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Bai Mani v. Usafali Bhudar

Bombay High Court
Aug 1, 1930
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued to recover from defendant 3 and from the joint family estate of the other defendants a sum alleged to have been misappropriated by the deceased Bhimashankar Motiram, who had been the guardian of the minor plaintiff as appointed by the District Judge of Ahmedabad. The defendants included the widow (defendant 1), the son (defendant 2), and two brothers (defendants 3 and 4) of the deceased. At first instance the Subordinate Judge passed a decree against the estate of the deceased in the hands of the other defendants and the joint estate of defendants 3 and 4, and a personal decree only against defendant 3 on the ground that he had signed a statement on 17 August 1925. On appeal the Assistant Judge varied the decree and made defendants 1 to 4 personally liable. The defendants appealed further, and the present opinion arises in that second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Assistant Judge erred in varying the Subordinate Judge's decree and in passing personal decrees against defendants 1, 2 and 4 in the absence of any cross-objections by the plaintiff and in the absence of any claim for a personal decree against those defendants contained in the plaint.
  2. Whether defendant 3 was personally liable for the misappropriated money merely because he had signed a statement on 17 August 1925 (i.e., whether that signed statement constituted a contract supported by consideration).
  3. Whether defendants 1 and 4 could be held personally liable for statements made in the written statement.
  4. Whether the son (defendant 2) is personally liable to pay the debt of his father when the debt is tainted by alleged illegality or criminal misappropriation — in particular, how the distinction between debts that are "Vyavaharika" and those arising from criminal misappropriation affects the son's liability.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (defendants)

  • The Assistant Judge had no jurisdiction under the circumstances to vary the Subordinate Judge's decree and pass personal decrees against defendants 1, 2 and 4 when no cross-objections were filed by the plaintiff on appeal.
  • Defendants 1, 3 and 4 were not personally liable for the debts of the deceased.
  • The son (defendant 2) was not liable to pay his father's debt because the debt was tainted with illegality and immorality (i.e., it was not a debt the son was bound to pay under the traditional texts dealing with Vyavaharika obligations).
  • Specifically as to defendant 3, it was contended that a statement signed on 17 August 1925 did not constitute a binding agreement supported by consideration.
  • On the factual question of misappropriation, the family members argued there was no permissible inference from the evidence that Bhimashankar had abstracted the money, given that the box had been in the keeping of a mamlatdar's clerk in the interval after Bhimashankar fell ill and before the box was opened.

Respondent / Plaintiff Arguments

  • The respondents contended the lower appellate court (the Assistant Judge) had jurisdiction under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure to pass a personal decree against defendants 1, 2 and 4 on appeal.
  • The plaintiff alleged in the plaint that the amount had been misappropriated by Bhimashankar and sought recovery from defendant 3 and from the deceased's estate in the hands of the other defendants; the plaintiff relied on the allegation of misappropriation rather than on a claim for personal decrees against defendants 1, 2 and 4.
  • On the primary fact of misappropriation, the plaintiff relied on the civil standard of proof and argued that an inference could properly be drawn from the evidence that Bhimashankar had committed the misappropriation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Uarsur Held that the son was not liable to pay the debt of his father which was not "Vyavaharika" — i.e., a debt the father ought not, as a decent and respectable man, to have incurred; son is answerable for legitimately incurred debts but not for those attributable to the father's failings. Discussed as one authority on the meaning of "Vyavaharika"; the opinion notes conflicting judicial views about its meaning and refers to Durbar Khachar in weighing different interpretative approaches.
Ramkrishna Trimbak v. Narayan Referenced in relation to consideration of Durbar Khachar and the meaning of "Vyavaharika" (exact rule in this text is not fully set out). Listed among subsequent cases that considered Durbar Khachar; cited in the discussion of conflicting judicial opinion.
Hanmant Kashinath v. Ganesh (Hanmant v. Ganesh) Considered in relation to whether a debt is Vyavaharika and in distinguishing criminal misappropriation from mere civil breaches of trust; includes a passage noting that retention of money may be a debt of "most sacred obligation" where not criminal. Used as part of the comparative authority establishing the distinction between criminal misappropriation and civil breach-of-trust liabilities; the opinion relies on this distinction to determine son's liability.
Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad Adopts a view criticizing Durbar Khachar and emphasizes a distinction between criminal offences and breaches of civil duty; translates and interprets "Vyavaharika" differently from Durbar Khachar. Relied upon as an authority that criticizes Durbar Khachar and supports drawing a line between criminal acts and civil breaches for the purpose of assessing a son's obligation.
Venugopala Naidu v. Ramanadhan Chetty Referenced among decisions of other High Courts concerning the interpretation of "Vyavaharika" and related principles (specific rule not elaborated in the opinion). Listed as one of the authorities that take a view contrary to Durbar Khachar and are referenced in the comparative discussion.
Sumer Singh v. Liladhar Referenced among High Court decisions relevant to the meaning of "Vyavaharika" (specific rule not elaborated here). Cited as part of the body of cases that do not follow Durbar Khachar's interpretation.
Kashinath v. Ganesh Annaji Discusses the pious obligation of a son to pay his father's debts and distinguishes between monies misappropriated (where liability may rest on estate) and liabilities arising from breach of civil duty (where son may be liable). Applied by the Court to distinguish the present facts (criminal misappropriation) from cases of mere civil breach and to support the conclusion that the son's estate is not liable when the father's act was criminal misappropriation.
Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh Cited as pertinent authority supporting the proposition that a son may be liable to pay debts which arise from misappropriation by the father (in context, cited among cases supporting liability when money was misappropriated by father but presented as civil misappropriation). Referenced as one of the decisions supporting the proposition that estate liability can arise where money was misappropriated by the father; used in contrasting types of liability.
Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Maliton Listed with other cases as pertinent to the principle that a son may be liable where money was misappropriated by the father (as a civil matter in certain contexts). Cited in support of the proposition that in certain circumstances the son’s obligation may arise in respect of money misappropriated by the father (as part of the survey of authorities).
McDowell & Co. v. Bagava Chetty Included among authorities used to illustrate when a son's liability to pay his father's debts may arise in respect of money misappropriated by the father. Referenced as supportive authority in the Court's discussion regarding instances where a son may be bound to satisfy debts arising from his father's misappropriation (as civilly actionable misappropriation).
Natasayyan v. Ponnusami Cited for a quoted passage stating that, on intelligible principles of morality, a debt due by the father by reason of his having retained for himself money which he was bound to pay to another would be a debt of the most sacred obligation; the opinion notes that in that case the retention did not amount to a criminal offence. Used to illustrate that some authorities treat certain retained monies as morally sacred obligations, but also to show the distinction where such retention does not amount to criminal misappropriation.
Kane mar Venkappayya v. Krishna Chariya Referenced as a case where the son would be liable when the father's debt arises on account of breach of civil duty (exact formulation in the opinion). Listed among cases supporting liability of the son where the debt flows from civil breach rather than criminal act.
Gurunatham Chetty v. Raghavalu Chetty Referenced with other cases as establishing that a son may be liable where the father's liability arises from breach of civil duty (specific details not elaborated). Cited as part of the group of authorities used to distinguish liabilities arising from civil breaches from those arising from criminal acts.
Tirumalayappa Moodelliar v. Veerabudra Included among authorities cited to support the proposition that the son might be liable where the father's debt arises from civil duty breach. Referenced in the Court's survey of authorities distinguishing civil breaches of duty from criminal misappropriation.
Jagannath Prasad v. Jugal Kishore Referred to in the opinion in the context of the proposition that if the liability arises directly from a criminal act the son would not be bound to pay the father's debt. Invoked to support the conclusion that where the father's act is criminal misappropriation, the son is not liable for the father's debt on that account.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in several distinct steps, each tied closely to the pleadings and the evidence as set out in the record:

  1. Jurisdiction and scope of decree on appeal: The Court examined the pleadings and noted that the plaint sought a decree against the estate of the deceased and against defendant 3, but did not seek personal decrees against defendants 1, 2 and 4. Because no personal decree was pleaded against those defendants and no cross-objections had been filed by the plaintiff on appeal, the Assistant Judge's order passing personal decrees against defendants 1, 2 and 4 was found to be erroneous. The Court relied on the principle that an appellate court cannot properly pass a personal decree beyond what was claimed in the plaint and beyond the scope of the contest on appeal where no cross-objection is pressed.
  2. Personal liability of defendant 3: The Court rejected the finding that defendant 3 was personally liable merely because he had signed a statement dated 17 August 1925. The Court observed there was no consideration for any agreement contained in that statement, and therefore the Assistant Judge was wrong to pass a personal decree against defendant 3 on that basis.
  3. Personal liability of defendants 1 and 4: The Court held that defendants 1 and 4 could not be held personally liable for any statement made in the written statement; the written pleadings did not ground personal liability.
  4. Liability of the son (defendant 2) — Vyavaharika and criminal misappropriation: The Court engaged in a textual and authorities-based analysis about the meaning of "Vyavaharika" and whether a son is bound to pay his father's debts in all cases. The Court summarized conflicting judicial opinions and commentarial translations of "Vyavaharika" but explicitly stated that it was unnecessary in the present case to decide the precise, contested meaning of the term.
  5. Distinction between civil breach and criminal misappropriation: The Court emphasized the settled distinction in the authorities between debts that arise from civil breaches of duty (where the son's estate may be held liable) and liabilities that arise directly from the father's criminal act (criminal misappropriation), where the son is not bound to pay. The Court surveyed multiple cases and commentaries to illustrate that distinction and concluded that the relevant precedent base supports the proposition that if liability arises directly from a criminal act, the son is not bound to pay the father's debt.
  6. Application to the facts: Turning to the evidence, the Court accepted the trial finding (endorsed for purposes of the civil suit) that Bhimashankar had misappropriated the money. The Court analyzed the timeline (Bhimashankar fell ill and died within days; the box was opened a short time later; in the interim the box was in the custody of a mamlatdar's clerk) and, applying the civil standard of proof (less exacting than criminal proof), concluded that an inference of misappropriation by Bhimashankar was permissible. However, because the misappropriation was an act amounting to criminal misappropriation, the Court held that the son's liability could not be imposed for that debt.
  7. Relief and costs: Based on the conclusions above, the Court held that the decrees of both lower courts must be reversed insofar as they imposed personal liability on defendants 1–4, and a decree should be entered in favour of the plaintiff against the estate of the deceased Bhimashankar Motiram in the hands of defendants 1–4. The Court also set out the costs allocation: the plaintiffs and defendants 1–4 to bear their own costs throughout, and defendants 1–4 to pay the costs of defendant 5 throughout.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court reversed the decrees of the lower courts insofar as they imposed personal liability on defendants 1 to 4, and ordered that a decree be entered in favour of the plaintiffs for the amount claimed from the estate of the deceased Bhimashankar Motiram in the hands of defendants 1 to 4. The Court explicitly held that the Assistant Judge was wrong to pass personal decrees against defendants 1, 2 and 4 in the absence of any plea for personal relief in the plaint and in the absence of cross-objections. The Court further held that defendant 3 was not personally liable on the basis of the unsigned-for (no consideration) statement of 17 August 1925, and that the son (defendant 2) is not personally liable for a debt which, on the proved facts, arose directly from the father's criminal misappropriation.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that recovery is limited to the deceased's estate in the hands of defendants 1 to 4; none of those defendants is personally liable for the debt in question.
  • Costs were apportioned: the plaintiffs and defendants 1–4 to bear their own costs, while defendants 1–4 were ordered to pay the costs of defendant 5 throughout.
  • The decision applies existing lines of authority distinguishing liabilities that arise from civil breaches of duty versus those that arise from criminal misappropriation; the Court did not purport to lay down a wholly new principle of law beyond the application of those authorities to the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No facts or authorities have been added beyond those explicitly contained in the opinion text.

Show all summary ...

Patkar, J.:— This was a suit brought by the plaintiff to recover from defendant 3 and the joint family estate of the other defendants the sum misappropriated by the deceased Bhimashankar Motiram who was the guardian of the minor appointed by the District Judge of Ahmedabad.

2. The learned Subordinate Judge passed a decree against the estate of the deceased Bhimashankar Motiram in the hands of the other defendants and the joint estate of defendants 3 and 4 and a personal decree only against defendant 3 on the ground that he had signed a statement on 17th August 1925. Defendant 1 is the widow, defendant 2 the son, and defendants. 3 and 4 are the brothers of the deceased Bhimashankar. On appeal by the defendants no cross-objections were filed by the plaintiff, and the learned Assistant Judge varied the decree of the Subordinate Judge, and passed a decree against defendants 1 to 4 and made them personally liable.

3. It is urged in this second appeal that the decree, in so far as it made defendants 1, 2 and 4 personally liable in the absence of any cross-objections, was erroneous, that defendants 1, 3 and 4 were not liable personally for the debts of the deceased, and that the son defendant 2 was not liable to pay the debt of his father as it was tainted with illegality and immorality. The learned Assistant Judge had no jurisdiction to vary the decree of the Subordinate Judge and pass a personal decree against defendants 1, 2 and 4 in the absence of any oross-objections. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the lower appellate Court had jurisdiction under O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC, to pass a personal decree against defendants 1, 2 and 4. It appears however from the plaint that no personal decree was asked for against defendants 1, 2 and 4, but a decree was prayed for against the estate of the deceased Bhimasankar Motiram and against defendant 3. In the absence of any claim made in the plaint for a personal decree against defendants 1, 2 and 4, we think that the order of the Assistant Judge passing a personal decree against defendants 1, 2 and 4 was erroneous.

4. We do not agree with the view of the learned Judge that defendant 3 was liable personally for the money misappropriated by the deceased Bhimashankar simply on the ground that he made a statement in August 1925. There was no consideration for the agreement contained in that statement, and we think that the learned Judge was wrong in passing a decree against defendant 3 personally.

5. We think that defendants 1 and 4 could not be liable personally for any statement made in the written statement. As regards the liability of defendant 2 to pay the debt of his father, there is a conflict of judicial opinion as to the meaning of the word Vyavaharika in the text of Ushanas cited in the Mitakshara in the commentary on verse 47, and Mayukha, Ch. 5, S. 4, pl. 15. In the case of Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Uarsur (1) it was held that the so was not: liable to pay the debt of hi father which was not Vyavaharika, i.e a debt which the father ought not “a a decent and respectable man to have incurred,” and the son is answerable for the debts legitimately incurred by hi sfather and “not for those attributable to his failings; follies or caprice's. This case has been considered by the Court in the subsequent cases of Ramkrishna Trimbak v. Narayan (2) an Hanmant Kashinath v. Ganesh ???, (3), and has not met with approval ??? the decisions of the other High Court Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad (4) Venugopala Naidu v. Ramanadhan Chetty (5), and Sumer Singh v. Liladhar (6). Avyavaharika has been translate in Durbar's case by Knight, J., as ??? usual or not sanctioned by law or customer by Mookerji, J., in Chhakauri's case (as not “lawful, usual or customary and by Sadashiva Ayyar, J., in ???'s case as

“not supportable as valid by legal argument and on which no right could be established ??? the creditor's favour in a Court of justice.”

6. The conflict of opinion is also refiected in the commentaries and translation Apararka explains it as not righteous proper, and Balambhatta as not for the benefit of the family. Colebrooke translated it as debts for a cause ??? to good morals,” and Gharpure ??? “not legal or capable of being recovere by a suit.” It is unnecessary to ??? in the present case the precise meaning of the word “Vyavaharika.”

7. With regard to the pious obligation of the son to pay the debt of his father the matter has been fully considered ??? this Court in the case of ??? Kashinath v. Ganesh Annaji , where distinction is made between the ??? of the sons to pay the father's debt in respect of money which was ??? ted by the father and money for which the father was liable on account ??? breach of civil duty. The son is ??? liable to pay the debt when such ??? of money misappropriated ??? the father, and in support of the proposition the cases of Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh (7), Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Maliton (8) and McDowell & Co. v. Bagava Chetty (9) are pertinent. On the other hand, where the debt is incurred by the father on account of breach of civil duty, the son would be liable to pay the said debt though the father may be subsequently liable to be prosecuted for criminal misappropriation, according to the case of Natasayyan v. Ponnusami (10), Kanemar Venkappayya v. Krishna Chariya (11), Gurunatham Chetty v. Raghavalu Chetty (12) and Tirumalayappa Moodelliar v. Veerabudra (13). The decision in the case of Darbar Khachar v. Khachar Harsur has been criticized in Chhahauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad where it was held that the distinguishing line must be drawn between a criminal offence and a breach of civil duty and where the taking of money is not in itself a criminal offence, a subsequent misappropriation by the father cannot discharge the son from the liability. It would follow from the decided cases that if the liability arises directly from a criminal act, i.e an act for which the father may or may not have been successfully prosecuted, but which can be presumed or proved to be criminal on the evidence on the record, the son would not be bound to pay the father's debt. I may, in this connexion, refer to the case of Jagannath Prasad v. Jugal Kishore (14). In the present case the plaintiff alleged in the plaint that the amount was misappropriated by Bhimashankar. The removal of the money from the safe was in itself a criminal offence. In the case of Hanmant v. Ganesh a decree was passed against the father for his failure to account as a trustee and there was no evidence that the property not accounted for was criminally misappropriated by the father who admitted his position as a trustee and the receipt of the property, and the conduct of the father amounted merely to a breach of civil duty as trustee.

8. The liability in the present case appears on the facts proved in the case to be the direct consequence of an act of the father which would be clearly an offence of criminal misappropriation, and therefore it would follow that the son, defendant 2, would not be liable to pay the debt of the father incurred by him by means of criminal offence.

9. I think therefore that the decrees of both the Courts must be reversed and a decree will be passed in favour of the plaintiffs for the amount claimed from the estate of the deceased Bhimashankar Motiram in the hands of defendants 1 to 4. The plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 4 will bear their own costs throughout and defendants 1 to 4 will pay the costs of defendant 5 throughout.

Barlee, J.:— The plaintiffs sued to recover from defendant 3 and the joint family estate of the other defendants, who are the widow and the son of Bhimashankar Motiram and his brothers, the sum which they alleged had been misappropriated by the deceased. The only question of fact at the trial was whether the deceased Bhimashankar had misappropriated money belonging to the plaintiff. The money had been in his charge. The plaintiff is a minor and the deceased was his guardian and the money admittedly was kept in the locked box. The deceased on 20th July 1925, suddenly fell ill and went on leave and died three days later. The news of his death was received at the taluka kacheri on 23rd, Saturday. The box containing the plaintiff's money was opened on the 25th. In the interval between Bhimashankar's going on leave and the opening of the box, it had been in the keeping of one of the mamlatdar's clerks. In these circumstances it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, i.e the members of Bhimashankar's family that there can be no inference that it was Bhimashankar who had abstracted the money from the box. It may be conceded that on this evidence a criminal Court would; probably not have found as a fact that Bhimashankar had abstracted the money. But this is not a criminal case, aid the onus of proof on a private plaintiff is not nearly so heavy as the onus on the Crown. We cannot say therefore that no inference is possible from the evidence which is recorded in the case. That being so it is not permissible for us to interfere with the finding of fact.

10. For the purpose of this case, then, we must hold that Bhimashankar committed a criminal offence, and the only question before us is as to whether the members of his family, his widow, son and brothers, are personally liable as found by the learned Assistant Judge. I agree entirely with my learned brother that there can be no personal liability on them. One person cannot be personally liable for the debts of a deceased person. I agree also that the liability can be placed only on the estate of the deceased. The principal question which we have to decide concerns the liability of the deceased's son's share in the family property. A son though under a pious obligation to pay the lawful debts of his I father, is not bound to pay debts due to certain specific causes specified in the ‘texts, and in particular is not bound to pay such as are termed Avyavaharika. This has been interpreted to mean:

“such debts as his father as a decent and respectable man ought not to have incurred, Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Harsur ,” and the defendants-respondent's learned advocate has tried to bring the debt in suit within this category on the strength of a passage quoted in Hanmant Kashinath v. Ganesh Annaji , from the case of Natasayyan v. Ponnusami where it was stated that

“upon any intelligible principles of morality a debt due by the father by reason of his having retained for himself money which he was bound to pay to another would be a debt of the most sacred obligation.”

11. But in that case the retention of the money did not amount to criminal offence and in Hanmant v. Ganesh , Scott, C.J adopted the view of Mookerjee, J., in Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad , that a distinction must be made between such acts as amount to offnces and mere civil breaches of trust. In consequence the estate of the minor appellant is not liable for the debt due to his father's criminal breach of trust.

12. I agree that the decree of the lower Court must be modified as indicated by my learned colleague.

R.M/R.K

13. Decree modified.