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Nil Kanta Ghosal v. Ram Chand Roy And Others Respdts.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was brought by Nilkanta Ghosal, who sought to execute a decree obtained by his deceased wife, Kanchan Barani Debi, in a suit against the respondents. In that suit the respondents pleaded that Kanchan Barani was a benamidar (a nominal holder). To avoid dismissal on that ground, Nilkanta Ghosal gave evidence in the suit asserting that Kanchan Barani was the real owner. After the suit and decree, Kanchan Barani died leaving a will in which she stated that the property in question was her husband's property and that her heirs would not succeed to it. Nilkanta Ghosal, as executor of her will, took out probate and applied for execution of the decree alleging that he was the true owner and that Kanchan Barani had been his benamidar.
The Subordinate Judge doubted whether a true owner could execute a decree that had been obtained in the name of another person as benamidar and imposed restrictions on execution (including reporting to the probate Court or Collector and payment of additional court fee). The present appeal challenges that order; the court below set aside the Subordinate Judge's order and remanded the matter for allowing the appellant to execute the decree in any capacity he chooses.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a true owner can execute a decree obtained in the name of another person who was a benamidar.
- Whether the executing court can decide, under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), the question of true ownership when that question is raised in execution proceedings.
- Whether the Subordinate Judge was correct to restrict execution by requiring reporting to the probate Court or Collector and payment of additional court fee (i.e., whether such restrictions are within the executing Court's powers).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant asserted that he was the true owner of the property; in the original suit he gave evidence that Kanchan Barani was the real owner (to avoid dismissal on the benami point).
- The money to acquire the property came undisputedly from the appellant's funds, supporting his claim as the true owner.
- He claimed the right to execute the decree both in his personal right as the true owner and as executor of his wife's will (having taken out probate).
Respondents' Arguments
- The learned advocate for the respondents contended that the question whether the appellant is the true owner cannot be decided under Section 47 CPC by the executing Court.
- The Subordinate Judge took the view that Kanchan Barani was the real owner and that her statement in the will was made under some misapprehension; this supported a finding against the appellant's claim to be the true owner.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Abdul Kureem v. Chukhun (1) decided in 1879 | Support for the principle that the true owner can execute a decree obtained in the name of a benamidar. | The court relied on this case and described it as supporting the principle that the person behind the benami "mask" may appear and execute the decree; the court preferred this authority. |
| Palaniappa Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar (2) | Expressed a dissenting view from Abdul Kureem v. Chukhun regarding the point in question (as noted by the learned advocate for the respondents). | The court stated that, with respect to the learned Judges in that case, their reasons did not commend themselves and declined to follow that dissenting authority, preferring the case of its own Court (Abdul Kureem v. Chukhun). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by analysing the nature of a benami transaction and the role of a benamidar. It observed that a benamidar is "a mere name" and that the real owner stands behind the fictitious owner. From that premise the court reasoned there is nothing to prevent the true owner from "taking off the mask" and appearing in proper person before the Court to execute a decree obtained in the name of the benamidar.
The court relied on the authority of Abdul Kureem v. Chukhun (1879) as supporting this principle and rejected the contrary reasoning in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar, stating that the latter's reasons did not commend themselves to the court.
Addressing the respondents' contention about Section 47 CPC, the court held that when the judgment-debtor raises the question that the person seeking to execute the decree is not the true owner, that question can be decided in execution under Section 47 CPC; the respondents' objection would have required more consideration only if there were a dispute between the alleged benamidar and the person claiming to be the true owner.
The court criticised the Subordinate Judge's assumption that the will's statement was made under some misapprehension, noting that such an assumption cannot be made without evidence. The court relied on the fact that the appellant had earlier stated in the suit that the lady was the real owner and that the acquisition money came from his funds (undisputedly), to conclude that the appellant should be considered the true owner.
On the question of the Subordinate Judge restricting execution by requiring the appellant to report to the probate Court or the Collector and to pay additional court fee, the court held that it is not the Subordinate Judge's duty to collect probate duty or to perform the revenue authority's functions under the Succession Act. Those duties lie with the probate Court and the revenue authority. Accordingly, the Subordinate Judge was wrong to impose such limitations on the appellant's right to execute the decree as executor under the will.
Holding and Implications
The order of the Subordinate Judge is set aside; the appellant is permitted to execute the decree in any capacity he chooses.
Direct effects on the parties:
- The case is remitted to the Subordinate Judge for allowing the appellant to execute the decree in any capacity he prefers (personal right as true owner and/or as executor).
- The judgment will govern both appeals before the court (as stated in the opinion).
- Costs: the appellant is entitled to the costs of the appeals, but not to the costs of preparation of the paper book (as unnecessary papers were printed). The hearing fee is assessed at five gold mohurs for the two appeals together.
- The cross-objection is dismissed without costs.
The opinion declines to follow the dissenting reasoning in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar and prefers the authority of Abdul Kureem v. Chukhun on the point that a true owner can execute a decree obtained in the name of a benamidar. The judgment does not purport to state any broader rule beyond the facts and authorities discussed in the opinion.
B.B Ghose, J.:— This is an appeal by one Nilkanta Ghosal who sought to execute a decree against the respondents which was obtained by his deceased wife Kanahan Barani Debi. The lady brought the suit against the respondents in which the decree was obtained, and it appears that the respondents took the plea that the lady was the benamidar of the present appellant. In that suit the appellant evidently for the purpose of preventing the suit being dismissed on the ground of its being brought by a benamidar (as the law then understood was that a benamidar could not sue for recovery of possession of landed property) gave evidence that the lady was the real owner. Kanchan Barani died after having left a will and in her will she stated that the property in question was her husband's property and as she had no interest in it her heirs would not succeed to it. After her death her husband as executor of the will of Kanchan Barani took out probate. He applied for execution of the decree on the allegation that he was the real owner of the property and Kanchan Barani his late wife, was his only benamidar. The Subordinate Judge was doubtful whether a true owner could execute a decree which was obtained by another person as benamidar. I do not see that there is any difficulty in holding that the true owner can execute such a decree. If one really considers what a benami transaction is and what the position of the benamidar is there should be no difficulty. It is well settled that the benamidar is a mere name, and as it has been called, a mere Behind the name of the fictitious owner ??? the real owner and also behind the mask is the Dorson who is the real owner of the property. That being so I do not see that there is anything which prevents the person behind the mask to take off the mask and to appear in proper person before the Court. The principle is supported by the case of Abdul Kureem v. Chukhun (1) decided in 1879. This case was no doubt dissented from, as pointed by the learned advocate for the respondents, in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar (2). But with great respect to the learned Judges the reasons stated by them do not commend themselves to me. I prefer to follow the case of our own Court. There is no reason therefore why a true owner cannot execute a decree obtained in the name of his benamidar.
2. The learned advocate for the respondents contends that the question whether the appellant is the true owner or not cannot be decided under Section 47 of the CPC, by the executing Court.
3. His argument might have required consideration if there was dispute between the person who was alleged to be the benamidar and the person who alleges himself to be the true owner. But when the judgment-debtor raises the question that the person who seeks to execute the decree was not the true owner, I do not see why that question cannot be decided under Section 47 of the CPC.
4. It is next argued on behalf of the respondents that the Subordinate Judge was right in his view of the fact that the lady was the real owner of the property for which she obtained the decree. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the lady made the statement in her will under some misapprehension. This is an assumption which the Subordinate Judge was not entitled to make without any evidence. It is quite clear that the appellant stated in the suit itself that the lady was the real owner in order to avoid the suit being dismissed on that ground. The money for acquiring the property came undisputedly from his fund and there is no reason why he should not be considered to be the true owner. The appellant therefore is entitled to execute the decree in his right. He was also entitled to execute the decree, as executor of the will of his wife. The Subordinate Judge held that he could do so. But there is no reason why his right to execute the decree should be restricted by stating that he should report to the Court which granted the probate or to the Collector and pay additional Court fee. It is not the duty of the Subordinate Judge to collect probate duty with regard to the will of any person. It is the duty of the probate Court and the revenue authority under the Succession Act. The Subordinate Judge is therefore wrong in limiting the right of the appellant to execute the decree as executor under the will as he has done.
5. The order therefore of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and the case sent back to that Court for allowing the appellant to execute the decree in any capacity he? likes. This judgment will govern both the appeals.
6. The appellant is entitled to the costs—of these appeals, but he will not be-entitled to the costs of the preparation of the paper book as unnecessary papers were printed. The hearing-fee is assesrsed at five gold mohurs for the two ap-appeals together.
7. The cross-objection is dismissed without costs.
Bose, J.:— I agree.
A.L/R.K
8. Order set aside.
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