Mookerjee, A.C.J:— This reference has been made in connection with a suit to enforce a mortgage security. On the 9th February, 1908, the first two defendants, who are described as cultivators by occupation, took a loan of paddy from the plaintiff, who is another cultivator. In the document, which was executed, the paddy was stated to be worth Rs. 300, and the borrowers agreed to pay interest on the loan in paddy at a specified rate. The paddy borrowed, together with interest thereon in the shape of paddy, was made returnable on the 12th February, 1909. It was further stipulated that if the paddy was not returned within the time fixed, interest at the prescribed rate would be paid up to the date of realization. As security for realization of the said paddy, the borrowers hypothecated specific immovable properties. The bond finally provided that in the event of default in the payment of paddy, the mortgagee would be entitled to take steps according to the law in force, and to realise the claim with costs and interest from the properties under mortgage as well as from other movable and immovable properties by attachment and sale. At the conclusion, as at the commencement, the document was described as a “simple mortgage bond for a loan of paddy.” The borrowers neither repaid the paddy lent nor the interest due thereon in the shape of paddy. Thereupon, on the 20th July, 1916, the creditor instituted the present suit for recovery of Rs. 998 as the value of the paddy lent and the interest thereon, by sale of the hypothecated properties. The claim was resisted on the ground, amongst others, that it was barred by limitation. In the trial Court, the plaintiff attempted to prove that the defendants had delivered some paddy to him in 1913 on account of interest; this, however, was not established, and as the same view was taken, when the matter went on appeal, no further reference need be made to the alleged payment. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit as barred by limitation, on the ground that the six years' rule prescribed by Art. 120, and not the twelve years' rule provided in Art. 132, was applicable. The Subordinate Judge adopted the same view and confirmed the decree of dismissal. On second appeal to this Court, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that there was a conflict of judicial opinion upon the point of limitation raised in the suit, and referred the following question for decision by a Full Bench:

“Whether a suit to recover the value of paddy charged upon immovable property is a suit to enforce-payment of money charged upon immovable or movable property within the meaning of Art. 132 of the Limitation Act.”

For the solution of the question referred, it is necessary to analyse the nature of transactions of this, class, which, as appears from the cases in the books, are by no means infrequent among agriculturists in the districts of Midnapur and Bankura. A cultivator-takes a loan of paddy which he agrees to repay with, additional paddy in the shape of interest for use of the paddy borrowed by him. The creditor requires real security in addition to the personal undertaking: of the borrower for the due performance of the obligation. The borrower thereupon gives his immovable property by way of mortgage. It need not be disputed that the primary intention of the parties to such a transaction is that the debt should be discharged by repayment of paddy, but it is equally clear that they also intend that in the event of default of delivery of paddy, the mortgagee would be entitled to the market value thereof. When the deed recites that the land is given to secure, payment of the paddy (principal and interest), the essence of the matter is that the land is made security for the value of the paddy, because upon failure to deliver the paddy, the mortgagee becomes entitled to recover the price thereof by the sale of the land; in other words, the parties contemplate that should it be necessary for the mortgagee to enforce his security, the land would be liable for the value of the paddy lent as well as of the paddy payable as interest. A transaction of this character falls within the comprehensive definition of a mortgage contained in section 58(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, namely, “the transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability.” The parties, in the case before us, entered into an engagement which, if not performed by the delivery of the paddy, would give rise to a pecuniary liability. No other construction can be reasonably placed on the transaction. The parties could not have intended that in the event of default in the delivery of paddy, the Court should sell the mortgaged property, and for the benefit of the plaintiff, procure paddy from the market with the sale proceeds, which, according to our Code of Procedure, must be money, the only recognized medium of exchange. From this point of view, it is a reasonable construction of Art. 132 to hold that in a case of this description the money value of the paddy was charged upon the mortgaged premises.

An interesting analogy is furnished by stock mortgages which are treated as mortgages, even though what has to be repaid is not money but stock. (Precedents are set out in all standard works on conveyancing, for example, in Davidson, Vol. II, Part II, p. 624, in Bythewood and Jarman, Vol. III, p. 1063, in Key and Elphinstone, Vol. I, p. 150, and in Prideaux, Vol. I, p. 829). Thus in Forrest v. Elwes , there was a transfer of stock by way of loan upon bond with a condition to replace the stock six months after the date and in the meantime to pay interest at 5 per cent; the stock was not replaced and became depreciated the obligee was held entitled to the value of the stock at the time fixed for the transfer. [See also Goddard v. Lethbridge .] Similarly, in McArthur v. Seaforth , it was ruled that, on failure to replace the stock, the plaintiff was entitled at his option to the price at the day when it ought to have been replaced or the price at the day of the trial. [See also Shepherd v. Johnson .] Again in Blyth v. Carpenter , where the mortgagor covenanted to replace on a specified day an amount of stock lent him by the mortgagee and the mortgage was allowed to continue beyond the date fixed, it was ruled that the mortgagor might redeem on transferring to the mortgagee original amount of stock and was not bound to pay the amount which it would have cost him to replace the stock on the prescribed day. [See also Pell v. De Winton , Whitney v. Smith , and Bromley v. Kelly .] These transactions all amounted to valid mortgages, although what was secured was not the repayment of what might be strictly called money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan or an existing or future debt, but the performance of an engagement which might give rise to a pecuniary liability. Finally, no plausible reason has been assigned why a narrow construction should be placed upon the word “money” or the expression “money charged” in Art. 132 of the Limitation Act. The word “money” is comprehensive enough to include, not merely money which has been advanced or will be advanced by way of loan or money which is due on account of an existing debt, or will become due on a future debt, but also money which has or will become due on account of non-performance of an engagement that might give rise to a pecuniary liability. If such money is secured by a mortgage of immovable property, the suit to enforce the security is obviously a suit for recovery of money charged on immovable property within the meaning of Art. 132 of the Limitation Act. It may be pointed out that, notwithstanding the famous definition of money given by Baron Gilbert in Shelmer's Case , the tendency of modern cases has been to place a wide interpretation on the term “money” as including not merely what would be technically considered “cash,” but also whatever is redeemable by money or saleable for money. Gallini v. Noble , Brennan v. Brennan , Conly v. Green , In re Smith , and Sorojini Bassi v. Gnanendra Nath Das recently affirmed by the Judicial Committee on 26th April, 1920, (12), R. v. Govinda Babaji Babde , though indications in favour of a restricted construction are sometimes not altogether wanting: Langdale v. Whiteld , Willis v. Plaskett (9), Ommanney v. Butcher (10) and Harrison v. Paynter (11). But whatever doubt may arise upon the construction of other statutes, it is, we think, fairly clear that in Art. 132 of the Limitation. Act the expression “money charged upon immovable property” includes money due for non-performance of an obligation when such money is secured by a mortgage on immovable property.

Our conclusion is that the question referred to the Full Bench should be answered in the affirmative, and that a suit to recover the value of the paddy charged upon immovable property is a suit to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property within the meaning of Art. 132 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the present suit should not have been dismissed as barred by limitation.

The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the Subordinate Judge set aside and the case remitted to him to be reheard in accordance with law. The appellant is entitled to his costs in this Court (both of this reference and of the hearing before the Division Bench) as also the costs in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The costs in the trial Court as also the costs of the hearing after remand will abide the result.

Fletcher, J.:— I agree.

Chatterjea, J.:— I agree.

Teunon, J.:— I agree.

Richardson, J.:— I agree.

S.M

Appeal allowed.