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Shaikh Rafiq-Ud-Din v. Haji Shaikh Asgar Ali

Patna High Court
Jul 29, 1921
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs-respondents filed a suit seeking multiple declarations related to sums of money allegedly borrowed and owed by the defendants in connection with a joint business. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought declarations that the defendants were liable to pay principal amounts and interest as per specified schedules and accounts, and that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover such amounts from the defendants if he were compelled to pay on their behalf. A preliminary issue arose regarding the sufficiency of court-fees paid on the plaint, with a Stamp Reporter asserting a deficiency of Rs. 275. The matter proceeded through lower courts before coming on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court-fees paid by the plaintiffs-respondents on the plaint were sufficient under the applicable law.
  2. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents lies within the scope of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, which permits suits for declaratory relief regarding legal character or rights to property.
  3. Whether the declarations sought by the plaintiffs constitute a suit for a declaratory decree under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deokali Koer v. Kedarnath Whether a suit without consequential relief can be treated as a suit for declaratory decree under the statute. The Court distinguished this case, noting that it involved a prayer for injunction as consequential relief, which was not present in the current suit.
Midnapore Zamindari Company v. The Secretary of State for India Whether a second declaration based on a first declaration constitutes consequential relief under the statute. The Court noted that in that case the second declaration was considered consequential relief, unlike in the present case.
Tewari Kara v. Bhupat Mandar Interpretation of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act regarding suits for declaratory relief. The Court referenced a differing view taken by Mr. Justice Roe in this case, supporting the conclusion of no deficiency in court fees here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the preliminary issue of court-fee sufficiency, rejecting the Stamp Reporter's assertion of deficiency. It reasoned that although the suit may not lie under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, it is nonetheless a suit for a declaratory decree because consequential relief was prayed for, distinguishing the present case from precedents cited by the Stamp Reporter.

On the substantive question, the Court analyzed the scope of Section 42, which allows a suit for declaration of legal character or rights to property without requiring further relief. The Court clarified that "legal character" refers to status such as legitimacy or marriage, which was not at issue here. Further, the Court held that the plaintiff was not seeking declaration of rights to any existing property, but rather a future entitlement to contribution from the defendants if the occasion arose. This prospective claim did not fall within the ambit of Section 42.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the suit did not lie under Section 42 and allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments and dismissing the suit without costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed, the judgments and decrees of the lower courts were set aside, and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed without costs.

Implications: The decision clarifies that a suit seeking a declaration of future or contingent rights to contribution does not fall within the scope of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, which is limited to declarations of legal character or rights to existing property. The ruling directly affects the parties by terminating the suit at the appellate stage but does not establish a new precedent beyond the statutory interpretation applied.

Show all summary ...

Das, J.:β€” A preliminary question arises in this appeal as to the sufficiency of the court-fees paid by the plaintiffs-respondents on the plaint filed in the Court of first instance. The Stamp Reporter reports that there is a deficiency of Rs. 275.

It will appear on a reference to the plaint that the plaintiff sued for a declaration, first, that Rs. 2,370 as given in Schedule A, was borrowed for the benefit of the joint business and that the defendants are therefore liable to pay the principal amount besides interest to the extent of their share; secondly, for a declaration that the defendants are liable to pay Rs. 1,350 principal, besides interest and costs as per account given in Schedule (B), together with interest and costs as may be found on calculation to be due by them according to the award of the panches; and, thirdly, for a declaration that in case the plaintiff for any reason whatever be compelled to pay the share of the defendants, he would be entitled to realize the same, principal with interest and costs, from the defendants.

In my opinion the view taken by the Stamp Reporter is not correct. It may of course be that the suit does not lie under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act; but it cannot be suggested as was suggested in the case of Deokali Koer v. Kedarnath that the suit is not a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed for. That case which is referred to by the Stamp Reporter is clearly distinguishable. The late Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court came to the conclusion that there was in substance a prayer for injunction and a prayer for injuction is a consequential relief within the meaning of the Statute. So far as the other case, namely. The Midnapore Zamindari Company v. The Secretary of State for India in Council is concerned, it will appear that the second declaration ought for by the plaintiff was based on the first declaration, and in the peculiar circumstances of the case the learned Judges took the view that the second declaration asked for by the plaintiff was in effect a consequential relief within the meaning of the Statute. In this Court Mr. Justice Roe took another view in the case of Tewari Kara v. Bhupat Mandar I am of opinion that there is no deficiency due from the respondents.

Coming now to the case I am clearly of opinion that the suit does not lie. The whole question is it a suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. That section declares that

β€œAny person entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title to such character or right, and the Court may in, its discretion make therein a declaration that he is entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief.”

The plaintiff in this suit has not, asked for a declaration as to his legal character. Now clearly a legal character under section 42 means the status of the plaintiff, that is to say, the status as to legitimacy, marriage, divorce, adoption and the like. It is quite clear that in this suit the plaintiff is not asking for a declaration as to his status.

Is he then asking for a declaration of his right as to any property? Clearly he is not. The right to any property must mean the right to any existing property. In this case he is not asking for any declaration as to any existing property. His whole suit is a suit for declaration that he will be entitled to contribution from the defendants if and when the occasion arises. That, in my opinion, is not contemplated by section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.

I would allow this appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit. In the circumstances of the case I would dismiss it without costs.

Adami, J.:β€” I agree.

Appeal allowed.