- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Gulab Chand Subh Karan v. Madholal Sadha Sukh And Others
B.N. Nigam, J.C.
1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge dated 6-1-1951 in Civil Appeal No. 106 of 1950 arising out of Civil Suit no. 228 of 1949.
2. The plaintiffs came to the court with the statement that Suraj Karan and Gouri Shankar defendants 2 and 3 executed a mortgage-deed in respect of the property detailed at the foot of para 1 of the plaint for a period of 50 years and borrowed a sum of Rs. 1300/- from the plaintiffs. That this house was sought to be attached by defendant No. 1 in execution of his decree No. 720 of 1947 for a sum of Rs. 227/4/-. The plaintiffs in order to protect their possession and rights preferred an objection under Order 21, Rule 58 which was rejected. The plaintiffs then brought a suit for a declaration that defendant No. 1 (Gulabchand decree-holder) is not entitled to attach and sell the property in suit in derogation of the plaintiffs' possession and rights and that all the defendants or any persons deriving title through defendants 2 and 3 are not entitled to disposes the plaintiffs who are entitled to remain in possession as stipulated in the document dated 6-1-1938.
3. The suit was contested and the learned Sub-Judge dismissed the suit with costs. The learned District Judge allowed the appeal in part and granted the plaintiffs a declaration of their right to the possession of the property as against the defendants. The plaintiffs' suit was decreed with costs in both the courts. Against that judgment and decree, Gulab Chand defendant No. 1 has come up in second appeal. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1-3. Respondent No. 4 is absent despite service and the appeal has been heard ex parte against him.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the principle of S. 53 A, T. P. Act could not be invoked by the plaintiffs. The contention of the learned counsel is that the doctrine of the part performance is not available to the plaintiffs inasmuch as there is no contract which is only partly performed. The learned counsel argues that the money payable to the transferors has been paid to them the possession to which the plaintiffs were entitled by virtue of the transaction has been delivered to them and the deed has been executed. The learned counsel urges that nothing remains except the registration of the mortgage-deed in question. The suggestion of the learned counsel is that the contract has been fully performed and therefore the doctrine of the part performance cannot be invoked by the plaintiffs. I am unable to agree. Section 53A definitely envisages a case in which the transferee has obtained possession and has performed his part of the contract. In a sale or mortgage the only two other steps are the execution of the deed and its registration. Para 1 of Section 53A also envisages the execution of some contract. As such, if only the step of the registration has not been taken, the contract will remain only partly performed and I am of opinion that it would be open to the transferee to invoke the principle of part performance and to take advantage of the provisions of S. 53A T.P. Act.
5. The next point urged by the learned counsel is that S. 53A operates only as a estoppel against the transferor or the persons claiming under the transferor. It gives the transferee a right to estop transferor or person claiming through him. The learned counsel urges that S. 53A can be used only as a shield and not as a weapon of attachment. The learner counsel has referred me to - 'Probodh Kumar v. Dantamara Tea Co. Ltd.': AIR 1940 PC 1 (A); - 'Hari Prasad v. Abdul Haq': AIR 1951 Pat 160 (B), - 'Padmalabha Panda v. Appalanarasamma',: AIR 1952 Ori 143 (C) & - 'Deochand v. Mt. Parwatibai',: AIR 1952 Nag 115 (D). The learned counsel for the respondents has, on the other hand, referred me to -- 'Municipal Board, Etah v. Moradhuj',: AIR 1940 All 340 (E): - Ewaz Ali v. Mt. Firdous Jehan'.: AIR 1944 Oudh 212 (P), & -'Fateh Mohd. v. Ghosia Bibi', AIR 1953 Ajmer 19 (G). In the last ruling my learned predecessor expressly considered this question and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff Fateh Mohammed could successfully claim the benefit of S. 53A. T. P. Act. That was a case in which the plaintiff had sought recovery of possession and mesne profits from persons whom he alleged to have clandestinely got in possession of the property purchased by him. My learned predecessor expressly held that in such a case Section 53A Transfer of Property Act could be invoked by the plaintiff. In the present case the plaintiffs had filed an objection under O. 21, R. 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure and a suit under O. 21, R. 68 must in my opinion be deemed to be a defensive proceeding in continuation of the proceeding under O. 21, R. 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am, therefore, of opinion that plaintiffs could certainly invoke the aid of Section 53A Transfer of Property Act particularly as the present proceedings are obviously defensive in character.
6. The last point urged by the learned counsel is that even if it is held that the present proceedings are defensive in character and the plaintiffs are entitled to invoke the aid of S. 53A T. P. Act, then too the action of the plaintiff is misconceived and ill-advised. The learned counsel urges that the decree-holder only sought to attach and sell the rights, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in the property in suit and did not seek to dispossess the plaintiffs. The learned counsel's contention is that the plaintiffs could have resisted dispossession and if necessary come to the court to recover possession if they had been dispossessed. I am in the circumstances of this case unable to see any considerable distinction between a suit for declaration that the plaintiffs are not liable to be dispossessed and a suit for recovery of possession after dispossession. I am, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that they were entitled to continue in possession in terms of the deed dated 6-1-1938. The plaintiffs were however in my opinion not entitled to a declaration that the property in suit was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of decree no. 720 of 1947 granted by the IInd Additional Sub-Judge, First Class, Ajmer.
7. No other point has been pressed before me. Accordingly I see no force in this second appeal and dismiss it. In this second appeal parties will bear their own costs.
Alert