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Ganeshi Lal Sharma v. Snehalata Dassi
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit initiated by the Plaintiff seeking recovery of khas possession of a plot of land measuring 12 cottas and 1 chittak, located at Ramesh Mitter Road, Bhowanipur. The Defendant was alleged to be a tenant of the land for a four-year term starting June 1939 and ending 31st May 1943. The land originally belonged to Jiban Krishna Ghosh and devolved to his sons, with Prafulla becoming the sole owner. The Defendant leased the property from Prafulla at Rs. 80 per month under a lease dated 13th July 1939. The lease stipulated that upon expiry, the lessor could take khas possession or grant a fresh lease, subject to a two-month notice if possession was to be taken or the property let to a third party.
On 4th August 1940, Prafulla executed a deed of declaration of trust, appointing his wife, the Plaintiff, as trustee for the property. The Plaintiff served a notice to the Defendant on 17th March 1943 to vacate the land by 31st May 1943. The Defendant did not vacate, prompting the Plaintiff to file suit on 18th June 1943 for khas possession and damages at Rs. 4 per diem from 1st June 1943.
The Defendant denied the Plaintiff's title, challenged the lease's validity and notice sufficiency, and argued that sub-tenants were necessary parties. The trial Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, granting eviction and damages calculated on the rent of Rs. 80 per month. The Defendant’s appeal to the District Judge was dismissed, leading to the present second appeal before this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial Court’s decree contravened Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure by passing a decree for mesne profits without directing an enquiry, and whether the Munsif had pecuniary jurisdiction to pass the decree given the suit’s value.
- Whether the lease term commenced from the date of execution of the indenture (13th July 1939) or from 1st June 1939, and whether the notice to quit served on 17th March 1943 was legally sufficient.
- Whether the deed of declaration of trust executed by Prafulla in August 1940 created a valid trust, thereby conferring competence on the Plaintiff to institute the suit.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The decree passed by the trial Court violated Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the Court should have directed an enquiry for mesne profits accruing after the suit’s institution.
- The Munsif lacked pecuniary jurisdiction because the value of the suit, including mesne profits, exceeded Rs. 2,000.
- The lease did not specify a commencement date, so it should be deemed to start from the date of execution (13th July 1939), making the suit premature.
- Alternatively, if the lease began on 1st June 1939, the four-year term would end on 1st June 1943, rendering the notice to quit given for 31st May 1943 legally insufficient.
- The deed of declaration of trust did not create a valid trust; thus, the Plaintiff lacked title and was not competent to sue.
Respondent's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| A.P Bagchi v. Mrs. F. Morgan | Preliminary decree for mesne profits necessary only when fresh evidence is required to ascertain amount. | The Court relied on this to hold that where mesne profits can be fixed on agreed rent, a preliminary decree is not necessary and the trial Court’s decree was valid. |
| Vella Veeran Chetti v. Veeran Chetti | Procedure regarding mesne profits and preliminary decree requirement. | The Court accepted the view that a preliminary decree is not mandatory if the amount of mesne profits can be ascertained without fresh evidence, supporting the trial Court’s decision. |
| Bidyadhar Bachar v. Manindra Nath Das | Jurisdiction of Court depends on value of property, not on future mesne profits. | The Court held that the Munsif had jurisdiction since the suit’s value based on the property was within limits, regardless of mesne profits claimed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the three points raised in the appeal sequentially:
First, regarding the decree for mesne profits, the Court interpreted Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure and recognized that while it is usual to direct an enquiry for post-suit mesne profits, the Court may pass a final decree if the amount is ascertainable without further evidence or if parties waive enquiry. Citing A.P Bagchi v. Mrs. F. Morgan and Vella Veeran Chetti v. Veeran Chetti, the Court found the trial Court’s decree appropriate because the rent was fixed and agreed upon, making further enquiry unnecessary.
Second, the Court rejected the contention that the Munsif lacked pecuniary jurisdiction. Referring to the Full Bench decision in Bidyadhar Bachar v. Manindra Nath Das, it held that jurisdiction depends on the value of the property and not on future mesne profits. Since the suit’s value was within the Court’s jurisdiction at institution, the decree was valid.
Third, the Court construed the lease as commencing on 1st June 1939, as expressly indicated in the lease document, not from the execution date. The lease term was held to expire on 31st May 1943, making the notice to quit served on 17th March 1943 valid and sufficient.
Finally, the Court examined the declaration of trust executed by Prafulla. It held that the trust was valid under sections 5 and 6 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, as the instrument was written, signed, registered, and indicated the three certainties of intention, purpose, and beneficiary. The word "arpan" was interpreted as a valid transfer of trust property. The Court also held that questions of stamp duty or admissibility were not open at this stage, affirming the Plaintiff’s competence to sue as trustee.
Holding and Implications
The Court dismissed the appeal with costs.
The direct effect of this decision is the affirmation of the trial and appellate Courts’ decrees granting khas possession to the Plaintiff and awarding mesne profits. The Court upheld the validity of the lease term, the sufficiency of the notice to quit, and the Plaintiff’s legal standing as trustee. No new precedent was set beyond the application of established principles regarding jurisdiction, mesne profits, lease interpretation, and trust validity.
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:
Mukherjea, J.:— This appeal is on behalf of the Defendant, and it arises out of a suit commenced by the Plaintiff for recovery of khas possession of the land in suit on the allegation that the Defendant was a tenant in respect of the same for a period of four years and that the term of the tenancy expired on the 31st May, 1943.
2. The disputed property is a plot of land measuring 12 cottas and 1 chittak, which is the southern portion of a 18 cotta plot situated at Ramesh Mitter Road, Bhowanipur, and belonged admittedly to one Jiban Krishna Ghosh. After the death of Jiban, it devolved upon his two sons— Prafulla and Jnanendra, and Jnandra having subsequently transferred his share to Prafulla. The latter became the sole owner of the property. There was originally one Kshetra Nath Banerjee in possession of the land as a tenant, under the proprietors, but he having vacated the land, the present Defendant took lease of the property from Prafulla at a rental of Rs. 80 per month for a period of four years beginning from June, 1939, and ending with May, 1943. The indenture of lease is dated the 13th July, 1939, and it provides inter alia that on the expiry of the term, it would be open to the lessor to take khas possession of the property or to grant fresh lease to the lessee himself at an enhanced rent, and in case he wanted to take khas possession of the property or let it out to a third party, he would be bound to give two months' notice to the tenant before the expiry of the lease. On the 4th August, 1940, Prafulla executed a deed of declaration of trust whereby his wife, the present Plaintiff, was constituted a trustee for a certain period and for certain purposes in respect to this property as well as certain other properties of the settlor. The Plaintiff as trustee served a notice on the Defendant on the 17th March, 1943, asking him to vacate the land on the expiry of the term on the 31st May following. As the Defendant did not quit the land, the present suit was instituted on the 18th June, 1943.
3. The Plaintiff prayed for khas possession of the property and also for damages or mesne profits, both before and after the suit which were claimed at the rate of Rs. 4 per diem from 1st June, 1943.
4. The Defendant in his written statement traversed the allegations of the Plaintiff and set up a number of pleas. It was averred that the Plaintiff had no title to the property, and that the indenture of lease was not binding on the Defendant and that its terms were illegal and inoperative. It was further contended that there was no sufficient and valid notice by which the tenancy could be determined and that the sub-tenants were necessary parties to the suit.
5. The trial Court negatived all the defence contentions, and made a decree in favour of the Plaintiff. The prayer for eviction was allowed, and the Plaintiff was given damages on the rental basis of Rs. 80 a month. The amount of damages calculated on that rate from 1st June, 1943, to the date of the decree was found to be Rs. 1,784 and the learned Munsif gave the Plaintiff a decree for that amount on payment of excess court-fees. It was further directed that the Plaintiff would have damages at that rate up to the date of delivery of possession. Against this decision was an appeal taken by the Defendant to the Court of the District Judge of 24-Par-ganas, and the learned Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The Defendant has now come up on second appeal to this Court.
6. Three points have been taken by the learned Advocate for the Appellant in support of this appeal. It is contended in the first place that the decree made by the trial Court contravenes the provision of Or. 20, r. 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and as the value of the suit was raised to Rs. 2,724 at the date when the decree was passed, it was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif to pass the decree at all. The second point taken is that as the lease was not expressed to commence from any particular date, it would be taken to begin from the 13th July, 1939, when the indenture was executed and registered, and as the period of four years could not in that event expire on the 31st May, 1943, the suit was premature: Alternatively, it is argued that even if the lease is taken to commence from the 1st June, 1939, the period of four years would end on the 1st June, 1943, and consequently the notice to quit that was served upon the Defendant asking him to quit the land on the 31st May, 1943, was legally insufficient. Lastly, it is urged that by the deed of declaration of trust executed by Prafulla on the 4th August, 1940, no valid trust was created in law, and the property not having legally vested in the present Plaintiff as trustee, she was not competent to institute the suit. We will take up these three points one after another.
7. So far as the first point is concerned, Or. 20, r. 12 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that
“Where a suit is for recovery of possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may pass a decree—
(a) for the possession of the property;
(b) for the rent or mesne profits which have accrued on the property during a period prior to the institution of the suit or directing an enquiry as to such rent or mesne profits;
(c) directing an enquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until—
(i) the delivery of possession to the decree-holder.
(ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with notice to the decree-holder through the Court, or
(iii) the expiration of three years from the date of the decree,
Whichever event first occurs.”
8. It appears, therefore, that as regards the mesne profits which accrued prior to the institution of the suit the Court can pass a decree fixing the amount, or it can, if it so chooses, pass a preliminary decree directing an enquiry as to the quantum of profits and postponing the passing of the final decree till the enquiry is held. But with regard to the mesne profits occurring after the date of the suit, it is argued on behalf of the Appellant that the Court has got no option but to direct an enquiry under cl. (c) mentioned above. We have no doubt whatsoever that under normal circumstances it is usual for the Court to pass a preliminary decree regarding mesne profits which accrued after the commencement of the suit, but we do think that the Court would be quite within its rights if it passes a decree for mesne profits payable subsequently to the suit if in the circumstances of the case, an enquiry is unnecessary or waived by the parties.
9. It has been observed by Sulaiman, C.J, in A.P Bagchi v. Mrs. F. Morgan(1) that a preliminary decree becomes necessary only when the exact amount has to be ascertained after examination of fresh evidence. If the Plaintiff claims mesne pro-fits on the basis of rent which is fixed and agreed upon between the parties, or if the Court decides that mesne profits ought to be allowed on that basis,—the amount being definitely ascertained, there would be no occasion for passing a preliminary decree so that there may be another ascertainment of the amount due to the Plaintiff.
10. The same view has been taken in Vella Veeran Chetti v. Veeran Chetti(2) which dissented from an earlier decision of the same High Court in In re: Ekanathalinga-swami Koil(3), where it was held that as regards future mesne profits, the Court had no option but to pass a preliminary decree in the first instance. The matter is one of procedure and not of jurisdiction of the Court, and unless the Defendant satisfies us that the decision is wrong on the merits, we are not inclined to interfere with the decree for mesne profits made by the trial Court in the present case.
11. Mr. Ganguli further argues that the Mun-sif in the present case was competent to try suits up to the value of Rs. 2,000 and he had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for khas possession as well as for mesne profits amounting to Rs. 1,784 which had the effect of raising the value of the suit to Rs. 2,744, an amount admittedly beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. We do not think that this contention is sound. On the principle enunciated by a Full Bench of this Court in Bidyadhar Bachar v. Manindra Nath Das(4) the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property and for mesne profits would depend upon the value of the property which is the subject-matter of the suit and not on future mesne profits which must vary according to the period for which the Defendant remains in possession of the property. In the present case, the value of the suit for purposes of eviction was rightly taken at Rs. 960, and even if we add to that the amount of mesne profits claimed by the Plaintiff up to the date of the institution of the suit, the value would not certainly exceed the Court's pecuniary jurisdiction. Pendente lite mesne profits, whatever their amount might be, would not affect the jurisdiction of the Court if the value of the suit at the date of its institution was within its jurisdiction. The first contention of Mr. Ganguli must, therefore, fail.
12. As regards the second point, we are definitely of opinion that the indenture of lease executed between Prafulla and the Defendant on 13th July, 1939, created a tenancy for a period of four years commencing from the beginning of June, 1939, and ending with May, 1943. There is no ambiguity whatsoever in the language and on a proper construction of document we would hold that the lease was expressed to begin from the 1st of June, 1939. It is not a case where no date of commencement being mentioned, time is to begin from the making of the lease. As the lease commenced from the 1st June, 1939, it should last under paragraph (2) of sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act up to the mid-night of the 1st June, 1943, but the stipulation in the document that the lease would end with May, 1943, would certainly constitute an express agreement to the contrary within the meaning of paragraph (2) of sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, and consequently the lease, in our opinion, would expire on the 31st May, 1943, and the notice to quit that was served upon the Defendant was quite a valid and proper notice.
13. The last point raised by Mr. Ganguli relates to the validity of the document of declaration of trust executed by Prafulla in August, 1940. Under sec. 5 of the Indian Trust Act (II of 1882),
“No trust in relation to immovable property is valid, unless declared by a non-testamentary instrument in writing signed by the author of the trust or the trustee and registered, or by the will of the author of the trust or of the trustee.
14. Sec. 6 further lays down that
“Subject to the provisions of sec. 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts (a) an intention on his part to create thereby a trust, (b) the purpose of the trust, (c) the beneficiary and (d) the trust property, and………. transfers the property to the trustee……….”
15. The provision of sec. 5 was certainly complied with in the present case as there was a non-testamentary instrument in writing signed by the settlor which declared trust and was registered in law.
16. The settlor also indicated with sufficient precision the three certainties which are indispensable to a trust. The only question is whether the trust property has been transferred to the trustee as is required under sec. 6. In our opinion the word arpan as used in the document is sufficiently comprehensive to signify transfer, and we think that there was a transfer of the trust property to the trustee as contemplated by sec. 6. Whether the document is properly stamped or not is a question that does not arise for our consideration in the present case. The deed of declaration of trust was admitted into evidence in the trial Court without any objection by any side, and under sec. 36 of the Stamp Act (II of 1899), no further question relating to the admissibility of the document can be raised at the Appellate stage.
17. The result, therefore, is that we dismiss this appeal with costs.
Sharpe, J.:— I agree.
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