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C. Shrikishen v. State Of Hyderabad And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, described as a journalist who is also a Barrister and an advocate of the High Court, presented a petition seeking a declaration and the issue of writs (including writs of prohibition) against 26 respondents. The respondents included the State of Hyderabad and the Government of India, Speakers and presiding officers of legislative bodies, several State Chief Ministers and Ministers, and various Congress Committee Presidents and national party officials, as specifically enumerated in the petition.
The petition alleged that the Prime Minister of India (respondent 15) was using his influence to procure the dismemberment of Hyderabad State and its merger of linguistic tracts with neighbouring States (Bombay, Mysore and Andhra). The petitioner contended that such actions would injure the people of Hyderabad generally and would cause him personal injury and distress. He asserted that neither the relevant State Assemblies nor Parliament had jurisdiction to recommend disintegration of Hyderabad, and he challenged the constitutional basis for the proposed Reorganisation Bill and the States Reorganisation Commission's recommendations.
The petitioner prayed for a declaration that the Government of India had no constitutional basis for introducing a draft Reorganisation Bill and sought writs restraining various named respondents from introducing, discussing or otherwise promoting measures for the disintegration of Hyderabad State. A stay petition and affidavit accompanied the petition.
Procedurally, the petition first came before a Bench including one of the judges and Ansari, J. During admission arguments the petitioner fainted and the matter was adjourned over the summer vacation. The petitioner persisted in urging the Court to hear, filed further petitions from hospital and later, and sought urgent consideration when a draft Reorganisation Bill was introduced in Parliament. The matter was ultimately heard afresh by the present Bench after the earlier member was on leave.
The Court recorded that it had repeatedly indicated to the petitioner difficulties about admission and the High Court's jurisdiction to grant the writs sought, but the petitioner focused on the merits and historical/political arguments rather than satisfying the Court about maintainability and territorial competence. The Court also noted the petitioner's refusal to amend the petition when invited to do so.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue writs against the several respondents, many of whom resided outside the territorial limits of the Court.
- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to issue writs (such as prohibition, certiorari or mandamus) to a Legislature, Parliament, their Speakers/Chairmen, or officers acting in their legislative capacity.
- Whether the petition was maintainable at all in the form presented, given the claimed relief and the parties sought to be restrained.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The Prime Minister (respondent 15) was alleged to be influencing Ministers and members of the Hyderabad Assembly to agree to the dismemberment of Hyderabad State and to press other Assemblies to pass resolutions for disintegration.
- The petitioner asserted that attempts to trifurcate Hyderabad would injure the people politically, socially and economically and would harm him personally (mental shock, financial injury).
- He contended that neither the State Assemblies nor Parliament had jurisdiction to recommend or effect the disintegration of Hyderabad State and that such acts would be illegal and ultra vires the Constitution.
- He relied on historical events and alleged assurances (including references to assurances by Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru and the absence of a convened Constituent Assembly) to argue that Hyderabad had not legally merged into the Indian Union and that the Rajpramukhship and Hyderabad's status were constitutionally protected.
- Reliefs sought included declarations against the Government of India and writs of prohibition restraining specified respondents (including central and state officers and presiding officers of legislative bodies) from introducing or discussing the draft Reorganisation Bill or from influencing others to promote Hyderabad's disintegration.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of specific legal arguments advanced by the respondents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 | The High Court's writs cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction; persons/authorities to whom writs are addressed must be within those territories (by residence or location). | The Court relied on this authority to conclude that it could not issue writs against many respondents who resided outside its territorial jurisdiction; this supported dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. |
| K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207 | Consideration of whether the location of the authority and the subject-matter affect a High Court's jurisdiction to issue writs; discussed territorial and subject-matter limits. | The decision was discussed as a related authority; the Court noted its principles and how the Supreme Court distinguished cases and applied territorial considerations in determining jurisdiction. |
| Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, AIR 1943 PC 164 | Referenced as an earlier authority distinguished by the Supreme Court in subsequent jurisdictional rulings. | The Court recorded that the Supreme Court had distinguished this case when resolving the territorial jurisdiction questions in later authorities. |
| Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. Venkatachalam Potti, AIR 1956 SC 246 | High Court may have jurisdiction to issue writs to persons within its territories who, though acting as agents, do acts not authorised by law or violations of fundamental rights. | The Court cited this case to highlight the limits and exceptions of territorial jurisdiction, but concluded that it did not assist the petitioner because many respondents were outside the territorial limits of the High Court. |
| King v. Legislative Committee of Church Assembly, Ex parte Haynes Smith, (1928) 1 KB 411 | Courts will not restrain a legislative assembly (or its committee) in the exercise of legislative functions; writs of prohibition and certiorari do not lie to control legislative acts in their legislative capacity. | The Court used this authority as an analogy to support the proposition that courts cannot interfere with legislative bodies or their officers in respect of their legislative functions, reinforcing that the writs sought against legislative bodies or presiding officers were not available. |
| Rex v. Dunehee, (1950) 2 All ER 741 (Lord Goddard) | Mandamus is discretionary ("neither a writ of course nor a writ of right") and will be granted where a duty is public and specially affects rights of an individual and there is no more appropriate remedy. | The Court cited this principle to explain the discretionary nature of mandamus and to show that even mandamus is not an automatic remedy to control legislative action or the internal conduct of assemblies. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in several connected steps, grounded in territorial jurisdiction principles and constitutional limits on judicial interference with legislative functions:
- Initial admissibility and maintainability: The Court emphasised that, before considering merits, the petitioner had to satisfy the Court that it had jurisdiction to grant the extraordinary writs sought. The petitioner instead concentrated on historical and political arguments about the merits, despite repeated directions to address maintainability and jurisdiction first.
- Territorial jurisdiction: The Court identified a fundamental defect — many respondents (12 to 26 and others) resided outside the territorial limits of the High Court (some in New Delhi, others in jurisdictions of other High Courts). The Court relied on Supreme Court authority to state that a High Court cannot issue writs against persons or authorities outside its territorial jurisdiction. This conclusion was fortified by citation to Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao and related Supreme Court decisions that clarified the territorial constraint on Article 226 writs.
- Limits and exceptions: The Court examined authorities addressing exceptions and nuances (e.g., where a person within territorial jurisdiction acts as an agent of an outside authority or where subject-matter considerations may bear on jurisdiction). It noted Thangal Kunju Musaliar as recognising limited circumstances in which a High Court may act against persons within its territory even if they act for others, but found these did not cure the petition's defects because many respondents were simply outside the Court's territory and the petitioner refused to amend.
- Non-justiciability of legislative acts: The Court turned to another independent ground: the constitutional bar on judicial interference in the internal legislative processes of Parliament and State Legislatures. It observed Articles 105 and 194 (privileges and powers) and Articles 122 and 212, which prohibit the Court's jurisdiction in respect of exercise of powers by legislative officers in regulating procedure or conduct of business. The Court explained that Speakers, Chairmen and Ministers in their legislative roles are officers protected by these provisions.
- Nature of writs vis-à-vis legislatures: Drawing on authorities (including King v. Legislative Committee of Church Assembly and principles relating to mandamus), the Court explained that writs such as prohibition, certiorari and mandamus are not available to restrain legislative bodies or their officers in the exercise of legislative functions. The Court reiterated that legislative power must be allowed to function without external interference and that courts cannot pre-emptively restrain legislative processes; judicial review is available only after a law has been enacted and a party with locus challenges it on constitutionality.
- Conclusion on maintainability: Combining the territorial incapacity to issue writs against many respondents and the non-justiciability of the legislative actions sought to be restrained, the Court concluded that the petition was not maintainable. The petitioner had been given ample opportunity to address these jurisdictional defects and to amend, but he declined.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Petition dismissed.
Implications:
- The direct effect of the decision is that the petition seeking declarations and writs to restrain the introduction or discussion of the draft Reorganisation Bill and related actions was rejected as not maintainable and incompetent.
- The Court's reasoning rests on two principal legal limitations: (a) a High Court cannot issue writs under Article 226 to persons or authorities residing or located outside its territorial jurisdiction; and (b) courts will not interfere by writ to restrain legislatures, Parliament or their presiding officers in the exercise of legislative functions (writs of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus are not available to control legislative action in advance).
- No assertion of the creation of new precedent is made in the opinion; the decision applies and relies upon existing authorities to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional and non-justiciability grounds.
1. The petitioner a journalist who is also a Barrister and an advocate of this High Court, has presented a petition for declaration and the issue of a writ of prohibition or any other writ or direction to 22 respondents of whom respondents 1 and 12 are respectively the State of Hyderabad and Government of India, New Delhi; respondents 2, 13 and 14 are respectively the Speaker of the Hyderabad Assembly, Speaker of Lok Sabha, Vice-President of Republic of India and Chairman of Rajya Sabha; respondents 3 to 10 are the Chief Minister and Ministers of the Hyderabad Government; respondents 11, 21, 23 and 26 are respectively the Presidents of Hyderabad, Andhra, Mysore and Bombay Pradesh Congress Committees; respondent 18 is the President of the All India Congress; respondents 15, 16 and 17 are respectively the Prime Minister of India, Education Minister and Home Minister of India; respondents 19, 22 and 24 are the Chief Ministers of Andhra, Mysore and Bombay, respondent 20 is the Home Minister of Andhra State while respondent 25 is the Revenue Minister of Bombay State.
2. The allegations in the petition are that the respondent 15 who is the Prime Minister of India is doing everything in his power to influence the Ministers and members of the Hyderabad Assembly to agree to the dismemberment of Hyderabad and the merger of its Maratha, Kannada and Telugu tracts with the adjoining new State units of Bombay, Mysore and Andhra, and that he is trying to force the different Assemblies in Hyderabad, Andhra, Mysore and Bombay to pass resolutions for the disintegration of the Hyderabad State, that the petitioner has drawn attention (as per annexures to the petition) of respondents 15, 16 and is to the undesirability of proceeding with the implementation of the States Reorganisation Committee, but they are paying no heed and that if they succeed in their mala fide attempt to break up and disintegrate the Hyderabad State
“it would not only injure the people of Hyderabad in general politically, socially and economically but it would affect the petitioner most adversely and give him a mental shock to see his land of birth torn asunder by disruptive forces and elements and injure him financially and otherwise.”
3. The petitioner further alleged that neither the Assemblies of Hyderabad, Andhra, Mysore and Bombay nor the Parliament have any jurisdiction or authority to suggest any recommendation regarding disintegration of the State of Hyderabad which according to him
“by all canons of decency, morals, politics and law has got a right to exist and their acts would all be illegal and ultra vires of the Constitution.”
4. After this the petitioner has set out historical facts leading to the Police Action and the alleged assurances and solemn promises of Sardar Patel and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to convene a Constituent Assembly but that Constituent Assembly has not been convened and consequently according to the petitioner:
“it cannot be said legally and constitutionally that Hyderabad State had ceased to have its own independent status and merged or acceded to Indian Union”
5. That even taking the Constitution as basis for guidance Hyderabad State exists as an entity under the Constitution and is continued under the aegis of the Nizam being thereafter styled as Rajpramukh, that this Rajpramukhship has been guaranteed to him both by the Constitution and even by the agreement of Government of India and that the States Reorganisation Commission has no jurisdiction to make any recommendation as regards the discontinuance of the Rajpramukhship, its recommendations having no legal or constitutional value are ultra vires. In the result the petitioner prayed for the issue of a declaration that the Government of India has no constitutional basis for the introduction of draft Reorganisation Bill in Parliament, and of the proposal for the disintegration of the Hyderabad State, for the issue of a writ of prohibition against respondent 15 ordering him not to introduce any bill or Act for the disintegration of Hyderabad State, to issue a writ of prohibition or order against respondents 1 to 11 ordering them not to discuss draft of the Reorganisation Bill as directed by respondent 15 in the Hyderabad Legislative Assembly, to issue a writ of prohibition against respondent 2, Speaker of the Assembly ordering him not to allow a discussion on the draft of the Reorganisation Bill, to order respondents 12 to 18 and also 19 to 26 to keep away from Hyderabad and respondents 1 to 12 not to influence them by direct or indirect contracts to say or do things for the disintegration of Hyderabad State, to issue a writ of prohibition against respondents 13 and 14 respectively the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Chairman of the Rajva Sabha not to allow any Bill to be introduced in the Parliament for the disintegration of Hyderabad State. A stay petition was also presented on the said date, along with an affidavit.
6. This petition first came up before a Bench consisting of one of us and our brother Ansari, J., but during the course of arguments to have the petition admitted the petitioner fainted on 13-4-1956, the last working day before the Summer Vacation and the case had to be adjourned over the Vacation, pending the recovery of the petitioner who insisted on arguing his own case even though the petition was presented by Mr. Zaidi an Advocate of this Court.
7. Later from the Osmania Hospital he submitted another petition on 28-4-1956 to have the case heard during the vacation in view of its urgency, but evidently the case could not be posted during the vacation. He again presented another petition on 21-6-1956 stating that respondents 15 and 16 had introduced a draft Reorganisation Bill in Parliament in which disintegration and trifurcation of Hyderabad State is proposed and that pending this Bill administrative action is being taken and that we should issue to the respondents notice to show cause why the application for writ be not admitted and to issue order for recording the evidence of respondents 1 to 22. As the same bench which heard this petition first could not be constituted due to Ansari, J., being on leave, the case has been posted before this Bench and had to be heard afresh.
8. This application in our view suffers from all the infirmities which a petition of this nature could conceivably suffer. We had at the outset indicated to the petitioner certain difficulties in the way of this petition being admitted and the want of jurisdiction in this High Court to issue the writs and directions prayed for but the petitioner submitted that before he could satisfy us on these points it would be necessary to give a background and he addressed lengthy arguments more on what he considered to be the merit of the case against trifurcation of Hyderabad State than to satisfy us as to the maintainability of the petition.
9. Notwithstanding the fact that we impressed on the petitioner on every occasion that he has to satisfy us, whatever be the merits of the case, as to the jurisdiction of this High Court to issue writs and directions of the nature prayed for by him lie tried to trace the history of the various stages of the development of Constitutional reforms in India, the position under the Government of India Act, then under the Government of India Adaptation Laws Order, 1947, the firman of H.E.H the Nizam of 1949 and the Constitution of India under which Hyderabad continued to be a State.
10. We have tried to point out more than once to the petitioner that all this is not relevant for the immediate admission of the petition, but he persisted in lengthy exhortations which were in the nature of political speeches avowedly designed to obtain publicity through Court proceedings. When we informed the petitioner firmly that we should be first satisfied with respect to the competence of his petition and that we cannot allow the courts to be utilised as public platforms for the purposes merely of venting political or social views, he submitted a petition yesterday that he must be allowed to argue in his own way and that he if confronted with an awkward dilemma by our insistence of his first satisfying us on the point of jurisdiction which stands in the way of his writ petition being admitted, that he was unable ‘to understand the peremptory directions and immediate compliance as he had offered to deal with the points raised in the course of his argument as he himself felt that without doing it he cannot expect his writ petition to be granted’ and that he feels in the circumstances he should not resume his arguments as he would not be in a position to do justice to the cause he has taken up.
11. We do not propose to deal with the various matters mentioned in this petition but we may on passant mention that the petitioner in Para 11 after stating that Article 3 only contemplates at the most a change of name or boundary for which a special procedure is provided for whereby the President has to ascertain the views of the State or States concerned, makes an unwarranted reference to an alleged agreement with his point of view by one of us.
12. Apart from the immediate relevance in the matter of admission of the petition on the petitioner putting forward the view adhered to in his petition, it was pointed out by both of as, that if it is conceded, it will lead to an absurdity because while in the case of a proposal in a Bill affecting the boundary or the name or names of any State or States, the views of the Legislature are to be obtained, while no such views would be necessary with respect to matters enumerated in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of Article 3 and that such an interpretation was not warranted because the word ‘unless’ in the proviso would show that it may not be necessary to consult the view of Legislature on a Bill affecting boundaries or name or names of State or States but with respect to the other matters the views of Legislatures have to be obtained.
13. Further we may point out that when during the course of arguments, Judges, in order to elicit the scope of an issue, or limit a proposition or to clarify the meaning or interpretation of any Section or Act or for any other purpose, put questions or assume a position for the purposes of argument, anything said cannot be deemed to be an agreement with the persons making a particular submission so as to be binding. What is binding is what is stated in the order or judgment after due consideration of the arguments and the points involved in the case.
14. Be that as it may, in our view, we have given the petitioner more than sufficient time to satisfy us if he could as to the maintainability of the petition which he equally recognises to be an impediment to the admission of this petition. We cannot at this juncture permit arguments which are not germane to the point for determination, only to find at the end thereof that the entire matter is circumscribed in a narrow compass relating to the maintainability of the petition.
15. The first defect in this petition is that relief is claimed against respondents 12 to 26 who are admittedly residing outside the jurisdiction, some of them in New Delhi within the jurisdiction of Punjab High Court, others within the jurisdiction of Andhra High Court and some others within the jurisdiction of Bombay High Court and others within the jurisdiction of Mysore High Court, at any rate all the several respondents as aforesaid residing outside the territorial limits of this High Court. This High Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to issue writs against them.
16. The Supreme Court has made this position quite clear in three cases. In the case of — ‘Election Commission, Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao .’, AIR 1953 SC 210 (A), the respondent who had obtained an order restraining the Election Commission, a statutory authority constituted by the President and having its offices permanently located at New Delhi, from enquiring into the alleged disqualification of the respondent for membership of the Legislative Assembly. The Election Commission appealed to the Supreme Court where Patanjali Sastri, C.J, observed:
“But wide as were the powers thus conferred, a two-fold limitation was placed upon their exercise. In the first place the power is to be exercised “throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”, that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. Secondly, the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be “within those territories”, which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories.”
17. A person or an authority against which a writ is sought to be directed must therefore be within the territories as a condition of the High Court being empowered to issue such a writ. In that case the High Court of Madras was held not to have jurisdiction to issue a writ against Election Commission which has its permanent office located at Delhi.
18. This decision in ‘Saka Venkata Rao's case (A)’, was followed in the case of — ‘K.S Rashid and Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission’, AIR 1954 SC 207 (B), which is a reverse case, namely, where the Punjab High Court had considered the objection urged on behalf of the respondent to the fact that the petitioners being assesses belonging to Uttar Pradesh, their assessments were to be made by the Income-tax Commissioner of that State and the mere fact that the location of the Investigation Commission was in Delhi would not confer jurisdiction upon the Punjab High Court to issue any writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.
19. In other words, the ratio of the Punjab High Court's decision was that even though the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs is within the territories, yet if the subject-matter is outside the jurisdiction the High Court cannot issue a writ. On appeal to the Supreme Court their Lordships distinguishing the case of — ‘Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi’, AIR 1943 PC 164 (C), and following ‘Saka Venkata Rao's case (A)’, held that the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ to the Investigation Commission in spite of the fact that the assessees were in the State of Uttar Pradesh and the original assessments were made by the Income-tax Authorities of that State itself.
20. In a latest case of — ‘Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. Venkatachalam Potti’, (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 (D), it was contended successfully that the High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ to any person within its territories though acting as an agent if he is guilty of doing an act which is not authorised by law or is violating fundamental rights of the citizens.
21. These decisions of the Supreme Court clearly leave no doubt as to the limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court to issue writs to persons or authorities residing outside its territorial jurisdiction. We asked the petitioner whether he would like to amend his petition but he refused to do so. On this ground itself the petition is liable to be dismissed.
22. There is yet another ground upon which the petition becomes untenable, viz., the want of jurisdiction in the High Court to issue any writs against a Legislature or Parliament or the Speaker or any officer of these Assemblies. It is an elementary proposition of Constitutional law that both Parliament and a State Legislature are sovereign within the limits assigned to them by the Constitution. Clauses (3) of Articles 105 and 194 determine the privileges and powers and immunities of Parliament and Legislatures of States to be those defined by it under any law and until so defined shall be those of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
23. Similarly Articles 122 and 212 expressly prohibit the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of the exercise of powers vested in any officer or member of a Parliament or an officer or member of a Legislature in whom powers are vested under the Constitution for regulating procedure or conduct of business or for maintaining order in the respective assemblies.
24. A Speaker of a Parliament or Legislature or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha are officers within the meaning of this Article. Ministers of the Government whether of the Centre or of States are also members respectively or the Parliament or Legislature; as such the Courts cannot interfere with them in the part they play in the proceedings or business of the Assemblies nor can they inter cere with their privileges, as the rights of any of them to introduce any Bill in their respective assemblies are rights and privileges of these members whether as members or as Ministers. There is an inherent right in the Legislatures to conduct their affairs without any interference from any outside body.
25. That apart neither a Writ of Prohibition nor a Writ of Certiorari nor a Writ of Mandamus will lie to restrain these bodies from enacting any legislation even if it is ultra vires these powers. If authority is necessary we may refer to the well known case of — ‘King v. Legislative Committee of Church Assembly, Ex parte Haynes Smith’, (1928) 1 KB 411 (E). In this case an application made to restrain by prohibition together with Certiorari the National Assembly of the Church of England from proceeding with the prayer book measure, was unsuccessful on the simple ground that neither the Committee was empowered to act nor had it in fact attempted to act judicially in matters which could be considered to affect the interest of the community. What was not permissible for the Courts to do in the case of the Church Assembly in its legislative capacity in regard to a measure which it was enacting cannot be permissible in the case of a Legislature or Parliament. The Writ of Prohibition and Certiorari by their very nature do not lie, nor a Writ of Mandamus which as observed by Lord Goddard in — ‘Rex v. Dunehee’, (1950) 2 All ER 741 at 743 (F),
“is neither a Writ of course nor a Writ of right, but that it will be granted if the duty is in the nature of a public duty and specially affects the rights of an individual, provided there is no more appropriate remedy.”
26. It is clear therefore that the Courts can have no jurisdiction to issue any of these Writs to the Legislatures; in other words until a bill becomes law, the Legislative power not being complete the Courts cannot reach them.
27. As we have already observed during the course of the arguments addressed by the petitioner that neither a Court nor a Judge has a general or roving superintendence over an undefined field, nor is it their function to declare void or directly annul a law immediately it is promulgated unless its interpretative function is sought by any person or party who challenges that law as having infringed his rights on the ground of its being ultra vires of the powers of the legislative body.
28. A perusal of the prayers would show that the petitioner is asking us to do what we are not empowered or competent to do. In this view of the matter the petition is rejected, as being not maintainable and incompetent.
V.S.B
29. Petition dismissed.
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