Agarwala, J.:— The applicant has been convicted under S. 209, I.P.C, of making a false claim to the Manager of an estate under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, under S. 471, for using a forged document in the same proceedings and under S. 193 for perjury committed in the course of those proceedings. He has been sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment under S. 209 and to one year's rigorous imprisonment under S. 471, these sentences to run consecutively. Under S. 193 he has been sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment to run concurrently with the other sentences. In the aggregate therefore he has been sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment.

2. The facts of the case were as follows: On 27th June, 1931 Maharaj Kumar Gopeshwar Nath Sahi Deo executed in favour of Jamuna Das, brother of the applicant, a hand-note for Rs. 600. On 21st November 1931, the Maharaj Kumar executed another hand-note for Rs. 1,000. The consideration for this hand-note was Rs. 700 by way of principal and interest on the old hand-note and Rs. 300 cash. The three hundred rupees was not paid to the Maharaj Kumar immediately, but to be paid subsequently. The payee of this hand-note was expressed to be Kewal Ram, the applicant. A demand (Ex. 9) for payment of Rs. 300 was made by the Maharaj Kumar on the 24th. In reply to his demand he received from Chirangi Lal, the son of Jamuna Das, a letter (Ex. 10) stating that in point of fact the amount due from the Maharaj Kumar on the old debt was not Rs. 700 as stated in Ex. 9, but Rs. 950, and therefore that Rs. 300 was not due to the Maharaj Kumar. Shortly after this Jamuna Das died and some time later the estate of the Maharaj Kumar was taken under management under the Chota Nagpur Emcumbered Estates Act. The effect of this was to vest the management of the whole estate in the Manager as provided by Section 2 of the Act. As required by Section 5 of the Act, the Manager, on 19th February, 1934, invited the creditors to notify, within three months, any claims they had against the owner of the estate. Accordingly on 8th March Chirangi Lal, the son of Jamuna Das, preferred a claim on the basis of the hand-note of 27th June, 1931. In pursuance of the powers conferred upon him by Section 8 of the Act, the Manager determined the validity of this claim and it was paid. On 4th May Kewal Ram put in a claim to the Manager on the basis of a hand-note purporting to be dated 21st October 1931. The amount of the claim was Rupees 1,813. It is not now disputed that in fact this hand-note was the hand-note of 21st November 1931 with the date altered. Kewal Ram's statement of claim did not disclose the fact that Chirangi Lal had already been paid in respect of the hand-note of 27th June, 1931, which formed part of the consideration for the note on which the claim of Kewal Ram was based. In fact there can be no doubt that the claim of Kewal Ram was put forward as entirely dissociated from the first hand-note. This is made clear by the statement which Kewal Ram made on solemn affirmation in the proceedings before the Manager. He then stated with reference to the claim for Rs. 1,813:

I paid the money in cash to Maharaj Kumar and got a hand-note from him. It is not a fact that the hand-note was executed in order to pay Jamuna Das's dues.

3. The claim was disallowed by the Manager on 2nd August, 1934. An appeal against the disallowance of the claim lay under Section 10 of the Act to the Deputy Commissioner, and such an appeal was preferred. It purported to be an appeal by Kewal Ram, the applicant, whose claim had been dismissed by the manager of the estate. The vakalatnama authorizing a pleader to prosecute the appeal purports to be signed by Madan Lal, the son of Kewal Ram, and a partner in the business carried on by Kewal Ram. The Deputy Commssioner agreed with the manager that it had not been proved that any consideration had passed for the hand-note which formed the basis of Kewal Ram's claim. He therefore dismissed the appeal. He noticed however that the date of the hand-note had been changed from 24th November, 1931 to 24th October, 1931, and being satisfied that this change had been effected deliberately for the purpose of supporting a fraudulent claim against the estate, he made a complaint in writing on 29th November, 1934, against Kewal Ram, and sent this complaint to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of it. The Magistrate issued summons to the accused and on 13th December, Kewal Ram appeared in answer to the summons and applied for bail which was granted.

4. The prosecution of Kewal Ram on the complaint of the Deputy Commissioner was before the Magistrate on 9th, 11th, 12th, 22nd and 28th January; 1st, 15th, and 18th March and 1st, 10th, 16th, 20th, 22nd and 25th April. Judgment was delivered on 17th May, convicting Kewal Ram of the offence already referred to. Against these convictions an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner was preferred by Kewal Ram on 17th May, 1935. The 31st was fixed for the hearing of the appeal. Before that date however, namely on 22nd May, Kewal Ram presented a petition to the Deputy Commissioner, who had heard the appeal from the manager's order disallowing his claim, alleging that in fact that appeal had not been preferred by him, that he knew nothing about it and that the signature on the vakalatnama which purported to be the signature of his son Madan Lal was not in fact the signature of Madan Lal. These allegations were repeated in a petition presented by Kewal Ram to the Judicial Commissioner before whom was pending the appeal from Kewal Ram's conviction. He prayed that the hearing of the appeal be postponed until an enquiry had been made into the truth of his allegations. An affidavit as to the truth of the facts alleged was sworn by Kewal Ram himself and affixed to the petition. The Judicial Commissioner declined to postpone the hearing of the appeal. The learned Advocate who was acting on the appellant's behalf informed the Judicial Commissioner that Kewal Ram had no desire to defraud the estate. He said that Kewal Ram had no pecuniary interest in the hand-note which had formed the basis of his claim and that he was, in respect of that hand-note, merely a benamidar for Jamuna Das.

5. He also alleged that he had made the claim to the manager not for his own benefit but for the benefit of Chirangi Lal, the son of Jamuna Das, because, as he himself was expressed to be the payee in the hand-note, it was apprehended that payment would be made only to him. He said that when his claim was disallowed, he suspected that it was not a bona fide claim and therefore did not prefer an appeal against the Manager's decision. The appeal which was in fact preferred in his name, he alleges, was the result of a conspiracy to which he was not a party and about which at the time he knew nothing. He suggested that if he could, in the enquiry which he had asked for, succeed in establishing that the appeal from the order of the Manager had not been made by himself or with his knowledge, this would necessarily lead to the inference that the rest of his story was true, namely that in making the claim he was not seeking any personal benefit but was acting merely in the interest of his nephew Chirangi Lal, whom he considered to be rightly entitled to recover the dues on the hand-note of 24th November, 1931. In the face of Kewal Ram's assertion in the proceedings on the claim before the manager, which has already been quoted, and of his subsequent reiteration of this statement when examined by the Magistrate under Section 342 of the Cr PC, and of the persistence of the claim in the grounds of appeal preferred against his conviction, the learned Judicial Commissioner found himself unable to believe the truth of the new defence which was being put forward by Kewal Ram after his conviction.

6. As the learned Judicial Commissioner was therefore not willing to adjourn the case for the investigation of allegations which he was convinced were entirely baseless, the learned Advocate who represented Kewal Ram did not argue the case further. The learned Judicial Commissioner however himself examined the evidence against Kewal Ram and came to the conclusion that the date on the hand-note had been deliberately altered for the purpose of evading the consequences of Exs. 9 and 10, and that Kewal Ram had fraudulently preferred his claim to the Manager and had himself preferred the appeal from the Manager's decision to the Deputy Commissioner. Consequently the conviction of Kewal Ram was confirmed. Kewal Ram has appealed to this Court in revision against the order of the Judicial Commissioner confirming his conviction.

7. Dr. P.K Sen, who has appeared for Kewal Ram in this revision, has contended that before the conviction of Kewal Ram was confirmed by the Judicial Commissioner, the latter, in the interests of justice, should have ordered the inquiry which the applicant asked for. I agree with the learned Judicial Commissioner that in view of Kewal Ram's repeated assertions in respect of his claim, it is impossible to believe in the bona fides of his present allegations. Dr. Sen, however, argued that his client was entitled to an inquiry. He referred to Section 476 of the Cr PC, which empowers civil, revenue or criminal Courts to make complaints in respect of certain offences committed in or in relation to proceedings in those Courts, and points out that the section empowers the Court contemplating making a complaint to hold a preliminary inquiry. It has been pointed out more than once in this Court that it is within the discretion of a Court proceeding under S. 476 to hold a preliminary inquiry or not to hold such inquiry. Even when an inquiry is made, it is not necessary that it should be detailed or formal. Furthermore, in the present instance the Deputy Commissioner did make such inquiry as he considered necessary before his complaint. Lastly, no objection on the ground of the omission to hold a preliminary inquiry was raised by Kewal Ram until after he had been convicted. I am therefore of opinion that there is no substance in the first objection to the conviction raised by Dr. Sen.

8. It was next contended that there had been no hearing of the appeal against the conviction within the meaning of Section 423 of the Cr PC. The only basis of this objection is that the advocate who appeared for Kewal Ram in the appeal before the Judicial Commissioner was not prepared to, and did not argue the case on the merits, after he had failed to persuade the Judicial Commissioner that his client was entitled to a postponement of the hearing until an investigation had been made into the allegations which he then made. The judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner however shows that without the assistance of the appellant's counsel he himself examined the evidence against the appellant and satisfied himself that the convictions were well founded. This objection therefore must also be overruled.

9. It is next contended that the entire proceedings against Kewal Ram were not merely irregular but illegal. For this contention reliance is placed on Section 195 of the Cr PC. That section debars any Court from taking cognizance of certain offences except, in the case of offences under Ss. 193 and 209, Penal Code, on the complaint of the Court in or in relation to whose proceeding the offence is alleged to have been committed or of some Court to which such Court is subordinate; and in the case of an offence punishable under S. 471, except on the complaint of the Court in which the forged document is produced or given in evidence or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. It is argued that if the offence charged in the present case was committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any of the Courts mentioned in S. 195, the Court in relation to whose proceeding the offences were committed was the Court of the Manager of the Encumbered Estate, and that the Deputy Commissioner is not a Court to which the Court of the Manager is subordinate within the meaning of S. 195. A reference was made to sub-S. (3), S. 195 which, so far as it is material for the present purpose, is as follows:

For the purpose of this section, a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decree or sentences of such former Court….

10. It is pointed out that the Manager has no power to pass any sentence so that no question arises with respect to the Court to which he is subordinate in this sense. It was also contended that the decision of the Manager under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act disallowing the claim against the estate is not a decree and therefore that the Deputy Commissioner who has power to hear appeals from such decisions is not a Court to which the manager is subordinate within the meaning of the section. The decisions of the manager are not declared by the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, to be decrees or to have the force of decrees. A decree has been defined in Section 2, Sub-Section (2) of the CPC, as a formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. That definition, of course is for the purpose of the Code of Civil Procedure.

11. The definition, however, does not differ in essentials from the ordinary meaning of the word “decree” namely, “a final order of a Court in a suit.” A proceeding before a manager under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act is not a suit; and it follows therefore that the orders which he passes in such proceedings are not decrees. Consequently, the manager is not subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner in the sense contemplated by Cls. (b) and (c), Sub S. (1), S. 195. The question then arises whether a manager, while dealing with the claim of a creditor against the estate, under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, is a Court? If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, it follows that no Court can take cognizance of the offences charged in the present case except on the complaint of the manager. If, however the answer to the question is in the negative then S. 195 is no bar to cognizance being taken on the complaint of the Deputy Commissioner. The word “Court” has not been defined in Section 4 of the Cr PC, but in Cl. (2), S. 195, the term “Court,” for the purposes of Cl. (b) and (c), sub-S. (1), is declared to include a Civil Revenue or Criminal Court, but not to include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar. This description is not of any assistance in the present case in determining whether the manager is a “Court” for the purposes of the section, for sub-S. (3), S. 195 merely declares that the term “Court” includes a civil Court, a Revenue Court or a Criminal Court and leaves undefined what is meant by the word “Court.” The only definitions to which we have been referred are those in Section 3 of the Evidence Act, and Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act.

12. In each of these cases the definition of the word “Court” is expressed to be for the purposes of the particular Act in which it occurs. In particular the definition is the Land Acquisition Act can have no application except to proceedings under that Act. By the definition in the Evidence Act, “Court” includes all persons legally authorised to take evidence. But although the power to take evidence is the test to be applied in determining whether a particular tribunal is a Court for the purposes of the Evidence Act, it does not follow that such a tribunal is a Court for other purposes, for example, an Official Assignee is empowered to take evidence in proceedings for claims against the estate which he represents, but be is not a Court within the meaning of S. 195: 37 Mad 107(1); nor does the fact that a manager under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act is required to conduct himself in a judicial manner in dealing with claims against the estate, lead to the conclusion that he is a Court.

Many bodies are not Courts although they have to decide questions and in so doing have to act judicially in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartially: Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 9, p. 9, para. 1).

13. The question whether manager dealing with a claim under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act is a Court was indirectly referred to in 10 PLT 879(2). In that case the creditor of an estate which was being administered under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act preferred a claim to the manager who admitted it in part. No payment, however, was made to the creditor by the manager. When the estate was released from the operation of the Act, the creditor instituted a suit for recovery of his dues and a question arose whether the suit was barred by limitation. It was argued, on the basis of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, that the plaintiff was entitled in computing the period of limitation, to exclude the time during which he was prosecuting his claim with due diligence in a Court, i.e, before the manager. Das, J. disagreed with this contention on the ground that there was nothing in the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act which prevented the plaintiff from instituting a suit in the civil Court. He also observed that he was doubtful whether a Manager under the Encumbered Estates Act is a Court. Rowland, J., with whom James, J., agreed, held that it was not open to the plaintiff to sue on his debt during the period of management under the Act, and stated that in his opinion it was unnecessary to invoke the theory of suspension of limitation in any case in which suspension is not expressly provided for either in the Limitation Act or in some special Act. This decision, therefore, is not of much assistance in the present case. Section 14 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, empowers the Manager to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel the production of documents by the same means and, as far as possible, in the same manner, as is provided in the case of a civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure and S. 15 declares that every investigation conducted by the Manager with reference to any claim preferred before him under the Act, or to any matter connected with any such claim, shall be taken to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code. The same section declares that every statement made by any persons examined by or before the Manager with reference to such investigation, whether upon oath or otherwise, shall be taken to be evidence within the meaning of the Penal Code. Under S. 8 the Manager is required, while dealing with a claim under the Statute, to act in accordance with rules made under the Statute. It will be noticed that it is only for the purposes of the Penal Code that the proceedings of the Manager are to be deemed to be judicial. The procedure for securing the production of evidence, witnesses and documents, is to be the same as “in the case of a civil Court”. But there is no declaration that the Manager is a Court or that he is to be deemed to be a Court.

14. The essential characteristic of a Court is that it is authorized by law to decide in accordance with law, disputes between parties that appear before it. In dealing with claims against the estate under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, the Manager is not deciding a dispute between two parties who have appeared before him for the determination of their dispute for, as was pointed out by the Privy Council decision in 3 Pat 625(3), the Manager is not merely the agent of another, but is himself the principal under the Statute. Although, therefore, he is empowered by the Statute to determine the validity of claims against the estate, he is in effect determining a claim as between himself, as the principal and a creditor, and although he is required, in dealing with such disputes, to follow the procedure prescribed by the rules, and to act fairly and impartially, this, as has already been pointed out, is not a conclusive indication that while so acting he is a Court. The opinion to which I have arrived is that there is no ground for holding that a Manager in dealing with a claim under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act is a Court. It, therefore, follows that there is nothing in Section 195 of the Cr PC, which affects the validity of the present proceedings.

15. The result of holding that the Manager is not a Court is that the conviction of the applicant under S. 209, Penal Code, must be set aside. That section provides for the punishment of a person who, with intent to injure or annoy any person makes, in a Court of Justice, any claim which he knows to be false. If a Manager is not a Court, he is not, of course, a Court of Justice. It, therefore, follows that, however fraudulent or dishonest the claim of Kewal Ram was, it was not made in a Court of Justice. The same consideration does not apply to the convictions under Ss. 471 and 193. It is not denied that Kewal Ram did produce the hand-note in question in support of his claim in a proceeding before the Manager. This constituted a user of a document within the meaning of S. 471. The statement of Kewal Ram, which has been quoted in the beginning of this judgment, must, by reason of para. 2, Section 16 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, be taken to be evidence within the meaning of the Penal Code, and the proceeding in which it was made must be taken to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of the Penal Code by reason of para. 1, Section 15 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act; and as the evidence which Kewal Ram gave before the Manager was false and was intentionally given, it follows that he had, within the meaning of S. 193, Penal Code, intentionally given false evidence in a judicial proceeding.

16. It was lastly contended by Dr. Sen that the procedure adopted by the Courts below was irregular in that the complainant, the Deputy Commissioner, was not examined in accordance with the provisions of Section 200 of the Cr PC. The answer to that contention is that as the complaint purported to be made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties, his examination was not required [S. 200(aa)]. A similar objection was raised with reference to Section 252 of the Cr PC, which requires that when the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate, such Magistrate shall proceed to hear the complainant (if any) and shall take all the evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. Although the section makes it incumbent upon a Magistrate to hear the complainant (if the latter appears in support of the complaint) it does not, in my opinion, vitiate a conviction in which the complainant has not been; examined. There are, of course, cases where a complainant dies before the trial commences and the prosecution proceeds on the evidence of other witnesses who are able to speak to the occurrence.

17. It is not necessary to discuss this point at any length because the objection was not taken at the earliest stage, nor indeed until the present stage, which is an attempt to obtain revision of an order confirming the order of conviction. S. 537 of the Code is a complete answer to the contention.

18. The result, therefore, is that the conviction and sentence under S. 209, Penal Code, must be set aside, and the conviction and sentences under Ss. 193 and 471 be confirmed.

19. Luby, J.:— I agree.

20. Order accordingly.