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Deputy Commissioner Of Singhubhum v. Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb

Patna High Court
May 25, 1921
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Judgment Summary — Das, J. (with Ross, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Testator, Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deb, died on 1 March 1916, leaving property in the District of Midnapur (Presidency of Bengal) and in Singhbhum (province of Bihar and Orissa). The petitioner, appointed sole executor, applied for probate in the District Judge of Midnapur. On 11 April 1916 the petitioner filed an affidavit of valuation in the Midnapore court valuing the properties within that court's jurisdiction at Rs. 45,879-1-1½ and was directed to pay probate duty on that value. It was disclosed that there were assets in another district, but the petitioner did not file the affidavit in the form of Schedule 3 of the Court Fees Act at that time.

On 15 March 1919 the petitioner applied under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act to the District Delegate, Singhbhum, for letters of administration in respect of properties within that Court's jurisdiction and valued them at about Rs. 700,000. An officer (managing estate under Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act) valued the estate at about Rs. 9,800,000; the petitioner withdrew that application.

On 16 August 1919 the petitioner presented an application in the High Court for letters of administration under section 5; he was later required to file the affidavit in the Schedule 3 form and filed it on 7 January 1920, stating the net value at Rs. 6,82,334. The High Court granted letters of administration on 28 January 1920 and, under section 19H(iv) of the Court Fees Act, referred the matter to the Board of Revenue and thence to the Deputy Commissioner, who held an enquiry and reported a valuation of Rs. 35,29,255. The High Court authorized a Registrar's enquiry under S.19H(v); the Registrar concluded a net true value of Rs. 64,87,085 and computed court-fee payable as Rs. 1,94,612-8-0, with a deficit (after prior payment of Rs. 19,323-4-0) of Rs. 1,75,289-4-0. The court considered the Registrar's report and addressed the legal questions arising from these valuation and duty calculations.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. At what date, under the Court Fees Act, is the value of the estate to be assessed for the purpose of probate duty (proposed dates included: date of death 1 March 1916; date of original affidavit in Midnapore 11 April 1916; date of application in the High Court/affidavit 3/7 January 1920; or the date of the High Court application 16 August 1919)?
  2. Whether an application under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act requires the petitioner to file an affidavit of valuation in the form set forth in Schedule 3 of the Court Fees Act.
  3. Whether the grant under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act is (for the purpose of court-fees) a grant of probate or of letters of administration with or without the Will annexed (i.e., liable to pay probate duty under Article 11, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act), or whether it is an ancillary/“resealing” type grant not itself chargeable with probate duty.
  4. Whether probate duty on assets situate outside the jurisdiction of the original grant (but within British India) was payable on the original probate granted by the District Judge of Midnapore.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended (in its extreme form) that the date contemplated by the Court Fees Act for assessment is the date of the testator's death (1 March 1916).
  • Implicit in the petitioner's conduct was that valuation and payment were assessed according to the petitioner's earlier affidavits and that the High Court's subsequent valuation should not operate as the controlling date.

Crown's Arguments

  • The Crown's extreme contention was that the relevant date is when the petitioner filed his affidavit of valuation in the High Court (3 January 1920) — in other words, the date of the later application/affidavit in the High Court.
  • The Crown relied on the language of Schedule 3 and on principles drawn from English authorities to support valuation at the time of the probate/administration grant or the contemporaneous affidavit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Doed Richards v. Evans Held that where land is improved in value between the owner's death and grant of administration (e.g., by building), duty on letters of administration is payable on the improved value. Cited in considering whether increased value after death should be included; supports the proposition that value may be taken at a time after death (i.e., not necessarily the date of death).
Bell v. Master in Equity of the Supreme Court of Victoria Distinguished profit-based duties from succession duties; held probate duty is payable on value of property at time it is granted. Used to support the Crown's position that the true value should be the value at the date of the application for probate or letters of administration (i.e., date of grant).
Attorney General v. Dimond Probate duty applies only to effects within the jurisdiction of the court granting probate; executor not liable for duty on assets lying in foreign jurisdiction if probate was not granted in respect of those foreign assets. Applied to frame the test: whether a grant was made in respect of particular assets; used to consider whether assets outside Midnapore jurisdiction were covered by the Midnapore grant.
Attorney General v. Hope Confirmed that probate duty is payable in respect of property as to which probate is granted, not merely property later administered by executor (i.e., jurisdictional/subject-matter limits of grant determine liability). Relied upon to emphasise that the critical question is whether probate was granted in respect of the assets sought to be taxed.
Attorney General v. Bouwens Affirmed that probate duty is regulated by value of such part of the estate that is within the jurisdiction of the judge at the death of the deceased. Considered together with the above cases to show that value for duty purposes is tied to the assets within the jurisdiction at the time of the grant.
Blackwood v. Queen Suggested probate duty should be confined to property directly affected by the probate (limiting otherwise sweeping statutory words), on the ground legislature could not intend to tax property the grant did not reach. Cited to show an alternative line of authority; the court expressed doubt about the breadth of this decision's reach but distinguished it as concerned with limits of local legislatures' power to reach external property.
Commissioners of Stomps v. Hope Followed Blackwood v. Queen (as stated in the opinion). Cited as following the narrower principle that duty is tied to property actually affected by the probate; the court noted this but analysed its limited application.
Partington v. The Attorney General In fiscal statutes, courts must adhere to the letter of the law; equitable construction in favour of the subject is not admissible where the statute's words plainly apply. Applied to emphasise that taxing enactments are strictly construed according to their natural meaning; used to reject an equitable re-interpretation that would avoid double or unexpected taxation.
Attorney General v. Earl of Selborne Affirmed the strict, literal approach to taxing statutes: Crown fails unless the case is brought within the statute according to natural meaning. Used to reinforce the principle that statutory words must be applied in their natural sense in tax matters, not altered for perceived fairness.
Bhaurao Dadajirao v. Lakshmibai Referenced as authority for the proposition that English law was followed in the procedure enabling courts to dispense with proof of original Will when granting ancillary relief. Used as supporting authority for treating section 5 grants as analogous to English resealing/ancillary grants.
Ezekiel Joshua v. Abraham Strachey, J.'s view (referred to) that the statement of assets in the application for probate served as a basis for testing later inventory and accounts; conceded the English statute required such statement so stamp duty could be properly paid. Referred to as representing a different judicial approach; the court noted this view but declined to follow it for the construction adopted in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning runs through (a) interpretation of the forms and language of Schedule 3 of the Court Fees Act and Article 11, Schedule I (probate duty provisions); (b) an examination of the nature and scope of a grant under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act; and (c) analysis of English authorities on the corresponding English statutes and the resealing procedure.

1. Character of Schedule 3 and the date of valuation:

  • Schedule 3's form expressly requires the affidavit to state the assets "inclusive of all rents, interest, dividends, and increased values since the date of the death of the said deceased" — language taken from English precedent. That language was examined closely.
  • Several English authorities (e.g., Doed Richards v. Evans; Bell v. Master in Equity) were considered. Those authorities had been interpreted to show that probate duty can reflect increases between death and the date of grant.
  • However, the court did not accept the view that the relevant date is the date of death. It concluded that the "true value of the estate must be its value at the date of the application for probate or of letters of administration" where the statutory form and context point to valuation contemporaneous with the application/grant.

2. Nature of a Section 5 grant (ancillary/resealing character):

  • Section 5 provides for grant of letters of administration when a Will has been proved and deposited in a court beyond the province and a properly authenticated copy is produced — the court held that such a grant is an ancillary grant (analogous to the English "resealing" grants), not a primary grant of probate or letters of administration made under sections 62/64.
  • The court contrasted the statutory requirements for a primary probate application (sections 62, 64, 76 and related provisions) — which require statements of assets, verification by petitioner and witnesses, undertakings to exhibit inventory and render accounts, and bonds under Section 78 — with Section 5's simpler procedure which omits these features. That difference in character was treated as substantive, not merely technical.
  • By analogy with English resealing statutes and rules (described in the opinion), a Section 5 grant is described as contingent on proof of two key matters: (a) that security has been given to cover the estate within both jurisdictions; and (b) that duty has been paid in respect of the estate in the original jurisdiction. Once satisfied, the court's function is largely ministerial in giving ancillary efficacy to the original grant.

3. Interaction of the two ideas (valuation date and ancillary grant):

  • If a Section 5 grant were itself to be treated as a probate grant for duty purposes, a petitioner applying under Section 5 would have to file a Schedule 3 affidavit in that court and the value would be fixed as of that later application date. The court examined whether Section 5 requires the Schedule 3 affidavit and whether the Article 11 duty attaches to Section 5 grants.
  • The court concluded Section 5 grants are not grants of probate or letters of administration in the character contemplated by Article 11; rather they are ancillary. Consequently, Section 5 grants are not themselves the primary occasion on which probate duty must be regarded as payable.
  • Given that (i) an original application under sections 62/64 requires a valuation of the whole estate and (ii) Section 5 is ancillary to give efficacy to that prior grant, the court held that the effective date for valuation (for the portion of the estate not assessed in the province where the ancillary grant is sought) must be the date of the original application (the grant under the District Judge of Midnapore), i.e., 11 April 1916 in this case.

4. Statutory construction principle for taxing statutes:

  • The court applied the strict approach to taxing statutes articulated in Partington v. Attorney General and Attorney General v. Earl of Selborne — if the taxed person fits the natural words of the statute he must be taxed; conversely, if outside those words the Crown fails. That principle reinforced interpreting the applicable provisions according to their natural meaning in the fiscal context.

5. Practical conclusion: The court held that, in the facts before it, probate duty on the properties which were not assessed in the Midnapore court must be regulated by the value as at the date of the original grant in the Midnapore court (11 April 1916), not by the date of the High Court application under Section 5 or a later affidavit date. The court noted lingering uncertainty about whether the whole probate duty was exigible at the time of the original grant, but found there was no escape from the conclusion that duty on the entire estate "was payable on the grant of probate made by the District Judge of Midnapore" and that the valuation date for the ancillary proceedings should be the date of that original grant.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court ruled that the court-fees (probate duty) must be regulated by the value of the estate as at the date of the original grant by the District Judge of Midnapore — 11 April 1916.

Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):

  • The valuation date for the properties in respect of which administration under section 5 was sought is fixed as 11 April 1916 (the date of the original Midnapore grant), not the date of the later High Court application or the date of the petitioner's later affidavit.
  • The court accepted the Registrar's enquiry framework and proceeded on the basis that probate duty on the whole estate likely to come into the executor's hand was payable on the original grant (although the court acknowledged that whether the duty was exigible or payable at that earlier time is a difficult question and did not decide every aspect of exigibility).
  • The Registrar had computed a net estate value and a court-fee/duty figure: Registrar concluded net true value Rs. 64,87,085; court-fee payable Rs. 1,94,612-8-0; prior payment Rs. 19,323-4-0; deficit Rs. 1,75,289-4-0. The opinion deals with the legal principle governing the date of valuation; the detailed valuation adjustments noted by the Registrar were not replicated in the reported portion of the judgment.
  • Ross, J. expressly agreed both to the valuation and to the reasoning set out by Das, J.
  • No broader novel legal principle was asserted beyond the interpretative conclusions drawn from existing statutes and authorities; the judgment primarily resolves the valuation-date question for the case at hand and interprets the character of Section 5 grants as ancillary/resealing in nature for Court Fees Act purposes.

This summary is confined strictly to the matters addressed in the reported portions of the opinion; the opinion itself indicates that "the rest of the judgment dealing with different items and their valuation is not material for reporting."

Show all summary ...

Das, J.:— The material facts are as follows:—Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deb, who was possessed of considerable property both in the District of Midnapur, in the Presidency of Bengal and in the District of Singhbhum in the province of Bihar and Orissa, died on the 1st March, 1916, having prior thereto made and published his last Will and Testament, whereof be appointed the petitioner his sole executor. In the course the petitioner applied for probate of the Will of the Testator in the Court of the District Judge of Midnapur and on the 11th April, 1916, filed an affidavit of valuation of the properties lying within the jurisdiction of that court. It is necessary to state that though the fact was disclosed that there were assets belonging to the testator which were situated in a district other than the Midnapur District, he was not required to file, and did not file an affidavit in the form set forth in Schedule 3 of the Court Fees Act. The court fixed the value of the properties situate within the jurisdiction of that court at Rs. 45,879-1-1½ and directed the petitioner to pay probate duty on the value so found.

2. On the 15th March, 1919, the petitioner applied under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act, to the District Delegate, Singhbhum, for letters of administration in respect of the properties within the jurisdiction of that Court and valued the properties at about 7 lakhs of rupees. The District Delegate called for a valuation from the officer in charge of the estate as the estate was under the management under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act. The officer valued the estate at about 98 lakhs of rupees and the applicant was directed to prove his case as to the true value of the estate. The applicant thereupon withdrew his application and on the 16th August, 1919, presented an application in this court for letters of administration under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act. This application was not supported by an affidavit by the petitioner himself as required by the form set out in Schedule 3 of the Court Fees Act. Be was requited to file an affidavit in the form required by law and be filed that affidavit on the 7th January, 1920. According to this affidavit the not value of the estate is Rs. 6,82,334. This court granted letters of administration to the petitioner on the 28th January, 1920, and under the provision of S. 19H(iv) of the Court Fees Act, gave notice of the application to the Board of Revenue as the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority for Bihar and Orissa. The Board of Revenue apparently asked the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum to hold an enquiry into the matter. The Deputy Commissioner having held an enquiry, asked the petitioner to amend the valuation. The petitioner having refused to do so, the Collector, under S. 19H(iv) of the Act, reported to this court that the proper value of the property, in respect of which the grant of administration was sought, was Rs. 35,29,255, and moved this court to hold an enquiry into the true value of the property. This court on the 17th November, 1920, under S. 19H(iv), authorized the Registrar of the High Court to hold the enquiry under S. 19H(v). The learned Registrar of this court has held an elaborate enquiry Into the matter and has come to the conclusion that the net true value of the estate is Rs. 64,87,085. In his opinion the court-fee payable by the petitioner is Rs. 1,94,612-8.0. The court-fee or duty already paid being Rs. 19,323.4.0, he has acme to the conclusion that the deficit for which the grantee of the letters of administration is liable is Rs. 1,75,289-4-0. We have now to consider the report of the learned Registrar.

3. The first question which we have to consider is what is the date contemplated by the Court Fees Act as the point of time at which the value is to be assessed? The extreme contention on the part of the petitioner is that the date contemplated by the Act for the assessment is the date of the death of the testator, that is to say, the 1st March, 1916. The extreme contention on behalf of the Crown is that date must be the date when the petitioner filed his affidavit of valuation in this court, that is to say, 3rd January, 1920. It both these contentions fall, then there are two other dates, which may be considered in this connection, namely, the 11th April, 1916, when the petitioner filed his affidavit of valuation in the Midnapore District Court, and the 16th August, 1919, when the petitioner filed his application in this court without the affidavit of valuation by the petitioner. We are of opinion that the date cannot be the date of the death of the tastator. There is very little doubt that the provisions in the Court Fees Act relating to probate duties are founded on 55 Geo. III, c. 184, which was the statute in force in England before the Finance Act, 1894, came into operation. It was held in the case of Doed Richards v. Evans(1) that where land has been improved in value by building, between the owner's death and the grant of administration to his estate, stamp duty on the letters of administration is payable for the improved value. In the argument before the court reliance was placed on the following passage from Gwynne on the Law Relating to the Duties on Probate and Letters of Administration:—

“The Commissioner of stamps require all rents interest and dividends from the death of the testator of intestate to the date of the probate or letters of administration to be included in the estimate upon which duty is paid; but it is to be observed that there hag been no Judicial decision upon the point and that counsel of great eminence have held a different opinion.”

4. The court rejected the contention and held that “the improvement is inseparably part of that which the deceased had, and of which administration was granted, and that the court cannot enter into the consideration of the value at the time of his decease”. Now looking to the form of valuation as set out in schedule 3 of the Court Fees Act, it is remarkable what a striking resemblance there is between the affidavit as required by the Commissioner of stamps under 55 Gec. III, c. 184 and the affidavit as required under the Court Fees Act. The third paragraph of the affidavit as set out in schedule 3 is as follows:—

“I further say that the said assets, exclusive only of such last mentioned items, but inclusive of all rents, interest, dividends, and increased values since the date of the death of the said deceased, are under the value of………………….”

5. The words, “rents, interest and dividends” are obviously taken from the form as was followed in England under 55 Geo. III, c. 184 and the words “increased value” seem to have been taken directly from the case just cited. In the case of Bell v. Master in Equity of the Supreme Court of Victoria(2) the essential distinction between a profit bate duty and a succession duty was pointed out. It was held that probate duty is a stamp duty payable on what is supposed to be the value of the property the subject of the probate at the time it is granted. An examination of the form of affidavit as set out in Schedule 3 of the Court Fees Act makes the position of the Grown on this point unassailable. I have already referred to the third paragraph of the affidavit which makes it perfectly clear that the value of the estate most be the value at the time of the affidavit. A close examination of Annexure A leads to the same conclusion. For instance, as regards property in Government securities transferable at the Public Debt Office the petitioner is asked to state the description and value at the price of the day, which means the price at the date of the application. So with regard to property in public companies, I have no doubt whatever that the true value of the estate must be its value at the date of the application for pro bate or of letters of administration.

6. I have next to consider whether the stamp in this case is to be regulated by the value of the property at the time when the application was first made in the Court of the District Judge of Midnapore. The solution of this problem must depend on two questions: first, on the question whether the petitioner making an application under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act was required under the law to file an affidavit of valuation in the form set forth in Schedule 3 of the Court Fees Act: and secondly, on the question whether the petitioner applying for probate in the Court of the District Judge of Midnapore was bound to pay probate duty in respect of all the assets that were likely to come into his band, and not merely in respect of those assets which were affected by the grant of the probata. If it appears on a construction of the relevant sections of the Probate and Administration Act and the Court Fees Act that the petitioner was bound to pay court-fees on his application for probate for all the assets that were likely to come into his hand, that is to say, assets for and in respect of which the probate was granted, then there is all the less reason for thinking that the legislature intended the petitioner to pay probate duty again on his application under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act.

7. The provisions relating to the grant of probate or letters of administration are to be found in the Probata and Administration Act, but the provisions relating to probate duty are to be found in the Court Fats Act. An application for probate is made under Section 62 of the Act and the applicant applying for probate is required, by the express provision of the statute to state amongst other things, first, the amount of assets, which are likely to come to his hand, and, secondly, when the application is to the District Judge and any portion of the assets likely to come to the petitioner's hand is situate in another province, the amount of such assets in each province and the District Judges within whose jurisdiction such assets are. The District Judge has power to grant probata under Section 76 of the Act and by the express provision of S. 76 the grant is of the

“administration of the property and credits of the said deceased, and in any way concerning his Will”

and the executor is required to give an undertaking be administer the same and to make a full and true inventory of the said property and credits and exhibit the same in the Court of the District Judge within six months from the date of the grant or within such further time as the court may from time to time appoint and to render to the same court a true account of the said property and credits within one year from the same date or within such further time as the court may from time to time appoint. It will be noticed, therefore, that the grant is in form an unlimited one though it is quite clear from S. 59 that the probata has affect only over the pro-party movable or Immovable of the deceased, in the province in which the same is granted. It follows, therefore, on a construction of Sections 62, 76 and 59 of the Probata and Administration Act that though the grant is in respect of all the assets which are likely to come into the executor's bands, still it has effect over the property situate in the province in which the grant is made. Section 5 of the Act provides that when a Will has been proved and deposited in a court of competent jurisdiction, situated beyond the limits of the province, whether in the British dominions, or in a foreign country, and a properly authenticated copy of the Will is produced, Utters of administration may be granted who a copy of such copy annexed. In my view the grant made under S. 5 is only an ancillary grant in order to give efficacy to the grant already made by another court of competent jurisdiction and the procedure laid down in section 5 is analogous to the procedure in England which enables the Probata Court in England to re-seal Sectch, Irish or Colonial grants. Grant under S. 6 is in no sense a grant of probate or letters of administration either with or without Will annexed.

8. I now come to the Court Fees Art. Article 11, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act provide for foes payable on probata of a Will or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed and it expressly states that such tea is payable on the amount or value of the property in respect of which the grant of probate or letters of administration is made. It will appear, therefore, on a literal construction of Article 11, that probate duty is payable on the annual or value of the property in respect of which the grant of probate or letters of administration is made, and not on the amount of value of the property affected by the grant of probata or letters of administration. The distinction is important. As I have shown before, the District Judge is competent to grant probate or letters of administration in respect of all the properties wherever situate that are likely to come into the hand of the executor or administrator as the case may be though the gnat by its own force only affects properties situate in the province in which the rent is made. On a literal construction of Article 11, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act one is entitled to come to the conclusion that court-fee was payable on the amount or value of all the properties that were dealt with by the Will of the testator and not on the amount or value of she property affected by the grant of probata. It that construction be adopted than clearly court-fec is not payable in respect of the grant made under Section 5 of the probata and Administration Act.

9. But although this result would follow on a literal construction of Article 11, it will be necessary to see, before giving effect to the construction, how the courts of law have construed the sweeping words to be found in the English statute. The English statute is 55 Geo. III, c. 184 and that statute made duty payable on property in respect of which probate was granted. The identical words have been used in Article 11, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. The two statutes are, therefore, in pari materia and it is permissible to consider the cases decided under the English Statute in dealing with a case under the Indian statute.

10. The first case which I shall consider is Attorney General v. Dimond(3). The question in this case was whether the executor was bound to pay probate duty on the amount of certain assets belonging to the estate of the testator which at the time of the death of the testator were lying in France. The executor proved the Will of the testator in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury and paid probate duty on the properties in England. But it appears that by Virtue of the probate granted to him by the Prerogative Court of Canterbury he ??? in recovering the assets which ware lying in France. It was argued on behalf of the Crown that as the executor got possession of the assets lying in France Under the probate granted in England and was actually administering those assets in England, probate duty was by virtue of 56 Geo. III, c. 184 payable in respect of those foreign assets. The contention was negatived by the court. It was pointed out by Lord Lyndhurst, delivering the judgment, of the court, that the only question in the case was for or in respect of what estates and effects was the probate granted in the case before him. He showed that the probate was granted in respect of the effects which were within the jurisdiction of the spiritual judge at the death of the testator and that the spiritual judge never exercised any I jurisdiction in respect of the assets outside his jurisdiction. As in the opinion of the learned Judge probate was not granted lot and in respect of the foreign assets, he held that probate duty was not payable in respect of those assets.

11. The next case is Attorney General v. Hope(4). In this case the testator died in England leaving assets situate both in England and in America. The executor upon obtaining probate paid duty to the Grown limited to the value of the effects in England, but proceeded to collect and administer all the personal estate of the testator both in England and in America. The question arose whether the executor was bound to pay probate duty on the American assets.

12. The case is interesting because the extent of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in former times in testamentary matters was carefully examined by the Lord Chancellor. He pointed out that the ancient practice of granting probate by the Ecclesiastical Courts arose from the interest that the ordinary had in the personality of individuals to be applied to pious uses for the safety of the souls of those individuals. He showed that the necessity of probate arose from the fact that there came a time when the ordinary had to relinquish the right to the property and vest it in the executor or administrator by granting probate or administration. This was according to the Lord Chancellor probably the origin of the probate duty which gave a great interest in the personality to the clergy. That being so, and the probate duty being payable by the express provision of the statute upon “the estate and effects for or in respect of which such probate, letters of administration, etc. respectively shall be granted”, the question which the Lord Chancellor had to investigate was this: Did the ordinary ever lay claim to anything beyond the goods of the deceased in his jurisdiction at the time of his death? Having regard to the history of these matters it was quite clear that his right to grant administration was co-extensive with, but not more extensive than his right to lay claim I to the goods of the deceased dying within his jurisdiction. If he could lay claim to anything beyond the goods in his jurisdiction at the time of the death of the testator, clearly he had power to grant probate in respect of such goods beyond his jurisdiction and accordingly probate duty by the express provision of the statute would attach to such goods. If on the other hand the ordinary never did lay claim to anything beyond the goods in his jurisdiction, then his power to grant administration in respect of goods beyond his jurisdiction never did exist and accordingly probate duty would, not attach to such goods. Having examined the matter with very great care the Lord Chancellor came to the conclusion that the ordinary never did lay any claim to goods outside his jurisdiction. That being so his conclusion was that as he could not grant administration in respect of goods outside is jurisdiction, probate duty could not attach to such goods.

13. The point established by this decision is that probate duty is payable in respect of the property as to which a probate is granted; not in respect of the property which may be ultimately administered by the executor. But it is well to guard ourselves against a possible misconception that may arise from this statement of the law. When it was said that probate duty is not payable in respect of properties which are not the subject-matter of the grant, but are ultimately administered by the executor, all that is meant is this: that such properties are not taxable because in respect of them probate was not granted. You may ultimately administer the assets either by virtue of the probate, or in spite of the probate, because the foreign bank has not closely scrutinized the grant. Where the grant covers the assets, probate duty is always payable. But to take the assets out of the statute it must appear that the assets which are ultimately administered by the executor were altogether outside the grant. As the Lord Chancellor in the case cited said, the whole question is—whether in respect of the foreign assets a probate was granted?. If it was, than clearly probate duty was payable; if it was not, then equally clearly probate duty was not payable.

14. It will appear, therefore, that the test adopted both in this case and in the preceding case was this: Was there a grant of probata in respect of the assets which you are seeking to tax?. The test was not whether the grant affected those assets? If the same test be applied to the present case (and the words in the English statute are identical with those employed in the Indian statute), it would appear that as there was a grant of probate by the District Judge of Midnapore in respect of the properties as to which Administration under Section 5 of the probata and Administration Act has now been granted, probate duty was payable in respect of these properties before the grant of probate was made by the District Judge of Midnapore. It is quite clear that, so far as these cases are concerned, the only test which they lay down is this: Was there a grant in respect of the assets outside the jurisdiction?

15. In the case of Attorney General v. Bouwens(5) both the above cases were tally considered. Lord Abinger, C.B delivering the judgment of the court took the cases of Attorney General v. Dimond and Attorney General v. Hope (ubi sup) as settling the law that probate duty is to be regulated, not by the value of all the assets which an executor or administrator may ultimately administer by virtue of the Will or letters of administration, but by the value of such part as is at the death of the deceased within the jurisdiction or the spiritual Judge by whom the probate or letters of administration are granted. Now it may be pointed put at once that in the cases cited by Lord Abinger the foreign assets which were ultimately administered by the executor were so administered not by virtue bl the probate at all, but because the French Bank in the first case and the American authorities in the second also made over the assets to the executor on the production of the probate. Those, cases undoubtedly proceeded on the view that probate duty was not payable in respect of the foreign assets because there was no grant of probate in respect of them; not because the grant did not affect those assets.

16. The case of Blackwood v. Queen(6), however raises some difficulty. It suggests that the English courts confined probate duty to the property directly affected by the probate notwithstanding the sweeping general words of the statutes which imposed it, the reason being that it was thought that the legislature, could not intend to levy a tax on the grant of an instrument in respect of the property which that instrument did not affect. This case clearly makes a distinction between properties which are the subject-matter of the grant and properties which are affected by the grant and lays down that as the legislature could not have intended to tax properties which could not be reached by the probate the perfectly general word used in the statute must be read as limited to such estate as was affected by the grant of probate. This case was followed in Commissioners of Stomps v. Hope(7).

17. Speaking entirely for myself I have very grave doubt whether Blackwood v. Quean intended to decide anything more than this, that as a subordinate legislature is not competent by legislation to authorize a court to grant probate in respect of assets situate outside the jurisdiction of the legislature the grant made by the court under the authority of the legislature, though it may be expressed in perfectly general words, must be deemed to be a grant in respect of assets within the jurisdiction of the legislature. The question involved in the case was this: whether personal estate belonging to a person who died domiciled in the colony of Victoria was liable to duty under the statute passed by the Victorian Legislature, though that estate was situate in New South Wales and New Zealand. The Supreme Court of Victoria had directed judgment to be entered for the Grown for the amount found to be due on so much of the property as was of moveable nature so as to fall within the maxim “mobilia sequntur personam”. Its judgment was based on the view that though prima facie the expressions “personal estate” and “real estate” refer to estates in Victoria, still the legislature must be deemed to have intended that the duty shall be paid upon all real and personal estates whatsoever which are to contemplation of law situate in Victoria. As Lord Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, pointed one, in their strict and literal meaning the words clearly included all personal estate, Wherever it might be, and not personal estate in Victoria; and, by their prima facia meaning, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court intended to indicate the ??? they are ??? to bear after the subject-matter of the statute is ascertained, and before legal rules and maxims are applied to it. Lord Hobhouse rejected the contention based on the maxim “mobilia sequntur personam”, and proceeded to find a basis for a substantial modification of the general words used in the statute. Having examined all the relevant provisions of the statute he came to the conclusion that by the terms “personal” and “real” estate, were meant personal and real estate in Victoria. He made no distinction whatever between personality and reality, for, as he pointed but, personality in England was as far beyond the direct power of the Victorian Legislature as reality in England. The conclusion at which he arrived was expressed in these words: “Their Lordships think that, in imposing a duty of this nature, the Victorian Legislature also was contemplating the property which was under its own band, end did not intend to levy a tax in respect of property beyond its jurisdiction and they hold, that the general expressions which import the contrary ought to receive the qualification for which the appellant contends, and that the statement of personal property to be made by the executor under S. 7, sub-section (2) of the Act, should be confined to that property which the probate enables him to administer”. In my judgment, this case is not an authority for the view that probata duty is payable only in respect of assets affected by the grant, but it is an authority for the view that probate duty is payable in respect of the assets which having regard to the power of the legislature, the probate is intended to affect. The distinction is an important one and ought not to be ignored. The Victorian Legislature has no power to affect properties situate outside Victoria; therefore probate granted by the Victorian Court under authority conferred on it by the Victorian Legislature one only be in respect of properties in Victoria. But there is no doubt that the Indian Legislature can give authority to any court in India, as it has given under Section 76 of the Probate and Administration Act, to grant probate in respect of the properties situate in India. This case is an authority for the view that, notwithstanding the sweeping general words of the statute, probate duty can be imposed only in respect of property under the hand of the Indian Legislature, and not in respect of property beyond its jurisdiction. The proposition, as stated in this form, does not touch the present case. I am inclined to think that probate duty was payable in respect of the entire assets of the testator including those situate in Singhbhum on the probate granted by the District Judge of Midnapore.

18. Now let me deal with the same question from another aspect. Is the petitioner making an application under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act required, under the law, to file an affidavit of valuation in the form set forth in Schedule 3 of the Court Fees Act? It he is so required, then there is no escape from the conclusion that the point of time at which the value of the estate is to be assessed is the date when the petitioner filed his affidavit of valuation in this court, that is to say, the 3rd January, 1920. But if he is not so required then clearly we must look to another point of time at which the value of the estate ought to be assessed.

19. The provision as to probate duty in India is to be found in Article 11, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. By the express provision of that article probate duty is payable on “probate of a Will or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed”. The problem accordingly narrows down to this: Is the grant made by the court under Section 5 of the probata and Administration Act a grant act a probate of a Will or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed? If it be such a grant than probata duty is clearly payable on it and the court-fee must be regulated by the value of the property at the time when the application was made to this court under section 5 of the Act. If, however, the grant under S. 5 is not a grant of probata of a Will or letters of administration with or without the Will, annexed, than clearly no duty is payable on such a grant and we must consequently seek for another principle on which to assess the properties which were not assessed at the time of the grant of probate by the District Judge of Midnapore.

20. Section 5 of the probata and Administration Act provides as follows:—

“When a Will has been proved and deposited in a court of competent jurisdiction, situated beyond the limits of the Province, whether is the British dominions, or in a foreign country, and a properly authenticated copy of the Will is produced, letters of administration may be granted with a copy of such copy annexed”

21. Clearly the grant under S. 5 is not a grant of probata or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed, but it is a grant of letters of administration with ??? copy of a properly authenticated copy of the Will annexed. If the argument ??? on nothing more than a mara technicality still the petitioner would be entitled to argue that probate duty is not by able on a grant made under Section 6 of the Probate and Administration Act.

22. The principle on which fiscal legislation ??? to be construed was considered in ??? case of Partington v. The Attorney General(8). The facts were as follows:— ??? 1819, one Mrs. Shard died in England ??? leaving a considerable estate in England and leaving as her next of kin ??? Isabel Cook, the wife of Ellis Cook, ??? of whom bad always been domiciled the United States. Mrs. Cook made no ??? to take out letters of administration to the estate of Mrs. Shard and as no one applied for a grant of letters of administration the Solicitors to the Treasury took out letters of administration for the purpose of administering her estate. Mrs. Cook died in 1825 without having reduced into possession the properties which were of Mrs. Shard. Her husband, Mr. Ellis Cook, died in 1840 also without having taken any steps to reduce into possession the properties to which his wife became entitled, upon Mrs. Shard's death. After the death of Ellis Cook his children gave Partington a power of attorney to recover from the Solicitors to the Treasury the properties which had belonged to Mrs. Shard and which they claimed under their mother. Partington than took out separate letters of administration to the estate, first of Ellis Cook and then of Isabel Cook. He then instituted an administration suit in Chancery against the Solicitors to the Treasury, and the court made the Solicitors chargeabla with the principal sums of the assets of Mrs. Shard and also with the accretions at per cent interest on such principal sum since they had some into the hands of the Solicitors to the Treasury. The letters of administration had been at first obtained as upon assets of a nominal amount, but when the principal sums and the accretions had been ascertained, Partington applied to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to that ad valorem stamp duty on the letters of administration. The Commissioners claimed that stamp duty should be calculated on a value including all accretions from the death of Isabel Cook to the date of the administration. With this question we are not at present concerned. The Commissioners also claimed that the grant of the administration for the affects of the late Ellis Cook who survived his wife should be, stamped at the same rate. In other words, they claimed that a doable duty was payable.

23. It was forcibly contended before the House of Lords that although on the latter of the law the Commissioners were entitled to a doable duty still there should be an equitable construction in favour of the subject inasmuch as the legislature could never have intended to levy doable duty on the same death. To this argument Lord Cairns replied as follows:—“I am not at all sore that, in a case of this kind—a fiscal case—form is not amply sufficient because, as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is tree, he waver apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible, in any statute what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute”. The same rule was followed in Attorney General v. Earl of Selborne(9) Collins M.B delivering the judgment of the court after quoting the passage from the judgment of Lord Cairns said as follows:—

“Therefore, the Crown fails if the case is not brought within the words of the statute, interpreted according to their natural meaning; and it there is a case which is not covered by the statute so interpreted that can only be cared by legislation, and not by an attempt to construe the statute benevolently in favonr the Crown”.

24. Now interpreting the words used in S. 5 in their natural meaning can we say that the grant of letters of administration with a copy of a properly authenticated copy of the Will is the same as a grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed? In my view the question is not one of technicality that of substance. The grant contemplated in Article 11, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act is a grant made on an application under section 62 and Section 64 of the Probate and Administration Act, that is to say, a grant made on an application to establish the Will or the representative character of the applicant. The grant under section 5 does not pretend to establish either the Will or the representative character of the applicant. It is merely an ancillary grant, giving efficacy to a grant already made by the court on an application under section 62 of the Act. It we apply certain tests which are ordinarily applied be grants of probate or letters of administration it will be seen that a grant made under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act does not partake of the character of a grant made in an application under section 62 and section 64 of the Act. In the first place an application for probate or for letters of administration must state certain necessary facts which are not required to be stated in an application under section 5 of the Act. For instance, the applicant under section 62 must state the amount of assets which are likely to come to his hand, and when the application is to the District Judge and any portion of the assets likely to come to his hand is situate in another province, the amount of such assets in each province and the District Judge's within whose jurisdiction such assets are. It will be noticed that these facts are not required to be stated in an application under S. 5. In my view the necessity for stating these facts in an application under S. 62 or Section 64 of the Act is this, that without these facts it is impossible to assess the proper court-fees payable on the grant, I am aware that Strachey, J., has taken a different view In re Ezekiel Joshua v. Abraham(10). His view is that the object of the section in requiring the executor to state in his application for probate the assets that are likely to come into his hand was to tarnish a basis for testing the accuracy of the subsequent inventory and accounts. Now he concedes that under the statute 55 Geo. III, c. 184 such a statement is required “in order that the proper and full stamp duty may be paid on such probate”. I can see no reason whatever for assuming that, the legislature in this country had another object in view in requiring the executor to make a statement of the nature which I have stated. I cannot understand how a statement of this kind can be a check upon the accuracy of the subsequent inventory and accounts unless it was intended by the legislature that the grant of probate should be in respect of the assets stated in the petition as likely to come into the petitioner's hand. I think Section 19(1) of the Court Fees Act makes the matter perfectly dear. That section provides that no order entitling the petitioner to the grant of probate or letters of administration shall be made upon an application for such grant until the petitioner has filed in court a valuation of the property in the form set forth in the third schedule and the court is satisfied that the tee mentioned in No. 11 of the first schedule has been paid on such valuation. It is not unreasonable to assume that the affidavit of valuation should correspond with the statement in the application for probate as to the assets likely to come into the petitioner's hand. It is not necessary, however, to determine this point except to say that whereas an application under S. 62 and S. 64 for probate does require the petitioner to make certain statements as to assets, an application under Section 5 of the Act does not require the petitioner so to do. In the next place a petition for probate or letters of administration must be subscribed by the petitioner and his pleider and must be verified by the petitioner in a particular manner and where the application is for probate or for letters of administration with the Will annexed the petition must in addition be verified by at least one of the witnesses to the Will when procurable in a particular manner mentioned in Section 67 of the Act. There is nothing whatever to indicate that these provisions apply to an application under Section 5 of the Act. In the third place the person obtaining a grant of probate or of letters of administration is required by the express provision of the legislature to give an undertaking to the court making the grant to administer the property and credits of the deceased and exhibit the same in the court within six months from the date of the grant and also to render to the same court a true account of the said property and credits within one year from the same date. There is no such undertaking required in a grant under Section 5 of the Act. The distinction is important. Its effect is to vest the District Judge with complete jurisdiction over the executor in all matters relating to inventory and accounts even in respect of properties situate outside the jurisdiction. Lastly the person to whom any grant of letters of administration is committed and, if the judge so direct, any person to whom probate is granted, is required by Section 78 of the Act to give a bond to the Judge of the District Court with one or more surety or sureties, engaging for the due collection, getting in, and administering the estate of the deceased. This again vests the District Judge with jurisdiction over the administrator or if the Judge so direct, the executor. The court making a grant under Section 5 of the Act has no power what ever to require a person to give a bond as required by Section 78 of the Act.

25. What the is the character of the grant made under Section 6 of the Act? It will be interesting in this connection to deal with the English procedure as to re-sealing grants under statutes which may conveniently be called Resealing Statutes. I shall presently show that the procedure under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act is analogous to the English procedure under the Resealing Statutes.

26. I will take the case of English grants in respect of properties situate both in England and in Ireland. Before the statutes to which I shall presently refer, grant made in England was ineffectual so as to affect any assets in Ireland or Scotland. It was necessary for the grantee to take out another grant of administration in Ireland or Scotland it the testator or the intestate left assets in Ireland or Scotland. By 20 and 21 Vict c. 79. S. 94 it was provided that

“From and after the period at which the Act shall come into operation, when any probate of letters of administration to be granted by the Court of Probate in England shall be produced and a copy thereof deposited with the Registrars of the Court of Probate in Ireland, such probata or letters of administration shall be sealed with the seal of the said last mentioned Court, and being duly stamped shall be of the like force and effect and have the same operation in Ireland as it had been originally granted by the Court of Probate in Ireland”.

27. By 22 and 23 Vict c. 31, S. 25 it was enacted that

“Letter of administration granted by the Court of Probate in England shall not be resealed, under section 91 of 90 and 91 Vict c. 79 until a certificate has been filed under the hand of the Registrar of the Court of Probate is England, that a bondhaa been given to the Judge of the Court of probate in England in a earn sufficient in amount to cover the property in Ireland as well as in England in respect of which such administration is required to be ???

28. Order 79, rule 74, of the Rules of the Supreme Court (Ireland) 1905, directs that the

“Sale is not to be affixed to any probate or letters of administration granted in England, so as to give operation thereto as if the grant had been made in Ireland, unless it appears iron a certificate of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue or their proper officer, that estate duty has been paid in respect of the personal estate and effects of which the deceased died possessed in Inland.”

29. This certificate is obtainable on application made by letter to the Secretary, State Duty Office, Somerset House, London, setting out the Irish property and asking for a certificate that the duty thereon has been paid. It will appear, therefore, that the procedure for getting an English grant resealed in Ireland is this: the applicant arms himself with a properly authenticated copy of the Will or an “exemplification” as it is technically called and proof of two important facts, first that he has given security to cover the estate of the deceased in Ireland as well as in England, and, secondly, that he has paid the duty in respect of the estate of the deceased in Ireland as well as in England, and then he applies to have the English grant resealed in Ireland. The duty of the Irish Court then becomes “ministerial merely, to grant ancillary probate or letters of administration”. It will be observed that there is no power in the Irish Court, in circumstances such as these, to hold an enquiry into the valuation of the estate of the deceased in Ireland. Exactly the same procedure is laid down by various statutes for having an Irish grant resealed in England or Scotland, or a Rootch grant resealed either in England or Ireland or an English grant resealed in Soot land, or a Colonial grant resealed in England, Soot-land or Ireland. It seems to me that the jurisdiction conferred on a court in India under section 5 of the Probate and Administration Act is analogous to that conferred on the courts in England, Scotland or Ireland by the resealing statutes to which I have referred. The court has no power, under S. 5, either to grant probate or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed. It has power only to grant letters of administration with a copy of a properly authenticated copy of the Will annexed. The language employed by the legislature under S. 6 is not accidents but is deliberate, and enables the court, “following the English law” as Farran, C.J, said in Bhaurao Dadajirao v. Lakshmibai(11), “to dispense with the necessity of proof of the original Will.”

30. Is a Court then bound to grant administration under S. 5 when an application is made for it? The word “may” indicates that there is some discretion in the court to refuse the grant. What than are the considerations which must weigh with the court in either granting or refusing to grant administration under-S. 5 of the Act? It seems to me that the limitations are exactly those which have by various statutes been imposed on the Resealing Courts in England, Scotland or Ireland. The word “may” has exactly the same operation as section 91 of 30 and 21 Vict c. 79 and Order 79, rule 74, of the Rules of the Supreme Court (Ireland) 1905, and the analogous provisions in the other statutes which have been passed in England. In other words, the court must be satisfied first, that the executor or the administrator has given security to cover the estate of the deceased within the jurisdiction of the court which granted probate or letters of administration as well as that within the jurisdiction of the court asked to mako a grant under section 5 and, secondly, that he has paid the duty in respect of the estate of the deceased within the jurisdiction of the court that granted the probate or letters of administration as well as that within the jurisdiction of the court asked to make a grant under S. 5. When the court is satisfied as to those facts, and it has been shown that the Will has been proved and deposited in a court of competent jurisdiction situate beyond the limits of the province, there is no further discretion left in the court to refuse to make a grant under section 5.

31. Now, as I have shown before, probate duty is not payable in respect of a grant made under section 5 of the Act and yet the court making a grant under S. 5 must be satisfied that probata duty has been paid in respect of the estate of the deceased within the jurisdiction of that court. It must follow, therefore, that either the entire probate duty is payable on the application made under S. 62 or Section 64 of the Act or that the applicant making the application under S. 5 must pay such portion of the probate duty as was not paid at the time of his application under S. 62 or Section 64 of the Act.

32. The question whether the entire probate duty was payable at the time when the application for probate was made to the District Judge of Midnapore is a question of some difficulty and I do not intend to decide it. But there can be no possible room for controversy, having regard to the construction of Section 5, Sections 62 and 64 of the Probate and Administration Act ant Article 11, Schedule I of the Court Fee Act, that probate duty on the entire estate likely to come into the band of the executor was payable on the grant of probate made by the District Judge of Midnapore. It may be that the time for payment is postponed, but it is one thing to say that the time for payment is postponed and another thing to say that no payment was necessary in respect of the properties outside jurisdiction on the grant of probate made by the District Judge of Midnapore. In this case probate was granted for or to respect of the properties not only situate within the jurisdiction of the Midnapore Court but also in respect of properties situate outside the jurisdiction of that court but within British India; but the grant by its own force did not affect the assets outside the jurisdiction until this court under S. 5 gave it efficacy. The grant made by this court under S. 5 was not grant of probate or letters of administration with or without Will annexed but an ancillary grant in order to give efficacy to the grant made by the District Judge of Midnapore. But although the payment of the duty in respect of the properties outside the jurisdiction was postponed, still the duty was payable not on the ancillary grant but on the original grant. Whether the duty on the whole estate was either exigible or payable on the original application at the time of the grant of probate is a difficult question on which much might be said, and the law is far from clear. But it is unnecessary to answer this question explicitly in that form because it is conceded that duty is payable now on the property on which it has not yet been paid and the only question arising on this part of the case is as to the period of the valuation. Now in view of these two considerations (1) that the original application is required to be accompanied by a valuation of the whole estate, and (2) that the grant under S. 5 is merely an ancillary grant giving efficacy to the original grant over the estate in this province, it seems to me that the effective date must be the date of the original application and I am fortified in this view by the general consideration that a taxing statute that in case of doubt be construed in favour of the subject. I hold that the court-fees must be regulated by the value of the estate not at the dat of the application to this court but at the data of the original grant, that is to say, the 11th April, 1916. [The rest of the judgment dealing with different items and their valuation is not material for reporting.]

33. Ross, J.:— I entirely agree both to the valuation and to the reasoning upon which it has been arrived at.