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Jateendra Chandra Bandopadhyay And Others v. Rebateemohan Das And Others

Calcutta High Court
Jul 10, 1934
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Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises from properties originally owned by one Rajchandra, who by a will dated 18 September 1888 bequeathed certain properties to his grandsons Rajendra and Jogendra. Rajchandra died on 28 November 1899, leaving Girish as his only son. On 29 October 1911 Girish mortgaged the properties now in dispute to the respondents, who obtained a mortgage decree against Girish on 3 December 1917.

On 2 January 1925 Chandrakala (spelt also as Cbandrakala in the record), appointed executrix under Rajchandra's will, instituted a suit seeking a declaration that the mortgaged properties were not liable to sale because Girish had no title and that the properties vested in her as executrix and were in her possession. A temporary injunction restrained the decree-holder from selling during the suit, but this injunction was dissolved on 1 December 1925. The mortgaged properties were sold in execution on 7 April 1926 and the sale was confirmed on 10 May 1926. When the auction purchasers sought delivery of possession on 23 August 1926, they were resisted by Chandrakala; an application for delivery was later dismissed for default on 13 November 1926.

Chandrakala's suit was decreed on 14 May 1928: it was declared Girish had no right to mortgage the properties, the mortgage was infructuous and the execution sale was not binding on the properties, and that the plaintiff as executrix had a right to the properties. The decree-holders/auction-purchasers appealed to this Court (First Appeal No. 352 of 1928). On 15 July 1931 this Court allowed the appeal and dismissed Chandrakala's suit. The auction-purchasers then applied on 8 October 1931 for delivery of possession; the judgment-debtors objected that the application was barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge overruled the objection and ordered delivery of possession; the judgment-debtors appealed, raising the limitation point before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application by the auction-purchasers for delivery of possession is barred by limitation under Article 180, Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • It was contended by the learned advocate for the respondents that Section 15 of the Limitation Act allowed deduction of the period from 14 May 1928 (date of the decree in Chandrakala's suit) to 15 July 1931 (date of this Court's decision) when computing limitation under Article 180.
  • Dr. Basak argued, invoking observations of the Judicial Committee in 1916 P.C. 961 (on a principle analogous to Section 14 of the Limitation Act), that limitation should remain in suspense at least from 14 May 1928 to 15 July 1931 because the auction-purchasers were bona fide litigating their rights in a Court of Justice.
  • They relied generally on the proposition that equitable or judicial suspension should operate during the period the title dispute was being litigated, thereby preventing the limitation period from running against the auction-purchasers.

Appellants' Arguments

  • Mr. Basu, appearing for the appellants (the judgment-debtors), argued that limitation began to run from 10 May 1926, when the sale was confirmed, and that the auction-purchasers' subsequent inability to obtain possession did not stop limitation.
  • In support of that contention reliance was placed on Section 9 of the Limitation Act (the appellants said the words "to sue" include an application for delivery of possession and therefore limitation ran from the date the cause of action accrued).
  • Mr. Basu also contended that the auction-purchasers could and should have made a formal application for possession during the pendency of the suit and, if refused, could have appealed against the refusal and thereby kept an application pending until the question of title was finally decided by the appellate Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1916 P.C. 961 Judicial Committee observations on a principle analogous to Section 14 of the Limitation Act — that limitation may remain in suspense while bona fide litigation of rights is pending. The Court noted this authority was relied on by Dr. Basak but held that, in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is not permissible to claim any exemption apart from what is contained in the Limitation Act; accordingly that authority did not afford the relief contended for.
1926 Cal. 652 (observation of Mukerji, J.) Support for the proposition that cancellation of the cause of action may operate to suspend rights and give rise to a fresh cause of action when cancellation is removed. The Court relied on the observation to explain that the decree of 14 May 1928 cancelled the auction-purchasers' cause of action for delivery of possession and, when that cancellation was removed by the appellate Court, a fresh cause of action arose.
23 Cal. 7753 Authority for the statement that there was "no actual sale which would give the purchaser a title to enter into possession or to enjoy the fruits of the sale." The Court cited this to characterize the effect of the Subordinate Judge's decree of 14 May 1928 — that effectively there was no real sale conferring a right to possession until the decree was set aside.
1920 Mad. 14 The principle that the language of Column 3, Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act should be interpreted so as to date the cause of action from when the remedy is available to the party. The Court invoked this authority to support the view that a cause of action for delivery of possession should be dated to when the remedy (possession) was actually available to the purchaser, not from a date when it was in fact unavailable due to a binding decree.
11 All. 475 A principle against requiring a party to institute a vain litigation under peril of losing rights — i.e., litigating a plainly futile application should not be compelled by limitation rules. The Court cited this to reject the appellants' contention that purchasers should have brought and prosecuted a formally vain application for possession during the period when a binding decree declared they had no right to possession.
1934 P.C. 1346 A decision in which a sale was confirmed and the appeal by the judgment-debtor was dismissed — cited for comparison on the question of suspension of cause of action. The Court explained that the present case is not inconsistent with 1934 P.C. 1346 because in that case there was no question of suspension of any cause of action; here there was an effective suspension by a decree declaring no right to possession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began from the statutory scheme. Article 180 of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act prescribes a three-year period for an application by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree for delivery of possession, to be computed from when the sale becomes absolute. The sale here had been confirmed on 10 May 1926, and the present application was admittedly made beyond three years from that date.

The respondents argued that various provisions of the Limitation Act tolled or suspended the running of limitation: specifically Section 15 (tolling in view of a suit or application for execution of a decree) and analogies to Section 14. The Court analysed these statutory provisions and their applicability:

  • Section 15 of the Limitation Act refers to a suit or an application for the execution of a decree. The Court held that while an application for delivery of possession may be treated as an application in execution proceedings, it cannot be equated to an "application for execution" in the sense required by Section 15; therefore Section 15 did not assist the auction-purchasers.
  • Section 14 likewise was not attracted because the auction-purchasers were not plaintiffs in the suit instituted by Chandrakala; rather they were resisting her claim as defendants. Hence the statutory protection of Section 14 did not apply to them in the circumstances.
  • The Court addressed the contention based on the Judicial Committee's observations in 1916 P.C. 961 (invoked as analogous to Section 14) but held that, under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, exemptions outside the Act's provisions cannot be claimed. In short, the Court did not accept that extra-statutory principles could expand tolling beyond the Limitation Act's text.

The Court then examined the legal effect of the Subordinate Judge's decree of 14 May 1928. That decree declared Girish had no right to mortgage the properties, that the mortgage was infructuous, and that the execution sale was not binding on those properties — in substance, it cancelled the purchaser's asserted title and thereby cancelled the cause of action for delivery of possession. The Court accepted the reasoning (citing 1926 Cal. 652) that such a cancellation suspends the purchaser's rights: until the appellate Court removed that cancellation the purchasers had no enforceable right to possession.

The Court considered whether Section 9 of the Limitation Act (and the interpretation that "to sue" might include an application for possession) would force limitation to run regardless. It concluded Section 9 presupposes that the cause of action continues to exist; it does not contemplate cases where a cause of action has been cancelled by subsequent events (such as a binding judgment saying the purchaser has no right). Therefore Section 9 could not be invoked to deny suspension where the cause of action was effectively extinguished by a competent Court's decree.

The Court further explained that the language of Column 3, Schedule 1 should be interpreted so that the cause of action is dated to when the remedy is available to the party (citing 1920 Mad. 14). Forcing purchasers to institute a plainly futile application during the period when a decree declared they had no right would impose an unreasonable duty (citing 11 All. 475). The Court characterized the order dismissing the 1926 application for delivery for default as not a final disposal in substance, but as leaving the application pending in the eye of the law because delivery was rendered infructuous by the executrix's resistance and a pending title dispute.

Given these conclusions, the Court treated the later application for delivery of possession as a continuance or revival of the former application, not as a new, time-barred claim. On this basis the Court found the Subordinate Judge correctly held the application was not barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • The Court held that the auction-purchasers' application for delivery of possession was not barred by limitation because a competent decree of 14 May 1928 had effectively cancelled their cause of action, suspending their right to seek possession until that cancellation was removed by the appellate process; the later application was treated as a continuance or revival of the earlier application rather than a fresh, time-barred claim.
  • The direct effect is that the Subordinate Judge's order overruling the limitation objection and ordering delivery of possession stands; the appeal by the judgment-debtors fails and there will be no order as to costs.
  • The opinion confines its reasoning to the facts and statutory provisions before it; it does not announce or rely on a broader novel principle beyond the application of the Limitation Act and the authorities cited. The Court expressly limited reliance on extra-statutory exemptions by reference to Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
K.S
Show all summary ...

1. The facts, which give rise to the present appeal, are as follows: One Rajcbandra was the owner of certain properties. He executed a will on 18th September 1888, by which he bequeathed his properties to his grandsons, i.e, son's sons, Rajendra and Jogendra. Rajchandra died on 28th November 1899, leaving Girish as his only son. On 29th October 1911 Girish mortgaged the properties, which are the subject-matter of the present litigation, to the respondents. The respondents obtained a mortgage decree on the basis of the said mortgage against Girish on 3rd December 1917. On 2nd December 1924, Cbandrakala, the wife of Girish, who was appointed executrix by the will of Rajchandra, obtained probate in common form. Subsequently, the probate proceedings were contested and the probate was ultimately issued to Cbandrakala on 25th May 1927. On 2nd January 1925 Chandrakala instituted a suit for a declaration that the mortgaged properties were not liable to be sold on the allegation that the mortgagor had no title to the property, that the property vested in her by virtue of the will and that she was in possession thereof as executrix to the estate of Rajchandra.

2. The said suit was numbered and registered as suit No. 1 of 1925 of the first Court of the Subordinate Judge at Dacca. A temporary injunction was issued by the Subordinate Judge, restraining the decree-holder from selling the mortgaged properties during the pendency of the suit. The said injunction however was ultimately dissolved on the 1st December 1925. The mortgaged properties were sold on 7th April 1926, and purchased by the decree-holders. On 10th May 1926, the sale was confirmed. On 23rd August 1926, the decree-holder purchasers applied for delivery of possession. The auction-purchasers could not however get possession on account of the resistance offered by Chandrakala at the time, when the nazir of the Court went to deliver possession. The application was thereafter dismissed for default on 13th November 1926.

3. The suit instituted by Chandrakala was decreed on 14th May 1928, and it was declared that Girish had no right to mortgage the properties in question and that the mortgage by Girish was infructuous and inoperative against those properties and the execution sale in execution of the decree was not binding against the properties. It was also declared that the plaintiff as executrix had a right to the properties. An appeal was thereupon taken by the decree-holder, auction-purchasers, to this Court which was registered as First Appeal No. 352 of 1928. On 15th July 1931, this Court allowed the appeal and dismissed Chandrakala's suit. On 8th October 1931, the auction-purchasers applied to the Court for delivery of possession. Thereupon the judgment-debtors took the objection that the application was barred by limitation. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled the objection of the judgment-debtors and ordered delivery of possession. Hence the present appeal by the judgment-debtors.

4. The only point for decision in this appeal is whether the application for delivery of possession is barred by limitation. Under Section 3 of the Lino. Act, subject to the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the said Act, an application made-after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been pleaded. Under Article 180, Sch. 1 Lim. Act, an application by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree for delivery of possession is to be made within 3 years from the time when the sale becomes absolute. The present application by the auction-purchaser was admittedly made beyond three years from 10th May 1926, when the sale was confirmed. It was however contended by the learned advocate for the respondents that under Section 15 of the Lim. Act, in view of the decree of the Subordinate Judge on 14th May 1928, in the suit of Chandrakala, the auction-purchasers were entitled to deduct the period from 14th May 1928 to 15th July 1931 in computing the period of limitation prescribed by Article 180. Section 15 of the Lim. Act however refers ta a suit or an application for the execution of a decree. The application for delivery of possession by the auction-purchasers may be treated as an application in an execution proceeding but it cannot be treated as an application for execution. Section 15 of the Lim. Act, therefore does not help the auction-purchasers in this case. Section 14 of the Lim. Act, also is not attracted in this case, inasmuch as the auction-purchasers were not in the plaintiffs in the suit before the Subordinate Judge, which was instituted on 2nd January 1925, but were resisting the claim of Chandrakala in the suit as defendants. It was however contended by Dr. Basak on the authority of the observations of the Judicial Committee in 1916 P.C 961, in the principle analogous to the provisions of Section 14 of the Liin. Act, limitation would amain in suspense at least from 14th May 1928 to 15th July 1931, as the auction-purchasers were bona fide litigating their rights in a Court of Justice. In view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Lira. Act, it is lot permissible to claim any exemption part from what is contained in the limitation Act.

5. It is contended by Mr. Basu appearing on behalf of the appellants that limitation began to run from 10th May 1926, when the sale was confirmed and that the subsequent inability of the auction-purchasers to get possession, in view of the decree of the Subordinate Judge on 14th May 1928, could not stop it. In support of this contention reliance was placed upon Section 9 of the Lim. Act. The effect of the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge however was that it was declared by a competent Court that the decree-holders had acquired no right on the cases of their auction-purchase in exertion of the mortgage decree and consequently had no right to get possession. This decree was binding on the auction-purchasers until it was set aside by the Court of appeal. Consequently, the position is that there was a cancellation of he cause of action for delivery of possession by the decree of the Subordinate Judge on 14th May 1928 operating to suspend the rights of the auction-purchasers. Consequently they are entitled, on removal of the cancellation by the Court of appeal, to avail of a fresh cause of action, which arose by reason thereof: see the observation of Mukerji, J., in 1926 Cal. 652. As already stated the net result of the decree, passed by the Subordinate Judge on 14th May 1928, was that

“there was no actual sale which would give the purchaser a title to enter into possession or to enjoy the fruits of the sale.”

6. In other words there was no real sale, to the benefit of which the purchaser was entitled: see 23 Cal. 7753. Assuming that the words ‘to sue’ in Section 9 of the Lim. Act, include an application for delivery of possession, in our judgment the section contemplates cases, where the cause of action continues to exist. It cannot apply to cases where the cause of action is cancelled by reason of subsequent events.

7. The language of Col. 3, Sch. 1, Lim. Act, should be so interpreted as to carry out the true intention of the legislature, that is to say, by dating the cause of action from a date when the remedy is available to the party: see the case of 1920 Mad. 14.

8. If the auction-purchasers applied for delivery of possession during the period between 14th May 1928 and 15th July 1931, they would have been successfully met with the plea that they had no right to get possession in view of the decree passed on 14th May 1928. Mr. Basu however contended that the auction-purchasers should have made a formal application for possession and, if their application failed, they could have filed an appeal against the order rejecting their application and thereby could have kept their application for delivery of possession pending till the question of title was finally decided by the appellate Court. In other words, the contention of Mr. Basu is that it was the duty of the auction-purchasers to apply for possession even though it was not possible for them to get possession till the question of title was finally decided. But the utmost benefit that the auction-purchasers could have got by such a proceeding would have been to have it suspended till the question of title was finally decided by the Court of appeal.

“It would be an inconvenient state of the law if it were found necessary for a man to in titute a perfectly vain litigation under peril of losing his property if he does not: see the case of 11 All. 475.

9. We are therefore unable to give effect to the contention of Mr. Basu. This view is not inconsistent with the decision of the Judicial Committee in 1934 P.C 1346. In that case the sale was confirmed by the Subordinate Judge and the appeal by the judgment-debtor was dismissed. In that case there was no question of suspension of any cause of action. Again the delivery of possession to the auction-purchasers in 1926 was interrupted and was rendered in fructuous by the resistance occasioned by the executrix, who was claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on her own account. In fact, as stated above, she had instituted a suit long before the sale for a declaration that the property belonged to her on the distinct assertion that she was in possession of the property as executrix. It is therefore clear that delivery of possession to the auction-purchasers was rendered in fructuous not by any fault or laches on the part of the auction-purchasers, but by an obstacle, which could not be removed even in a proceeding under O. 21, R. 97 of the CPC. The position then was that the obstruction could not be removed until the suit terminated in favour of the auction-purchaser. In these circumstances, we are of opinion that the real effect of the order dated 13th November 1926, dismissing the application for delivery of possession for default, is that the application for delivery of possession was not finally disposed of but remained pending in the eye of the law. The present application for delivery of possession should therefore be treated as one for continuance or revival of the former one. We are accordingly of opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the application for delivery of possession is not barred by limitation. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, but there will be no order for costs.

K.S

10. Appeal dismissed.