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Fani Bhusan Bhuian Auction-Purchaser v. Surendra Nath Das And Others

Calcutta High Court
Jul 13, 1921
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal concerning execution sale)

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises from an application made by respondent No. 1, Surendra Nath Das, to set aside a sale in execution.

Relevant facts as stated in the opinion:

  • On 9 February 1915 the respondent No. 2 (landlord) obtained a decree under the Bengal Tenancy Act for arrears of rent in respect of a holding of which four persons were co-tenants: three adults (Dinu Das, Thakurdas Das and Rupai Das) and a minor, Surendra Nath Das.
  • Surendra Nath was a minor throughout the material proceedings and was represented in the original suit by his mother as guardian ad litem; his mother died on 9 October 1916.
  • An application for execution was filed in 1917 in which the mother's name appears as the minor's guardian. A notice under Order XXI, Rule 22 was addressed to the adult co-tenants and to the minor and his mother; an affidavit by the serving peon records delivery to Surendra Nath (then about thirteen) at the house where the co-tenants lived.
  • The holding was sold at public auction on 19 May 1917 and purchased for Rs. 250 by the appellant, a third party unconnected to the suit.
  • Post-sale litigation history:
    • 19 June 1917 — judgment-debtor No. 1 (Dinu Das) applied to set aside the sale; that application was dismissed and the sale confirmed on 1 September 1917.
    • 4 December 1918 — possession delivered to the auction-purchaser (appellant).
    • 6 July 1919 — judgment-debtors Nos. 2 and 3 made a second application to set aside the sale; dismissed on 6 July 1919.
    • 21 July 1919 — Surendra Nath (through his brother-in-law as next friend) made a further application to set aside the sale; the Court of execution dismissed it but the District Judge allowed the appeal from that dismissal.
  • The present appeal challenges the District Judge's decision which had set aside the sale; the Munsif (trial/execution court) had earlier dismissed the minor's application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the omission to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor (Surendra Nath) after the death of his mother in the execution proceedings rendered the sale void or merely irregular/voidable.
  2. Whether notice under Order XXI, Rule 22 was validly served such as to give jurisdiction to sell in execution.
  3. Whether the omission to bring the adult co-tenants on the record (under the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 92(2)) was a fatal defect to the execution proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khiarajmal v. Daim (Privy Council) Principle that representation for litigation may be incomplete yet sufficient; courts have exercised discretion in allowing one family member to represent the estate and will not disturb sales merely because some minors were not made parties if no prejudice is shown to them. The District Judge relied on this case, but the present court found it distinguishable in particulars while endorsing the underlying principle that incomplete representation may nevertheless suffice to sustain execution proceedings in appropriate circumstances.
Ramaswami Chettiar v. Oppilamani Chetti Commentary affirming that representation may be incomplete yet sufficient and that sufficiency can be a question of fact; the Privy Council's observations do not impose an absolute rule. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that the adequacy of representation in execution can be assessed in substance and may be sufficient despite procedural imperfections.
Malkarjun v. Narhari (Privy Council) Earlier Privy Council authority upon which Khiarajmal relied — supporting the discretionary approach to representation in litigation involving family estates. Cited as part of the chain of authority affirming the permissive approach to representation in such cases; used to justify looking at substance rather than strict formal compliance where no prejudice is shown.
Tekait Krishna Prasad Singh v. Moti Chand Held that where, in execution, a minor was unrepresented by a guardian and other serious irregularities existed, their Lordships found that the infant had sustained substantial injury — the non-representation alone was not held to automatically vitiate the sale. The court relied on this to underscore that non-representation of an infant, by itself, is not necessarily a sufficient ground to avoid a sale; what matters is whether substantial injury resulted from irregularities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by examining form and substance in the execution proceedings rather than reopening the merits of the original decree (which was admitted to be valid against the infant as well as the adults).

Key steps in the court's reasoning:

  1. The court acknowledged the Munsif's view that adult co-tenants were not made parties under the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 92(2), but held it unnecessary to decide whether the Munsif was right on that point for the purposes of the present appeal.
  2. It considered the District Judge's conclusion that the omission to appoint a guardian for the minor in execution amounted to an illegality vitiating the sale and his reliance on Khiarajmal v. Daim, but found Khiarajmal distinguishable on its facts. The court nonetheless accepted the general principle from the authorities that representation may be incomplete yet sufficient.
  3. The court observed that the co-tenants were members of the same family, living together, and that a notice under Order XXI, Rule 22 had in fact been issued addressed to all the co-tenants and (as supported by the serving peon's affidavit) was delivered to the minor at the family home. On those facts the court regarded it as a refinement of technicality to say that all co-tenants were not duly notified.
  4. On the question of guardianship, the court explained that the provisions of Order XXXII (Suits by or against minors) have no direct or strictly applied operation in proceedings in execution after parties' rights have merged in a valid decree. Once a decree has merged the lis, the courts may look to the substance of representation in execution rather than rigidly enforce the procedural requirements that apply to litigation proper.
  5. The court accepted that Rule 22 of Order XXI is necessary to give jurisdiction to sell in execution, but concluded that in the present case Rule 22 was sufficiently complied with.
  6. The omission to appoint a guardian for Surendra Nath was treated as an irregularity (not an illegality). Under Order XXI, Rule 90, such an irregularity will not justify setting aside a sale unless the applicant shows substantial injury and no fraud was alleged in this case.
  7. The court noted precedent (Tekait Krishna Prasad Singh v. Moti Chand) where non-representation of a minor by itself was not held to avoid a sale and emphasized that in the present record nothing had been shown to indicate that Surendra Nath suffered substantial injury from the irregularity.
  8. Given the procedural history (repeated unsuccessful applications by co-judgment-debtors) and absence of proof of substantial injury, the court concluded that there was no useful purpose in remanding the case for further inquiry and that continuing litigation would be counterproductive.
  9. The court also noted that the District Judge had not expressed any view on the effect of non-compliance with the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 92(2), and that, had the District Judge taken the view he did, he should have dealt with that additional point as the Munsif had treated that omission as an independent ground.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal was allowed; the order of the lower Appellate Court (District Judge) setting aside the sale was set aside, and the order of the Court of first instance (the Munsif), which had dismissed the application to set aside the sale, was restored.

Consequences and practical effects on the parties:

  • The execution sale is not set aside by this Court's decision; the purchaser's acquisition (sale for Rs. 250) and the earlier confirmation of the sale are effectively upheld by restoration of the Munsif's order.
  • Costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the lower Appellate Court were awarded against the judgment-debtor Surendra Nath Das: payable personally if he is a major, and payable out of his estate if he is still a minor.
  • The Court assessed the hearing fee in this Court at two gold mohurs.

The opinion does not purport to establish a novel rule of law; it applies existing authorities to the facts and emphasizes that, absent fraud and absent proof of substantial injury from an irregularity, an execution sale need not be set aside. No broader or new precedent beyond the application of these principles is asserted in the opinion.

Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion; no external information has been added.

Show all summary ...

Richardson, J.:— This second appeal arises out of an application made by the respondent No. 1 before us, Surendra Nath Das, to set aside an execution sale.

2. The relevant facts areas follows:—The respondent No. 2, as landlord, obtained on the 9th February, 1915, a decree under the Bengal Tenancy Act for arrears of rent in respect of a holding of which three adults, Dinu Das, Thakurdas Das, and Rupai Das, and a minor, Surendra Nath Das, were co-tenants.

3. It appears that these persons were members of the same family, though their precise relationship is not apparent on the record. I will say at once that Surendra Nath Das was at all material times a minor and still appears as such on the record, though he may now have attained his majority. He was represented in the suit by his mother as his guardian ad litem, and it is not disputed that the decree was a good and valid decree as well against the infant as against the adult defendants. The mother of the infant died on the 9th October, 1916. The decree-holder apparently was not aware of this death. An application for execution was filed in 1917 in which the mother's name appears as the minor's guardian. A notice was issued under Order XXI, Rule 22, addressed to the adult co-tenants and to the minor and his mother. On the back of the notice there is an affidavit by the serving peon that it was delivered, at the house at which all the co-tenants were living, to Surendra Nath, then apparently about thirteen years old. The holding was sold by public auction on the 19th May, 1917, and was purchased for Rs. 250 by the appellant, a third party having no connection with the parties to the suit. The proceedings which followed are somewhat surprising and illustrate the difficulties with which the decree-holders have to contend in this country. First on the 19th June, 1917, the judgment-debtor No. 1, Dinu Das, applied to have the sale set aside. That application was dismissed on the 1st September, 1917, the sale being confirmed on the same day. Possession was delivered to the auction-purchaser, the present appellant, on the 4th December, 1918. On the 6th July, 1919, however, the judgment-debtors Nos. 2 and 3, undeterred by the failure of the judgment-debtor No. 1, made a second application to have the sale set aside. The application met with the same fate as its predecessor and was dismissed on the 6th July, 1919. It is scarcely credible but a third application for the same purpose—the application with which we are now concerned—was made by Surendra Nath, represented by his brother-in-law as his next friend, on the 21st July, 1919. The application was thrown out by the Court of execution, but on appeal to the District Judge's Court it succeeded. The success so obtained proves at any rate the virtue of persistence. The bare statement of the facts sufficiently explains why the case turns not on the merits but on points of form.

4. The judgment of the learned Munsif, dismissing the application, is brief. The adult co-tenants had not been made parties to the proceeding and he held that they ought to have been brought on the record under the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 92(2). In the view we take it is unnecessary to express an opinion whether the learned Munsif was right in that respect. He went on to say that the omission to appoint a guardian ad litem for Surendra Nath Das after the death of his mother was in respect of the execution proceedings an irregularity which made the sale not void but merely voidable. The learned District Judge, however, on the appeal preferred by Surendra Nath, was of a different opinion. He held that the omission to have a guardian appointed for the minor in the execution proceedings was not merely de irregularity but and illegality which vitiated the sale, and that, apparently, not only as regards the minor's one-fourth share of the holding but as regards the entirety. He further held that no notice had been legally served upon the minor under Order XXI, Rule 22, and that this omission was also fatal to the validity of the sale.

5. With great respect to the learned Judge I am unable to agree with him. He relied mainly on the case of Khiarajmal v. Daim (1), which appears to me clearly distinguishable. There a decree had been made and it was sought to make liable under the decree an infant who had not been properly represented at any time during the course of the suit. Even, however, in that case their Lordships made this observation:

“The Indian Courts have properly exercised a wide discretion in allowing the estate of a deceased debtor to be represented by one member of the family, and in refusing to disturb judicial sales on the mere ground that some members of the family, who were minors, were not made parties to the proceedings, if it appears that there was a debt justly due from the deceased, and no prejudice is shown to the absent minors.”

6. A concise commentary on their Lordships' decision will be found in the judgment of Sir Arnold White, C.J, and Miller, J. in Ramaswami Chettiar v. Oppilamani Chetti (2). A judgment-debtor had died during proceedings in execution and a representative, who was not the true legal represantative, had been brought on the record in his place. It was contended that the proceedings had in execution were of no effect against the latter. The learned Judges said:

“We do not find anything is the judgment of the Privy Council in Khiarajmal v. Daim to compel us to accept this contention. Their Lordships recognise that representation for the purposes of litigation may be incomplete and yet sufficient, and though they confine their observations on this point to cases in which all the representatives are the members of a family, the case before them being of that kind, they do not lay it down that those cases exhaust the matter, but rather indicate that the sufficiency of the representation may be in part a question of fact.

7. The decision of the Court, as stated in the head-note, was as follows:

“A decree-holder who has to apply for execution against the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor may select, from among several rival claimants, as legal representative, the one whom he believes honestly to have the best prima facie title and the representation, in the absence of fraud or collusion, will be sufficient, even though it is subsequently found that some other person is the true legal representative.”

8. In other words, that case was decided upon the principle which had already been applied by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the familiar case of Malkarjun v. Narhari (3). The present case seems to me an even stronger case, Here the judgment-debtors were co-tenants of one holding, sold under the Bengal Tenancy Act for arrears of rent in execution of a decree admittedly binding on all the co-tenants. A notice was, in fact, issued under Order XXI, Rule 22, addressed to all the co-tenants. There is nothing to suggest that there was any divergence of interest among the co-tenants. They were living in the same home stead, and it seems to me a refinement of technicality to say that all the co-tenants were not duly notified that the decree was to be executed.

9. It is true that Surendra Nath's mother had died and that at the stage of execution he had in fact no guardian on the record. But as I have always understood the matter, the provisions of Order XXXII relating to Suits by or against minors” have no direct application in proceedings in execution after the rights of the parties have merged in a good and valid decree. At any rate the rules in Order XXXII are not so strictly applied at that stage. The “lis” in respect of which it is essential that a minor defendant should be represented by a duly appointed guardian is at an end and execution having taken place, in determining whether the minor was sufficiently represented in the execution proceeding, the Courts are at liberty to look at the substance of the transaction.

10. No doubt it is settled that the notice required by Order XXI, Rule 22, is necessary to give jurisdiction to sell in, execution. Such notice is required by one of the special provisions relating to execution. In the present case, as I have indicated, Rule 22 was in my opinion sufficiently complied with and if the fact that Surendranath had no guardian is treated not as an illegality but as an irregularity, the case comes within Order XXI, Rule 90, and fraud not being suggested, before the sale can properly be set aside, the Court must be satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity.”

11. I may add that in Tekait Krishna Prasad Singh v. Moti Chand (4), where in execution a minor defendant was unrepresented by a guardian, there were other serious irregularities and it was expressly held by their Lordships that “the infant appellant sustained substantial injury through such irregularities.” The non-representation of the infant by a guardian was not treated as being in itself a sufficient ground for avoiding the sale.

12. In the present case the judgments dismissing the previous applications by the judgment-debtor No. 1 and the judgment-debtors Nos. 2 and 3 were not placed before us, and nothing has been said in argument to lead us to think that Surendra Nath has suffered any substantial injury by reason of the irregularity complained of. Having regard to the whole history of this case, in my opinion, it would serve no useful purpose to remand this case for a further enquiry upon that question. It is surely time that litigation in regard to this sale came to an end. It is such proceedings as are disclosed in the present case which tend to lower the prices obtained at sales in execution.

13. In conclusion I may observe that the learned District Judge has recorded no opinion on the effect of the non-compliance by Surendra Nath with the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 92(2). In the view he took he should have dealt with that question inasmuch as the Munsif had treated the omission as an independent ground for dismissing the application.

14. The result is that I would allow this appeal, set aside the order of the lower Appellate Court and restore that of the Court of first instance with costs here and in the lower Appellate Court. The costs are payable by the judgment-debtor Surendra Nath Das personally if major, and out of his estate if he is still a minor. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at two gold mohurs.

Sanderson, C.J:— I agree. Appeal allowed.