- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
F.D Bellow v. T. Elke Opposite Party.
Judgment Summary: Revision of Rent Controller's Order — Standard Rent Application under sec. 15, Calcutta Rent Act (1920)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was a tenant of premises No. 24, Royd Street for a six-month tenancy commencing 5 August 1922. On 31 October 1922 the petitioner applied to the Rent Controller under section 15 of the Calcutta Rent Act, 1920, for fixation (standardization) of the standard rent. The matter was adjourned repeatedly and took eight months to reach a hearing.
Meanwhile, on 14 May 1923 a decree of the Calcutta Small Cause Court was passed evicting the petitioner on grounds of non-payment of rent and insolvency; the petitioner vacated the premises on 30 June 1923. When the case was heard on 6 July 1923 the Rent Controller dismissed the petitioner's application on the ground that the petitioner was no longer a tenant of the premises for which standard rent had been sought. The Rent Controller explained that he followed a ruling of the President of the Improvement Trust Tribunal, who has revisional authority.
A Rule was brought to revise that order. The Rent Controller was served and submitted observations admitting he now considered dismissal to have been wrong but stating he had followed the President's decision. The court (Suhrawardy, J., with Page, J. concurring) set aside the Rent Controller's order and directed a rehearing according to law. Costs were to abide the result; the hearing fee in the High Court was assessed at two gold mohurs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a proceeding under section 15 of the Calcutta Rent Act, duly started by a tenant, ceases to be maintainable merely because the applicant ceases to be tenant before the Rent Controller fixes the standard rent (i.e., whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to dismiss the application on that ground).
- Whether a new tenant who occupies the premises after the original applicant has ceased to be tenant must be made a party to the section 15 proceeding, on the basis that any decision will bind the new tenant.
- Whether any of the statutory provisions (notably sections 8, 14 and section 15(4) of the Act) support the proposition that proceedings for fixation of standard rent abate on a change in tenancy.
Arguments of the Parties
Opposite Party (Landlord)'s Arguments
- It was argued that, in the general scheme of the Rent Act, a proceeding for standardization initiated by a tenant should not continue if the landlord-tenant relationship has ceased by the time of hearing; therefore the Rent Controller properly dismissed the application after the petitioner ceased to be tenant.
- The landlord relied on and placed reliance upon certain provisions of the Act (sections 8 and 14 were referred to) as indicating the necessity of the continuing landlord-tenant relationship for the operation of remedies under the Act.
- It was also argued that the new tenant, who occupied the premises after the petitioner left, ought to have been made a party because any decision fixing the standard rent would bind that new tenant; hence the original application was alleged to be not maintainable without joining the new tenant.
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner contended (as reflected in the court's analysis) that nothing in the Rent Act indicates that a section 15 proceeding becomes inoperative simply because the relationship of landlord and tenant has terminated before the determination; a regularly started proceeding should not be dropped absent a specific disqualifying provision.
- It was also argued that the Act does not make it obligatory for an applicant for standardization to join all persons who may be interested (other than the landlord), and that section 15(4) itself contemplates notice to the "tenant, if any" and allows interested persons to make applications to be heard — addressing the landlord's concern about the new tenant's rights.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis was given separately by Suhrawardy, J. (leading opinion) and Page, J. (concurring), but both reached the same conclusion. Their reasoning can be summarised in the following steps and points drawn from the text:
- Starting point: The application before the Rent Controller was regularly made by the petitioner (a tenant) under section 15 of the Calcutta Rent Act seeking fixation of the standard rent. The only ground given by the Rent Controller for dismissal was that the petitioner had ceased to be tenant by the date of hearing.
- Statutory examination — absence of express disqualification: The court found nothing in the Act which expressly requires that a proceeding under section 15 must terminate if the relationship of landlord and tenant no longer exists at the time of the hearing. Suhrawardy, J. emphasised that "when a case has been regularly started, there must be some direct provision in law to disqualify [it] from being carried to the end" — and no such provision was found.
-
Consideration of specific provisions relied upon by the Opposite Party:
- Section 8 (regarding enhancement and notice) was considered not to support the landlord's contention that proceedings abate when tenancy ends.
- Section 14 (as to recovery of overpaid rent and deduction within six months) was acknowledged to contemplate a continuing remedy, but the court observed that section 14 protects one mode of recovery and is "without prejudice to any other method" — and under the general law a person who has ceased to be tenant can still recover overpayments.
- Interpretation of section 15(4): The court placed particular weight on the wording of section 15(4), which requires the Rent Controller, before exercising powers, to give notice of his intention to the landlord and "tenant, if any." The inclusion of the words "if any" was taken by the court to indicate that the statute contemplates situations where, at the time notice is given, a party may no longer be a tenant or landlord — supporting continuation of proceedings despite a change in tenancy.
- Parties and joinder: The court rejected the submission that the new tenant must necessarily be made a party. It noted that the Act does not require the applicant to make "all persons interested" parties (other than the landlord) and that section 15(4) expressly allows the Rent Controller to consider applications from any person interested. The court also cited Order 1, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code as a procedural safeguard that disfavors dismissal for want of proper parties and allows interested persons to intervene or be heard.
- Practical and remedial considerations (Page, J.'s emphasis): Page, J. stressed the practical consequence that, if proceedings were held to abate upon a change of tenant, an applicant who had sought standardization while still a tenant could be deprived of the opportunity to obtain a certificate of standard rent and thereby be unable to pursue recovery of any statutory overpayment. He thus reasoned that the Rent Controller is under an obligation, in circumstances like these, to proceed and grant a certificate certifying the standard rent so as to preserve the applicant's substantive remedies where they properly exist under the Act.
- Addressing the countervailing concern: The court acknowledged the landlord's concern that a subsequent tenant might be bound by a determination in which he had no opportunity to be heard. Both judges addressed this by relying on the notice requirement in section 15(4), which permits the present tenant (the substituted occupant) to apply to be heard within the period specified in the notice. Thus, continuation of the proceeding is compatible with protecting the interests of a subsequent tenant.
- Administrative practice and precedent before the Rent Controller: The Rent Controller had followed a decision of the President of the Improvement Trust Tribunal and thought that decision binding. The High Court observed that it was not necessary in this case to decide how far the Rent Controller is bound by the President's rulings, and proceeded to decide the Rule without resolving that larger question.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The court made the Rule absolute: the Rent Controller's order dated 6 July 1923 dismissing the petitioner's section 15 application was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Rent Controller for a rehearing according to law.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The petitioner's application for standardization of rent must be re-heard by the Rent Controller; the Rent Controller is required to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act (including giving notice under section 15(4) and allowing interested persons to be heard).
- Costs of the Rule were directed to abide the result; the High Court assessed the hearing fee at two gold mohurs.
Broader implications and precedent:
The judgment does not purport to establish a broad binding precedent on all questions of administrative hierarchy or the extent to which the Rent Controller is bound by the President of the Tribunal's rulings; the court expressly stated it was unnecessary to decide that question in this case. The decision is grounded on statutory interpretation of the Calcutta Rent Act and on practical considerations arising from the Act's remedial scheme. No new general legal principle beyond the application of the Act to these facts was announced by way of sweeping precedent.
Order: Rule made absolute. (J.N.R)
Suhrawardy, J.:— In this Rule we are asked to revise the order of the Rent Controller, dated the 6th July 1923 in Standard Rent Case No. 673 of 1922 dismissing the application of the Petitioner under sec. 15 of the Calcutta Rent Act III of 1920. The facts are that the Petitioner was a tenant under the Opposite Party in respect of premises No. 24, Royd Street for six months from the 5th August 1922. On the 31st October 1922 the Petitioner applied to the Rent Controller to have the standard rent fixed. The case was adjourned from time to time and it took eight months to come to a hearing. On the 30th June 1923 the Petitioner was evicted under a decree of the Calcutta Small Cause Court. That decree was passed on the 14th May 1923 on the ground that the tenant had not paid rent and was an insolvent. On the 6th July 1923 the Petitioner's application under the Rent Act was dismissed. The ground upon which the application has been dismissed is that the Petitioner having ceased to be a tenant in respect of the premises for which he had applied for standardization of the rent, the case could not go on. No authority has been cited for this view but the learned Rent Controller has felt himself bound by a certain ruling of the President of the Improvement Trust Tribunal who under the Act has been vested with revisional authority over the Rent Controller.
Under the Act a tenant is empowered to apply to the Rent Controller to have the standard rent of a premises fixed. It is conceded by the learned Vakil for the Opposite Party that there is nothing in the Act which indicates that the proceeding under it comes to a determination as soon as the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties has ceased. But it is argued that in consideration of the general scheme of the Act it must be so. I am unable to accede to the proposition. I find on a close scrutiny of the Act nothing in it to justify the dropping of a proceeding which has been started regularly under the Act, because one of the parties was not at the date of the hearing occupying the position which he did at the commencement of the case. In my opinion, when a case has been regularly started, there must be some direct provision in law to disqualify from being carried to the end. Reference has been made to certain provisions of the Act. Sec. 8 has been referred to as indicating that when there is an enhancement of rent on the application of the landlord he cannot recover it until after the expiration of one month after the landlord served on the tenant a notice in writing of his intention to increase the, rent. I do not think that this provision lends support to the contention of the landlord. Then reliance has been placed upon sec. 14 which provides that when a tenant has overpaid the landlord and then rent is subsequently reduced he may recover the amount from the landlord and may deduct it from any rent payable with in six months. It is contended indicates that the relationship of landlord and tenant must continue even after the Rent Controller has fixed the rent. It may be so, but that section provides that this is one of the modes of recovering money paid to the landlord more than what was due to him, as it is especially mentioned that this remedy is without prejudice to any other method of recovery. A person who has ceased to be a tenant has under the general law a right to recover any overpayment made to the land-lord.
In support of my view reference may be made to sec. 15, cl. (4) which says that before exercising any of the powers conferred upon him by this Act the Controller shall give notice of his intention to the landlord and tenant if any. The words “if any” indicate that it is possible that when time comes far the Rent Controller to give notice of his intention under the Act one of the parties may have ceased to be either a landlord or a tenant.
It is also argued on behalf of the Opposite Party that the application before the Rent Controller was not maintainable inasmuch as the new tenant who was brought on the premises after the Petitioner had left it ought to have been made a party because any decision in this case will be binding upon him. I do not see much force in this contention. The Act does not make it obligatory upon the applicant for standardization of rent to make all persons interested in the litigation parties to the proceeding except the landlord; and this view finds support from sec. 15, cl. (4) of the Act which provides that the Rent Controller shall duly consider any application received by him from any person interested. The new tenant, if he so chooses, may make an application to the Rent Controller to be heard at the time of the hearing of this case. I may also refer in this connection to the provisions of Or. 1, r. 9, C.P.C, which provides against the dismissal of a case for want of proper parties.
I may add that a copy of this Rule was also served on the Rent Controller and he has submitted his observations. He seems to be now of opinion that he was not right in dismissing the case. He has, however, followed a decision of the President of the Tribunal which he considers to be binding upon him. He has asked us to express an opinion as to how far he is bound by the ruling of the President. In this case it is not necessary for us to decide that question.
In the result this Rule should, in my opinion, be made absolute, the order of the Rent Controller dated the 6th July 1923 set aside and the case sent back to him for a re-hearing according to law. Costs will abide the result. I assess the hearing fee in this Court at two gold mohurs.
Page, J.:— I am of the same opinion. On the 30th October 1922 the Petitioner applied to the Rent Controller that the rent of the premises of which he was then a tenant might be standardized under sec. 15 of the Calcutta Rent Act. On the 19th June 1923 the hearing of the application was adjourned until the 6th July 1923. Meanwhile on the 14th May, a decree was passed by the Court of Small Causes ejecting the Petitioner from the premises and on the 30th June, he vacated the premises. When the case was called for hearing on the 6th July 1923 the Rent Controller dismissed the application on the ground that the applicant was no longer tenant of the premises. The question which we have to determine is whether or not he had jurisdiction to make that order. The determination of this issue does not appear to me to present any real difficulty. It is true that an application for standardization of rent under sec. 15 must needs be made by a landlord or by a tenant of the premises in question. In this case the application was made by the tenant. There is nothing in the Act which provides that the application shall become inoperative, although properly made in the first instance, because subsequent to the making of the application, but before the rent was standardized a change of tenant has taken place. In this case it would not appear upon the evidence as placed before us that the Petitioner had any right to recover the difference between the rent which he had paid and the standard rent which under the application might be assessed, because the last payment of rent which was made by the Petitioner was in February 1923 in respect of the period ending with the 31st January 1923 and under sec. 14, sub-sec. (1) of the Act, it is provided that “where any sum has after the commencement of the Act been paid on account of rent, being a sum which is by reason of the provisions of this Act irrecoverable, such sum shall at any time within a period of six months from the date of payment be recovered by the tenant by whom it was paid from the landlord receiving the payment.” But we are invited to decide this issue irrespective of the rights which accrued or may accrue under the Rent Act to the Petitioner.
In my opinion, under circumstances such as those in this case the Controller is under an obligation to grant a certificate certifying the standard rent; and for this reason that, if in such circumstances the Rent Controller does not proceed to certify the rent and neither the landlord nor the subsequent tenant applies for standardization under sec. 15, no standard rent will be fixed, and a tenant who might have applied, while still a tenant, for a certificate of standardization because he was desirous of recovering rent overpaid which was irrecoverable under the Act, would be deprived of an opportunity of making a claim to recover that rent overpaid, because no standard rent in fact was fixed. On the other hand, it is urged on behalf of the Opposite Party that, if a person who at the time when he made the application for standardization was a tenant, but who before the certificate was issued by the Controller had ceased to be a tenant, was entitled after he had ceased to be a tenant to call upon the Rent Controller to fix the rent, the result might be that the tenant of the premises at the time when the rent was standardized would have no voice or opportunity of pleading before the Tribunal facts he thought material for the purpose of standardization of the rent. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention, because under sec. 15, sub-sec. (4) of the Act the Rent Controller “before exercising any of the powers conferred on him by this Act shall give notice of his intention to the landlord and tenant, if any, and shall duly consider any application received by him from any person interested within such period as shall be specified in the notice.” It would be open on this application for the present tenant, if he elected so to do to apply to the Rent Controller to be heard on the question as to what was the right sum to be fixed for the standard rent. In these circumstances, it seems to me that if the contention of the Opposite Party was held to be valid, injustice might result to persons who were tenants at the time when they made the application for standardization of rent, whereas, if the Rent Controller in such circumstances as those prevailing in this case were to continue the proceedings and to certify standard rent, no hardship, so far as I can see, would result to anybody. In these circumstances, in my opinion, this Rule should be made absolute in the sense which my learned brother has stated.
J.N.R
Rule made absolute.
Alert