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Abinash Chandra Ghosh v. Narhari Mether

Calcutta High Court
Mar 22, 1929
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Judgment Summary — Mitter, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (now respondent) sued to recover possession of a disputed plot of land and to have his title declared. The Subordinate Judge of 24 Parganas dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground of limitation, although he found in the plaintiff's favour on title. On appeal the Additional District Judge of 24 Parganas reversed that decision and decreed the plaintiff's suit. Defendant 1 appealed against the appellate decision.

Material facts as stated in the opinion: the property originally belonged to Rup Narain Basak and by successive transfers devolved on Padmabati, then on her son Lakhinarain Goswami. Lakhinarain died leaving a widow Dinomoyee who obtained a Hindu widow's estate and executed a deed of surrender of all her husband's estate in favour of Atal Goswami. Atal died in Asar 1327 B.S., leaving a widow Mrinalini and two daughters; Mrinalini sold the disputed plot to the plaintiff (for legal necessity), which is the plaintiff's title.

Plaintiff's case included contention that a kabuliyat (unregistered) by defendant 1's father in favour of Dinomoyee was rightly excluded from evidence; plaintiff relied further on a registered kabuliyat (Ex. 6) executed by defendant 1 in 1298 B.S. in favour of Dinomoyee in the benami of defendant 2. In 1910 Dinomoyee sued for rent against defendant 2; defendant 1 was impleaded on 28 June 1910. The suit was decreed against defendant 2 and dismissed against defendant 1. Execution was taken against defendant 2 and an attachment followed; the parties' records differ as to whether both land and hut were attached or only the hut. A claim resulted in defendant 1 being found in possession on his own account and the attached property was released.

The present suit was instituted on 3 August 1922. The Subordinate Judge held the suit barred by limitation because it was filed more than 12 years after 28 June 1910 (the date when defendant 1's denial of tenancy was given effect). The District Judge (lower appellate Court) held instead that Article 143, Schedule 1, Limitation Act applied and that forfeiture was incurred on 15 January 1911 when Dinomoyee served notice on defendant 1, so the present suit was within limitation. Defendant 1 appealed on two grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lower appellate Court was wrong in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation (i.e., whether Article 143, Sch. 1, Limitation Act applied or whether limitation began to run from 28 June 1910).
  2. Whether the lower appellate Court erred in preventing the appellant (defendant 1) from supporting the judgment of the Subordinate Judge on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish title, contrary to Order 41, Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant 1)

  • The District Judge's conclusion that Article 143, Sch. 1, Limitation Act applied was wrong and the suit should be time-barred from 28 June 1910 (the date when defendant 1's denial of tenancy was given effect by the Munsiff's judgment).
  • The lower appellate Court was in error in not allowing the appellant to support the Subordinate Judge's decree on the alternative ground that plaintiff had failed to establish title; such support was barred by the appellate court despite O. 41, R. 22 CPC permitting a respondent to support a decree on grounds decided against him in the court of first instance.
  • Implicitly, appellant argued that adverse possession which barred the widow Dinomoyee should also bar the reversioner (and therefore the plaintiff through Atal), relying on later Privy Council and Calcutta High Court decisions (as argued in the brief).

Respondent's / Plaintiff's Position

  • Plaintiff maintained that defendant 1's father's kabuliyat was unregistered and rightly excluded from evidence; nothing further needed to be said about it.
  • Plaintiff relied on a registered kabuliyat (Ex. 6) in 1298 B.S. executed by defendant 1 in favour of Dinomoyee in the benami of defendant 2, and on the facts surrounding the 1910 rent suit and subsequent execution/attachment and release.
  • Implicitly, the respondent contended that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between plaintiff and defendant 1 and that adverse possession against Dinomoyee could not be tacked to adverse possession against Atal or the plaintiff.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ranchor Das v. Parvati Bai [1899] 23 Bom. 725 (also referred as Banchor Das) Held that extinguishment of a widow's right would not extinguish the reversioner's right; a reversioner is not barred by adverse possession of a limited owner prior to the reversioner's right accruing. The court relied on this authority to reject the appellant's contention that adverse possession which barred the widow would also bar the reversioner through whom the plaintiff claims.
Vithialinga v. Srirangath Anni, A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 249 Decision turned on the circumstance that a decree as to adverse possession (decree of 1892) was binding on the estate; applied rule in the Shivaganga case that a decree fairly obtained against a widow is binding on the reversioner. The court distinguished this case from the present facts, explaining that Vaithia Linga proceeded on the binding effect of a decree and did not support the broader proposition that mere adverse possession which barred a widow would automatically bar a reversioner under the Limitation Act.
Aurabindo Nath Tagore v. Manorama Devi, A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 670 (Page, J.) Held (per Page, J.) that adverse possession against the widow could be effective as against the reversioners. The court noted Page, J.'s conclusion but expressed difficulty in reading Vaithia Linga as supporting that broad proposition; the court did not accept Page, J.'s conclusion as establishing a general rule applicable to the present case.
Moniram Kolita v. Kery Kolitani [1880] 5 Cal. 776 Explained that a Hindu widow's estate is an estate of inheritance to herself and the heirs of her husband, but for purposes of limitation it is to be taken as an estate of an ordinary tenant for life. Cited to explain the characterization of a Hindu widow's estate for limitation purposes and to support the application of limitation Articles treating such estates as analogous to life estates.
Vundravan Das v. Curson Das [1897] 21 Bom. 646 Article 141 appears intended for limitation purposes to assimilate a Hindu widow's estate to that of an ordinary tenant for life, addressing anomalies around the widow's estate. Cited to support the proposition that Article 141 treats a widow's estate as a life estate for limitation purposes.
Nobin Chunder v. Issuar Chunder [1868] 9 W.R. 505 Observation (Sir Barnes Peacock) that reversionary heirs bound by decrees obtained against widows (without fraud or collusion) are also bound by limitation which bars the widow. Quoted in the opinion as instructive and as part of the historical line of authorities, but the court observed later Limitation Acts changed the law applicable to reversioners' rights.
Harnath Chatterjee v. Mathur Mohan [1894] 21 Cal. 8 Lord Watson's observation that a new law must give a right of action to a reversioner notwithstanding that the widow's right had been extinguished by decree. Quoted to show that Vaithia Linga proceeded on principles akin to the Shivaganga case where a decree binding on the estate justified barring the reversioner.
Amrit Dhar v. Bindesri [1901] 23 All. 448 Interpreted Banchor Das as laying down that under Article 141, Sch. 2, Lim. Act 1877, a reversioner can sue within 12 years from the death of the female heir even if she had been out of possession for more than 12 years. Cited to show that courts have read earlier authorities as giving reversioners a 12-year period from the death of the female heir to bring suit.
Radha Kissen v. Nauratan Lal; Kedar Nath v. Jatindra [1909] 9 C.L.J. 236 Referred to in support of the proposition that the statute of limitation cannot begin to run against the reversioner in consequence of dispossession of the limited owner and reversioner has 12 years from the death of the Hindu female to sue. Cited as part of the authorities understood in India supporting the rule that the reversioner’s period runs from the death of the Hindu female limited owner.
Shivaganga case (rule referenced) Where the estate of a deceased Hindu vested in a female heir a decree fairly and properly obtained against her in regard to the estate (absent fraud or collusion) is binding on the reversioner. The court applied this principle to distinguish cases where a decree binds the reversioner (and thus can start limitation) from ordinary adverse possession which does not, absent such a binding decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, relying only on the facts and authorities discussed in the opinion:

  1. The court first considered whether Article 143, Schedule 1, Limitation Act applied as the District Judge had held. It observed that Article 143 did not apply because the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between the plaintiff and defendant 1 — that relationship had been denied in the Munsiff's rent suit and the rent suit was dismissed against defendant 1.
  2. The court recognized that defendant 1 had been in adverse possession for more than 12 years prior to the present suit and noted Dinomoyee died on 1 April 1918; the present suit was brought within 12 years of her death. The core question was whether the adverse possession against Dinomoyee could be tacked to adverse possession against Atal (through whom plaintiff claimed) so as to bar the plaintiff's right.
  3. The court analyzed the chain of title and succession: Atal did not inherit the disputed property from Dinomoyee but from Lakhinarain (Atal was the reversioner). Given that reversionary succession, the court held adverse possession against Dinomoyee could not be tacked to adverse possession as against Atal or his successors.
  4. The court examined the appellant's reliance on later authorities (notably Vaithia Linga and the Calcutta decision in Tagore) but concluded those decisions turned on special circumstances — in particular where a decree as to adverse possession was binding on the estate (the operation of the Shivaganga rule). The court emphasized that where a decree fairly obtained against the widow binds the reversioner, the reversioner may be barred; but mere adverse possession that barred the widow does not automatically bar the reversioner under the Limitation Acts as later enacted.
  5. The court reviewed the historical progression of Limitation Acts (1859, 1871, 1877, 1908) and authorities (including Moniram Kolita, Vundravan Das and Ranchor/Banchor Das) to explain that Article 141 contemplates that for limitation purposes a widow's estate is treated like a life estate and that the reversioner has a 12-year period running from the death of the Hindu female to sue.
  6. On the second ground (O. 41, R. 22 CPC), the court agreed that the District Judge was in error: under that rule defendant 1, as respondent in the lower appellate Court, could have supported the decree of the Subordinate Judge on the ground of defect in plaintiff's title even though that ground had been decided against him by the Court of first instance. The court observed it would normally have remanded the case for that issue to be heard.
  7. However, the court declined to remand because defendant 1's own documents proved the disputed land belonged to Lakhinarain (through whom the plaintiff claims), and the Munsif had correctly characterized the defence on title as frivolous; thus a remand would be useless.
  8. On this basis the court concluded that the lower appellate Court's result (decreeing the plaintiff's suit) was correct, albeit the court's reasoning differed from that of the District Judge.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The court upheld the decision of the lower appellate Court decreeing the plaintiff's suit and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's decree for recovery of possession stands; the appellant's challenge based on limitation and the complementary challenge under O. 41, R. 22 CPC failed in the result.
  • The court clarified that mere adverse possession which barred a Hindu widow did not automatically bar the reversioner under the Limitation Acts in force; only where a decree binding on the estate (per the Shivaganga rule and cases like Vaithia Linga on their facts) existed would the reversioner be bound. The court applied existing precedents to hold that the reversioner has 12 years from the death of the Hindu female to bring suit.
  • No new legal precedent was announced by the court beyond the application of the authorities and principles discussed; the court expressly stated its reasons differed from the District Judge's but reached the same result as the lower appellate Court.

Result recorded in the opinion: "14. Appeal dismissed."

Show all summary ...

Mitter, J.:— The plaintiff, now respondent, having sued to recover possession of a plot of land now in dispute in this suit after declaration of his title to the same, had his suit dismissed by the Subordinate Judge of 24 Paraganas on the ground of limitation there being a finding in his favour on the question of title. This decision has been reversed by the Additional District Judge of 24 Parganas on appeal and plaintiff's suit has been decreed.

2. Against this decision defendant 1 has preferred this appeal. Two points have been argued on this appeal: (1) that the decision of the lower appellate Court that the suit is not barred by limitation is wrong; (2) that the lower appellate Court was clearly in error in not allowing the appellant to support the judgment of the Subordinate Judge on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish title to the disputed land, a ground which had been decided against him by the Court of first instance and in so doing has misunderstood the plain provisions of O. 41, R. 22 of the CPC. The material facts necessary for determining the questions raised by this appeal are these: The property in suit admittedly belonged to one Rup Narain Basak and by successive transfers devolved on Padmabati. On her death it devolved on her son Lakhinarain Goswami. Lakhinarain died leaving behind him a widow Dinomoyee who obtained a Hindu widow's estate in the property now in question. She executed a deed of surrender of all her husband's estate in favour of one Atal Goswami. Atal, who was the next reversioner died in the month of Asar 1327 B.S On Atal's death the property devolved on his widow Mrinalini, as Atal left no soil but only two daughters besides the widow behind him. Mrinalini sold the disputed plot to the plaintiff for legal-necessity. This is plaintiff's title. Plaintiff's case is that defendant 1's father executed a kabuliyat in favour of Dinomoyee but as this deed is an unregistered document it has been rightly excluded from evidence and nothing more need be said about it. Plaintiff's case further is that a registered kabuliyat in respect of the disputed land (Ex. 6) was executed by defendant 1 in the year 1298 B.S in favour of Dinomoyee in the benami of defendant 2. In 1910 Dinomoyee brought a suit for rent against defendant 2 on the basis of the kabuliyat. In that suit on the objection of defendant 2, defendant 1 was impleaded on 28th June 1910. The suit, however, was decreed against defendant 2 and dismissed against defendant 1, as he denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. The decree was executed against defendant 2 and the land and the hut standing thereon was attached as the appellant states. The respondent says that only the hut was attached on 14th July 1910. It does not appear clear on the proceedings whether the land and hut were both attached. On the other hand the register shows that the hut only was attached. A claim was preferred by defendant with the result that defendant 1 was found to be in possession on his own account and the attached property—whatever it was, was released.

3. The present suit was instituted originally on 3rd August 1922 and the Subordinate Judge held that as the suit was filed more than 12 years after 28th June 1910 the date when the denial of tenancy by defendant 1 was given effect to the suit was barred by limitation. On the other hand the learned District Judge has reached the conclusion that Article 143, Sch. 1, Limitation Act, applied and the forfeiture was incurred not on the date when the denial was given effect to by the judgment of the Munsiff but on the date when some overt act was dona by Dinomoyee i.e, on the date when she served a notice on defendant 1, i.e, on 15th January 1911 and as such the suit was well within the period of limitation. The appellant contends that this, view cannot be sustained.

4. It seems to us that Article 143 has no application to the present case because the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist and has not existed between the plaintiff and defendant 1. It was so decided in the Rent Suit 672 of 1910 in the Munsiff's Court at Sealdah. Defendant 1 has been in adverse possession for more than 12 years before the present suit. Dinomoyee died on 1st April 1918 and the present suit has been instituted within 12 years from the date of her death. The question is whether the adverse possession against Dinomoyee could be tacked to the adverse possession against the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title so as to extinguish plaintiff's right. Atal Goswami through whom the plaintiff claims did not inherit the disputed property from Dinomoyee but from Lakhinarain whose reversionery heir Atal was. In these circumstances the adverse possession of defendant as against Dinomoyee cannot be tacked to the adverse possession as against Atal who died in 1920 or of his successors-in-interest. It is argued, however, for the appellant that the adverse possession which barred the widow Dinomoyee would also bar the reversioner Atal or the plaintiff who claims through him. This contention, however, seems to be opposed to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Ranchor Das v. Parvati Bai . [1899] 23 Bom. 725, where the defence of limitation was raised but their Lordships held that it did not apply saying:

“It is not necessary to consider what might be the case if the widows or the survivor of them were suing, as the plaintiff does not derive his right from or through them, and the extinguishment of their right would not extinguish his.”

5. It is said on behalf of the appellant that this decision has been explained in another recent decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Vithialinga v. Srirangath Anni . A.I.R 1925 P.C 249 and it is contended that the true effect of the later decision of their Lordships is to hold that adverse possession for more than the statutory period which would bar a widow would also bar the reversioner. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a recent decision of Mr. Justice Page in the case of Aurabindo Nath Tagore v. Manorama Devi . A.I.R 1928 Cal. 670. It seems to us that the decision in Vaithia linga v. Srirangatha Anni, above referred to turned on the circumstance that the decree of 1892 as to adverse possession was binding on the estate. In this case their Lordships were really considering the rule in the Shivaganga case namely:

“Where the estate of a deceased Hindu has vested in a female heir a decree fairly and properly obtained against her in regard to the estate is, in the absence of fraud or collusion, binding on the reversionary heir.”

6. Although it is not right to speak of a. Hindu widow's estate as a mere estate for life for as has been pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Moniram Kolita v. Kery Kolitani . [1880] 5 Cal. 776. She holds an estate of inheritance to herself and the heirs of her husband; still for the purposes of limitation it must be taken to be an estate of an ordinary tenant for life and as Sir Charles Parran, C.J, of Bombay pointed but that Article 141 appears to be intended for limitation purposes to do away with the anomalies which surround a Hindu widow's estate and other estates analogous thereto and to assimilate it for these purposes and for these purposes only to that of the estate of an ordinary tenant for life: see Vundravan Das v. Curson Das . [1897] 21 Bom. 646. at p. 669. This decision was affirmed on appeal by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Ranchor Das v. Parvati Bai already referred to. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Banchor Das's case has always been understood in India as an authority for the proposition that the statute of limitation can never begin to run against the reversioner in consequence of dispossession of the limited owner whether a Hindu widow or daughter and that in all cases the reversioner has 12 years from the death of the Hindu widow or daughter or mother as the case may be in which to sue for recovery of possession of property from which the Hindu female was dispossessed.: see Radha Kissen v. Nauratan Lal6 Kedar Nath v. Jatindra . [1909] 9 C.L.J 236 at p. 238. Adverse possession cannot run against the reversioner until after the death of the widow or daughter as the case may be but where the adverse possession was the result of a decree which is binding against the reversioner the reversioner is barred. It was to this latter state of circumstances that their Lordships of the Judicial Committee were referring in Vithia Linga's case as will appear from the following observations of Sir John Edge:

“The result, of the cases to which their Lordships have referred shows, in their opinion, that the Board has invariably applied the rules of the Shivaganga case as sound Hindu law where that rule was applicable and the Shivaganga case laid down that a decree fairly obtained against a Hindu widow was binding against the reversioner if the decree is not tainted by fraud and collusion. A case is an authority for what it actually decides and not for what would logically follow from such decision. Vithia Linga's case does not in my opinion lend support to the proposition that adverse possession which barred the widow will also bar the reversionary heir under the present Limitation Act. I am not unmindful of the fact that Page, J., has in the Tagore case already referred to arrived at the conclusion that the adverse possession against the widow would be effective as against the reversioners but with great respect to my learned brother it is difficult to read Vaitha Linga's case as supporting the broad proposition that adverse possession for more than the statutory period which was not the result of an radverse decree against a Hindu widow would bar the reversioner.

7. It is true that the Judicial Committee in Vaitha Linga's case quoted the following observation of Sir Barnes Teacock in the Full Bench case of Nobin Chunder v. Issuar Chunder . [1868] 9 W.R 505 and said that those observations were very instructive. Sir Barnes Peacock said:

“It is said that the reversionary heirs could not sue during the lifetime of the widow (for possession), and that therefore they ought not to be barred by any adverse holding against the widow at a time when they could not sue. But when we look at the widow representative, and see that the reversionary heirs bound by decrees relating to her husband's estate which are obtained against her without fraud or collusion we are of opinion that they are also bound by limitation by which she, without fraud or collusion, is barred.

8. At the time of that decision the Limitation Act was the Act of 1859 under which it was held that the adverse possession which barred the widow or other females having limited estates barred also the reversioners. In the later Limitation Acts of 1871, 1877 and 1908 a reversionary heir was permitted to sue within 12 years from the time when his right to possession accrued i.e from the date of the death of the Hindu female (Article 141). In Harnath Chatterjee v. Mathur Mohan . [1894] 21 Cal. 8, Lord Watson said:

“But you must show that the new law gives a right of action to a reversioner notwithstanding that the widow's right of possession had been extinguished by decree.”

9. These observations of Lord Watson are referred to in Vaitha Linga's case, From this it appears that the actual decision in Vaitha Linga's case proceeded on the principles of the Shivaganga case, namely, that the decree of 1892 as to adverse possession was binding upon the estate.

10. The Allahabad High Court reads Banchor Das's case as laying down that under Article 141, Sch. 2, Lim. Act 1877, a suit can be brought by a reversioner for possession of immovable property to the possession of which a female heir had been entitled within 12 years from the date of the death of the female heir, although she may have been out of possession for more than twelve years: see Amrit Dhar v. Bindesri . [1901] 23 All. 448.

11. It is not necessary to consider in this case whether Article 141 would apply where the widow died a civil death by surrendering all her husband's estate in favour of the next reversioner or would apply only to the case of natural death for in this case both the civil death and the natural death of Dinomoyee took place within 12 years of suit.

12. In this view we think that the decision of the lower appellate Court was right although our reasons are very different from those of the learned District Judge.

13. With regard to ground 2 taken, the learned District Judge was clearly in error for under O. 41, R. 22, it was open to defendant 1 who was the respondent before the lower appellate Court to support the decree of the Court of first instance on the ground of defect in plaintiff's title although such ground has been decided against him and we would have remanded the case to the lower appellate Court but for the circumstance that it is proved by defendant's own documents that the disputed land belonged to Lakhinarain Goswami through whom plaintiff claims and the Munsif rightly points out the frivolous nature of the defence regarding title to the property in question. In these circumstances it would be useless to send back the case for a hearing of the appeal on the question of title. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Jack, J.:— I agree.

V.S/R.K

14. Appeal dismissed.