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Satish Chandra Chatterjee v. Kali Charan Chaudhury

Calcutta High Court
Nov 29, 1923
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the plaintiff's appeal in a suit for rent for the years 1321 to 1324 B.S. The plaintiff claimed to be landlord of the defendants in respect of a jama of Rs. 90-8-0 and odd gandas, the superior interest in which he said fell to his share upon a partition effected in 1914 under the Bengal Estates Partition Act V (B.C.) of 1897.

The Munsif of Basirhat decreed the plaintiff's suit, but on appeal the Subordinate Judge of 24 Parganahs dismissed it. The Subordinate Judge's decision rested on findings about the history of the tenancy: originally a single tenancy with a jama of Rs. 251-0-6 pies; subsequently (by about 1913) tenants were claiming the original jama had been split into twelve separate jamas; a decree of 1913 proceeded on that basis; in 1914 sharers entitled to superior interest effected a partition under the Estates Partition Act. The Deputy Collector prepared partition lists, served notices, and concluded (for partition purposes) that the original jama of Rs. 251 odd still subsisted; Section 81 powers were exercised and notices given to tenants, with only one tenant objecting (whose objection was overruled and not appealed).

The Subordinate Judge held that the 1913 decree was not brought to the Deputy Collector's notice, that the Deputy Collector had jurisdiction to inquire and did so, but that by later evidence it appeared his factual conclusion was incorrect; hence the Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction to amalgamate and re-divide the jamas and his order was entirely without jurisdiction; therefore the plaintiff's claim, which relied on that order, must fail.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order made by a Deputy Collector under Section 81 of the Bengal Estates Partition Act (Act V of 1897) can be challenged in a rent suit by a tenant as a defence (i.e., whether such an order may be treated as a mere nullity and ignored without a distinct suit to set it aside).
  2. What is the effect of Section 119 of the Estates Partition Act (which generally bars contesting certain orders except by means provided in the Act) on the ability to challenge an order under Section 81, and whether Section 119 confers or restricts any right to challenge Section 81 orders.
  3. Whether a wrong factual finding by the Deputy Collector in exercising Section 81 powers deprives him of jurisdiction so that the resulting order is null and void for all purposes, or whether such orders have some operative validity that requires a civil suit (in presence of all interested proprietors) to set aside.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The appellant's learned Vakil relied primarily upon Section 119 of the Estates Partition Act, arguing (as framed in the opinion) about the scope of that section and the consequences for challenging orders under Chapter IX and, specifically, Section 81.
  • The appellant contended that Section 119's language and structure require analysis as to whether orders under Section 81 can be contested otherwise than by ways provided in the Act; the appellant relied on the construction of Section 119 to support the right to challenge the Deputy Collector's order.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondents' learned Vakil relied on authorities holding that partition papers (butwara papers) prepared under Chapter VI of the Estates Partition Act are evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, and that such entries as to rents are prima facie evidence against tenants. On that basis the respondents contended that the lower appellate judge could rightly find the butwara papers wrong and dismiss the suit.
  • Implicit in the respondents' position (as characterized by the court) was that where the Deputy Collector properly inquired into facts under Section 81 and made findings, a wrong factual conclusion should not be lightly set aside in proceedings like this rent suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nandlal Pathak v. Mohunth Chanurpat Das (1913) 17 C.W.N. 779 That records of partition proceedings under Act V of 1897 (butwara papers) are admissible as evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. The Court observed this authority to show that butwara papers prepared under Chapter VI are evidence, and that this point influenced the respondents' contention that the partition record could support the lower court's finding.
Janki Dobey v. Kirtarath Roy (1908) 13 C.W.N. 93 Used to fortify the view that entries in partition papers as to rent are evidence in a rent suit (analogy with record-of-rights under the Bengal Tenancy Act). Referred to for the proposition that partition records are prima facie evidence against the tenant; the Court considered the scope of this decision when assessing the evidentiary weight of the butwara papers.
Hridoy Nath v. Ram Chandra A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 34 Support for the legal distinction between existence of jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction. The Court relied on this distinction to analyse whether a wrong factual finding by a Deputy Collector under Section 81 amounts to want of jurisdiction (making the order a nullity) or merely a mistaken exercise that must be corrected by suit/appeal.
Krishna Kishore v. Amarnath (1920) 47 Cal. 770 Cited alongside Hridoy Nath to illustrate the approach to jurisdictional questions and the consequences of erroneous findings. The Court cited it to support the proposition that one must distinguish between jurisdictional existence and errors in exercise when interpreting the Acts and the consequences of Deputy Collector findings under Section 81.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in stages, closely following the statutory scheme of the Estates Partition Act and the evidentiary role of partition records:

  1. Interpretation of Section 119: The court examined Section 119's prohibition against contesting certain orders "by suit in any Court or by any means other than those expressly provided in this Act," noting that Chapter IX orders are included but Section 81 is expressly excepted from that prohibition. The court held that Section 119 does not itself import that nobody can challenge an order under Section 81 except by bringing a suit; rather, Section 119 merely excludes Section 81 from the wide prohibition. It does not affirmatively create a right to challenge Section 81 orders by any particular method.
  2. Evidentiary weight of partition (butwara) records: The court reviewed authorities (Nandlal Pathak, Janki Dobey) concluding that partition records made under Chapter VI are admissible evidence (under Section 35 of the Evidence Act) and are prima facie evidence as to rents; however, the court emphasised that such records, made for the purpose of partition, do not themselves alter tenants' status absent further steps under the Act.
  3. Statutory scheme and role of the Deputy Collector: The court dissected Chapters VI, VIII and IX of the Estates Partition Act. Chapter VI requires the Deputy Collector to prepare a record of existing rents and assets for partition-purposes; that record is primarily evidentiary and does not itself change a tenant's rights. When Section 81 powers are invoked during the partition process, however, the Deputy Collector is not merely recording but is empowered to alter or affect proprietary and tenancy rights after due notice. The court emphasised that the Deputy Collector, when exercising Section 81 powers, functions in a quasi‑judicial capacity and performs duties analogous to those of a judicial officer rather than a mere executive revenue officer.
  4. Distinction between jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction: Relying on authorities that distinguish existence of jurisdiction from the manner of its exercise, the court considered whether an erroneous factual conclusion by the Deputy Collector can be treated as depriving him of jurisdiction. The court concluded that while a suit can be brought to set aside an order under Section 81 where the order is shown to be inconsistent with the statute (for example, if tenures were not split up as required), it is not correct to treat every wrong factual finding as rendering the order immediately a mere nullity that may be ignored by a single proprietor or tenant in unrelated proceedings.
  5. Practical consequences and statutory design: The court reasoned that permitting a tenant, years later, to nullify partition orders by raising the issue as a defence in an unrelated rent suit (and thereby affecting proprietary rights among co-sharers in the absence of all parties) would be inconsistent with the Act's scheme and likely lead to chaotic and unjust consequences. Accordingly, the court concluded that the correct course is that such orders should be set aside, if at all, by a proper suit in the civil forum (subject to limitation and procedural requirements) and not by ad hoc defenses in separate proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge are set aside and the decree of the Munsif is restored with costs.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Court held that a defendant (tenant) may not, in the course of defending a rent suit, challenge the correctness of a Deputy Collector's order made under Section 81 of the Estates Partition Act so as to treat that order as a nullity and thereby defeat a landlord's rent claim, at least where doing so would affect the proprietary rights of other co-sharers who are not parties to the suit.
  • If a person wishes to impugn an order made under Section 81 on grounds that it was contrary to the Act (for example, that the statutory conditions for splitting or not splitting tenures were not met), the appropriate course is to bring a suit in the civil court to set aside the order (subject to limitation and other procedural rules). The Court emphasised the need for such a suit to involve the parties materially interested in the partition.
  • The Court rejected treating the Deputy Collector's order as automatically void for all purposes merely because of a later-discovered error of fact in the Collector's finding; rather, such errors should be corrected by the remedies provided by law (suit/appeal) rather than by informal defenses in other proceedings.
  • The opinion records that a further question remains open for reconsideration (expressly reserved by one judge): whether a tenant aggrieved by an order under Section 81 may have any right to challenge that decision by means other than those provided in the Estates Partition Act. However, for the present proceedings, the Court held that the method adopted by the defendants (raising the objection as a defence in the rent suit in the absence of other proprietors) was not permissible.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the statements, reasoning and conclusions set out in the provided opinion. No facts, authorities or implications beyond those expressly discussed in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

1. This is the plaintiff's appeal in a suit for rent for the years 1321 to 1324 B.S. The plaintiff claims that he is the landlord of the defendants in respect of a jama of Rs. 90-8-0 and odd gandas, the superior interest in which fell to his share upon a partition made in the year 1914 under the Bengal Estates Partition Act V. (B.C.) of 1897. The Munsif of Basirhat decreed his suit: but the Subordinate Judge of 24 Parganahs, on appeal has dismissed the suit.

2. The facts upon which the case has been decided by the learned Subordinate Judge may be stated as follows:-Originally the plaintiff with a number of co-sharers was the landlord in respect of a tenancy comprising lands in a number of mouzas, of which tenancy the rent was Rs. 251-0-6 pies. In course of time, the tenancy by arrangement, in the first instance, was split up, and about the year 1913, if not much earlier, the tenants were claiming that the original jama of Rs. 251 odd had entirely gone and that in point of fact and law, there were created twelve separate jamas, certain of the landlords having the superior interest in each of those jamas, and certain of the tenants having the tenants' interest in them. It appears further that in 1913 a decree was obtained which proceeded on the basis that by this time at all events the claim that the original jama had been legally split up was well-founded. In these circumstances in 1914, the sharers entitled to the superior interest effected a partition under act v of 1897. The Deputy Collector, so far as appears, proceeded quite regularly under that Act. He made out the necessary lists of assets, he gave the necessary notices and he found that the original jama of Rs. 251 odd still subsisted. Accordingly, it became necessary for him in making the partition to exercise the powers conferred by Section 81 of the Act and there again proper notices were served on the tenants concerned. None of the tenants concerned with a single exception appeared to object. One tenant did appear and did object but his objection was over-ruled and he did not appeal. The learned Subordinate Judge in the present case has found that the decree of 1913 was not brought to the notice of the Deputy Collector, so that in exercising his powers under Section 81 the position is that having jurisdiction to enquire into the facts, he did enquire into the facts and came to a conclusion which, on the evidence adduced, was correct enough. But it now turns out by reason of a further piece of evidence that his conclusion was in fact incorrect. Now, in these circumstances, the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge in the present rent suit is that it being established that, there was no one jama of Rs. 251 but that this bad, at the time of the partition, been split into twelve different jamas,, the Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction to amalgamate the different jamas and then to sub-divide them again: that his order was entirely without jurisdiction; and that, therefore, the plaintiff's claim which is based upon that order must fail.

3. In answer to this contention, the learned Vakil for the Appellant relies, in the first place, upon Section 119 of the Estates Partition Act. That section provides that no order of certain kinds therein enumerated " shall be liable to be contested or set aside by suit in any Court or by any means other than those expressly provided in this Act." The orders which are so guarded include orders made under Chapter IX. But when Chapter IX is mentioned, there is introduced this exception "except Section 81." It is to be noticed that with regard to certain orders made under Section 84; 86 and 88, an express right is given to bring a suit to modify or set aside the order. The first question is whether Section 119 imports that nobody can challenge an order under Section 81 except by bringing a suit. In my opinion that is not a possible construction. All that is done here is to exclude orders made under Section 81 from the wide prohibition against bringing a suit or doing anything else to challenge. Another question arises upon this section. As Section 81 is excepted from a provision which forbids not only the bringing of a suit to set aside but forbids the use of any means other than those expressly provided in this Act, is it a correct inference to say that this impliedly means or imports that, in the case of Section 81, it is liable to be challenged not only by bringing a suit but by taking the point in any other fashion? There again, in my judgment, the inference would be unsound. Section 119 does not, in my opinion, prejudice the question either way. It seems to me that if a person has the right to bring a suit or to challenge the order by any other means, the section leaves him that right. But the section gives no right in respect of Section 81. I have, however, no doubt at all that a suit does lie to set aside an order made under Section 81 if it turns out that by that order a tenure or holding has not been split up but an amalgamation of tenures and holdings has been divided contrary to the meaning of the section. In such a suit I am fairly clear that it would be no answer at all to say that the Deputy Collector had jurisdiction to enquire into the facts and that if he has found the facts wrongly his order cannot be interfered with. For the purposes of such a suit, it seems reasonable to say that the Deputy Collector could not give himself jurisdiction under Section 81 by coming to a wrong finding of fact. In my opinion, the question in this case, since no suit has been brought to set aside the order under Section 81, is really whether in the circumstances and upon the facts found the tenants are entitled to treat this order as a mere nullity-an order which no man is required to pay any attention to, and an order which does not even require to be set aside. That question, in my opinion, in view of the draftsmanship of the Act, has extraordinary difficulty and to resolve it, it is necessary to make a careful study of the scheme of the Estates Partition Act.

4. Before embarking upon that it may be observed that in the reports there are two cases only which seem to be of any assistance. In the case of Nandlal Pathak v. Mohunth Chanurpat Das (1913) 17 C.W.N. 779, Sir Lawrence Jenkins was plainly of opinion that the records of the partition proceedings under the Act of 1897 would be evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, notwithstanding that the batwara khasra under the previous Act of 1876 was held not to be such a record. In that conclusion the Court was fortified by the decision in Janki Dobey v. Kirtarath Roy (1908) 13 C.W.N. 93. I think that the scope of this decision has been somewhat misunderstood. The case there was a suit for arrears of rent and, as a proof that the defendant held the jama sued upon under the plaintiff there was tendered in evidence certain butwara papers, that is to say, papers prepared by the Deputy Collector acting under Chapter VI of act v of 1897. The Court in that case remarked on the provisions of Section 44 of the Act and observed that the procedure as to the preparation of the rent roll and the publication thereof was analogous to the procedure under Sections 103 and 103 A of the Bengal Tenancy Act; and the conclusion was that entries in the partition papers as to the amount of the rent are evidence in the same way as entries in the record-of-rights prepared under Chapter X of the bengal tenancy act are admissible in evidence under Section 103-B " Prima facie they are evidence against the tenant, though that evidence may not be very valuable." I put aside for a moment whether the record of existing rent is or is not entitled to the presumption of correctness given to the record-of-rights under Section 103-B. There can be no doubt that a record-of-rights made under Chapter VI is evidence, at all events, under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Now, in these circumstances the learned Vakil for the respondents naturally contends that if this is all the effect that the butwara papers have, then at all events the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court could not be wrong in finding on the basis of the decree that the butwara papers were all wrong and that he was entitled to dismiss the suit. The question is whether that point of view is really correct.

5. Now, under the Estates Partition Act there are various stages and these stages have by the Act been separated out and dealt with very conveniently in different chapters. By Section 44, Chapter VI is introduced which deals with "proceedings up to the determination of the partition" which I understand to mean up to the time when the decision dividing the property has to be come to. It begins by saying that every Deputy Collector shall have the powers of a Revenue Officer under Chapter X of the bengal tenancy act. It orders him to make a survey and prepare a record of the existing rents and other assets. He has to record several things: the rents payable for all rent-paying lands, first, as stated by the landlord, secondly, as stated by the tenants, and thirdly, as taken by the Deputy Collector for the purposes of the partition. Notices have to go to everybody. The record has to be published and, after providing for that, the Deputy Collector is told to record an order fixing a date on which to come to a decision as to the partition of the estate. When we come to Chapter VIII, we come to the chapter which deals with making of the partition and at that stage we. find that the Deputy Collector has to consult all the proprietors who are present and dispose of any objection that they may urge. He has then to proceed to determine how the lands of the parent estate shall be partitioned into separate estates and various precautions are provided to safeguard against injustice. The important thing to notice for the present purpose is this- That the record prepared under Chapter VI is a record which in no way affects the tenants of the holdings save as a matter of evidence. If there is any question and doubt about the tenants' possession or the amount of rent, the Deputy Collector has to take down the two views and has to come to a decision for the purposes of partition only. When the partition comes to be made in the usual course, it is made only in the presence of the proprietors of the estate under partition and, if one proprietor thinks that the Deputy Collector has over-estimated the rent of a particular tenant then for the purposes of the partition he may have his say and the fact may be taken account of when the lands are divided up. Under Chapter VI, the Deputy Collector is not a person who is authorised to change or affect the status of a tenant. He has no power over the tenant's jama but he is to act as a person whose duty is to make a true record of the existing rights and to estimate truly for the purposes of a partition between the proprietors. If, therefore, the matter stops there it is fairly plain that the mere entry of a tenant's jama in such a record would not, at any rate, have higher value than an entry in the record-of-rights under the bengal tenancy act: it might not have as much but it would not have more. While this, therefore, is the prima facie position, the position is manifestly changed when, in the course of making the partition it becomes necessary to consider the exercise of the powers given by Section 81. A Deputy Collector considering this question is not merely a person making a record. He is a person who, on certain conditions, is authorised not merely to record but to alter or affect the right of a tenant, to make an order that whereas up to this moment the tenant held so much land of a proprietor, now hereafter he shall hold such and such land of one proprietor and such and such land of another proprietor. I do not think that analogies from the bengal tenancy act are anything but fallacious for the present purpose, but the kind of duty under Section 81 is not be much analogous to the duty of Revenue Officer under the first part of Chapter X as to the duty of a Revenue Officer who is exercising the power to alter the right of a tenant given by the second part of Chapter X. No useful analogy, however, can be derived because under the second part of Chapter X there is not only provision for a suit before the Revenue Officer but there is ample provision for appeals to the Civil Court and under Section 107 there is a definite enactment as regards finality.

6. Leaving aside all questions of mere analogy, we have to come to the position of the Deputy Collector under Chapters VIII and IX of the Estates Partition Act, and to ask as to Section 81 whether, if the enquiry which he makes is properly made but the conclusion of fact to which he comes is unfounded the tenant is entitled not merely to bring a suit to have it set aside but to treat it as null and void for all purposes and to take no notice of it. Now, under Chapter VIII, the Deputy Collector is ordered to be guided by the provisions of Chapter IX: he is performing a task which is ordinarily the task of a Civil Court. When the statute comes to deal, in Section 118, with the powers of officers with regard to false evidence, it speaks of " a Collector or other officer exercising jurisdiction under this Act" and it deals with him in language which is closely analogous to the language which one uses when dealing with a judicial officer acting judicially. There is a series of appeals provided for by Chapter X. There is also by section 106 (a) provision made that " if the directions of the Act are in substance and effect complied with, no proceedings thereunder shall be affected by reason of any mistake or informality unless any person has suffered or is in danger of suffering material injury in consequence." That provision certainly does not cover the present case but it is an indication of the nature of the duties which the Collector has to perform. It appears to me that when under Section 81 a Deputy Collector summons the tenants and proceeds to enquire into the necessity of splitting up a holding and to make an order that the tenure or holding be split up, he is acting, at all events, as a quasi judicial officer. An ordinary executive order proceeds upon the assumption that people's rights are readily ascertainable and does not purport or attempt to alter proprietary right. An order under Section 81 is not adequately described as being of that character. A Deputy Collector has to find out what the holdings are, and he is given power to affect the proprietary rights not only of proprietors but upon due notice, of tenants. If he were acting as an ordinary Civil Court, the con-sequence of any wrong finding of fact would have to be corrected either by review, revision or appeal. But if he is not a person making an executive order and he is not functioning as an ordinary Civil Court but is functioning in a quasi judicial capacity as a special tribunal for certain purposes, then, upon the whole it seems to me that the distinction in the case of Hridoy Nath v. Ram Chandra A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 34 must be taken and there is difference between the existence of jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. [See also Krishna Kishore v. Amarnath (1920) 47 Cal. 770.] One has to look to the position created by the Act. Now, what is it? The question whether this large jama of Rs. 251 odd existed or not may well have made all the difference in the world to the partition effected in 1914. If the tenant makes no objection, what happens? What happens is that each of the proprietors is given a certain jama as his superior interest. If it is to be said that on a wrong finding of fact the order is a mere nullity then that partition may become a mere nullity; the whole basis of the partition may well be gone. In any case, as there is no saving such as is provided for by Section 89 for other cases one proprietor would be liable in the suit of another to have the partition ripped up again. If the order under Section 81 is a mere nullity then I take it that a proprietor to whom a particular jama has not been given would still be entitled to insist upon his proprietary rights as a co-sharer in respect thereof. In a case like this where the error is merely an error in the ascertainment of the fact by the person whose duty it was to ascertain it and who did ascertain it correctly enough on the evidence before him, the consequences which flow from the idea that the order under Section 81 is absolutely null and void, not needing even to be set aside, are certainly very alarming. It seems to me that the correct view is that on ordinary principles a suit in the Civil Court to set aside such an order would be necessary because it is an order which as between the proprietors certainly has some value in the circumstances of this case at least and which ought only to be set aside in the presence of all the proprietors, every one of whom is vitally interested in the matter. In short, if a tenant is allowed at any time-ten years later it may be-to take this point by mere defence in a rent suit under a system of procedure which does not recognize counter-claims, and to take it in the presence of one only of the proprietors, party to the partition, the consequences are so manifestly impossible that the legislature in providing a scheme as it has done by act v of 1897 cannot readily be supposed to have intended it. My opinion, therefore, is that while in such a case as this, in a suit properly constituted and brought within whatever limitation period may be applicable the plaintiff would on the facts found have a complete right to have the order made under Section 81 set aside, yet on that footing, it is going too far to say that that order is to be regarded as a mere nullity, so that, although the tenants have had notice and although the landlords have had to act upon the order for a substantial time it can be ignored or set aside as against a single landlord in answer to a suit for rent. For these reasons, it appears to me that this appeal should be allowed, the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge should be set aside and those of the Munsif restored with costs.

Page, J.

7. I agree that the appeal should be allowed. Section 119 of the Estates Partition Act V (B. C.) of 1897 provides that certain orders under the Act

" shall not be liable to be contested or set aside by suit in any Court or by any means other than those expressly provided in this Act."
Section 119, in my opinion, does not confer a right to challenge an order under Section 81 All it does is to exempt Section 81 from the prohibitive provision of Section 119. If a right in conferred upon an aggrieved per-son to challenge the decision of a Deputy Collector under Section 81 it must be found elsewhere. I agree with what has fallen from my learned brother with respect to the scope and object of the Estates Partition Act, and, having regard to the view which he has expressed, and in which I concur, as to the object of the Act, I should expect to find in the Act some provision analogous to Sections 104-J and 107 of the Bengal Tenancy Act making an order of the Deputy Collector under Section 81 final and conclusive for all purposes or for such purposes as might be deemed to be fit and proper. But, so far as I can ascertain, there is no such provision in the Act and having regard to the provisions of section 119 it may be that the legislature intended that there should be some mode in which an order under Section 81 should be challenged. I desire in thin case to reserve my right to reconsider the question as to whether, if a tenant or other person is aggrieved by an order under Section 81, he is entitled to challenge that decision otherwise than by the methods provided in the Estates Partition Act, because I agree with my learned brother in thinking that it is not open to a tenant, in any event, to challenge such an order by the mode which he has adopted in this case. If any right exists which entitles a tenant to challenge an order under Section 81, in my opinion, it cannot be challenged by way of defence to a suit for rent in the absence of the other parties to the partition. If that were so, for the reasons given by my learned brother, Mr. Justice Rankin, the scheme of the Act would be or might be rendered nugatory. Therefore in these proceedings, constituted as they are, in my opinion, it is not open to the defendants to challenge the correctness of this order. Upon these grounds I agree that the appeal should be allowed with costs.