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Prasaddas Sen v. K.S. Bonnerjee

Calcutta High Court
Nov 29, 1929
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, Prasaddas Sen, Santoshlal Sen, and Hrishikesh Sen, filed a suit against Kamalkrishna Shelley Bonnerjee, the Official Receiver of the Court. The suit arises from a prior case (Suit No. 923 of 1919) where, by a consent decree dated 8th July 1920, the Official Receiver was appointed receiver of certain immovable properties belonging to the defendants in that suit, including the premises known as No. 1, Shama Bai Lane. Pursuant to an order dated 10th September 1920, the Official Receiver took possession of these premises.

The plaintiffs alleged that the premises were let to Ramnarayan Jalan at a monthly rent of Rs. 401, and that the Official Receiver wilfully neglected and defaulted in regularly realizing the rents, resulting in a loss of Rs. 16,660 in arrears of rent which became irrecoverable. Bholanath Sen, a partner in the firm B.N Sen & Brothers and defendant 2 in the present suit, was joined as a defendant for refusing to join as a plaintiff.

The suit was dismissed by the trial Judge on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to comply with Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) requiring prior notice before suing a public officer. Although the plaint was amended to include an allegation that notice was given on 18th May 1925, the defence under Section 80 was raised only after the plaint was amended. The plaintiffs sought a decree against the Official Receiver for the arrears and an order for rendering accounts on the footing of wilful default.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Official Receiver, appointed under a Court order as receiver of a particular estate, qualifies as a public officer within the meaning of Clause 17, Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether neglect or default in realizing rents and profits by the Official Receiver constitutes "any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity" under Section 80 of the CPC.
  3. Whether the notice letter dated 18th May 1925 complies with the requirements of Section 80 of the CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Skippers and Co. Ltd. v. E.V David, A.I.R 1927 All. 132 Held that the Official Receiver is a public officer. Supported the classification of the Official Receiver as a public officer under the CPC definition.
Davis v. Curling [1845] 8 Q.B 286 Notice is required before suing a public officer for nonfeasance (failure to act) under a statute. Established that neglect or default (nonfeasance) falls within the scope of acts requiring notice under similar statutes.
Jolliffe v. The Wallasey Local Board [1873] 9 C.P 62 Nonfeasance amounts to an act done within statutory notice provisions. Reinforced that omissions or failures to act are covered by notice requirements.
Queen v. Williams [1884] 9 A.C 418 Omission to perform a public duty amounts to an act requiring notice of action. Confirmed that omissions or continuing failures to perform public duties are acts within the meaning of notice provisions.
Wilson v. Mayor and Corporation of Halifax Omissions or neglect by public officers are acts requiring notice. Supported the broad interpretation of acts including omissions under notice provisions.
Sharpington v. Fulham Guardians [1904] 2 Ch. 449 Section protecting public bodies does not apply to breach of private contracts. Distinguished public duty breaches from private contractual claims, clarifying scope of notice requirements.
Jones v. Nicholls [1844] 13 M. & W. 361 Common-sense approach to sufficiency of particulars in notices. Guided the court’s assessment of the adequacy of the notice letter’s contents.
Palmer v. G.J Ry. Co. [1839] 4 M. & W. 749 Notice required for actions against railway company for omission of statutory duties. Analogous principle that notice is required for omissions in discharge of public duties.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined whether the Official Receiver is a "public officer" as defined in Clause 17, Section 2 of the CPC. It held affirmatively, reasoning that the Official Receiver is appointed by the Chief Justice, remunerated by salary, and acts as an officer of the Court, supported by the precedent in Skippers and Co. Ltd. v. E.V David.

Next, the Court considered whether neglect or default in realizing rents is an "act purporting to be done" by the public officer in his official capacity within the meaning of Section 80. The Court rejected objections that nonfeasance is not an act or that the section applies only to torts. It relied on English authorities (Davis v. Curling, Jolliffe v. The Wallasey Local Board, Queen v. Williams) and the General Clauses Act to conclude that omissions and neglect are included in the scope of acts requiring notice.

The Court distinguished actions ex contractu (breach of contract) from those arising from breach of public duty, citing Sharpington v. Fulham Guardians, holding that the present suit concerns breach of official duty and thus falls within Section 80.

Finally, the Court analyzed the sufficiency of the notice letter dated 18th May 1925. It found that although the letter was sent and received, it lacked essential particulars such as the description and place of residence of the plaintiffs, which are mandatory under Section 80. The Court declined to adopt a broad or lenient approach to these omissions, emphasizing the necessity of formal compliance with the statutory requirements. Consequently, the notice was held insufficient.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The Court held that the Official Receiver is a public officer under the CPC and that neglect in realizing rents is an act within the scope of Section 80 requiring prior notice. However, the notice letter provided did not comply with the statutory requirements, leading to dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit. This decision affects the parties directly by upholding the necessity of strict compliance with procedural notice requirements before suing public officers. No new precedent beyond the application of existing principles was established.

Show all summary ...

Rankin, C.J:— The plaintiffs in this suit are three in number Prasaddas Sen, Santoshlal Sen and Hrishikesh Sen. They bring their suit against Kamalkrishna. Shelley Bonnerjee, Official Beceiver of this Court, and their case is that in Suite No. 923 of 1919, by a consent decree, dated 8th July 1920, the Official Receiver was appointed a receiver of certain immovable properties belonging to the defendants in that suit, including the premises known as No. 1, Shama Bai Lane, and that pursuant to an order, dated 10th September 1920, the Official Receiver took possession of the said premises under the consent decree. The defendants in the previous suit were a firm trading under the name or style of B.N Sen & Brothers, in which firm the plaintiffs and Bholanath Sen, defendant 2 in the present suit, were partners.

2. The plaintiffs' case is that the premises. No. 1, Shama Bai Lane, were let to one Ramnarayan Jalan on a monthly rent, of Rs. 401 and they allege that the Official Receiver

“wilfully neglected and defaulted in realizing regularly the rents of the said premises and took no steps for the collection thereof, as a result of which considerable loss and damage has been caused to the plaintiffs”.

3. In particular they say that a sum amounting to Rs. 16,660, being arrears of rent due from the said Ramnarayan Jalan, has been lost and has become irrecoverable by the wilful default and gross negligence of the defendant in failing to collect the same as receiver. The plaintiffs have joined Bholanath Sen as a defendant to the present suit as he has refused to join them as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs ask for a decree against the Official Receiver for Rs. 16,660 and also for an order that he do render accounts on the footing of wilful default and that judgment may be given against him for such sum as may be found due upon such account. The suit has been dismissed by the learned trial Judge on the ground that, under Section 80 of the CPC, it was obligatory on the plaintiffs to give notice as therein prescribed. The plaint did not originally contain an allegation that any such notice of action had been given, but it was amended by an order, dated 28th June 1927 by the addition of a statement that notice as contemplated by the section was duly served upon the Official Receiver on 18th May 1925. The defence under S. 80 was not taken originally in the written statement, and it appears that leave was given to amend the plaint, by including the allegation as to notice having been given, as a result of the Official Receiver's desire to amend his written statement by taking an objection to the suit on the ground of want of notice. The plaint was filed on 4th February 1927, the Official Receiver's written statement was filed on 24th February 1927. On 16th June 1927, the Official Receiver took out a summons for leave to amend the written statement, and on 18th June 1927 the plaintiffs took out a summons for leave to amend their plaint. It is reasonably clear that no question of waiver or estoppel arises to prevent the Official Receiver from making good the plaint as to want of notice.

4. Three questions require to be considered. The first is whether the Official Receiver, acting under an order appointing him to be receiver of a particular estate, is a public officer and this question has to be decided upon a consideration of the definition of “public officer” given in Cl. 17, S. 2 of the Code. The second question is whether neglect of default in realizing the rents, issues and profits of properties in respect of which the Official Receiver has been appointed a receiver by a decree of this Court comes within the words

“any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity.”

5. If these two questions are answered in the affirmative, then the last question is whether or not the letter of 18th May 1925 is a notice sufficiently complying with the requirements of the section. It is not disputed that the letter in question was sent and received. The judgment of the learned Judge deals with the third question only.

6. At one stage of the case objection was taken that leave to sue had not been obtained from the Court, which appointed defendant 1 to be a receiver. This objection however has been expressly abandoned on his part both before the trial Judge and before us.

7. On the first point, the question is whether defendant 1 is an officer of a Court of justice whose duty it is to take charge or dispose of any property, or a person especially authorized by a Court of justice to perform such duty, or is an officer in the service or pay of Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty. In my opinion the Official Receiver appointed to act as receiver in any particular case is a public officer both within Cl. (d) and also within Cl. (h) of the definition of “public officer” in S. 2(17) of the Code. This Court, though it is not obliged when appointing a receiver to appoint any particular persons, has long had an official with an office and staff, who executes receiverships when appointed thereto by the Court. R. 9, Ch. 21, of the rules of the High Court on its Original Side refers to this official as the Court Receiver. He is generally called the Official Receiver. For his services, fees are charged under the rules. These fees are, however credited to Government which remunerates the officer himself by a salary and pays for his staff and office expenses. The Official Receiver is appointed by the Chief Justice as an officer of the Court under the powers conferred in that behalf by the Letters Patent of this Court. In Skippers and Co. Ltd. v. E.V David . A.I.R 1927 All. 132 the Official Receiver was held to be a public officer. The next question is whether the present suit is instituted against the Official Receiver:

“in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity.”

8. The allegation against him is that of neglect and wilful default in the discharge of his official duty, and I am unable to see that this claim can be said to be outside the scope of S. 80. Two objections may however be noted. It may be said first that default or neglect or any form of mere nonfeasance is not an act purporting to be done in this official capacity. It may also be said that what is charged against the Official Receiver is not a tort and that there is some authority to the effect that the section is only concerned with actions in tort. In my judgment neither of these objections can be sustained. Upon the question of nonfeasance it is true that this is a matter which has constantly been considered by Courts in England when applying the provisions of particular statutes, which provide for public officers the protection of a requirement as to notice of action. In Davis v. Curling . [1845] 8 Q.B 286. the words of the Statute (5 and 6 Will. 4, c. 50) were “any act done in pursuance of or under the authority of” the statute, but it was held that notice was necessary before a surveyor of highways could be sued for damages for injuries occasioned to the plaintiff by his failure to remove a heap of gravel from the road. Again in Jolliffe v. The Wallasey Local Board . [1873] 9 C.P 62 the Board had neglected to cause a proper and sufficient buoy to be placed in the river at the spot, where they had cast an anchor for the purpose of securing a landing stage. This case was decided under Section 139 of the Public Health Act of 1848, of which the words were “for anything done or intended to be done.” The opinion of Brett, J. was to the effect that, where the plaintiff was suing in tort, nonfeasance was to be considered as an act done within such clauses as these; and Keating, J. said:

“It has been suggested that protection is not intended to be given by clauses of this description in cases of nonfeasance. But that is not so it is clear from the cases of Davis v. Curling Newton v. Ellis . [1855] 5 E. & B. 115, Wilsom v. Mayer and Corporation of Halifax . [1868] 3 Ex. 114. and Selmes v. Judge . [1871] 6 Q.B 724., all of which seem to me to establish that a case of what appears to be nonfeasance may be within the protection of the Act.”

9. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Queen v. Williams . [1884] 9 A.C 418. referred to Jolliffe's case with approval as holding that an

“omission to do something which ought to be done in order to be the complete performance of a duty imposed upon a public body under an Act of Parliament or the continuing to leave any such duty unperformed amounts to “an act done or intended to be done” within the meaning of a clause requiring a notice of action.”

10. This is indeed what was laid down by Kelly C.B in Wilson v. Mayor and Corporation of Halifax. Now the words in the Indian statute (S. 80 of the Code), are any “act purporting to be done in his official capacity.” But these words have to be read with the second definition given in Cl. 3, General Clause Act (10 of 1897), which provides as one of the general definitions as follows: “Act” as used with reference to an offence or a civil wrong shall include a series of acts, and words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions.”

11. In strictness there is no doubt a difficulty in seeing how an omission can be said to purport to be done in an official capacity. There is an equal difficulty however in seeing how an ordinary neglect or default or omission to discharge completely a public duty can be said to be “intended to be done” under the authority of a statute. The English cases I have referred to show that the English Courts have never regarded the latter difficulty as formidable and having regard to the language of the General Clauses Act namely, “words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions,” I am not of opinion that this case can be held to be outside the scope of S. 80 of the Code upon the ground that the cause of action is neglect or nonfeasance. The plaintiffs are complaining of a failure to use reasonable diligence in doing the very thing which the Official Receiver had a public duty to do, namely to realize the rents, issues and profits of property over which he was appointed a receiver.

12. The second objection is that S. 80 applies only to actions in tort and that the present suit is not strictly speaking, an action in tort. It is no doubt broadly speaking true that such a section as this is not intended to apply to actions ex contractu and there are other classes of actions no doubt which do not come within the meaning of the expression

“in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity.”

13. Public bodies in the course of their duty frequently have occasion to enter into contracts e.g, for the erection of buildings, wharfs etc., and if an action is brought for breach of such contract it will no doubt as a rule be outside the scope of this section. In Sharpington v. Fulham Guardians . [1904] 2 Ch. 449, the Fulham Guardians employed a builder to alter an old mansion house so as to make it into a receiving house for children of paupers. The builder claimed certain additional sums beyond the original contract amount. The case arose under the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, which provided a special period of limitation for proceedings against any person

“for any act done in pursuance, etc., of any Act of Parliament or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, duty or authority.”

14. In holding that the Act did not apply to the case Farwell, J., as he then was, after referring to certain cases in which the Act had been held to apply said:

“The present case seems to me quite different. The public duty which is here cast upon the guardians is to supply a receiving house for poor children; a breach or negligent performance of that duty would be an injury to the children or possibly to the public who might be injured by finding the children on the highway. In order to carry out this duty they have power to build a house or alter a house and they accordingly entered into a private contract. It is a breach of this private contract that is complained of in this action. It is not a complaint by a number of children or by a member of the public in respect of a public duty. It is a complaint by a private individual in respect of a private injury done to him. The only way in which public duty comes in at all is, as I have pointed out, that if it were not for a public duty any such contract would be ultra vires. But that would apply to every contract.”

15. With this we may compare what Baron Parke said in another case, Palmer v. G.J Ry. Co. . [1839] 4 M. & W. 749:

“If the action was brought against the railway company for the omission of some duties imposed upon them by the Act, then notice would be required.”

16. We are not here and now concerned to inquire whether the plaintiffs have a good cause of action. If they have, it is on the principle that this public officer has committed a breach of his official duty, which includes a specific duty towards the claimants, and is either liable therefore in a common law action for damages or can be called upon to make redress therefore in a Court of equity. This in my opinion makes the section applicable. There remains the question whether the letter of 18th May 1925 is a sufficient compliance with the section. It seems impossible that letter should have been written with the section in view, but if it contains the elements required by the section it is none the worse for that. At the time it was written, it would not even appear that the plaintiffs had made up their minds to bring a suit, as it seems that in-August 1926, they endeavoured to obtain redress by an application in the previous suit to reopen the receiver's accounts. I am inclined to think that the section contemplates a notice of action in the English sense, since it requires a statement of the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff but I do not propose to proceed upon this ground. So far as the plaintiffs are concerned the name of the client is given in the letter as Messrs B.N Sen & Bros., this being the name of the partnership firm which was defendant in the previous suit. The letter in no way contains-either a description or anything by way of a statement of place of residence. Or behalf of the plaintiffs the language of Pollock, C.B, in Jones v. Nicholls . [1844] 13 M. & W. 361., has been pressed upon us that it is necessary to

“import a little common-sense into notices of this kind,”

and in a case in which it is reasonably clear that the defendant would have no real difficulty in approaching the plaintiff for the purpose of making a tender of amends, or otherwise negotiating with him, it is open to the Court, where a name, or description, or place of residence is given, to take a broad rather than a meticulous view as to the sufficiency of the particulars given under any of these heads. I trust however that I shall not depart altogether from common-sense, in holding that a notice which contains no description and no statement of place of residence, is not a compliance with the section. In my opinion, such a notice cannot be held to be sufficient upon the strength of evidence or suggestions that the defendant would have had little or no difficulty in finding out these matters for himself whether by reference to documents in his possession or by in independent research. The fact that the letter in question is headed

“Suit No. 923 of 1919: Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. B.N Sen & Bros.,”

does not seem to me to incorporate as part of this letter any document stating, or intending to state the place of residence of the present plaintiffs at the date of the letter. In my opinion, this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Buckland, J.:— I agree.

M.N/R.K

17. Appeal dismissed.