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The Emperor v. Sri Narain Prasad Accused.

Calcutta High Court
Feb 14, 1907
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a reference by the Sessions Judge of Patna under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused is Sri Narain Prasad, who was tried with the assistance of a jury on charges under sections 420, 466, 468, 471 and 419 of the Indian Penal Code. The jury returned a majority verdict (four to one) finding the accused not guilty. The Sessions Judge disagreed with the jury's verdict to such an extent that he referred the case to the higher court.

The underlying facts, as established in evidence for the prosecution, are that the accused, employed as an amin in the Behar Survey Department, represented himself to a complainant (Sheo Persad Gowala) as an Inspector and induced the complainant to pay sums of money (variously Rs. 4, Rs. 5, Rs. 75, Rs. 12-8 and Rs. 25) on the pretext of necessary expenses, security deposit and uniform. The accused furnished printed documents and, on 18th October, presented a purwana (letter of appointment) purportedly signed by Mr. Kraal (Assistant Superintendent) directing the complainant to join as an Inspector. On inquiry Mr. Kraal denied the signature and the purwana as forgeries; the Police were informed, the accused was arrested and a die-stamp and a genuine purwana bearing Mr. Kraal's real signature were found in the accused's house.

The accused denied the prosecution story and led no defence evidence, except admitting that he sent a letter dated 22nd September mentioning a payment of Rs. 4. The reference was made under section 307 Cr. P.C., permitting the court to re-examine guilt despite the jury's majority verdict and the Sessions Judge's opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial on multiple charges (three counts under section 420, two counts under sections 466 and 468, one count under section 471, and one count under section 419, IPC) was irregular under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (in particular, whether the offences formed one transaction such that joinder was permissible under section 235, Cr. P.C.).
  2. Whether the accused was guilty of the offences charged — specifically: cheating under section 420, forgery under sections 466 and 468, using a forged document as genuine under section 471 (read with section 466), and cheating by personation under section 419, IPC.
  3. If guilty, which offences should properly be the subject of conviction (i.e., whether to convict under forgery provisions as well as under section 471 and section 420) and what sentence should be imposed.

Arguments of the Parties

Pleader for the Accused (Defence) — Contentions

  • Challenged the regularity of trying the accused on seven charges together; argued that this joinder was improper. To support this contention, cited Birendra Lal Bhandur v. The Emperor and Bhagwath Dial v. The King-Emperor.
  • Impugned the credibility of prosecution witnesses, arguing inconsistencies in dates and the absence of documentary proof of certain payments (e.g., Mangar Mahton's inability to produce private payment records).
  • Contended that the accused could not be convicted under section 419 (cheating by personation) because, although the accused may have given a false description of himself, he did not impersonate any specific other person.

Prosecution / Crown — Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The evidence, as presented and commented on by the Deputy Legal Remembrancer for the Crown, established the sequence of events that showed the accused induced payments and used a forged purwana to obtain money; the prosecution maintained the truth of its factual story and the credibility of its witnesses.
  • The prosecution's evidence included the accused's admitted letter dated 22nd September, the purwana dated 18th October which was proven to be unsigned by Mr. Kraal, and discovery of a die-stamp and other documents in the accused's house consistent with fabrication.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Birendra Lal Bhandur v. The Emperor Cited by defence to show that charging multiple offences in one trial can be irregular where offences arise from distinct transactions. The court distinguished this case from the present facts, noting Birendra Lal concerned two distinct transactions; therefore it did not apply to the present matter where offences formed a single transaction.
Bhagwath Dial v. The King-Emperor Relied on by defence to argue irregularity where offences fall under different provisions and arise in separate transactions (it involved offences under sections 234 and 235 Cr. P.C.). The court found the factual matrix of Bhagwath Dial materially different (it involved clearly separate transactions), so it did not govern the present case.
Emperor v. Sherufalli Allibhoy Cited as an analogous authority where trial on multiple related offences was held not to be illegal. The court found the present case "on all fours" with Sherufalli Allibhoy and treated it as supporting the regularity of trying all the offences together under section 235, Cr. P.C.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step-by-step analysis, grounded on the evidence presented and established legal principles:

  1. Standard of review and admissible scope on reference: The matter was a reference under section 307 Cr. P.C.; the court acknowledged it must give due weight to the Sessions Judge's opinion and the jury's verdict, but it was entitled to form its own conclusion on guilt or innocence.
  2. Assessment of facts and credibility: The court examined the prosecution evidence and the accused's limited admission. It found the prosecution story "perfectly true" and the accused guilty of cheating and of using a forged document as genuine. Specific credibility points:
    • Discrepancies in dates by the complainant (Sheo Persad) between the first information report and trial evidence were treated as bonâ fide mistakes, explainable by the complainant's limited education and lack of contemporaneous record; the letter dated 22nd September aided in fixing dates.
    • Mangar Mahton (father-in-law) was credible despite not having private-account entries for payments; the court accepted his explanation that he kept business accounts but not private disbursement records.
    • Ram Lal Gowala was accepted as a genuine witness and not a chance witness because of his proximity to the family and lack of motive to fabricate.
  3. Joinder/regularity of charges: The defence contention that the trial on seven charges was irregular was considered under section 235 Cr. P.C. The court concluded that all charged offences arose from a single transaction: representation as an Inspector, acts of cheating relying on that representation, and the use of a forged purwana to obtain further money. Thus, joinder was permissible and the trial regular. The cited authorities were distinguished or found inapplicable, and the court relied on Emperor v. Sherufalli Allibhoy as analogous support for the regularity.
  4. Determination of specific offences and necessity of multiple convictions:
    • The court accepted the prosecution proof of three separate acts of cheating (24th September, 8th October, 18th October) and therefore held the accused guilty under section 420, IPC for each.
    • It also found beyond doubt that the purwana dated 18th October was not signed by Mr. Kraal and that the accused used it as genuine to obtain Rs. 12-8. This supported conviction under section 471, IPC, read with section 466 (since the document purported to be signed by a public servant in this official capacity).
    • Although the court found persuasive evidence suggesting forgery (handwriting similarity with the 22nd September letter and the discovery of a die-stamp corresponding to the purwana), it considered it unnecessary to convict separately under sections 466 and 468 in addition to section 471 read with section 466.
    • On section 419 (cheating by personation), the court found it unnecessary to decide the precise legal question raised by defence (whether the accused personated a specific other person), because convictions under section 420 (three counts) and section 471 read with section 466 sufficed to meet the ends of justice; accordingly the accused was acquitted on section 419.
  5. Sentencing: The court sentenced the accused to three years' rigorous imprisonment for each offence of which he was convicted, directing that the sentences run concurrently.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The court set aside the jury's verdict of acquittal (Verdict set aside).
  • The accused, Sri Narain Prasad, was convicted of three offences under section 420, IPC (three counts of cheating) and of one offence under section 471, IPC read with section 466, IPC (using a forged document purporting to be signed by a public servant, used as genuine).
  • The accused was acquitted of the charges under sections 466, 468 and 419, IPC.
  • Sentence: Three years' rigorous imprisonment for each conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently.

Implications

The direct consequences are the accused's conviction on specified counts and imprisonment as stated above; the jury's majority acquittal was set aside. The court treated the joinder of offences as proper under section 235, Cr. P.C., distinguishing earlier authorities cited by defence and aligning the present facts with the cited authority Emperor v. Sherufalli Allibhoy.

The opinion does not announce the creation of any new legal precedent; it applies existing principles (joinder under section 235, assessment of witness credibility, and the elements of sections 420 and 471 read with 466) to the facts and reaches the convictions and concurrent sentences described.

Show all summary ...

This is a reference by the Sessions Judge of Patna, under sec. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The accused in this case is one Sri Narain Prasad. He has been charged with offences under secs. 420, 466, 468, 471 and 419, I.P.C The trial was conducted with the assistance of a jury. The jury by a majority of four to one found the accused worthy of acquittal, that is to say, they found him not guilty. The learned Sessions Judge has differed so much from the verdict of the jury that he has considered it necessary for the requirements of justice to refer the case to us.

The facts of the case are very simple. The accused person has for some time past been employed as an amin in the Behar Survey Department. In September last he made the acquaintance of the complainant, Sheo Persad Gowala, when he went to visit the place of business of Ganesh Mistry, the master of the complainant (who was a photographer), for the purpose of having his likeness taken. On that occasion he entered into conversation with Sheo Persad, observed that his work was very laborious and advised him to seek an appointment in the Survey Department, in which he represented himself to be an Inspector. He also offered to help him to obtain an appointment in that department similar to his own. On the 22nd September last, a letter, admittedly sent by the accused, reached Sheo Persad; and in it was stated that the accused had already paid the Peshkar Saheb Rs. 4 “for necessary expenses.” The accused also said in the letter that he would call upon the complainant in a few days. The promised visit was subsequently made; and the necessity for paying Rs. 5 Was explained to Sheo Persad. The money was obtained by Sheo Persad from his master Ganesh and paid to the accused. Two or three days later a printed pamphlet of survey instructions was given by the accused to Sheo Persad to study, and on the 8th October a printed paper containing the rules as to the deposit of security by employees in the Survey Department was produced by the accused. Rs. 75 was there indicated as the amount fixed for security in the case of an Inspector; and, at the suggestion of the accused, that sum was obtained by Sheo Persad from his father-in-law Mangar Mahton and paid to the accused. Certain official forms were then filled up by Sheo Persad with the assistance of the accused. Then, on the 18th October last, what purported to be a purwana, or letter of appointment signed by Mr. Kraal, the Assistant Superintendent of the Survey Department and bearing an official stamp, was presented by the accused to the complainant. That purwana directed Sheo Persad to join Mr. Kraal in the Monghyr District, on the 1st November as an Inspector on Rs. 25 a month. The purwana also mentioned Rs. 12-8 as payable for uniform; and accordingly that sum was obtained by Sheo Persad from his father-in-law and given to the accused. On the 27th October the accused asked for Rs. 25, on the ground that the head clerk would upset the whole arrangement unless paid that sum. Sheo Persad agreed to pay the money. On consulting his master Ganesh, however, the suspicions of the latter were roused. He said it was difficult to understand how a mere underling could interfere in the matter after a purwana had actually been issued by the Saheb; and so, on the advice of Ganesh, a reference was made to Mr. Kraal himself. The result was that Mr. Kraal denounced the purwana and his signature thereon as impudent forgeries; and the Police were applied to and the accused arrested. His house was searched next morning; and one of the die-stamps used in the survey office as also the appointment purwana of the accused himself bearing the real signature of Mr. Kraal were discovered.

These are, shortly, the facts of the case. They have been duly proved by the witnesses for the prosecution. The defence is a total denial of the whole story which is declared to be concocted and false. No evidence was adduced by the accused in his defence. The only admission made by him is that he sent the letter of the 22nd September in which the payment of Rs. 4 to the peshkar is mentioned.

We have had all the evidence laid before us: and it has been commented on by the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer for the Crown and the pleader who appears on behalf of the accused. We may mention that this is a reference under sec. 307, C.Cr P., and that although we are bound in dealing with it to give due weight to the opinion of the Sessions Judge and the verdict of the jury, we are entitled to make up our minds for ourselves on the question of the guilt or otherwise of the accused. After hearing the evidence we have no doubt whatever that the story of the prosecution is perfectly true and we feel no doubt that the accused has been guilty of cheating and of using a forged document as genuine.

The learned pleader for the accused has raised various objections both as to the regularity of the proceedings in the Sessions Judge's Court and as to the credibility of the witnesses. In the first place, he maintains that the trial of the accused on seven charges—three of cheating under sec. 420, I.P.C, two of forgery under secs. 466 and 468, I.P.C, one of using as genuine a forged document under sec. 471, I.P.C, and one of cheating by personation under sec. 419, I.P.C is irregular. In support of this contention he cites the case of Birendra Lal Bhandur v. The Emperor and the case of Bhagwath Dial v. The King-Emperor, the latter case being one tried by the Punjab Chief Court.

It appears to us, however, that the trial of the accused on all these charges was perfectly regular, under sec. 235, Cr. P.C The offences with which the accused has been charged in this case all form one transaction. The accused represented himself to be an Inspector in the Survey Department and he committed two acts of cheating, relying upon that representation. He then made use of a forged document purporting to be a letter of appointment, signed by Mr. Kraal, the Assistant Superintendent in the Survey Department, appointing the complainant to be an Inspector: and, on the strength of that document, he obtained a further sum of Rs. 12-8 as from Sheo Persad on the 18th October last. In our opinion these offences form one and the same transaction; and, therefore, under sec. 235, Cr. P.C, there has been no irregularity in the proceedings. The cases relied upon by the pleader for the accused differ very considerably from the present case. In the case of Birendra Lal v. The Emperor there were two distinct transactions, one committed apparently in the Registration Office and the other when an attempt was made to cheat a Loan office. Then, the case of Bhagwath Dial v. The King-Emperor relates to an offence which comes under the provisions both of secs. 234 and 235, C.Cr P., and the accused in that case was tried, first, for the forgery of three cheques and, secondly, for cheating in respect of each cheque and then for falsifying certain account books. Now the third offence was clearly not committed in the same transaction as that in which the first two were committed.

The case of the present accused seems to us to be on all fours with that of The Emperor v. Sherufalli Allibhoy in which the trial was held not to be illegal.

Then the pleader for the accused has impugned the credibility for the witnesses for the prosecution. But we have come to the conclusion that the evidence of these witnesses is perfectly reliable. The evidence of Sheo Persad is impugned because there is some difference in the dates of the occurrences as mentioned by him in the first information report and the evidence he gave before the Sessions Judge. In the first information report he seems to have said that the cheating on the first occasion, that is, in respect of the Rs. 5, was committed on the 2nd October: whereas it appears that it was really committed on the 24th September. The complainant appears in the first information to have made a bonâ fide mistake; and in determining the correct date he was assisted when giving evidence before the Sessions Judge by a reference to the letter which the accused admits that he sent to the complainant and which is dated 22nd September. Then, there is some little discrepancy as to the date on which, he says, the second offence of cheating was committed. But that is not important. It was very natural that a young man of but little education, like Sheo Persad, should have made mistakes in describing events of which he kept no record whatever. There is no mistake made about the date of the third offence of cheating committed on the 18th October and there could have been none, because the purwana which is said to be forged is dated the 18th October, and that enabled the complainant to fix the date of the occasion on which he was cheated out of Rs. 12-8 as.

The credibility of Mangar Mahton, the father-in-law of the complainant, is impugned because it is said that this man has not been able to produce any record of the payments which he made on behalf of the complainant to the accused. In particular, it is said that he should have been able to show in his account the payment of the sum of Rs. 75 said to have been made on the 8th October. But this witness, who is a butter merchant, explains that he keeps an accurate account of the transaction of his business, but no account of his private disbursements. This is not an unlikely story but a very probable one: for people are often particular about their business affairs but careless with regard to their private transactions.

Then, the credibility of the witness Ram Lal Gowala has been impugned on the ground that he is a chance witness. We do not think, however, that he is a chance witness. He appears to be a close neighbour of the father-in-law of the complainant, Mangar Mahton. We there fore see no reason to disbelieve the evidence given by these witnesses. The are apparently respectable men: and no reason is shown why they should give false evidence. There is, moreover, no ground for supposing that they bear the accused any grudge. Their evidence then clearly proves the substantial truth of the story for the prosecution.

We now turn to the question of the offences of which the accused should be convicted. We entirely believe the story of the three acts of cheating committed by the accused on the 24th September, the 8th October and the 18th October respectively. There is ample evidence, in our opinion, to show that he committed these acts on these dates. He has therefore been guilty of offences under sec. 420, I.P.C Similarly, we feel not the slightest doubt as to his being guilty of an offence under sec. 471, I.P.C, that is of having used on the 18th October a purwana or letter of appointment, a document purporting to be signed by Mr. Kraal. It is proved beyond a doubt that this purwana was never signed by Mr. Kraal and the accused undoubtedly used it as genuine and by means of it obtained payment of Rs. 12-8 from the complainant. We have, therefore, no hesitation in convicting the accused under sec. 471, I.P.C, and as the document purports to be a document signed by a public servant in his official capacity, we convict him under sec. 471 read with sec. 466, I.P.C

In these circumstances, as we find him guilty under sec. 471 read with sec. 466, I.P.C, we do not think it necessary to find him guilty of the offences of forgery under secs. 466 and 468, with which he has been charged. We have not very much doubt that he forged the document. The fact of the handwriting of this purwana being similar to the handwriting in the letter which he admits he sent to the complainant on the 22nd September and the fact that a die-stamp was found in his house which corresponds with the impression stamped on the purwana point to the conclusion that the accused forged the punwana. But it is unnecessary for us to convict him under secs. 466 and 468 as well as under-sec. 471 read with sec. 466, I.P.C There remains the charge under sec. 419, I.P.C, of cheating by personation. It is not necessary, we think, to convict him under this section. The pleader for the accused has contended that his client cannot be convicted of an offence under this section, because, although he may have given a false description of himself, he did not describe himself as being any other person than he is. It is unnecessary to consider this question, because we think that a conviction for the three offences under sec. 420, I.P.C, and a conviction for the one under sec. 471, I.P.C, are sufficient to meet the ends of justice. We acquit the accused of the charges under secs. 466, 468 and 419, I.P.C But we convict him of the three offences under sec. 420, I.P.C, and of the one offence under sec. 471, I.P.C, read with sec. 466, I.P.C

We sentence him for each offence to three years' rigorous imprisonment, but we direct that the sentences do run concurrently.

B.C
Verdict set aside.