Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Kunja Mohan Chakravarty v. Manindra Chandra Roy Choudhuri

Calcutta High Court
Jul 20, 1921
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs were landlords and the defendants held a tenure under them. Rent arrears accrued, and the plaintiffs obtained a decree in a suit for arrears of rent. In execution of that decree the tenure was sold on 8 January 1907 and was purchased by the landlord decree-holders for Rs. 1. On 29 April 1918 the plaintiffs instituted a fresh suit for ejectment, alleging that the defendants were in unlawful occupation notwithstanding the earlier sale. The defendants contended that the earlier decree and the execution sale were made without jurisdiction and therefore did not affect their interest in the tenure.

At trial the Court accepted the defendants' contention as to want of jurisdiction and dismissed the ejectment claim while making a decree for arrears of rent. The District Judge on appeal reversed that decision and decreed ejectment with mesne profits. The present appeal challenges the District Judge's view.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit for rent (and the consequential decree) was instituted in a Court having jurisdiction in view of Sub-section (1) of Section 144, Bengal Tenancy Act and the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.
  2. Whether the execution sale of the tenure, held by the Court that passed the decree but outside the local limits of the property, was held with jurisdiction and if not, what is the legal effect of that sale.
  3. Whether the defendants may be precluded from challenging the place of suing or the execution sale by reason of Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code (i.e., whether procedural objection to place of suing was waived or barred).
  4. Whether, alternatively, the proceedings (decree and sale) could be treated as the decision of a quasi-arbitrator by consent of the parties and so be immune from collateral attack.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants (Appellants)

  • The decree for rent and the execution sale of the tenure were made and carried out without jurisdiction over the property and therefore did not affect their interest in the tenure.
  • Because the sale was beyond the Court's jurisdiction in respect of the property, it should be treated as a nullity.

Plaintiffs (Respondents)

  • The earlier suit for rent was properly instituted in the Court at the district headquarters where the defendants resided; therefore the decree is not impeachable on jurisdictional grounds.
  • Even if the sale was held without jurisdiction, the proceedings might be treated as if the Judge were a quasi-arbitrator by reason of the parties' acceptance of the Judge's decision (relying on authority for the "quasi-arbitrator" proposition).
  • The District Judge relied upon Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code to contend that objections as to place of suing should not be entertained on appeal or revision unless taken at the earliest opportunity and unless there was a consequent failure of justice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fazlur Rahim Abu Ahmed v. Dwarka Nath Chowdhry (30 C. 453 : 7 C.W.N. 402) Interpreting Section 144, Bengal Tenancy Act and its relation to Sections 15 and 17 (now Section 20) of the Civil Procedure Code: Section 144 defines where the cause of action is deemed to arise but does not itself specify the Court of institution. Used to show that to ascertain the competent Court one must apply the Civil Procedure Code provisions (Section 20) together with Section 144; supported the conclusion that a rent suit can be instituted where the tenant resides in appropriate circumstances.
Chintaman Narayan v. Madhavrav Venkatesh (6 B.H.C.R.A.C.J. 29) Authority for allowing a suit to recover rents to be brought where the defendant resides, even if the land is situated elsewhere, where the plaintiff's title only incidentally comes into question. Relied upon to support the finding that the rent suit was properly instituted in the Court at the district headquarters because the defendants resided there when the suit was begun.
Ram Lall Moitra v. Bama Sundari Dabia (12 C. 307 : 6 Ind Dec. (N.S.) 209) Supporting inclusion of Order XXI, Rule 3 in the 1908 Code permitting attachment and sale of an estate spanning jurisdictions by any one of the competent Courts. Used to explain the limited circumstance in which a Court may validly sell immovable property lying within the local limits of more than one Court.
Rajlaashmi Dasee v. Katyayani Dasee (12 Ind. Cas. 464 : 38 C. 639 at p. 668) Authority supporting the proposition that a sale held by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity. Relied upon in concluding that the execution sale in the present case, being held without jurisdiction over the property, was void and of no effect.
Legdard v. Bull (9 A. 191 : 13 I.A. 134 : 4 Sar. P.C.J. 741 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 561) (P.C.) Statement that where parties agree to accept a Judge's decision although the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Judge may function as a quasi-arbitrator and the decision may be final and not open to ordinary attack. Cited by respondents as supporting the arbitrator theory; court considered and rejected its application here because the decree and sale were ex parte and there was no mutual consent to treat the Judge as arbitrator.
Burgess v. Morton ((1896) A.C. 136 : 65 L.J.Q.B. 321 : 73) Authority noting that a judge's decision when treated as arbitration does not, in form or effect, resemble an award. Referenced in the discussion of the limits of the quasi-arbitrator principle and to distinguish such a procedure from an arbitral award; court used this to temper the respondents' reliance on Legdard v. Bull.
Minadshi Naidu v. Subramanya Sastri (11 M. 26 : 14 I.A. 160 : 5 Sar. P.C.J. 54 : 11 Ind. Jur. 393 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 18) (P.C.) Authority for the proposition that consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court which inherently lacks it; judgments in such cases are void. Invoked to support the general rule that a court's lacking jurisdiction renders its judgments void and not merely voidable, and that consent cannot supply inherent jurisdiction.
Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrika Singh (1 Ind. Cas. 913 : 36 C. 193 : 5 C.L.J. 611) Review of authorities on the subject of jurisdictional nullities and their consequences. Referred to as a source where the authorities on jurisdictional nullities are reviewed; used to reinforce the conclusion that proceedings without jurisdiction are void.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a staged legal analysis, applying statutory provisions and precedent strictly as they appear in the opinion:

  1. Interpretation of Section 144, Bengal Tenancy Act:

    The Court emphasized that Section 144 defines where a "cause of action" for landlord-tenant suits is to be deemed to arise for the purposes of the Civil Procedure Code; it does not itself specify the forum of institution.

    The Court relied on Fazlur Rahim Abu Ahmed v. Dwarka Nath Chowdhry to show that one must consult the Civil Procedure Code (now Section 20 of the 1908 Code) to determine the proper Court of institution. Section 20 provides several bases for jurisdiction (residence, business, cause of action arising, etc.), and when read with Section 144 a rent suit may in some circumstances be instituted where the property is situated or, where the plaintiff seeks only a monetary decree, where the tenant resides.

    Applying these principles to the facts, there was evidence that at the time of institution the defendants resided within the jurisdiction of the Munsif at the district headquarters. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the original rent suit was brought in a Court which had jurisdiction to entertain it and the decree cannot be impeached on that ground.

  2. Whether the execution sale was held with jurisdiction:

    Distinct from the question of jurisdiction over the person, the Court focused on jurisdiction over the immovable property.

    The execution sale was held by the Court which had passed the decree (the Court at the headquarters). That Court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants but did not have local jurisdiction over the disputed tenure (the property lay within the jurisdiction of the Munsif at Kurigram). The Court held that, except in the limited circumstances prescribed by Order XXI, Rule 3 of the Code of 1908 (which permits sale by one Court where the immovable property forms one estate situate within multiple jurisdictions), a Court cannot validly attach and sell immovable property lying outside its local limits.

    Because Order XXI, Rule 3 did not apply to validate the sale in this case, the Court concluded that the sale had been held without jurisdiction.

  3. Legal effect of a sale held without jurisdiction:

    The Court applied established authority and principle.

    Citing Rajlaashmi Dasee v. Katyayani Dasee and a line of authorities reviewed in Gurdeo Singh, the Court stated categorically that where a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, its judgments and orders are nullities. Such nullities are void and not merely voidable; consent cannot cure the absence of inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the execution sale was a nullity.

  4. Consideration of the "quasi-arbitrator" argument:

    The Court examined whether the parties' conduct could be treated as consenting to the Judge acting as an arbitrator, thereby validating the result.

    The Court considered the passage in Legdard v. Bull that, if parties agree to accept the Judge's decision despite lack of jurisdiction, the Judge may be treated as a quasi-arbitrator. However, the Court rejected this theory on the facts: the decree and the sale were made ex parte (the defendants did not appear), so there was no mutual or express consent to treat the Judge as an arbitrator. Hence that doctrine did not apply.

  5. Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code (as relied upon by the District Judge):

    The Court treated Section 21 as a limited statutory exception to the general rule.

    Section 21 bars objections as to place of suing by Appellate or Revisional Courts unless the objection was taken at the earliest opportunity in the Court of first instance and there has been a consequent failure of justice. While acknowledging this provision, the Court emphasized that it is an exception and cannot be extended beyond its terms to validate proceedings where the Court had no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter. The Court observed that parties cannot, by mutual consent, convert a proceeding before a Court that has no inherent jurisdiction into a proper judicial process unless they have expressly consented to such a procedure — a fact not established here.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is allowed. The decree of the District Judge (which had decreed ejectment with mesne profits) is set aside, and the decree of the Court of first instance (which dismissed the ejectment claim but made a decree for arrears of rent) is restored. Costs were awarded to the appellants both in this Court and in the lower Appellate Court.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence is that the execution sale held by the Court lacking local jurisdiction over the property is declared a nullity and cannot serve as the plaintiffs' root of title in the ejectment suit.
  • The decision reaffirms the established principle that where a Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter (here, the immovable property), its orders (including execution sales) are void and cannot be validated by consent in the absence of an express mutual agreement to treat the Judge as arbitrator; ex parte proceedings cannot give rise to such consent.
  • The opinion applies existing authorities and statutory provisions to the facts; it does not purport to create a novel rule or broad new precedent beyond those applications.

End of summary — all content in this document is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal by the defendants in a suit for recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for assessment of rent. The disputed tenure was held by the defendants under the plaintiffs and fell into arrears. The plaintiffs thereupon instituted a suit for arrears of rent and obtained n decree. In execution of that decree the tenure was sold on the 8th January 1907 and was purchased by the landlord decree-holders for the sum of Rs. 1. On the 29th April 1918 the plaintiffs landlords instituted the present suit for ejectment on the allegation that the defendants were in unlawful occupation, notwithstanding the sale of their tenure. The defendants urged that the decree had been made and the sale had been held without jurisdiction. So that their interest in the tenure had not been affected thereby. The Trial Court accepted this contention as well founded and dismissed the claim for ejectment. The Court, however, made a decree for arrears of rent. Upon appeal the District Judge has reversed that decision and made a decree in ejectment with mesne profits. On the present appeal the view taken by the District Judge has been assailed as contrary to law.

2. It is not disputed that the tenure is situated within the jurisdiction of the Court of the Munsif at Kurigram within the district of Rangpur. The suit for rent however, was instituted in the Court of the Munsif at the head-quarters of that district. The defendants did not appear, with the result that the suit was decreed ex parte. The decree was then executed at the instance of the plaintiff and the tenure was brought to sale in the Court where the decree had been passed. On these facts, the defendants contend that the decree was made and the sale was held without jurisdiction.

3. In support of the contention that the decree was made without jurisdiction, reliance has been placed upon Sub-section (1) of Section 144, Bengal Tenancy Act, which is in these terms:

The cause of action in all suits between landlord and tenant as such shall, for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure, be deemed to have arisen within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court which would have jurisdiction to entertain a suit or the possession of the tenure or holding in connection with which the suit is brought.
This provision, it will be observed, does not specify the Court where the, suit is to be instituted. It merely defines the expression 'cause of action' as applied to suits between landlord and tenant for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure. That this is the true scope of the section is clear from the decision in Fazlur Rahim Abu Ahmed v. Dwarka Nath Chowdhry 30 C. 453 : 7 C.W.N. 402. In that case, it was ruled that Section 144, Bengal Tenancy Act, was controlled by, Sections 15 and 17 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, and that consequently a suit for rent was required to be instituted, subject to pecuniary limitations, in the Court of the, lowest grade competent to try it. Sir Francis Maclean, C.J., pointed out that Section 144 merely lays down where the cause of action in suits between landlord and tenant shall, for the purpose of the Code of Civil Procedure, be deemed to have arisen: it does not say in which Court the suit is to be instituted. To ascertain this, we must go to Section 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, which provides that all other suits, chat is, other than those mentioned in Section 16, shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises. This, in the case of suits between landlord and tenant, is controlled by Section 144, Bengal Tenancy Act which tells us where, in such suits, the cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen: i.e., within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court which would have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the possession of the holding or tenure in connection with which the suit is brought. We must consequently turn to the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of 1908 which replaces Section 17 of the Code of 1882. Now Section 20, provides that subject to the limitation aforesaid, that is the limitations set out in the preceding sections, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction (a) the defendant or each of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, provided that in such case, either the I have of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business or personally work for gain as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution, or (c) the cause of action wholly or in part, arises. Consequently under Section 20(e) of the Code of 1908 read with Sub-section (1) of Section 144, Bengal Tenancy Act, a suit for rent may be instituted in the Court within the local limits of the jurisdiction of which lies the property in respect of which a suit for possession may have been brought. This, however, does not exhaust all the provisions of Section 20. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 allow a landlord to institute a suit for rent where the tenant resides. This must obviously be limited to cases where the landlord seeks a decree fur money. Where however, the landlord seeks a decree for rent as also ejectment under Section 66, Bengal Tenancy Act, the suit must be treated as one for recovery of immoveable property within the meaning of clause (4) of section 16 and can consequently be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate. In the case before us, there is evidence to show that at the time the suit for rent was instituted, the defendants resided within the local limits of the Court of the Munsif at the headquarters of the District of Rungpur. The suit was consequently brought in a Court which had jurisdiction and the decree cannot successfully be impeached on that ground. The view we take is supported by the decision in Chintaman Narayan v. Madhavrav Venkatesh 6 B.H.C.R.A.C.J. 29 where it was ruled that a suit to recover the rents of land situated in District may be brought in District S., where the defendant is residing, although in such suit the plaintiff's title to the land in respect of which the rent is sought to be recovered may incidentally come in question.

4. We have next to consider whether the sale was held with jurisdiction.As we have already stated the sale was held by the Court which had made the decree. That Court had jurisdiction over the person of the defendants but not over the disputed property. In these circumstances, it is plain that the Court was not competent to bring the property to sale. The only case in which a Court a is entitled to sell immoveable property beyond the local limits of it's jurisdiction is that provided in Order XXI, Rule 3 of the Code of 1908 which provides as follows:

Where immoveable property forms one estate or tenure situate within the local limits of the jurisdiction of two or more Courts any one of such Courts may attach and sell the entire estate or tenure.
This provision was inserted for the first time in the Code of 1908 and gave effect to the decision of this Court in Ram Lall Moitra v. Bama Sundari Dabia. 12 C. 307 : 6 Ind Dec. (N.S.) 209. We must hold accordingly that the sale was held without jurisdiction.

5. This brings us to the question of the effect of such sale. In our opinion, there is no room for controversy, that the sale was a nullity. In support of this conclusion reference may be made to the decision in Rajlaashmi Dasee v. Katyayani Dasee 12 Ind. Cas. 464 : 38 C. 639 at p. 668.

It is an elementary principle of law that if a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, its judgments and orders are mere nullities, and may not only be set aside at any time by the Court in which they are rendered, but be declared void by every Court in which they are presented. If a Court has no jurisdiction its judgment is not merely voidable but void and it is wholly unimportant how precise, certain and technically correct its proceedings and decisions may have been; if it has no power to bear and determine the cause, its authority is wholly usurped and its judgments and orders are the exercise of arbitrary power under the forms, but without the sanction of the law. These principles apply, not only to Original Courts but also to Courts of appeal. Accordingly where an Appellate Court does not possess Jurisdiction to review the act ion of the Court below, jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon it by consent of the parties; and any waiver on their part cannot make up for the lack or defect of jurisdiction. This view has been recognised by the Judicial Committee in Legdard v. Bull 9 A. 191 : 13 I.A. 134 : 4 Sar. P.C.J. 741 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 561 (P.C.) and Minadshi Naidu v. Subramanya Sastri 11 M. 26 : 14 I.A. 160 : 5 Sar. P.C.J. 54 : 11 Ind. Jur. 393 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 18 (P.C.). Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrika Singh 1 Ind. Cas. 913 : 36 C. 193 : 5 C.L.J. 611 where the authorities on the subject are reviewed.

6. It was contended, however, on behalf of the respondents that although the sale was held without jurisdiction, and although. the proceedings could not be validated on the ground of acquiescence, still the proceedings might be deemed as those of an arbitrator chosen by the parties. In support of this proposition reliance was placed upon a passage from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Legdard v. Bull 9 A. 191 : 13 I.A. 134 : 4 Sar. P.C.J. 741 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 561 (P.C.) where Lord Watson observed that when, in proceeding spending before the Court, the parties agree to accept the Judge's decision as final even though the Court may not have jurisdiction, they thereby constitute the Judge a quasi-arbitrator. The effect of such agreement is that the decision of the Judge is not appealable and cannot be questioned in any way. But though the Judge may be considered as an arbitrator, his decision is not, and does not, in any way resemble, an award; Burgess v. Morton (1896) A.C. 136 : 65 L.J.Q.B. 321 : 73. This principle, however, has 11,0 application to the circumstances of the present litigation. The decree was made ex parte; the sale was held ex parte; and consequently it cannot be assumed that the parties, that is, the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, agreed to constitute the Judge as their arbitrator and to abide by the sale held by him.

7. Finally, reference has been made, in the course of the argument, to Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code, which forms the basis of the view taken by the District Judge. That section provides that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless, such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement; and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. That provisions was inserted for the first time in the Code of 1908 and is framed on the analogy of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1884. The provision is an exception to the well-established rule that where the Court has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit,its decree is a nullity even though the parties may have consented to the jurisdiction of the Court. This exception cannot obviously be so interpreted as to hive a wider application than what is justified by its terms. It is possible for us to hold that Section 21 debars the defendants from questioning the validity of the execution sale which is the root of the title of the plaintiff's. "When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process, although the may constitute the Judge their arbitrator and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him. This, however, can be accomplished, only when the parties have expressly consented to such a procedure.

8. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the District Judge is set aside and that of the Court of first instance restored, with costs both here and in the lower Appellate Court.