was payable by annual instalments of Rs. 500, with a clause that in default of payment of any two instalments the plaintiff may recover the whole amount then remaining due in one sum by sale of the property in suit. The first instalment was made payable January 1924. Four instalments (for the years 1921, 1925, 1926 and 1927) had been paid; instalments for 1928 and 1929 were not paid. The darkhast was presented on 15 June 1932. The cause of action for recovery of the whole amount arose on 1 February 1929, but the judgment-creditor abandoned his claim for the 1928 and 1929 instalments and prayed for the balance.
Procedurally, lower courts were split: in one matter the Subordinate Judge and District Judge held the application in time; in the other the Subordinate Judge held it in time but the District Judge held it time-barred. The District Judge relied on certain Bombay decisions; the Bench in this opinion considered those authorities and others, and rendered a final decision on both appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the law of limitation applicable where a decree for money is payable by instalments but contains a clause making the whole amount payable on default of one or more instalments — specifically, whether failure by the decree-holder to avail himself of the option to sue for the whole amount bars his right to recover instalments that fell due within three years of his application.
- Whether an execution application (darkhast) seeking recovery by sale of attached property was "in accordance with law" where the decree provided for recovery by sale through Court of attached immovable property and attachment existed prior to the judgment.
- Relatedly, in the second appeal, the proper date from which future interest should run (the trial court awarded future interest from a specified earlier date; respondents contended it should run from the date of the darkhast).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- In Second Appeal No. 568, the appellants (as argued by their advocate) contended that the decision in 37 Bom LR 942 (a recent Bench decision) was inconsistent with several earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court and had not been overruled by the Privy Council; therefore they urged not to follow it.
- Also in No. 568, the appellant argued that, apart from limitation, the darkhast should fail because it was not an application "in accordance with law." They relied on precedents (13 Bom 237 and 12 All 64) to contend the form of relief sought (recovery by attachment and sale) was not authorized by the decree.
Respondents' / Other Contentions Referred to in the Opinion
- Lower courts (District Judge in one case) applied the Privy Council decision in 59 IA 376 and treated the default clause as a provision in favour of the judgment-creditor such that if he did not avail himself of the option to sue for the whole sum he did not thereby lose his right to recover instalments as they fell due.
- In Second Appeal No. 716, respondents contended that future interest should run from 15 June 1932 (date of darkhast) because interest up to that date had been included; they argued thus against earlier date used by trial court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 59 IA 376 (Privy Council) | Construction of a default clause in a mortgage bond; Privy Council considered Article 132 (Limitation Act) in that context. | The Bench treated the Privy Council's construction as a valuable criterion but noted it concerned a mortgage bond and Article 132, not Articles 181/182; therefore it was not necessarily conclusive. The Court accepted it as persuasive but distinguished it where appropriate. |
| 37 Bom LR 942 | Held that where a decree for money is payable in instalments and default makes the whole payable immediately, the decree-holder may apply, even after three years from the date of default, to recover those instalments which became due within three years of his application. | The Court preferred and followed this recent ruling as directly covering the point and as consonant with justice and common sense; it overrode reliance on earlier conflicting Bombay authorities. |
| 2 Bom 356 | Held that a decree payable by instalments with a proviso that the whole shall become payable on default is barred if execution is not applied for within three years from the date of any unpaid instalment. | The Court criticised this decision as unargued and of limited value; it was distinguished and not followed in preference for 37 Bom LR 942. |
| 1 Bom 125 (Full Bench) | Earlier Full Bench authority relied on in 2 Bom 356 (as stating a rule on instalment decrees and limitation). | Mentioned as part of the line of authorities relied upon in 2 Bom 356; the present Bench did not adopt that reasoning in light of later authority. |
| 4 QB 519 and 2 QB 509 (English cases) | English decisions cited in earlier arguments on construction of limitation provisions and default clauses. | The Court noted English decisions were cited historically but emphasized the Privy Council had warned against uncritical application of English decisions to Indian Acts; no direct application of these English cases was adopted for deciding the present appeals. |
| 42 Bom 728 | Held that a judgment-creditor is barred from applying for instalments within time if he might also at a later stage sue for the full amount — reasoning based on potential extension of limitation. | The Court criticised the reasoning in 42 Bom 728 (Beaman, J.) as fallacious and doubted its correctness; it did not follow that decision and preferred 37 Bom LR 942. |
| 27 Bom LR 461 | Decision turned largely on provisions of R.48 CPC; expressed view that decree was no longer an instalment decree after default. | The Court noted scant reasoning in that decision and declined to treat it as decisive; it preferred the later ruling in 37 Bom LR 942. |
| 20 Bom LR 773 | Earlier Bombay decision cited by the District Judge in support of a time-barred view. | The Court referenced it as part of the body of authorities relied upon by the District Judge but chose to follow 37 Bom LR 942 instead. |
| 57 All 108 (Allahabad Full Bench) | Distinguished 59 IA 376 on the ground that it concerned Article 132 and a mortgage bond. | The Court cited this Full Bench distinction as supporting the view that 59 IA 376 is not universally conclusive. |
| 51 All 237 and 56 All 921 (Allahabad) | Allahabad High Court decisions which reconsidered earlier rulings and are consistent with the view in 37 Bom LR 942. | The Court relied on these Allahabad decisions as additional support for following 37 Bom LR 942. |
| 13 Bom 237 | Case where an application was made for possession of a house not mentioned in the decree. | The Court distinguished this case on its facts and held it was not applicable to the question whether recovery by sale of attached property under a decree was in accordance with law. |
| 12 All 64 | Involved an application for arrest contrary to provisions of the then section 341 of the CPC and an application for sale contrary to Section 99 of the Transfer of Property Act. | The Court distinguished this authority from the present case, holding that the examples there were illegal because they were contrary to statutory provisions; the present darkhast was not similarly objectionable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded from a textual construction of the decrees and consideration of relevant authorities. The principal steps in the reasoning were:
- Construction of the Default Clause:
The Court interpreted the language (including vernacular forms) of the decrees as conferring an option upon the judgment-creditor. The use of subjunctive and permissive forms (e.g., "may recover", vernacular "vasul karun ghyavi/vasul karavi") indicated a choice for the creditor to sue for the whole amount, rather than a clause making it compulsorily necessary to do so on default.
- Effect of Failing to Avail the Option:
Because the clauses were construed as optional and for the benefit of the creditor, the Court held that the creditor's failure to exercise the option to recover the whole amount did not operate to deprive him of his right to recover individual instalments as they fell due (subject to the ordinary limitation rules).
- Authority and Precedential Choice:
Although the Privy Council decision in 59 IA 376 was a valuable criterion, it concerned a mortgage bond and Article 132 (Limitation Act) and so was not conclusive for all situations under other Articles (181/182). The Court preferred to follow a recent Bench decision of this Court (37 Bom LR 942) which directly addressed instalment decrees with default clauses and supported the view that a decree-holder may apply for instalments which fell due within three years of application even if the default that could entitle him to the whole amount occurred earlier.
- Critique of Conflicting Authorities:
The Court examined earlier Bombay decisions (e.g., 2 Bom 356, 42 Bom 728, 27 Bom LR 461) and found weaknesses in their reasoning or applicability. It criticized reliance upon unargued or inadequately reasoned opinions, and rejected the view that allowing recovery of instalments within time would necessarily permit indefinite extension of limitation for the whole debt (the Court observed that claims to recover the whole debt would themselves be governed by the appropriate limitation articles).
- Execution Procedure Issue (Second Appeal No. 568):
The Court considered whether the darkhast seeking recovery by sale of property was "in accordance with law." It distinguished cited precedents (13 Bom 237 and 12 All 64) on their facts and concluded there was nothing illegal in seeking recovery by sale of movable property under the Code of Civil Procedure even if the decree also provided the right to recover by sale of attached immovable property.
- Future Interest (Second Appeal No. 716):
On the minor point of future interest, the Court noted the decree provided interest at six percent on the full amount and that the trial court's award did not appear to give the judgment-creditor more than was due; the Court therefore declined to interfere with the trial court's assessment of future interest.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core rulings):
- Second Appeal No. 568 of 1933: DISMISSED with costs.
- Second Appeal No. 716 of 1933: ALLOWED. The order of the District Judge in that matter was set aside and the order of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs throughout.
Direct consequences and implications:
- As applied to the facts, a decree-holder who has an optional default clause in his favour does not, by failing to exercise the option to sue for the whole amount immediately on default, lose the right to apply for recovery of instalments that fell due within three years of his application.
- The Court followed the reasoning in 37 Bom LR 942 and related Allahabad decisions, preferring them to earlier conflicting Bombay decisions which it criticised. The opinion therefore endorses that approach for similar factual and legal situations.
- On procedural objections to the form of the darkhast in No. 568, the Court held the application for recovery by sale (including sale of movable property) was permissible under the Code of Civil Procedure and not barred by the facts relied upon in the cited authorities.
- No broad novel rule of law beyond the reasoning adopted from existing decisions was laid down; the Court expressly preferred and followed an existing recent ruling of this Court (37 Bom LR 942) rather than establishing a new departure.
Order: The Bench's orders were pronounced (N.J. Wadia, J. concurred; the final direction was "Order accordingly").
Broomfield, J.:— These appeals have been beard together as they involve a common question as to the law of limitation applicable to instalment decrees where the whole amount is made payable in default of one or more instalments. In the case from which Second appeal No. 568 of 1933 arises, there was a consent decree for Rs. 769-2-9 with coats and future interest payable in four equal instalments, the first being due in January 1928. The decree also provided that “if any instalment remains unpaid, the defendants to pay all the moneys due in one sum after deduction of the payment already made, and in case the defendants fail to pay accordingly, the plaintiff may recover the amount due by sale through Court of the property under attachment.” The vernacular expression for “the defendants do pay” is dyavi; the vernacular for “plaintiff may recover” is vasul karun ghyavi. On the point of the construction of the decree we take the view that the use of this subjunetive form implies that the judgment-creditor is given an option of recovering the whole amount in case of default, and not that the decree makes it compulsory to apply at once for the whole amount. The words vasul karun ghyavi may equally well be translated may or should recover.”
2. In this case no instalments were paid. So that if time were to run from the first default, an application for execution would be barred after three years from 1st February 1928. The darkhast which gave rise to the appeal was filed on 1st February 1932, and the judgment-creditor then applied to recover the whole amount, due. But he gave up his claim for the first instalment and sought to recover the remaining instalments, all of which had fallen due. The District Judge agreeing with the trial Judge, held that the darkhast was in time. He applied the decision of the Privy Council in 59 IA 376 (1), and held that the provision in the decree allowing the whole amount to be recovered in case of default was one in favour of the judgment-oreditor, and that if he did not avail himself of it, he did not thereby lose his right to recover the instalments as they fell due. In the other appeal, Second Appeal No. 716 of 1933, there was a consent decree for Rs. 2,798 with costs and future interest, which was made payable by annual instalments of Rs. 500, and it was provided that “in default of payment on any two instalments, the plaintiff do recover the whole amount then remaining due in one sum by sale of the property in suit.” The vernacular for “do recover” is vasul karavi. In our opinion there is nothing in the language of these two decrees to justify any distinction being made between them, and in this case also we think that the judgment-creditor was given an option to recover the whole amount. The facts in this case were that the first instalment was made payable in January 1924, and four instalments were paid, viz for the years 1921, 1925, 1926 and 1927. Instalments for 1928 and 1929 were nob paid. The darkhast giving rise to the appeal was presented on 15th June 1932. The cause of action for the recovery of the whole amount arose on 1st February 1929, but the judgment-creditor gave up his claim for the instalments for 1928 and 1929 and prayed for the balance.
3. The Subordinate Judge held that the darkhast was in time. The District Judge, who, as it happens, was the same District Judge as in the other case, took the other view and held that it was time-barred. He relied on two cases of this Court, 27 Bom LR 461 (2) and 20 Bom LR 773 (3). The point in issue in both cases is directly covered by a recent decision of a Bench of this Court in 37 Bom LR 942 (4), where it was held by the learned Chief Justice and my learned brother N.J Wadia, that where a decree for money is made payable in instalments and in default of payment of any instalment the whole of the decree becomes payable immediately, it is open to the decree-holder to apply, even after three years from the date of the default, to recover such of the instalments as have become due within three years of the date of his application. The reasoning of the Judicial Committee in 59 IA 376 was held to apply and 42 Bom 728 was doubted and not followed.
4. The learned advocate who appears for the appellants in Second Appeal No. 568, contends that this decision is inconsistent with several previous decisions of this Court which, he says, have nob been overruled by the Privy Council in the case referred to. Now it is a fact that no Bombay authorities were referred to in 59 IA 376 , and also, as is pointed out at p. 384 of the report of that case, the important and difficult questions involved bad to be decided without the assistance of counsel for the respondents. Moreover, it is clear, as Mr. Pardhan says, that in 59 IA 376 , their Lordships were concerned with a default clause in a mortgage bond and with Article 132, Limitation Act, not with Article 182 or Article 181, and it can hardly be said that they intended to lay down any general principle of law which would necessarily apply to any other article of the limitation act. The case 59 IA 376 has been distinguished on that ground by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in 57 All 108 (5). But, on the other hand, the point we have to decide depends not so much on the construction of any article of limitation as on the construction of the decrees. The question really is what is the effect of the default clause on the rights of the judgment-creditor. The construction placed by the Privy Council on a similar clause in a mortgage bond is not conclusive certainly, but may be regarded as a valuable criterion. I do nob think it is possible to dispute the position that the default clause in an instalment decree is as much for the benefit of the creditor as a similar clause in a mortgage bond, and, if so, on principle it is difficult to see why the creditor's failure to avail himself of it should deprive him of the remedy he would have had, apart from the clause. In support of the contrary view we have been referred to three cases, 2 Bom 356 (6), 42 Bom 728 and 27 Bom LR 461 . In 2 Bom 356 it was held that a decree payable by instalments, with a proviso that in default of payment of any one instalment the whole amount of the decree shall become payable at once, is barred, if application for execution be not made within three years from the date on which any one instalment fell due and was not paid. There is little discussion of the question in the judgment of Westropp, C.J, but the Court relied on an earliar Full Bench case, 1 Bom 125 (7), where reliance seems to have been placed on the rule laid down in 4 QB 519 (8) The last mentioned case and also 2 QB 509 (9) were cited in the argument before the Privy Council in 59 IA 376 . 4 QB 519 was not mentioned in the judgment, but as to 2 QB 509 , their Lordships, at p. 385 of the report, made the comment that it is always dangerous to apply English decisions for the construction of an Indian Act. There is a reference to 2 Bom 356 in 27 Bom 1 (10) ???, C.J, observed in connexion with it (p 9):
Notwithstanding the high respect that must at all times be yielded to the opinion of the learned Judges responsible for that decision, it undoubtedly detracts from its value that the case was unargued, and this disadvantage is, I think, apparent in the somewhat inconcinsive reasoning on which the opinion is supported.
5. There are other criticisms in Sir Lawrence Jenkins' judgment which must be said, I think, to weaken the ??? of 2 Bom 356 considerably. 42 Bom 728 (11) has been criticised by the learned Chief Justice in 37 Bom LR 942 . With respect I agree with his observations, and I may add this. The main ground on which Beaman, J., in 42 Bom 728 seems to have held that the judgment-credit or is barred from applying for the instalments which are within time, is that if he be allowed this right, his right to apply for the whole amount of the decree may also be extended indefinitely. He says (p. 730):
The ground of appeal is that it was optional with him (the judgment-creditor) to waive all breaches on the part of the debtor to fulfil his obligations under the instalment decree and so at the very end of the eight years, sue for at least three instalments in arrears then due. If this view be correct, it follows that the creditor would likewise be entitled to sue, within three years of failure to pay the last instalment, for the total amount of debt with interest.
6. He goes on to say that:
The effect of acceding to this argument would be that no matter how complete the right to call in a definite sum of money had become, the judgment-creditor might ignore it and extend the period of limitation, perhaps to the extent of some 20 instead of 8 years, as for example, if the instalment decree had provided for the repayment of the capital sum over a period of 20 years.
7. With due deference, this reasoning seems to me to be fallacious on any view the claim to recover the whole ??? of the debt on default of payment of one or mote instalments must be barred within three years of the default either under Article 182 or Article 181, Limitation Ace. The difficulty to which the learned Judge refers appears, therefore, to be non-existent, and his finding that the ??? right to enforce the payment of the full amount upon breach of the condition puts an end to the instalment decree as an instalment decree, must be supported on tome other ground. I am unable to see any reason why the decree should cease to be regarded as an instalment decree, unless indeed the terms of the decree itself make it clear that result of the failure to pay the instalments in time was intended. That is to say, if the terms of the decree made it perfectly dear that the judgment-creditor bad no option, and in case of default was bound to execute the decree for the full amount, then no doubt it might be said that the decree would cease to be an instalment decree. But, in the two cases with which we are concerned at any rate, the language of the decrees did allow an option to the judgment-creditor either to apply for the full amout or to waive that privilege. As to 27 Bom LR 461 , the decision there turned largely on the provisions of R. 48 of the CPC, and, although Sir Norman Macleod has held in his judgment at p. 462 that the decree was no longer an instalment decree after default had been made, no reasons are given for that view. We think, therefore, that we are at liberty to follow, and we prefer to follow, the latest ruling of this Court in 37 Bom LR 942 , which is in accordance with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in two recent cases in which the earlier rulings of that High Court have been reconsidered: 51 All 237 (12), a Full Bench decision, and 56 All 921 (13). We are all the more inclined to take this view, because, looking at the question apart from authority, it appears to be more consonant with justice and commonsense. We could hardly decline to follow 37 Bom LR 942 We might, in view of the conflict of authority, have referred the matter to a Full Bench, but under the circumstanjes there seems to be no necessity to do so.
8. There is one special point in Second Appeal No. 568 which should be mentioned. The learned advocate for the appellant argued that apart from the point of limitation the darkhast should fail because it was not an application in accordance with law. The decree provided that in case of default the plaintiff might recover the amount due by sale through Court of the property under attachment. Certain immoveable property had been attached he ore judgment; and this attachment was directed to continue until the whole an cunt was paid up. The relief prayed for in the darkhast, however, was the recovery of the sum due by attachment end sale of the ??? property of the judgment debtor. That, it is contended, is not in accordance with law, and in support of that proposition we were referred of 13 Bom 237 (14) and 12 All 64 (15). I do not consider that these cases have any bearing on the present case. In the former there was an application made for possession of a house which was nob mentioned in the decree at all. In the other case an application had been made for arrest of the judgment debtor contrary to the provisions of section 341 of the old cpc, and there was also an application for the sale of property contrary to Section 99 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is easy to see, therefore, why those applications should have been held to be not in accordance with law. But there is nothing illegal in an application to recover money found due by the decree by sale of the moveable property of the judgment-debtor. That is a method of execution the right to which is given by the Code of Civil Procedure, and the right is not taken away in my opinion, because the decree gives the further right of recovering the money by sale of the attached immoveable property. I think, therefore, there is no substance in this point. A minor point was also mentioned in the other Appeal No. 716, in connection with the amount of future interest awarded. The trial Court has awarded future interest on Rs. 1,039-6-6 from 1st February 1930.
9. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that future interest should run from 15th June 1932, i.e the date of the darkhast, because interest up to that date has been included. However, as the learned advocate for the respondents points out, the decree provided that interest should be payabe at six per cent, on the full amount Rs. 1,500 and not on any lesser amount. As it does nob appear that the judgment-creditor has been awarded anything more than is due to him, we do not propose to interfere. The result of our finding on the question of limitation is that appeal No. 568 of 1933 is dismissed with costs. Appeal No. 716 of 1933 is allowed. The order of the District Judge is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs throughout.
N.J Wadia, J.:— I agree.
V.B/R.K
10. Order accordingly.
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