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L.A. Subbarama Iyer v. R.H. Hitchcock

Madras High Court
Aug 4, 1924
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit filed by Mr. Hitchcock, District Superintendent of Police, South Malabar, against five defendants for damages for libel contained in a report titled "Police crimes in Ottapalm," published in April-May 1921. The Subordinate Judge awarded damages of Rs. 6,000 against all defendants. Only the 4th defendant, who alone filed a written statement and defended the case, appeals.

The suit was filed in August 1921, issues were settled on 15th February 1922, and the trial commenced on 3rd April 1922. Various interlocutory applications by the 4th defendant, including adjournment requests, petitions for cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses, and amendment of pleadings, were dismissed. The 4th defendant also applied for transfer of the suit, which was refused. The trial proceeded on issues originally framed without an issue on publication of the libelous report, which was deemed admitted by the Subordinate Judge.

On the merits, the case involved allegations concerning incidents at Ottapalam on 26th April 1921, where police conduct was criticized in the defendants' report. Evidence was examined regarding assaults and insults by police on various persons, and the plaintiff's role and knowledge of these events were scrutinized. The appeal challenges the findings and the refusal to allow amendment of pleadings or framing of new issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Subordinate Judge erred in refusing the adjournment prayed for by the 4th defendant on the first day of trial and in proceeding with examination of plaintiff's witness.
  2. Whether the Subordinate Judge ought to have recalled the plaintiff for cross-examination after the 4th defendant did not cross-examine on the first day.
  3. Whether the Subordinate Judge ought to have framed a new issue relating to the 4th defendant's denial of authorship and publication of the report.
  4. Whether the Subordinate Judge ought to have permitted amendment of the 4th defendant's written statement to deny publication of the report.
  5. Whether the report published by the defendants constituted libel on the plaintiff.
  6. Whether the report was a fair and bona fide comment on a matter of public interest.
  7. Whether the report was justified and privileged.
  8. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to damages and if so, the quantum thereof.
  9. Whether the report was published maliciously.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Subordinate Judge erred in refusing adjournment on 3rd April 1922, prejudicing the defence.
  • The Judge should have recalled the plaintiff for cross-examination in June, as the 4th defendant did not cross-examine on 3rd April.
  • The Judge ought to have framed a new issue regarding whether the 4th defendant wrote or published the report, as the pleadings indicated ambiguity.
  • The Judge ought to have permitted amendment of the written statement to deny publication and membership in the Emergency Committee.
  • The 4th defendant denied authorship and publication of the report and challenged the framing of issues that did not include this question.
  • The appellant contended that the denial of publication was intended but omitted due to mistake or oversight.
  • The appellant argued that original statements appended to the report were needed for effective cross-examination of the plaintiff.
  • The appellant challenged the sufficiency of pleadings and the framing of issues, including the lack of a specific issue on publication.
  • The appellant relied on English precedents to support the right to amend pleadings and to contest the framing of issues.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The refusal of adjournment did not prejudice the defence as the trial was adjourned and the defence declined to cross-examine without justification.
  • The denial of publication was not specifically pleaded and thus deemed admitted under the rules of pleading.
  • The application for amendment to plead denial of publication was rightly refused as it introduced a new case at a late stage, contrary to procedural rules.
  • The report’s allegations, while serious, were not justified by the evidence and contained libellous imputations against the plaintiff.
  • The defence of justification failed as the evidence did not establish the plaintiff’s complicity in the alleged conspiracy or misconduct.
  • The plea of fair comment failed because the report went beyond fair criticism into unjustified allegations of fact.
  • The damages awarded were appropriate and no enhancement was warranted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hunt v. “Star” Newspaper Co. Ltd. Fair comment justified if facts are correct, reasonable, and plausible. The court held that fair comment applies only if facts warrant the imputation; here, the facts did not justify the libellous allegations.
Joynt v. Cycle Trade Publishing Co. Defence of fair comment fails if no facts warrant the imputation. The court found defendants could not rely on fair comment as the statements were made without due care and were unjustified.
Cooper v. Lawson Statement of fact not proved is libellous. The court applied this to hold that reckless conclusions without proof are libellous.
Adkins v. The North Metropolitan Tramway Co. Specific denial of allegations in pleadings need not be strictly formal. The court distinguished this case, finding appellant’s general denial insufficient to deny publication.
Grocott v. Lovatt Defence pleaded in loose form may still amount to a denial. The court held the appellant’s pleadings were not sufficiently specific to deny publication.
Tildesley v. Harper, Cropper v. Smith, Hollis v. Burton, Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Principles on granting leave to amend pleadings to bring out real questions in issue. The court held that amendment should be allowed unless bad faith or prejudice is shown; here amendment was refused as the denial of publication was a new case.
Odgers on Libel and Slander Nominal damages awarded only when plaintiff does not seek monetary compensation. The court held this was not a case for nominal damages due to seriousness of libel.
Halsbury Vol. 18 S. 1285 pp. 702-3, 706 Malice in law may arise from reckless conclusions without proof. The court found the defendants’ reckless statements amounted to malice in law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the procedural objections raised by the appellant and found no merit in the refusal of adjournment or the denial of cross-examination recall, as the defence had not justified their conduct and the trial was adjourned.

Regarding the framing of issues and amendment of pleadings, the court strictly interpreted the Civil Procedure Code rules on pleadings (Order 8 Rules 3 and 5). It held that a general denial was insufficient to deny publication of the libelous report and that the appellant had effectively admitted publication by failing to specifically deny it. The court found no intention by the appellant to deny publication at the time of filing the written statement, supported by the absence of any issue on publication and the conduct of the defence throughout the trial.

The court examined the merits of the libel claim, reviewing evidence about the incidents at Ottapalam on 26th April 1921. It accepted that police misconduct occurred but rejected the allegation that the plaintiff, as District Superintendent, was complicit in a conspiracy or responsible for the violent acts. The report’s statements attributing complicity and conspiracy to the plaintiff were found to be unjustified and libellous.

The court distinguished between fair comment and libel, holding that while criticism of police conduct was legitimate, the report went beyond fair comment by making unsubstantiated factual allegations against the plaintiff. The plea of justification failed due to insufficient evidence supporting the libellous imputations.

On damages, the court agreed with the trial judge that the amount awarded was fair compensation and declined to enhance damages, noting the absence of special damage, private malice, or grounds for exemplary damages.

Overall, the court upheld the Subordinate Judge’s findings and dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

The court's final decision is DISMISSED WITH COSTS the appeal of the 4th defendant.

The direct effect is that the decree of Rs. 6,000 damages against the defendants for libel, including the 4th defendant, stands affirmed. The 4th defendant’s attempts to deny publication of the libellous report at a late stage were rejected, and the libel was held established on the evidence. No enhancement of damages was made, and no exemplary damages were awarded. The opinion does not establish any new precedent but reinforces strict adherence to pleading rules and the limits of fair comment in defamation cases.

Show all summary ...

Ramesam, J.—This appeal arises out of a suit by Mr. Hitchcock, the District Superintendent of Police, South Malabar, against five defendants, for damages for libel, contained in a report issued in April-May 1921, by them entitled—‘Police crimes in Ottapalm’ The Subordinate Judge gave a decree for Rs. 6,000. Only the 4th defendant, the only defendant who filed a written statement (in the proper sense of the term) and defended the case, appeals.

Mr. T. R. Ramachandra Aiyar, for the appellant argued, at the outset, certain preliminary matters, relating to the course of the trial in the Court below. The suit was filed in August 1921. The issues were settled on 15th February, 1922, and the case came on for trial on the 3rd April 1922, to which day it was first posted. It is now argued: (1) that the Subordinate Judge erred in refusing the adjournment prayed for, by the 4th defendant on that day and in proceeding with the examination of plaintiff's witness; (2) that the Subordinate Judge ought to have recalled the plaintiff for cross-examination in June, the 4th defendant not having cross-examined him, on the 3rd April; (3) that the Subordinate Judge ought to have framed the new issue applied for, by the 4th defendant (see page 18 of the pleadings; and (4) that the Subordinate Judge ought to have permitted the amendment of the 4th defendant's written statement (vide page 21 of the pleadings).

Points 1 and 2 are, to a certain extent connected. Point 4 is similarly dependent on point 3.

I do not think it necessary to deal with these points in details, as my learned brother has done so, at great length, I agree with the Subordinate Judge and with my learned brother in their conclusions. As to the first point, the question now is, not whether the Subordinate Judge might not or might have granted an adjournment, on the 3rd April, but whether his refusal calls for any interference on our part now. Seeing that the trial of the case was not closed on that day, but was adjourned to June and that only the plaintiff's witness were then examined, I am not satisfied that the procedure of the Subordinate Judge has prejudiced the defence. Nor am I satisfied that there was any justification for the defendant in refusing to cross-examine the plaintiff on that day, with the materials then available. It follows that the appellant's contention on the 2nd point also must be disallowed.

I do not feel called upon to discuss the large number of English decisions cited by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar, on the other points. On a careful Provincial of the written statement, and having regard to the fact that the application for a new issue and for amendment of the written statement were not made on the 3rd April, when the case was partially tried but only in June, I am satisfied that the additional defence was not originally intended to be raised by the original written statement. In saying so, I do not mean to say that the 4th defendant took part in the preparation of the report. Perhaps he did not. All that I mean is that, at the time he was content to sail in the same boat, along with the other defendants and not to raise any defence peculiar to himself, though available. This is also the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge.

I now come to the merits of the case.

On the 26th April 1921, there was a students' conference at Ottapalam. It followed three other conferences. The Kerala Provincial Conference (23 and 24th) and Ulema Confereace and a Khilafat Confernce (25th). First, we have to ascertain the events, that happened on the 26th April. It appears that the District Magistrate ordered the plaintiff to have men for preserving peace. The plaintiff ordered the special police to be kept in reserve and not to be in evidence. The three days (23rd to 25th) passed off quietly. The plaintiff says:

“All through the week, the Sergeant and the men of the reserve police were complaining to me of insults by the party calling themselves volunteers. The short-hand Sub-Inspectors were complaining about the treatment accorded to them in the pandel and that they were refused soda water by the persons outside. The members of the force behaved very well. I have cautioned them against offering insult”.

I accept this evidence of Mr. Hitchock. I believe that, not only did he receive complaints from his men, but also that it is lively that petty insults and annoyances (not actually amounting to any violence) were offered by some of the volunteers, though I do not think that the Sub-Inspectors have any right to complain, if they did not get soda water. The report of the defendant itself (Ex. B) supports Mr. Hitchcock's evidence. At page 5 it says:

“Until then, there was every reason to believe that the reserve police, headed by Mr. Hitchcook, the District Superintendent of Police, the Assistant Superintendent of Police and other officers, contributed a good deal to the success of the conference by their non-interference.

Mr. Hitchcock was to leave Ottapalam by the mail train of that day, which was to arrive at 10-30 A. M., but arrived late at 11-8. He went to the railway station; but, on being informed that the train would be late, went back to the police station, having left a sergeant at the station, to inform him of the arrival of the train. At about the time that the train arrived, the sergeant rushed on a cycle to inform the plaintiff of the train's arrival. Mr. Hitchcock immediately hurried to the station. The train left at 11-13 and he arrived at Calicut at about 1-30 p. m. There is not the smallest doubt about the time mentioned above, apart from the fact that Mr. Hitchcock has not been cross-examined, for no justifiable reason. During the time that he was at the police station, between 10-30 and 11-8, the special police constable No. 615 came up with D. W. 6, Kunhappa Menon, the Captain of the Volunteers, for the conferences and told him that he was insulted by the latter. The plaintiff “told constable No. 886 to find out what was the matter and sent them away.” Mr. Hitchcock also swears:

“During the time I was at Ottapalam, there was no complaint made to me, against any police officers about insults offered to any member of the congress party, or conference party.”

I unreservedly accept this evidence of Mr. Hitchcook.

But, as a matter of fact, other incidents happened at Ottapalam, on the 26th April, unknown to Mr. Hitchcock.

According to the statements which form the appendix to the report and which were analysed in the report, the following parsons have been insulted, beaten or otherwise roughly handled, by the police-men of the Reserve Force.

(1) Eunhappa Menon (D.W 6) was beaten.

(2) Eunhee Koya, a moplah: his sherbet bottles and tumblers were broken and he himself was beaten.

(3) K. Narayana Menon (D. W. 11). They kept a cycle shop and were beaten by the Policemen. (4) His brother K. Unnikrishna Menon (D. W. 14). (5) C. Govinda Menon, a Vakil's Clerk (D. W. 12) had injuries on his legs.

(6) P. Ramunni Menon, a Vakil, (D. W. 5), was beaten, kicked and insulted. He had become obnoxious, as a prominent non-co-operator, who had written articles to the press, against the Police administration.

(7) Kunhimarakkan, son of Avoo: a beedi merchant. His cap was thrown away and he was beaten,

(8) His father, Avoo, was also beaten, when he went up to rescue him.

(9) Atchutan: a paddy merchant was beaten.

(10) Arakkan Kunhi Baboo was slapped on the face, for joining the Khilafat movement.

(11) Mulapmam Thangal and his juttku driver: while the Thangal was going to the Station, his jutka was stopped, taken to the Police Station. His attendants were deprived of their turbans and silver rods and the jutka driver assaulted.

(12) Mayankutti: A rickshaw wallah was beaten and his cap torn to pieces.

(13) Abdul Kadir: his badge was torn to pieces and he was given blows

(14) A. Emuddin Kutty: cloth mercahant was beaten for being a Khialafat man.

(15) K. Mohideen Kutti—was slapped on the face for being a Khilafat man.

(16) K. Koya Kutti: a cloth merchant was th reatened.

(17) K. Abdul Rahman was abused and kicked,

(18) C. Hydru was beaten when he tried to interfere in the beating of Kunhi Marakkar.

(19) M. A. Sankara Narayana Aiyar: a paddy merchant was beaten.

(20) C. Kunhirama Nair: the flag in his office wag torn.

(21) Kunhirapalikal Ahmad was given two blows, when he interfered in favour of M. Ramunni Menon.

(22) Abdul Khadar: a soda water shop-keeper was not only not paid for the soda bottles supplied by him, but was also beaten by Sub-Inspector Echu Menon, and taken to the Police station, under the order of Sub-Inspector Govinda Menon and beaten there.

All the above persons were examined by the committee and gave statements on the 26th, 27th and 28th April. Mr. Fernandez, the correspondent of the Madras Mail, sent a report (Ex. B. 2) on the 27th April. In this report, he supports the defendants' report; so far as the attacks of Mr. Ramunni Menon, Kunhappa Menon, and the stopping of the Thangal are concerned. In my opinion, this report is noteworthy, for the calm, judicial temperament it shows and its manifest impartiality. He says:

“It is admitted on all hands that it is unfortunate that Mr. Ramunni Menon should have been one of the victims of the assaults; for, he is well-known to be a man of calm temperament and an ardent believer in non-violent agitations***In spite of the very conciliatory attitude, which Mr. Ramunni Menon adopted, be was beaten.**Some one appears to have told the Reserve Police Constables that the man who had just gone away was Mr. Ramunni Menon, one of the leading officials of the conference. On hearing this, a couple of reserve men ran after Mr. Ramunni Menon, who was, by this time, some distance away and fetched him back, slapping him on the face and beating him, as he was brought along. Arriving at the gate of the Police station, Mr. Ramunni Menon was allowed to go and went straight back to the Conference Pandal…………When Ramunni Menon returned, he was embraced by the leaders and garlanded. Many Moplahs were in a state of frenzy and one of them begged the permission of the leaders to go out and die, in furtherance of their cause. It must be said to the credit of the leaders that they had the situation well in hand and put just restraint upon the audience. They exhorted them, on no account to resort to violence, which would be detrimental to their movement. One of the Thangals, present at the Conference, also used his influence and exhorted the Moplahs to behave peacefully. A crowd of sixty or seventy Moplahs, armed with knives, came up from the town side, and their attitude seemed to me to indicate that they were bent upon making reprisals on the police, but, fortunately, they thought better of their action and, I believe, it was mainly through the instrumentality of the local Village Magistrate, an elderly man, that the Moplahs were induced to return……There is no knowing what my happen at any time, if the Moplahs get out of hand………The assault if upon Ramunni Menon was a most regrettable incident. The leaders at the Conference Pandal behaved in a most praise-worthy manner.”

It is clear from Mr. Fernandez's Report and his evidence that, however much one may differ from Mr. Ramunni Menon's politics, he is an honourable man and truly non-violent in temperament. But, there is another phase of Mr. Fernandez's Report, which throws a different light on the conduct of some of the volunteers. He says:

“Kunhappa Men on was the most arrogant of the volunteers and is reported that on more than one occasion he deliberately bumped against a sergeant of the reserve police, when passing in the street, with a view to provoke a quarrel. The sergeant, however, treated the matter lightly, having had strict instructions from his Superintendent, to avoid causing any disturbance, if possible. Further, some of the local bazaarmen and volunteers are said to have made disparaging remarks, about the reserve Police when passing in the street………at 11 a.m Some altercation appears to have taken place bsetween the volunteer Kunhappa Menon and one of the Reserve Constables and I saw him being brought to the Police Station and roughly handled by a couple of Reserve men……It would be a mistake to suppose that the Reserve Police was let loose upon the volunteers, or Conference Leaders. It was only half a dozen or so of the Reserve men, who indulged in acts of violence………I am bound to remark that the incidents of the morning did not take place without some sort of provocation, on the part of the volunteers. There are no two forces that are more likely to come into conflict than Khilafat Volunteers and the Mallapuram Reserve police, who, if allowed freedom, would avenge the slightest insult. But for the presence of the Reserve Police at Ottapalam and the insolent behaviours of the volunteers, who seem to be losing their heads, the conferences might have passed without any untoward incident.”

Of the 24 persons named by me, six have deposed before the Subordinate Court, supporting their former statements. Mr. P. V. Menon, the agent of the Nedungadi Bank, has given evidence, as D. W. 3 (corroborating his former statements). He supports the statement, in the report by Atchutan (No. 9). Dr. Joseph proves he treated Narayana Menon (D. W. 11), for his wounds. Mr. Fernandez also corroborates, in his evidence, the assault on D. Ws. 11 and 14 and on D. W. 12. The other persons, who made statements, have not now been called. It is suggested for the defence that they would not come for fear of the Police. I am constrained to state that this suggestion is not unfounded. D. W. 8, who was called to prove the incident of the Thangal, could not prove it and he had to be dropped. In the examination of Dr. Joseph, D. W. 9, he has asked:

“Did you not ask Mr. Subbrama Aiyar to excuse you from giving evidence? Answer: I did not ask him to excuse me……(in cross-exmination). I signed Ex. 12, without reading it, as Kochunni Nair told me that the paper would not go out and that no one would see it. I believed him. He told me that I would not be dragged to a Court of Law like this. I do not know Khan Bahadur Ammu Sahib, Deputy Superintendent of Police. I see him for the first time to-day. I was questioned by Police people in connection with this case. Last time, when I was summoned, Mr. Madhava Menon asked me about it. He asked me whether I read the summons and whether I was attending. He asked me this at Ottapalam”.

D. W. 12 said:

“Police Inspector Mr. Govindan Nambiar who is sitting in Court now, took me to the guard room attached to the Court and spoke to me.

Question.—Did he close the door?

Answer.—Yes.

Question.—Was there any other police official there?

Answer.—Deputy Superintendent, Mr. Ammu Sahib was there……

(In cross-examination):

“The Inspector of Police asked me, if I was a witness in the case. I told him that I was. He asked me what I was going to say. I said that I would give evidence, in accordance with the statement made by me. The Deputy Superintendent was with him then.”

(In re-examination):

“Mssers. Govinda Nambiar and Ammu Sahib are sitting in Court, near Mr. A. V. Govinda Menon. I was with them in the guard room for about 10 minutes.”

D. W. 13 (the 4th defendant) said:

“I have not called some of the witnesses summoned by me, as I had reason to believe that they have been influenced by the Police. I myself saw Mr. Madhava Menon, Inspector of Police, and another person, who was not in uniform, talking to the witnesses outside the Courthouse. The other person was said to be C. I. D. Panikar. He is in Court to-day. I think he is the man just pointed out by me. After the conversation with the police officers, some of the witnesses came to me and told me that I must manage, without examining them as witnesses, as they would be ruined? I have therefore not examined them. I have also heard that they were influenced by Police officers. I have also seen Police officers taking active part, on behalf of the plaintiff in Court. I do not examine Sankara Narayana Ayyar, as he requested me, in tears not to examine him as he would be put to trouble by the police, if he gave evidence. When the trial of this suit began, Martial Law was in force in Ottapalam and special Ordinances are still in force at Ottapalam”.

It is stated also that Madhava Menon, above mentioned, has been since dismissed by Government, for his conduct relating to Moplah trials. Having regard to the extracts, I am of opinion that attempts have been made, by some of the Subordinate Police Officers, to dissuade other persons, who gave the statements in the report, from now coming and giving evidence. In view of this fact and the fact that Moplah trials were going on in 1921 and the occurrences that are actually proved now before the Court, I am inclined to think that most of the incident mentioned in Ex. B, in connection with the unexamined persons, are substantilly true, though with possible occasional exaggerations.

I have gone into the events of April 26th, at greater length than the Subordinate Judge, as it was insistently argued before us, by Mr. Ramaohandra Aiyar, that these incidents fully justify the allegations in the report against Mr. Hitchcock. In my opinion they do not, accepting all the incidents in respect of the 24 persons as proved.

Out of the 24 persons, only two mentioned Mr. Hitchcock—Kunhappa Menon (D.W.6) and Unni Krishna Menon (D.W 14) in their statements. Kunhi Koya gave a description, from which the report claims to identify Mr. Hitchcock. That the first was taken to Mr. Hitchcock is admitted by him. But Kunhappa Menon did not complain to Mr. Hitchock against his treatment by the Police. If the plaintiff took no more action than he did, Kunhappa Menon must thank himself for it. Apart from this, the impression, on Mr. Hitchcock must have been that the incident (so far as known to him) was petty and it would be childish or silly to take more serious notice. As to Unni Krishna Menon, it now turns out that his identification of Mr. Hitchcock in the statement cannot be relied on. But assuming for a moment, that the defendants were honestly misled by Unni Krishna Menon's statement, what reference does it make to Mr. Hitchcock?

“I was taken before the Police Superintendent, Mr. Hitchcock, and the Assistant Superintendent, who were sitting in front of the Sub-Jail. They asked who I was; I replied that I was a merchant in the local bazaar and not a non-co-operator, that I earned my living by trade and that it was a pity to illtreat me, a poor man, in this manner. The two officers left the spot”.

It is clear that Unni Krishna Menon protested against being brought up before the Police officers (who, we now know, did not include the Superintendent) and made no other complaint. D. W. 6 says:

“about 20 statements were taken on that day. None of them mentioned the names of Mr. Hitchcock etc., They said it was all done by the Reserve Police men.”

My conclusion as to the incidents of the 26th are:

(1) The Reserve Police men received sundry petty insults from the volunteers and others, but kept themselves under restraint during the first three days (23rd to 25th).

(2). The pent up feelings burst forth on the 26th and they were guilty of discreditable conduct. I say, ‘discreditable,’ in spite of the insults they received, for bodies of trained, disciplined and organised servants of the Government, acting under instructions and directions of superior officers, (such as the police and the military), are expected not to give way to feelings of vengeance and to observe a higher standard of conduct, than untrained, undisciplined, and unorganised rabble in the street, among whom the former are expected to keep order.

If the report had contented itself with criticising the conduct of the Reserve Police-men, or even said that Mr. Hitchcock committed an error of judgment in not keeping the Reserve Police-man under greater control on the 26th (for he admits “I knew that the people would insult them and it would be difficult to keep one's temper when insulted”) the report would not have been libellous.

But, as it is, the report has gone far beyond limits of justifiable criticism. Just as we expect a higher standard of behaviour from the Military and the Police, as compared with the crowds in the streets, similarly we expect from a body of cultured, highly educated gentlemen, preparing to make an enquiry, a calmer attitude and a more judicial attitude than casual narrators. The defendants have grievously fallen from this high standard. Even with reference to the statements before them, their report contains grossly inacurate statements of fact. At p. 24, the report says about Kunhappa Menon:

“It was in their presence that his Khilafat badge was removed. He explained to them how he was beaten, kicked, and dragged to their presence by the police.”

These statements are not supported by his deposition before them.

The following statements in the report, viz., “it also shows that the superior officers are accessories before the fact and after the fact”and (2) There is evidence on record to show that the attack was the result of a conspiracy carefully designed beforehand” may not necessarily refer to the plaintiff. As to the third sentence complained of in the plaint viz., “it was decided victory etc,” I do not think it has anything to do with the incidents of 26th April. At p. 25, the report refers to an article by Mr. Ramunni Menon, in the “Hindu,” dated 3rd March 1921, under the title of “Vagaries of the District Authorities” and proceeds to summarise it. The next sentence refers to Mr. Thomas. The last sentence remarks “after referring to various other vagaries of these District Officers, Mr. Ramunni Menon pointed out that………the people maintained perfect non-violence and that it was a decided victory etc.” If the last sentence is an unfair summary of Mr. Ramunni Menon's article, it may be libellous, but not with reference to the incidents of 26th April.

The next sentence complained of is:

“We consider that the evidence is conclusive and unimpeachable about the complicity of Mr. Hitchcock in the transaction”.

The two incidents, discussed in the sentences, immediately preceeding this conclusion, relate to Unni Krishna Menon and Kunhi Koya. I have already observed that the former's identification of Mr. Hitchcock is now known to be wrong. Kunhi Koya never named him. One would have thought that the defendants, before using the words “conclusive and unimpeachable,” took greater care to satisfy themselves of the connection of Mr. Hitchcock with these two men, instead of being content with the statement of Unni Krishna Menon. As the facts had now turned out, we know Mr. Hitchcock did not see these men, and the conclusions stated, without proper enquiry, and manifestly erroneous, cannot be held to be justified. The fifth sentence complained of is:

“Is it believeable that the Malappuram Reserve Police could have thought of attacking the innocent people of Ottapalam, without being aided by the superior officers and the Local Police”?

Leaving aside the doubtful innocence of the Ottapalam people, one would think the answer is ‘yes’. The natural explanation of the occurrances is not to bring in the aid of the superior officers, but to attribute it to the men themselves. In the present case, the petty insults of the preceding days are enough to explain the fracas. Assuming these petty acts of insult were not known to the framers of the report, even then the prima facie conclusion should be to attribute the conduct of the Police-men to the men themselves and not to explain with reference to a supposed aid or instigation by superior officers.

I do not think it necessary to refer to the 6th and 7th sentences complained, beyond saying that they were unjustisfied.

If the facts stated are correct, reasonable and even plausible, criticim may be justified as fair comment Hunt v. “Star” Newspaper Co. Ltd.(1). But if there are no facts to warrant the imputation, the defence of fair comment cannot be maintained in an action for libel: (Joynt v. Cycle Trade Publishing Co.,(2). The defendants cannot justify the libel, by saying they believed in the presence of Mr. Hitchcock in the Police Station, when Unni Krishna Menon and Kunhi Koya were taken there; for, the enquiry on which such belief could be based was incomplete and they could easily have ascertained the actual facts, if they took greater care to ascertain it. The statement, about the evidence of his complicity being conclusive and unimpeachable, was made at their risk and they cannot escape liability, merely because they made it honestly, but without due care: (see also Halsbury Vol. 18 S. 1285 p. 702-3 and p. 706).

In Cooper v. Lawson(3), it was held that the statement “there can be but one answer to these very natural and reasonable queries, he is hired for the occasion,” was rightly held to be libellous, as it contained a statement of fact, which the defendant failed to prove.

As to damages, this is not a case for nominal damages, which will he awarded only when the plaintiff is content to clear up his character and does not care to put money in his pocket: (Odgers on Libel and Slander p. 374). The libel is also serious. The appeal is also dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff has filed a memorandum of objections for enhancement of damages. I do not think it necessary to enhance the amount of damages for the following reasons:

1. No special damage has been proved.

2. The trial Court has made an honest endeavour to arrive at a figure, which will fairly compensate the plaintiff, for the annoyance and mental suffering, which the libel must undoubtedly have caused. It is for the respondent to satisfy us that it is inadequate. Besides the Rs. 6,000, awarded in this case, he obtained a decree for another Rs. 1,000 in the suit against the “Hindu,” for the same libel. He never filed an appeal against the other defendants.

3. The learned Advocate General referred to the fact that the 4th defendant continued in this appeal to justify his libel.

But while the conduct of the defendant may be considered in assessing the damages, such conduct is only the conduct in the first Court. The repetition in the appellate Court of the defence in the Court below cannot be considered as aggravating conduct.

4. While the reckless conclusions of the defendant may amount to malice in law, no private malice or personal grudge has been proved in the case. The defendants acted throughout, in the public interest. Therefore, it is not a case for exemplary damages.

5. The incident of 26th April led to the fair comment that Mr. Hitchcock might have more efficiently postponed his departure for another day and, in any event, did not, on the 26th April exercise such efficient control over the men of the Reserve Police, as the public had a right to expect and as he exercised on the previous days. This is also a ground for disallowing exemplary damages.

In the result, the Memorandum of Objections is dismissed, but without costs.

Reilly, J.—Plaintiff, who was District Superintendent of Police, S. Malabar, sued the 5 defendants for damages, for certain statements contained in Ex. B, a printed pamphlet entitled “Police Crimes in Ottapalam, being the report of the Emergency Committee, appointed to investigate and report on the police tyranny in Ottapalam, on 26th April 1921,” at the end of which are printed the names of the defendants with the symbol “(Sd)” before each, as if each had signed the original, and contained also in a copy of the report, which appeared over the names of the 5 defendants, in the issue of the Madras news-paper, The Hindu, for 11th May 1921, Ex. A. Defendant 4 alone contested the suit. The Subordinate Judge made a decree for Rs. 6,000 and costs, against all the defendants. Defendant 4 appeals.

2. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar for defendant 4 argued grounds 4 and 7 of his appeal, as preliminary grounds. They are to the effect that the Subordinate Judge misconstrued the pleadings in the suit and misunderstood appellant's defence, that he erred in dismissing the appellant's petition to frame a special issue, whether appellant wrote or published, or caused to be published the report in question and that even if there was any ambiguity in appellant's written statement, the Subordinate Judge should have allowed appellant's application for its amendment. In considering these contentions, it is necessary to examine the pleadings in some detail. In para III (c) of the plaint, it is set out that some incidents are said to have occurred at Ottapalam, on 26th April 1921, in which some members of the Malappuram Special Police Force are said to have taken part, and that plaintiff was apprised of some of the said incidents, for the first time when he reached Calicut Railway Station from Ottapalam between 1 and 2 p.m on that day. In paragraph III (d), it is alleged that defendants constituted themselves, or were constituted into what has since been described as an “Emergency Committee,” with the professed object of investigating the causes and details of the said incidents and wrote and published and caused to be published the so-called report, Ex. B. In Paragraph III (e), are set out 7 extracts from the report, Ex. B, which plaintiff alleges were written, published and caused to be published by defendants falsely, maliciously, and without probable cause and constitute grave and serious libels against plaintiff personally and in the way of his office, as superior District Officer of the Police force of South Malabar. In paragraph III (f), it is stated that the so-called investigation, into the alleged incidents was un-authorised, highly coloured by bias and used as a convenient protest for the malicious vilification of the executive heads of the Malabar District, of whom plaintiff was one. In paragraph III (h), plaintiff charges defendants with having, in their so called report, fastened upon him out of malice and spite unworthy motives and criminal acts, with the full consciousness of his absolute innocence and with deliberate object of holding him up to public odium, as an official tyrant, unworthy of his office. In paragraph III (i), plaintiff states that he has been greatly injured by the libel, in his reputation and by way of his office and has been brought into public odium, ridicule and contempt; and in paragraph III (j), he claims damages from defendants, which he assesses at Rs. 20,000: Defendant 4 filed his written statement in the suit, on 24th October, 1921. In paragraph 1, of the statement, he says:

“This defendant does not admit all or any of the allegations in the plaint, except such as have been expressly admitted herein and as regards those allegations (by which I understand the allegations not expressly admitted), this defendant puts the plaintiff to the proof of the same.”

Then, in paragraph II, he submits that the report, Ex. B, embodies the conclusions arrived at honestly and in good faith, at an inquiry held openly and impartially, on a matter of public importance and is based upon evidence, which there is no reason to disbelieve and states that the import is fair comment, made in good faith and without any malice or spite, on a matter of public interest and is in law justified and privileged. In paragraph 3, he submits that the extracts from the report, quoted in paragraph III (e) of the plaint constitute no libel and afford no cause of action to plaintiff and states that he does not admit the correctness of the various inferences drawn and the innuendoes, suggestions and interpretations made, in respect of them in the plaint. In paragraph 4 of the statement defendant 4 denies paragraph 3 (b) of the plaint. In paragraph V, he denies the charge of malice, and spite in paragraph III (h) of the plaint; in paragraph 6, he denies that plaintiff has been injured, or brought into public odium, ridicule and contempt; and in paragraph 7, he denies that he is liable to plaintiff in damages. It will be notified that this written statement, besides raising pleas of justification and fair comment, specifically traverses every material averment in the plaint, except the allegations that defendant 4 was one of those, who constituted themselves, or were constituted into the “Emergency Committee” and that he wrote and published and caused to be published the report in question. On 15th February 1922, the following issues were settled in the presence of the vakils of plaintiff and defendant 4, viz.,

(1) Whether the report mentioned in the plaint and the extract therefrom quoted in the plaint, constitute a libel on the plaintiff.

(2) Whether the report in question is a fair and bona fide comment on a matter of public interest:

(3) Whether the report was justified and privileged,

(4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any damages, and if so, what;

(5) Whether the report was published maliciously.

It will be noticed that there is no issue about publication of, the alleged libels, from which it appears that the Judge understood that there was no controversy about publication and that defendant 4 admitted publication. On the issues so settled, the parties went to trial, the final hearing being fixed for 3rd April 1923.

3. On that day, defendant 4 put in a petition for adjournment (I.A No. 156 of 1922) which was dismissed. Plaintiff's witnesses were then examined and the suit was adjourned to 19th June, 1922, for the examination of defendant 4's witnesses after a petition (I.A.No 155 of 1922) that the cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses might be reserved, had been dismissed. On the next day, defendant 4 presented a petition (I.A No. 158 of 1922) that plaintiff's witnesses might be summoned for cross-examination, at the next hearing. That was dismissed by the Judge, on 7th April 1922. On 4th April 1922, defendant 4 also put in another petition (I.A No. 159 of 1922), in which he prayed that summons might be issued for the production of certain official records; but that too was dismissed, on 7th April 1922. Then, defendant 4 applied to this Court, for the transfer of the suit to some other Court; but that application was dismissed, on 5th May 1922. When the suit came on for hearing, on 19th June 1922, defendant 4 applied (I.A 183 of 1922) for the framing an additional issue, viz., “whether the 4th defendant wrote and published and caused to be published the report in question.” In the affidavit, Ex. R, accompanying this petition, defendant 4 says that in his written statement he said that plaintiff's allegation, that the defendants wrote and published and caused to be published the report, was not admitted and that plaintiff should prove it; no issue was framed about the signing or publication of the report; but, in his order of 7th April 1922, on I.A 158 of 1922, that is the petition for summoning plaintiff's witnesses to attend again for cross-examination, the Subordinate Judge had remarked that defendant 4 was one of the persons, who signed the report, as a matter of fact defendant 4 did not take any part in writing the report or in its publication; nor did he sign it. As a misapprehension in regard to defendant 4's responsibility for the preparation and publication of the report had ‘crept in’, a specific issue should be framed on the point. The Subordinate Judge dismissed his application for framing an additional issue, his view being that the proposed issue did not arise on the pleadings, in which it must be held that defendant 4 had admitted the allegation in the plaint, that he, among others, wrote and published and caused to be published the report. On the failure of his petition for a new issue, defendant 4, on the same day, put in a petition, I.A No. 184 of 1922, for the amendment of his written statement, by the addition of a paragraph, denying that he ever was a member of the Emergency Committee and denying that he was in any way responsible for the report and that he wrote and published it or caused it to be published. The Subordinate Judge dismissed this petition for amendment also and proceeded with the trial of the suit, on the issue originally framed.

4. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar's argument for, defendant 4, on this part of the case, is twofold, firstly, that publication is sufficiently denied, in his client's written statement as it stands, and secondly, that if that is not so defendant 4 should have been allowed to amend his written statement, so as to bring out the denial of publication, which he intended originally to plead. The question whether defendant 4 in his written statement did deny publication sufficiently for the purpose of pleadings depends on the construction of Rr. 3 and 5 of O. 8. Civil Procedure Code. R. 3 of that Order lays down that “it shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact, of which he does not admit the truth except damages.”

That rule gives directions, how denials are to be made. Defendant 4's denial of publication in his written statement has to be found, if anywhere, in paragraph 1 of that statement. In that paragraph, he says that he “does not admit all or any of the allegations in the plaint, except such as have been expressly admitted,” and as regards the unadmitted allegation, he “puts the plaintiff to the proof.” No one can contend that this paragraph contains a specific denial, of publication. The paragraph is clearly a general denial, such as the rule states to be insufficient. R. 5 of the Order goes on to state the consequence of a defendant failing to observe the directions of R. 3. It states that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically, or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted (except as against a person under disability).

Now it is clear that the allegation in the plaint that defendant 4, among others, wrote and published and caused to be published the report in question is not specifically denied in defendant 4's written statement. Nor, in my opinion, can that allegation be said to have been denied by defendant 4 in his written statement “by necessary implication” within the meaning of R. 5, on the ground that a general denial includes the particulars within the purview; as that would be to construe R. 5. in a sense inconsistent with R. 3. Similarly, the words “stated to be not admitted” in R. 5 must be taken to mean, if we are to read the two rules together, as we must, “specifically stated to be not admitted.” To my mind, the strict interpretation of the two rules present, no difficulty. It is true, as urged by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar, that it has often been recognised that rules of pleading should not be enforced to a party's detriment, so strictly in this country as in England; but I am here confining myself to the interpretation of the two rules in question. In this connection, Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has drawn out attention to two English cases, Adkins v. The North Metropolitan Tramway Co. and Grocott v. Lovatt. In the former case, to each paragraph of the plaintiff's statement of claim, the defendants replied that they denied each and all the several statements and allegations, set out in paragraph so and so, of the statement of claim; and it was admitted that the defendants intended to traverse all the material allegations in the statement of claim. The decision was that there was no ground for striking out the defence so framed. In Grocott v. Lovatt the plaintiff alleged in paragraph 3 of his statement of claim that the defendants, on or about a certain date, falsely and mali ciously wrote, printed and published a certain handbill. The first paragraph of the defence was “The defendants deny the facts, alleged in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim.” The Court of appeal decided that, although the defence was pleaded in a loose and irregular form, the Trial Judge was wrong, in treating the case as one in which defendants had admitted publication. It will be seen that neither of the cases quoted is really similar to the present case. In each of the cases quoted, the defendant went much farther towards a specific denial of the allegations in the plaint, than defendant 4 has done in the general expressions used in paragraph 1 of his written statement. To my mind, on a strict interpretation or indeed on any reasonable interpretation of Rr. 3 and 5 of O. 8, Civil Procedure Code, Defendant 4 cannot be held to have sufficiently denied the allegation of publication and must, therefore, be held to have admitted publication.

5. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar's contention that defendant 4 should have been allowed to amend his written statement, so as to bring out clearly the denial of publication, which he intended originally to plead, is more serious. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has referred to several cases, Tildesley v. Harper, Cropper v. Smith, Hollis v. Burton and Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba(4), as showing the principles, on which leave to amend pleadings should be granted. Those cases do not go beyond the well-recognised principle, that, however the necessity to amend may have arisen, leave to amend should always be granted and at any stage in the proceedings, in order to allow the real question at issue between the parties, to be raised on the pleadings, unless the party applying for leave has acted in bad faith, or the amendment will cause some injury to the opposite party, for which he cannot be fully compensated by costs, or otherwise. At this time of day, it is hardly necessary to quote authorities to support that principle, which has certainly not been disputed, by the learned Advocate General in this case. Hollis v. Burton may perhaps be noticed for a moment, as in that case Burton, who was a solicitor, and therefore, might have been expected to know better, made a very serious admission by mistake and was subsequently allowed to withdraw it by amendment. That case is of some particular interest, in comparison with the present case, as it appears that defendant 4 is a High Court Vakil of long standing and large experience, who is no doubt well acquainted with the rules of pleading. But a High Court Vakil, like any one else, may make a mistake or omission in his pleadings, and, if he has really done so, he is as much entitled as any one else to put the matter right by amendment, in order that the real question in controversy between him and his opponent may be decided. So far from being slow, to grant leave to amend pleadings, or from pinning the parties to the strict letter of their pleadings, it is the duty of the Court to assist parties, in bringing out clearly the real questions in issue between them. But, when we speak of the real questions in issue, or in controversy between the parties, we must be careful as to the stage of the proceedings to which we refer. The questions in controversy between the parties, which have to be brought out clearly and decided, are, save in exceptional cases, the questions in controversy, when the parties join issue, that is when the defendant puts in his written statement. They do not include new questions, which the defendant neither wished nor intended then to dispute, but which, at a later stage, in the proceedings, either because he has changed his mind, or because something has happened after he filed his written statement, he thinks it profitable to dispute. A defendant, who has deliberately and under no mistake or misapprehension, admitted a material fact in his written statement, cannot be allowed, at a later stage in the proceedings, to change his front and make a new case for himself, by denying that fact. As I understand him, Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar does not urge that defendant 4 should be allowed to do anything of this sort. His contention is that defendant 4, when he filed his written statement, really intended to deny that he had published the report in question. What we have to consider is whether it is possible to accept that contention.

6. In the plaint, there is a clear allegation that defendant 4, among other defendants, wrote, published and caused to be published the report in question, and with the plaint, was filed the pamphlet, Ex. B and the issue of the “Hindu,” Ex. A, in each of which defendant 4's name printed is at the end of the report, in such a way, as to indicate that he had signed its original. Defendant 4, in his written statement, traversed the other material allegations in the plaint individually; but according to his own account, he did not think it necessary to refer to the very important allegation of publication, except in his general refusal to admit in the omnibus paragraph, with which he opened his statement. At a very late stage of the hearing, Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has drawn our attention to the fact that in his written statement defendant 4 has not specifically denied the allegation in the plaint that plaintiff was apprised, for the first time, of some of the incidents, which happened at Ottapalam, on 26th April 1921, when he reached Calicut that day. That statement, Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar contends the whole course of defendant 4's conduct of the suit shows he intended to deny; but there is no specific denial of it, from which Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar asks us to infer that defendant 4 intended to deny it, in his general refusal to admit in paragraph 1 of his written statement, and from this again, he asks us to infer that it may be true that defendant 4 intended to deny also the allegation of publication, in the same general paragraph. The answer to that is that logically it was not necessary to defendnant 4's case, to deny that plaintiff was first apprised of some of the incidents at Calicut and that, so far as thas statement in the plaint was in any way material, it was sufficiently traversed by implication in the plea of justification set up by defendant 4. The Subordinate Judge has fallen into an error in paragraph 19 of his judgment, in saying that the plea of justification, set up by defendant 4, itself implied an admission of authorship. Defendant 4 was quite at liberty, if he wished, in such a case, to deny publication and then to set up alternative pleas of justification etc. It is not because a denial of publication would conflict with a plea of justification, that we can infer in this case, that defendant 4 never intended to deny publication. But the learned-Advocate General has asked as to compare the written statement with the plaint and to note the particularity, with which other allegations in the plaint are traversed and to contrast the vagueness of the general refusal to admit, by which it is now contended defendant 4 intended to deny the allegation of publication. He asks and it may well be asked, is it likely that any reasonable man, intending to contest such a case as this and to put forward the cardinal plea, that he did not publish the alleged libels and had nothing whatever to do with them, would have put in a written statement, containing no specific mention of the plea though traversing in detail almost every other allegation in the plaint. And here it must be remembered that defendant 4 is not an ignorant or illiterate man, but a lawyer of experience. As I have said, a lawyer like anyone else, may make a mistake or omission in the pleadings in his own case. But is it likely that a lawyer of experience intending in such a case as this, to deny publication, would have filed such a written statement as that of defendant 4, in this suit? The statement was verified and signed by defendant 4 himself. Defendant 4 is asking us to believe, in spite of the form of his pleadings, that he did intend to deny publication. In the circumstances, I think we may legitimately look into his further conduct in the suit, to see whether there is anything in it to make it probable or improbable, that he had that intention. Issues in the suit were framed, on 15th February 1922. If one had never seen the pleadings in the suit, the first thing that would attract one's attention, on looking at the issues, would be that there is no issue about publication. That shows, at least that the Subordinate Judge was under the impression, when framing the issues, that no question of publication was in controversy, but that on the contrary defendant 4 had admitted publication. If, as is represented, defendant 4 intended to deny publication and believed that by his written statement he had denied publication, how was it that his vakils, in whose presence the issues were framed and who must have understood that that was a cardinal part of his defence, did not protest at once that a most important issue had somehow been omitted? The denial of publication was not only an obvious plea, which it would be almost impossible for them to forget; it was a line of defence which, if seriously intended, would be far more easy to maintain than most of the other pleas raised. Can it be believed that defendant 4 and his vakils were so negligent that they did not observe that on the issues as framed, that most valuable line of defence was not available to them? But the matter does not end there. The Subordinate Judge has mentioned in his judgment that defendant 4's senior vakil submitted draft issues in the case and that it does not appear from those draft issues that there was any intention to deny publication. The draft issues have not been submitted to this Court; but the Subordinate Judge's statements regarding them are not disputed. This shows at least how defendant 4's senior vakil understood his written statement. Is it possible that defendant 4 really intended to deny publication, but his vakil was under the misapprehension that he had admitted it? And, when the suit came on for final hearing, it is clear that defendant 4 contested it strenuosly. As has been stated, he put in petitions for adjourning the trial, for reserving the cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses, for re-calling plaintiff's witnesses and for the production of further documents, and he also applied to this Court for the transfer of the suit from the Subordinate Judge's file. As was shown by his affidavits, in support of those petitions; defendant 4 himself was watching his interests in the suit keenly. But in spite of all this we are asked to believe that it was not until some time after the examination of plaintiff's witnesses had been concluded that defendant 4 discovered that such an important part of his defence, as denial of publication, had been omitted from the issues. An examination of the pleadings and defendant 4's own conduct in the suit leave no doubt upon my mind that he did not intend to deny publication when he filed his written statement. In my opinion, therefore, the Subordinate Judge was right in refusing to allow him, at a later stage, to change his front and to put forward by amendment a new case denying publication.

7. At the very close of the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar, in his reply, has suggested that the averment of publication in the plaint is not sufficiently specific, that it does not state where or to whom publication was made, nor how defendant 4 was responsible for publication, either in Ex. A or B. Nothing was said about this before the Subordinate Judge, and the point is not raised in the appeal memorandum. If there would ever have been anything in the objection, it has been raised too late. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has also brought to notice, at the same stage of the proceedings, the fact that there appears to be a mistake in the plaint, in giving the date of the cause of action. That point too should have been raised before the Subordinate Judge, if of any importance.

8. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has urged that the Subordinate Judge should have granted defendant 4's petitions of 3rd and 4th April 1922, for reserving his cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses and for re-calling those witnesses on another day for cross-examination; on the ground that defendant 4 had not then obtained the originals of the statements appended to Ex. B, on which that report was professedly based. The statements, as printed at the end of Ex. B, were in defendant 4's hands; but Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has urged that for the purpose of cross-examining plaintiff, the original statements were required. He has not been able however to explain to us why equally effective questions could not have been put to plaintiff, on the basis of the printed statements, as on that of the manuscript originals. In his order on I. A. No. 150 of 1922, the Subordinate Judge has remarked that defendant 4 adopted a defiant attitude, at the hearing of 3rd April 1922 and declined to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. Defendant 4's conduct in this matter appears to have been very unreasonable; and, when a party behaves in such a way at the trial, he puts those who have to defend his conduct in the appellate Court in an unenivable position. Neither in this matter, nor in the other interlocutory applications, which I have mentioned, do the Subordinate Judge's orders appear to me improper.

On the merits of the case, it is unnecessary for me to add much to the judgement just pronounced by my learned brothers, with the result of which I agree. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has urged that most of the extracts from the report, which have been set out in the plaint, do not necessarily apply to plaintiff. It is true that the first two extracts, viz., (1) “it shows also that the local police and superior officers are accessories before the fact and after the fact” and (2)” there is evidence on record to show that the attack was a result of a conspiracy, carefully designed beforehand” taken by themselves, do not necessarily refer to plaintiff. The 3rd extract, viz., “it was a decided victory for the non-co-operation movement and a correspondingly decided failure for the authorities, as their attempts to goad the people to violence had so thoroughly and signally failed” appears in the report only as a remark made by D.W 5 in a news-paper article published by him, in March 1922. But when we come to the 4th extract, viz., “we consider that the evidence is conclusive and unimpeachable, about the complicity of Mr. Hitchcock in the transaction”, the reference to plaintiff is specific. In regard to this extract, Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has contended that the “transaction” referred to is merely the taking of one Kunhi Koya to the Police Station, which is mentioned in a few lines earlier in the report. But, we must go further in the report to see what the “transaction” was. At the bottom of page 26 of Ex.B we find “hence the necessity for a conspiracy to provoke a breach of the peace at Ottapalam, on the morning of the 26th of April, and, if any untoward casualties or injuries were caused to the police, to bring in all their instruments of destruction into play and then attribute the whole thing to the movement of non-co-operation. There is ample proof on record that the Reserve Police of Malapuarm, committed in furtherance of the common object, the various offences with which they have been charged” i.e, house-breaking, robbery, assault, grievous hurt and mischief, as mentioned on page 8 of the report. Then on page 28, we find “what do all these expressions prove? They prove not only a pre-existing conspiracy, but also the method and manner of execution resolved upon by the conspirators. They establish beyond ever a shadow of doubt that all these conspirators, before they started out, resolved to get at the captain of the volunteers, vakil Ramunni Menon, all Khilafat workers and volunteers, the Khilafat flags and any others, who might oppose them and assualt them as roughly as possible, so as to provoke violence and then use their arms and ammunitions, in the name of order and peace. They also show that it was part of their campaign that the local police should abet and aid the Reserve Police, by accompanying them to point out the persons they wanted. In this connection, the important question is whether Mr. Hitchcock, the District Superintendent, and the Serjeant of the Reserve Police had left Ottapalam before the riot commenced, or whether they left after the riot commenced with full knowledge of the same”. Then on page 31, we find the extract, in question, viz., “we consider that the evidence is conclusive and unimpeachable, about the complicity of Mr. Hitchcock in the transaction.” The argument of the report from the bottom of the page 26, until we reach this extract, is continuous, and it is clear that the “transaction” referred to is the alleged conspiracy and the facts alleged to have been done, in carrying out its object. In the 5th extract, viz., “is it believable that the Malapuram Reserve Police could have thought of attacking the innocent people of Ottapalam, without being aided by the superior officers and the local police”, it is clear I think from the context that plaintiff is included in “the superior officers”. The 6th extract is “at Calicut, there was no riot and house-breaking by the police, whereas at Ottapalam riot and house-breaking proceeded with the attack on the Khilafat emblems and workers. Mr. Hitchcock and his Assistant did all that was necessary, to use this unlawful Assembly of the Reserve Policemen, as an instrument to serve their own purpose, without directly implicating themselves.” And the next sentence of the report explains the last words of this extract, by saying “Mr. Hitchcock hurried to the station, with full knowledge of what was going on, with a view to avoid responsibility and save his reputation.” The 7th and last extract appears in the report, after the words “on a review of the whole evidence” and is, “we are of opinion that the Reserve Police of Malapuram, the local police of Ottapalam and the superior police officers were, before the commencement of the riot, engaged in a criminal conspiracy, for the purpose of provoking a breach of the peace and violence on the part of non-co-operators and then using reprisals and finally fixing the responsibility on the movement of non-co-operation. We are also of opinion that all the abovenamed offiences were committed by the Reserve Police of Malapuram, in furtherance of their common object and that they failed to secure desired result.” Here again, it is clear that plaintiff is included in “the superior Police Officers” mentioned. It must also be remembered that on page 19 of the report it is stated that one of the questions for consideration is “if it (i. e., the conduct of the police) was the result of the previous conspiracy, whether the District Superintendent of Police, Mr. Hitchcock, and the Assistant Superintendent of Police and the local police were parties to the conspiracy and to what extent, if any.” Taken with their context, there can be no doubt, I think, that the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th extracts, set out in the plaint, refer to plaintiff.

It has not been contended by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar that, if these extracts refer to plaintiff, they are not defamatory. Indeed they are most gravely defamatory. Hardly a graver allegation could be made against an officer, in the position of plaintiff, whose duty it was to preserve the peace of his district, than that he played the hateful and shameful part of deliberately provoking a section of the public to break the peace, in order that the police might have an excuse to bring “all their instruments of destruction into play.” Further, it is alleged that plaintiff entered into a conspiracy with his subordinates, to carry out this disgraceful plan. And finally, it is alleged that he was guilty of the crowning meanness of deserting his men and leaving Ottapalam, while the plan was being carried out, in order to conceal his part in it. These are atrocious allegations.

11. Defendant 4 has set up the plea of justification. To make out that plea, he has produced evidence that Madhava Menon, D. W. 6, the local chief of the “Khilafat volunteers” was beaten by a police constable, at the Ottapalam Railway station, on the morning of 26th April, 1922, was kicked by some other constables and was then taken to plaintiff at the Ottapalam police station but made no complaint to plaintiff and was sent away, that Ramunni Menon, D. W. 5, the local Congress Secretary, after hearing about 10-30 A. M., that some shop-keepers and others had been beaten, by the police, went with D. W. 10 and another man, towards the Railway station, and then towards the court-building, of which the police station part, and on their way, passed plaintiff who was going to the railway station, but did not speak to him, that when they got to the shop of Narayan Menon, D. W. 11, which is opposite the court-building, they found that he had received a wound on the nose, that his brother, D.W 14, had been beaten and that D. W, 12 had an injury on his leg, that after an altercation with a police constable, a student, who was with Ramunni Menon, was hit on the back of his neck by the same constable and that a little later, Ramunni Menon was seized by some constables and dragged towards the police station, but was released before he reached it. The evidence of D. Ws. 11, 12, and 14 is to the effect that, when they were all in the shop of D. Ws 11 and 14, some police constables, who had been chasing another man, entered the shop; D. W. 14 resisted them; the constables hit him, and he jumped down into the road: his brother D. W. 11, went to his rescue; he in turn was hit by the constables and pulled out of the shop: he fell into the road-drain and injured his nose, breaking one of its bones: D. W. 12 was also beaten by the constables and fell down and hurt his hand and knee. It is not clear from the evidence of D. Ws. 11, 12, and 14, when all this happened. D.Ws 11 and 14 say, it was between 10 and 11 A.M; D.W 21 says he posted a letter “about 10 or 11 A.M” and was sitting in the shop after that, when the constables arrived. From the evidence of D. W. 5, Ramunni Menon, it appears that D. Ws. 11, 12 and 14 had been beaten, before he reached the shop, which was very soon after he passed plaintiff going to the railway station, from the court, building-opposite to the shop. But how soon after Ramunni Menon and his companions met plaintiff, he got to the shop has not been made clear. D. W. 2, a correspondent of the Madras Mail, says that he saw the assaults of Rammuni Menon and on D. Ws. 11, 12 and 14 and that all these incidents happened within 10 minutes. D. W. 14 says, that after he had been beaten by the police, he was taken to the police station: he saw two sahibs there; he heard that they were Superintendents, but he cannot say that they were not Serjeants. It does not appear that D. W. 11 or 12 or 14 had anything to do with the non-co-operation movement and their evidence suggests rather that some police constables had some private reason for attacking them. There is evidence that plaintiff left Ottapalam Railway station, by the train for Calicut, at 11-13 that morning. D. W. 3, who was in charge of the Ottapalam branch of a Calicut Bank, says that he saw some men in khaki shirts chasing a man in front of his office. They absued him and ‘made preparations’ to get into his office, desisted when one of them read the notice board; he sent a telegram about the incident to his Head office at Calicut, about 11-15 a.m that day. It will be seen that, if every word of this evidence produced, by defendant 4, is true, it does not show that plaintiff knew, before he left Ottapalam, that anyone had been assaulted by the police and that it is ludicrously insufficient, as a basis for the other allegations made against him. I agree that the plea of justification fails.

12. There remains the plea of fair comment. The right of fair comment, on matters of public interest, is a right, which it is our duty carefully to guard and liberally to interpret. But, can the statements in question be brought, within even the widest interpretation of fair comment? The conduct of the police is undoubtedly a matter of public interest. If the evidence produced by the defendant 4, regarding the conduct of the police at Ottapalam, on 26th April, 1922 is true and it must be remembered that it was not necessary for plaintiff's purpose in the suit to controvert that evidence, it was a subject, on which comment, very strong comment, was legitimate. But the report goes far beyond that Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has harped upon the argument that, if police constables at Ottapalam acted, in the way the evidence shows they, acted, on the morning of 26th April, 1922 of while plaintiff was still in the village, or immediately after he left, it might resonably be said that plaintiff was responsible for their conduct. In one sense, the head of the District Police force is responsible, if the discipline of the force breaks down and the men get out of hand. If the evidence in this case is true, strong language might have been used, on the way in which plaintiff appeared to have discharged that responsibility without overstepping the legal limits of fair comment. But from the position that plaintiff must be held responsible for the conduct of his subordinates, to the allegation that he joined them in a conspiracy, for the vile object attributed to him in the report, we have to jump over an unbridged chasm in the argument. The 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th extracts, quoted in the plaint, contain unjustified allegations of fact. It makes no real difference in this respect that the 5th extract is put in the form of a rhetorcial question and that the 4th and 7th extracts are stated, as conclusions of fact, drawn from evidence. As the learned Advocate-General has contended, these extracts are not fair and they are not comment. The plea of fair comment also fails.

13. In regard to damages, I agree that there is no sufficient reason to interfere with the Subordinate Judge's decree.

14. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs and that the memorandum of objections should be dismissed without costs.

W. S. S.Appeal dismissed.