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Girish Chandra Gangopadhaya v. Sri Krishna De Nag
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was brought by the defendants against a decree in a suit originally filed by the plaintiffs on 14 April 1909 for apportionment of rent and recovery of arrears. The litigation dates back to purchases and execution sales in the 1890s and has been before multiple courts over many years:
- One Siba Sundari Debi owned a 3 annas share of a tract measuring 1827 bighas 11 cattas. On 8 July 1884 the first two defendants took a lease of that 3 annas share (approx. 342 bighas 10 cottahs), the annual rent being Rs. 793.
- On Siba Sundari Debi's death, Nilmadhab Chatterjee succeeded as landlord. On 15 September 1892 (sale dated variously in the text), the right, title and interest of Nilmadhab Chatterjee in 123 plots (248 bighas) was sold in execution and purchased by the plaintiffs; sale confirmed 24 November 1892 and symbolical possession delivered 6 June 1895.
- On 10 January 1893 the right and interest of Nilmadhab Chatterjee in the entire tract was sold in another execution in a higher court; Radhanath (Radha Nath) Sarkar purchased that sale, confirmed 10 April 1893 and symbolical possession delivered 31 January 1896. The defendants acquired a conveyance from Radhanath Sarkar on 4 February 1896.
- The plaintiffs instituted the present action on 14 April 1909 seeking relief in respect of the 3 annas share (248 bighas) they had purchased in 1892. The defendants contested on the principal ground that they had acquired superior title by adverse possession since 4 February 1896.
- Procedurally the suit has been through multiple trials and appeals between 1910 and 1921, with differing results at trial and on appeal. The last decision of the Subordinate Judge (in favour of the plaintiffs) is the subject of the present appeal, being assailed on the ground of an error concerning adverse possession.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendants had acquired a good title to the superior interest in the land by adverse possession since their conveyance dated 4 February 1896, thereby extinguishing the plaintiffs' title.
- More specifically, whether the plaintiffs became first aware of the conveyance executed by Radhanath Sarkar in favour of the defendants more than 12 years before the institution of the present suit on 14 April 1909 (i.e., whether the plaintiffs had knowledge of the defendants' claim prior to 13 April 1897), which would be decisive for the operation of the statute of limitations.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments
- The defendants contended that they had acquired a good title in the superior interest by adverse possession since 4 February 1896, the date on which they received a conveyance from Radhanath Sarkar.
- The defendants maintained that by occupying the lands without payment of rent to the rival claimants or to the rightful proprietor, they had established possession sufficient to sustain title against the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Arguments
- The plaintiffs argued that they had purchased the specific 248 bighas (123 plots) at the execution sale of 15 September 1892, and when that sale was confirmed (24 November 1892) title vested in them as auction-purchasers.
- Because the plaintiffs' sale preceded the later sale (10 January 1893), the subsequent purchaser (Radhanath Sarkar) could not acquire any title in respect of those plots that would prevail against the plaintiffs, and therefore the conveyance from Radhanath Sarkar to the defendants could not convey a valid superior title.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bykant v. Rajenara | That a contravention of Section 285 CPC (sale by higher court when property under attachment in two courts of different grades) does not invalidate a sale held by the Court of lower grade. | Used to support the proposition that the plaintiffs' earlier sale (held by the lower court) was not invalidated by the subsequent higher-court sale; thus title vested in plaintiffs on confirmation (24 Nov 1892). |
| Ramnarayan v. Mina | Same principle as above regarding invalidity of lower-court sale when higher court also sells (i.e., contravention of Section 285 CPC does not necessarily invalidate the lower sale). | Cited with the same effect to justify that the plaintiffs' sale remained effective despite a later sale in a higher court. |
| Gopichand v. Kasimunnessa | Same principle as above concerning the effect of sales by courts of different grades and Section 285 CPC. | Relied upon to conclude that nothing remained in the judgment debtor to pass to the purchaser at the subsequent sale, so Radhanath Sarkar could not convey superior title to the defendants. |
| Prasanna Kumar Mookerjee v. Srikanta Raut | That mere non-payment or discontinuance of payment of rent does not by itself create adverse possession. | Applied to reject the idea that defendants' occupation without paying rent to either rival claimant sufficed to constitute adverse possession. |
| Jagdeo Narayan v. Baldeo Singh | Approval by the Judicial Committee of the principle that mere non-payment of rent does not alone create adverse possession. | The court noted that Prasanna Kumar Mookerjee was approved by the Judicial Committee in this case and used that approval to bolster the rule applied to the facts (that non-payment alone is insufficient). |
| Bhaiganta v. Himmat | That the tenant cannot deny his landlord's title; possession of the tenant is generally deemed possession of the landlord unless contrary shown. | Invoked to illustrate the general rule that tenancy possession is treated as landlord's possession and that a tenant must clearly repudiate the landlord's title (with landlord notice) before adverse possession can arise. |
| Reajuddi v. Chand Baksh | Same principle regarding the tenant's relation to the landlord and inability to acquire adverse title without clear repudiation. | Used to reinforce the requirement that a tenant must renounce the tenancy and put the landlord on notice by open, notorious, hostile acts before adverse possession can be established. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through a sequence of legal determinations strictly tied to the facts as found:
- The court first determined that the plaintiffs' earlier execution purchase (confirmed 24 November 1892) vested title in them as auction-purchasers; consequently nothing remained in the judgment-debtor (Nilmadhab Chatterjee) that could pass to a purchaser at a subsequent sale. The precedent series (Bykant; Ramnarayan; Gopichand) and the legislative approval in S.63 of the Code of 1908 were relied upon for this proposition.
- From that premise the court concluded that Radhanath Sarkar (the purchaser at the later sale of 10 January 1893) did not acquire a title which could prevail against the plaintiffs, and therefore his subsequent conveyance (4 February 1896) to the defendants could not convey a valid superior interest. At best, that conveyance enabled the defendants to assert an unfounded title.
- The Subordinate Judge had found that neither the plaintiffs nor Radhanath Sarkar ever realised rent from the defendants, i.e., the defendants occupied without paying rent to either party. The court regarded such non-payment as insufficient, by itself, to constitute adverse possession — following Prasanna Kumar Mookerjee and its approval in Jagdeo Narayan.
- The court then examined the law of adverse possession in the landlord-tenant context. It reiterated the fundamental principle that possession by a tenant is generally possession of the landlord and cannot be treated as hostile absent clear, positive, continued acts of disclaimer and assertion of adverse title brought to the landlord's notice (citing Bhaiganta and Reajuddi). Mere change of mental attitude or failure to pay rent is inadequate without the landlord having actual notice or being put on inquiry by open, notorious acts.
- Applying these principles to the present record, the court found the factual findings insufficient to resolve whether the tenants (defendants) had, by clear repudiation of the landlord's title and with notice to the plaintiffs, established adverse possession. Crucially, the court could not determine when the plaintiffs first became aware of the defendants' conveyance from Radhanath Sarkar (4 February 1896). Evidence showed plaintiffs were aware of Radhanath Sarkar's purchase by 19 March 1895 (previous plaint) and aware of the defendants' purchase from Radhanath by 3 November 1902 (title suit plaint), but the date when the plaintiffs first learned of the conveyance remained unclear.
- Because the plaintiffs' awareness date is decisive for the operation of the statutory period (12 years), the court concluded that further inquiry and additional evidence on that single question were necessary before a decree for or against the plaintiffs could be properly made.
Accordingly, rather than affirming or reversing on the merits as to adverse possession, the court remanded the case to the Subordinate Judge to determine the discrete factual question: whether plaintiffs became aware of the 4 February 1896 conveyance more than 12 years before 14 April 1909.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was allowed; the decision of the Subordinate Judge was set aside and the case remanded for reconsideration of a single factual question: whether the plaintiffs became first aware of the conveyance executed by Radhanath Sarkar on 4 February 1896 more than 12 years before the commencement of the present suit on 14 April 1909.
Consequences spelled out by the court:
- If the Subordinate Judge answers that the plaintiffs did become aware of the conveyance more than 12 years before 14 April 1909 (i.e., between 4 February 1896 and 13 April 1897), then the suit will stand dismissed.
- If the Subordinate Judge answers that the plaintiffs did not become so aware within that period, then the suit will stand decreed in favour of the plaintiffs.
- The Subordinate Judge was directed to take such additional evidence on this point as the parties may adduce. Costs were ordered to abide the result.
Implications for broader law: The opinion does not purport to establish any new principle of law; it applies established principles concerning (a) the effect of competing execution sales conducted by courts of different grades, and (b) the requirements for adverse possession by a tenant against his landlord (necessity of clear repudiation and notice). The decision's practical effect is limited to the parties: the case was remanded for determination of the pivotal factual question, and no new precedent was announced beyond application of existing authorities.
1. This is an appeal by the defendants in a suit which was commenced by the plaintiffs respondents so far back as the 14th April, 1909 for apportionment of rent and for recovery of arrears. The litigation has had a chequered career during the last thirteen years. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the 17th January 1910. The District Judge affirmed this decision on the 21st November, 1910. On second appeal to this Court, the suit was remanded for re-consideration on the 14th March, 1913, by Jenkins, C.J and Mullick, J. On the 9th January, 1914 the District Judge remitted the case to the Court of first instance for retrial. On the 11th May, 1915, the trial Court decreed the claim in part. On the 23rd August, 1916, the Subordinate Judge on appeal reversed this decision and dismissed the suit. On second appeal to this Court, N.R Chatterjea and Newbould, JJ. set aside the decision of Subordinate Judge on the 22nd March, 1920, and remanded the case for reconsideration. On the 4th February 1921, the Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. The primary Court has thus decided on one occasion in favour of, and on another occasion against, the plaintiffs, while the lower Appellate Court has decided on one occasion in favour of and on two occasions against the plaintiffs. The last decision of the Subordinate Judge, which is in favour of the plaintiffs, has been assailed before us as vitiated by an error upon the question of adverse possession.
2. The facts material for the determination of the one point now in controversy lie in a narrow compass and may be shortly narrated.
3. One Siba Sundari Debi was the proprietor of a 3 annas share of a tract of mal and lakhraj lands, measuring 1827 bighas 11 cattas in 761 plots. On the 8th July, 1884 the first two defendants took a lease of this 3 annas share, which would comprise 342 bighas 10 cottahs; the annual rent was fixed at Rs. 793. The interest of Sibasundari Debi as landlord devolved on her death upon one Nilmadhab Chatterjee. On the 13th September, 1892, the right, title and interest of Nilmadhab Chatterjee in 123 plots which included an area of 248 bighas, was sold in execution, and was purchased by the plaintiffs. The sale was confirmed on the 24th November, 1892 and symbolical possession was delivered to the purchasers on the 6th June, 1895. On the 10th January, 1893, the right, and interest of Nilmadhab Chatterjee in the entire tract of 1827 bighas 11 cottahs was sold, in another execution, in a different Court of higher grade, when one Radhanath Sarkar became the purchaser. This sale was confirmed on the 10th April, 1893, and symbolical possession was delivered to the purchaser on the 31st January, 1896. The defendants took a conveyance, on the 4th February, 1896, from Radha Nath Sarkar, of the title acquired by him at the second execution sale. On the 14th April, 1909, the plaintiffs commenced the present action against the defendants for apportionment of rent and recovery of arrears in respect of the 3 annas share of 248 bighas purchased by them at the execution sale held on the 15th September, 1892. The plaintiffs assigned to the defendants the position of tenants under the lease of the 8th July, 1884. The only defence which is material at this stage and requires consideration, is, that at the date of the suit, the plaintiffs had no subsisting title, as the defendants had acquired a good title by adverse possession since the 4th February, 1896, when they took the conveyance from the purchaser at the second execution sale.
4. It is incontrovertible that Radha Nath Sarkar, the purchaser at the execution sale held on the 10th January, 1893, did not acquire a title which could prevail against the plaintiffs. No doubt, his purchase was at a sale held by a Court of a spade higher than that of the Court which held the sale of the 15th September, 1892, when the plaintiffs became the purchaser. It may further be conceded that the sale was held in contravention of the provisions of Section 285 of the CPC of 1882, which prescribed that when a property was under attachment by two Courts of different grades, the sale should be held by the Court of higher grade. It is well-settled, however, that a contravention of this provision did not invalidate the sale, if any, held by the Court of lower grade; Bykant v. Rajenara(1) Ramnarayan v. Mina(2) Gopichand v. Kasimunnessa(3). This view, it may be noted, has received legislative approval in S. 63 of the Code of 1908. Consequently, when the sale in favour of the plaintiffs was confirmed on the 24th November, 1892, the title vested in them as auction-purchasers, and nothing was left in the judgment debtor Nilmadhab Chatterjee which could pass to the purchaser at the subsequent sale. There is thus no escape from the position that the purchaser at the second sale could not convey a valid title in the superior interest to the defendants by his conveyance of the 4th February, 1896. The only result of the conveyance was that the defendants, who were lessees under the grant of the 8th July, 1884, were placed in a position to set up an unfounded title to the superior interest. The plaintiffs, as already stated, did not, however, institute the present action till the 14th April 1909, in other words after the lapse of more than 12 years from the 4th February, 1896, when the defendants claimed to have acquired the superior interest in derogation of the purchase of that very interest by the plaintiffs on the 15th September 1892. The question thus arises, whether the title of the plaintiffs has been extinguished by hostile possession on behalf of the defendants for the statutory period.
5. It has been found by the Subordinate Judge that neither the plaintiffs after their purchase on the 15th September, 1892 nor Radhanath Sarkar after his purchase on the 10th January 1893, ever realised rent from the defendants; in other words, the defendants have occupied the lands without payment of rent either to the rightful proprietors or to the rival claimant. This, however, is clearly insufficient to constitute adverse possession, because, as ruled in Prasanna Kumar Mookerjee v. Srikanta Raut(4) which was approved by the Judicial Committee in Jagdeo Narayan v. Baldeo Singh(5) mere non-payment of rent or discontinuance of payment of rent does not by itself create adverse possession. We have consequently, to consider the principles applicable to the question of adverse possession between landlord and tenant.
6. As a general rule, the possession of a tenant is that of his landlord and will be so deemed until the contrary appears. This, fundamental rule affects all who may succeed to the possession, immediately or remotely, through or under the tenant. From this point of view, it is clear that so long as the relationship of landlord and tenant exists, the tenant cannot, subject to the qualification presently to be stated, acquire an adverse title as against his landlord. This is merely one application of the rule that the tenant cannot deny his landlord's title; see the decisions in Bhaiganta v. Himmat(6) and Reajuddi v. Chand Baksh(7). It is equally well settled however, that one who enters as tenant is not, merely because of that fact, precluded from subsequently holding adversely to his landlord. But to enable him to do so, it is necessary for him to renounce the idea of holding as tenant and to set up and assert an exclusive right in himself. It is further essential that the landlord should have actual notice of the tenant's claim, or that the tenant's acts of ownership should be of such an open, notorious and hostile character that the landlord must have known of it. Such conduct on the part of the tenant necessarily furnishes the landlord with the legal right to enter and repossess himself of the premises. Hence an adverse possession by the tenant cannot be predicated from the mere fact of non-payment of rent or discontinuance of payment of rent, unless in connection therewith the landlord has been apprised that the tenant claims title in himself. When the tenant thus disclaims the title of the landlord, claims title in himself, and the landlord has notice of that fact, it has the effect of an ouster and disseisin, even though this has happened during the continuance of the term. The theory on which adverse possession becomes a perfect title is that the true owner has, by his own fault, failed to assert his right against the hostile holder. Consequently where possession is originally taken and held under the true owner, a clear, positive, and continued disclaimer and disavowal of title, and an assertion of an adverse right brought home to the true owner, are indispensable before any foundation can be laid for the operation of the statute of limitations. Without this, the length of the occupation is immaterial and does not affect the title; possession for the full period of limitation must have elapsed after repudiation before title based thereon can be acquired. If the rule were otherwise, the greatest injustice might be done; without such know ledge of the repudiation, the landlord has the right to rely upon the fiduciary relation under which the possession was originally taken. As has been well said, a possession commencing under the authority of or in subordination to the true title, does not become transformed into a hostile one, by a mere change in mental attitude. It must be shown that the true owner had knowledge of the adverse holding, or it must be so open and notorious as to raise a presumption of notice to him.
7. The case before us has not been considered from this point of view, and such facts as are found in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge are not sufficient to enable us to decide the question. The plaint in a previous suit filed by the plaintiffs on the 19th March, 1895, shows that they were then aware of the purchase made by Badhanath Sarkar at the execution sale held on the 10th January, 1893. The plaint filed by the plaintiffs in the title suit on the 3rd November, 1902 shows that they were at that date aware of the purchase made by the defendants from Badhanath Sarkar. But we are unable to determine, when the plaintiffs were first apprised of the conveyance. If the plaintiffs became aware of the conveyance more than 12 years before the institution of the present suit, that is, between the 4th February, 1896 and 13th April 1897, they had knowledge of the adverse claim for longer than the statutory period. This question must be investigated before a decree is made in favour of the plaintiffs. We regret that another remand is necessary, but we cannot overlook that the plaintiffs are in a large measure responsible for their difficulties. They have created a cobweb of fictitious titles which has effectively obscured the real question at issue.
8. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decision of the Subordinate Judge set aside and the case remanded to him for reconsideration of the following question only:
“Did the plaintiffs become first aware of the conveyance executed by Radhanath Sarkar on the 4th February, 1896 in favour of the defendants, more than 12 years before the 14th April, 1909 when the present litigation was commenced”.
9. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the suit will stand dismissed. If the question is answered in the negative, the suit will stand decreed.
10. The Subordinate Judge will take such additional evidence on this point as may be adduced by the parties. Costs will abide the result.
11. Appeal allowed;
12. case remanded.
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