Manni Lal v. Radhe Gopalji

Piggott, J.:— I cannot read the plaint in this suit as anything but a claim for a declaratory decree, with consequential relief, under section 9(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, No. VII of 1870. This being so, the case is covered by the ruling in Jageshra v. Durga Prasad Singh . I am not prepared to recommend a reconsideration of that decision. I Can see the point that, on the wording of the section, it is arguable that the expression “the relief sought” means the “consequential relief” spoken of in sub-clause (c). At the same time I do not think we ought to unsettle the law laid down by a Bench of two Judges more than ten years ago. Moreover, I am impressed with the argument based upon section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, No. VII of 1887. I accept the contention that the valuation for purposes of court fees is to be determined first and that for purpose of jurisdiction must follow on the same; but the plaintiff in a suit in which consequential relief is prayed cannot at one and the same time obtain the services of the highest possible tribunal for the determination of his claim and evade the payment of ad valorem court fees. If for purposes of jurisdiction he sets a high value on the relief by way of declaration and a merely nominal value on the relief by way of injunction, it is doing him no injustice to hold that the “relief sought,” on which the court fee must be levied, is the sum-total of the two reliefs. It is beside the point to suggest that different consequences would have followed if the plaintiff in the present case had asked for a declaration only, or for an injunction only: the question under the Court Fees Act must be determined upon the plaint as framed.

I affirm the report of the stamping officer, and allow the parties concerned one month in which to make good the deficiency.

Stamping Officer's report affirmed.