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Kashi Prasad v. Chhabi Lal And Others
Judgment Summary — Mukerji, A.C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title executed two usufructuary mortgages on 17 June 1907 for Rs. 658 and Rs. 115 respectively. On 3 January 1920 they executed a further usufructuary mortgage in favour of the principal defendants for Rs. 8,500, out of which over Rs. 6,000 was left with the mortgagees for payment to creditors, which included the two 1907 mortgages.
The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the defendants failed to redeem the two mortgages of 1907, by which the plaintiffs were deprived of the use of the mortgaged lands. The plaintiffs sought (a) damages for deprivation of use of the 1907 mortgaged property and (b) a direction that the defendants redeem the two mortgages of 1907 (a claim characterized in the opinion as specific performance).
The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the damages claim as time-barred, but decreed the plaintiffs' claim for a direction to redeem the 1907 mortgages, holding that that relief was within time. The defendants 1 and 2 appealed, arguing that the specific performance claim (redemption) was also barred by limitation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the three-year limitation period for a suit for specific performance (Article 113, Sch. 1 / Col. 3, Limitation Act) begins to run from a date "fixed for the performance" that must be expressly stated in the contract, or whether a date may be regarded as fixed by necessary implication from surrounding circumstances.
- When, on the plaintiffs' pleadings, the specific performance was refused (i.e., the date from which the period of limitation runs where no contractual date is fixed).
- Whether, applying the foregoing, the plaintiffs' claim for specific performance to redeem the 1907 mortgages was barred by the three-year limitation period.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The learned counsel for the appellants (defendants 1 and 2) argued that the claim for specific performance (direction to redeem the mortgages of 1907) was barred by limitation and therefore should have been dismissed.
Plaintiffs' Contentions (as pleaded)
- The plaint alleged that the plaintiffs agreed to extend the time for payment (i.e., an extension of the payment date), but that the defendants nonetheless refused to pay the amount to the creditors.
- Paragraph 7 of the plaint stated: “The cause of action arose on Baisakh Sudi 15th, of 1921, and subsequent years as well as in the month of December 1926, when refusals were made, etc.”
- The plaintiffs therefore pleaded a refusal occurring on Baisakh Sudi 15th, 1921 (approximately June 1921), and later refusals.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in several steps:
-
The court identified the relief for redemption as a claim for specific performance and noted that the Limitation Act provision applicable to such a relief (referred to as "Col. 3, Limitation Act") describes the date from which the three-year period runs as:
“the date fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”
- The court considered whether "the date fixed for the performance" must be an express date in the contract or may be a date fixed by necessary implication from surrounding circumstances. The court held that the word "fixed" requires a date "clearly mentioned in the contract whether the said contract be oral or in writing." The court reasoned that "fixed" implies a definite date and not one to be inferred from surrounding circumstances. On that interpretation, the court concluded no date was fixed within the meaning of Article 113, Sch. 1, in the present case.
- Having found no express contractual date, the court then examined when specific performance was refused. It relied on the plaintiffs' own pleadings: paragraph 5 of the plaint admitted the plaintiffs agreed to extend time for payment but alleged the defendants nonetheless refused to pay creditors; paragraph 7 expressly stated the cause of action arose on Baisakh Sudi 15th, 1921, and subsequent years, and that refusals were made in December 1926 as well.
- The court observed that, although the learned Subordinate Judge disbelieved the plaintiffs' account that an agreement extended the date of payment beyond Baisakh Sudi 15th, 1920, that did not preclude accepting the plaintiffs' own allegation that a refusal occurred on Baisakh Sudi 15th, 1921. The court held that, on the plaintiffs' own showing, the first refusal occurred on that 1921 date.
- Because that refusal took place more than three years prior to the institution of the suit, the court concluded the claim for specific performance was barred by limitation. The court further noted that the plaint was liable to rejection on limitation grounds even without awaiting a defensive plea from the defendants.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; the plaintiffs' suit dismissed in toto as time-barred.
Consequences stated by the court:
- The decree of the Court below (which had directed the defendants to redeem the 1907 mortgages) is set aside.
- The plaintiffs' suit is dismissed in its entirety with costs.
- Cost allocation: the appellants alone may recover the costs of the appeal; the appellants will also have their costs in full from the plaintiffs in the Court below; respondents other than the plaintiffs who appeared at the appellants' instance will receive their costs of this appeal from the appellants.
The opinion does not discuss any broader precedential implications beyond the direct consequence to the parties, and it does not purport to lay down a new rule beyond the court's interpretive conclusion on the meaning of a "date fixed for the performance" under the Limitation Act as applied to these facts.
Mukerji, A.C.J:— The only point that has been argued in this appeal is one of limitation and arises under the following circumstances. The predecessors-in-title of the plaintiffs made two usufructuary mortgages on 17th June 1907, one for the sum of Rs. 658 and the other for the sum of Rs. 115. They then on 3rd of January 1920, executed a usufructuary mortgage-deed in favour of the principal defendants to the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, for a sum of Rs. 8,500. Out of this sum an amount of over Rs. 6,000 was left with the mortgagees for payment to creditors. Among the debts to be paid were the two mortgages of 17th June 1907. The suit was instituted on the allegation that the defendants had failed to redeem the two mortgages of 1907, and the result was that the plaintiffs were deprived of the use of the lands mortgaged. The plaintiff accordingly prayed for two reliefs One was for damages for being deprived of the use of the property mortgaged in 1907 and the other was for a direction to the defendants to redeem the two mortgages of 1907. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the claim for damages as barred by time but decreed the suit for directing the defendants to redeem the mortgages of 1907, holding that the same was within time. The learned counsel for the appellants who were defendants 1 and 2, has argued that the claim for specific performance of the contract, namely, to redeem the mortgages of 1907, should have been dismissed as barred by time. There can be no doubt that the relief (b) in the plaint is a relief for specific performance of a contract. The date from which the period of three years' limitation runs is described in Col. 3, Limitation Act, as:
“the date fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”
2. The first question that arises is whether the date fixed for the performance must be a date fixed in the contract itself which is to be specifically enforced so that the date fixed would for a date fixed by express contract, or whether the date fixed may be a date which the parties may have fixed by necessary implication without stating expressly what it was. We are of opinion that it must be a date clearly mentioned in the contract whether the said contract be oral or in writing. The force of the word “fixed” implies that it should be fixed definitely and should not be left to be gathered from surrounding circumstances of the case. If this interpretation is right, no date was fixed within the meaning of Article 113, Sch. 1, in this case.
3. Then the question is when the specific performance was refused. In para. 5 of the plaint the plaintiffs mentioned that they agreed to extend the time for payment, but even then the defendants refused to pay the amount to the creditors. In para. 7 they say: “The cause of action arose on Baisakh Sudi 15th, of 1921, and subsequent years as well as in the month of December 1926, when refusals were made, etc.” On the plaintiffs' own showing therefore the first refusal that was made was on Baisakh Sudi 15th of 1921, some time in June 1921.
4. It is true that the learned Subordinate Judge has refused to believe the plaintiffs' story that by agreement the date of payment was extended beyond Baisakh Sudi 15th of 1920. But that does not mean that the learned Judge believed that there was no refusal in Baisakh Sudi 15th of 1921. On the plaintiff's own allegations contained in the plaint, the plaint was liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation, without waiting for the defendants to appear and raise a plea of limitation. In this view we have to accept the plaintiffs' story as to when the refusal took place. That refusal having taken place more than three years prior to the institution of the suit, it was time barred, so far as the claim for specific performance was concerned. The result is that the whole of the suit was liable to be dismissed and we allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit in toto with costs. The costs of the appeal would be recoverable by the appellants alone, and they will also have their their costs in full from the plaintiffs in the Court below. The respondents, other than the plaintiffs, who have appeared at the instance of the appellants will get their costs of this appeal from the appellants.
K.S
5. Appeal allowed.
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