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Raimohan Karmakar And Another v. King-Emperor
Factual and Procedural Background
On 21st February 1916, the President Panchayet of the Hashara Union reported to the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Munshigunge that the halat from Hashara Bazar to Teghoria had been destroyed by several persons, six of whom were named. These individuals were alleged to have dug earth, excavated a pond, or ploughed up the land, incorporating it into their holdings. On 4th March, the Magistrate initiated proceedings under section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P.C.) against these persons, directing them to remove the obstructions within seven days or show cause on 24th March why the order should not be confirmed. However, the formal order was not drawn up and signed until 14th March, served only on 21st March, leaving the petitioners effectively two days to respond. At the hearing, one person appeared and consented to remove the obstruction, three were absent and the order was made absolute against them, and two appeared but were denied an adjournment to file a written statement. The Magistrate made the order absolute against those two as well. The Sessions Judge, upon application by these two persons, recommended setting aside the order on grounds of insufficient opportunity to show cause and defects in the proceedings, particularly the imprecision of the orders. The court agreed with these objections.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioners were afforded sufficient opportunity to show cause against the order under section 133 Cr. P.C.
- Whether the proceedings and the orders issued were sufficiently precise, particularly in specifying the obstruction attributable to each person.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Srinath v. Ainaddi | Establishes that the report or information on which the Magistrate acts before making the conditional order under section 133 is not evidence against the opposite party. | Used to emphasize the necessity of giving reasonable opportunity to the opposite party to show cause and to adduce evidence as required by sections 135 and 137(1) Cr. P.C. |
| Upendra v. Rampal | Clarifies that an order under section 133 cannot be based on information gathered at a local enquiry, even with consent of parties. | Applied to reject the Magistrate’s reliance on a prior inspection conducted before the proceedings were instituted. |
| Kalimohan v. Nakari Chandra | An order under section 133 must not be vague, indefinite, or ambiguous; it must clearly specify what each person is required to do. | Supported the court’s conclusion that the joint orders lacking precise specification of individual obligations were invalid. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the procedural and substantive defects in the Magistrate’s handling of the section 133 proceedings. It observed that the initial order, though dated 4th March, was not served until 21st March, leaving only two days for the petitioners to respond, which was unreasonable and justified their request for adjournment. The court underscored that proceedings under section 133 are initially ex parte and the information forming the basis of the order is not evidence against the opposite party, necessitating a fair opportunity to be heard as contemplated by sections 135 and 137(1) of the Cr. P.C. The Magistrate’s reliance on a prior inspection was rejected as impermissible.
Further, the court found the orders defective for failing to specify the particular obstruction attributable to each individual. Since the report indicated different obstructions caused by different persons and did not allege joint responsibility, the joint orders without specific directions were improper. The court cited the principle from Kalimohan v. Nakari Chandra that orders under section 133 must be clear and precise to inform each person what they must do to comply, especially given the serious penal consequences under section 140 and section 188, IPC, for disobedience.
On these grounds, the court agreed with the Sessions Judge’s recommendation to set aside the Magistrate’s order dated 24th March 1916.
Holding and Implications
Order set aside.
The court’s decision nullifies the Magistrate’s order under section 133 against the two petitioners who appeared and were denied adequate opportunity to show cause. The ruling emphasizes procedural fairness in summary proceedings under section 133 and the requirement for specificity in orders that impose obligations on individuals. No new precedent was established beyond affirming established principles regarding notice, opportunity to be heard, and clarity of orders in such proceedings. The direct effect is that the petitioners are relieved from the immediate obligation to remove the obstructions pursuant to the set aside order.
This is a reference by the Sessions Judge of Dacca, under sec. 438, Cr. P.C, in the matter of a proceeding under sec. 133.
On the 21st February 1916, the President Punchayet of the Hashara Union reported to the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Munshigunge that the halat from the Hashara Bazar to Teghoria had been destroyed by several persons (six of whom were mentioned in his list) “who had either dug earth therefrom, or excavated, a pond, or had ploughed up the land and included it in their holding.” On the 4th March, the Magistrate directed proceedings to be drawn up against all the persons to show cause why they should not remove the obstructions mentioned; by the same order he fixed the 24th March for the hearing of the case. A proceeding was then drawn up against the six persons jointly requiring them to remove the obstructions mentioned within seven days or to show cause on the 24th. March why the order should not be confirmed. The order however in the form No. 16, Schedule V of the Criminal Procedure Code, was not drawn up and signed till the 14th March and was not made over to the peon till the 18th March. His return shows that the order was not served till the 21st March. On the date fixed, one of the six persons mentioned in the notice appeared and stated that he had no objection to remove the obstruction, and the order was made absolute against him; three of the others were absent and the order was made absolute against them under sec. 136. The remaining two persons appeared and prayed for an adjournment to enable them to file a written statement. The Magistrate refused the application and made the order absolute against them also. Pursuant to this order, a notice was issued upon them that they do remove the obstruction immediately on receipt of the notice. The Sessions Judge has, upon the application of these two persons, who had appeared to show cause under sec. 135, recommended that the order be set aside on two grounds, namely, first, that the Petitioners had not sufficient opportunity to show cause against the order, and secondly, that the proceedings were defective, because the initial as well as the final order was not sufficiently precise. We are of opinion that these objections are well founded.
The initial order under sec. 133, though made on the 4th March, was not served till the 21st March. The reason for the delay has not been explained, but the result has been that the Petitioners had only two days to enable them to show cause. Their application for an adjournment was thus not unreasonable. It cannot be overlooked that a proceeding under sec. 133 is, in the first instance, entirely ex parte, and, as pointed out in Srinath v. Ainaddi(1), the report or the other information whereon the Magistrate has taken action before making the conditional order is no evidence against the opposite party. It is consequently desirable that reasonable opportunity should be given to the opposite party to show cause as contemplated by sec. 135, cl. (b) and to adduce evidence as prescribed by sec. 137(1). In the case before us, we agree with the Sessions Judge that the Petitioners had not such opportunity given to them. We may add that the Magistrate in his explanation relies upon the result of an inspection he had made of the locality in the course of a tour long previous to the institution of the proceedings. It may be pointed out, as explained in Upendra v. Rampal(2), that an order under sec. 133 cannot, even by consent of parties, be based upon information gathered at a local enquiry.
It is further plain that the-initial order is not sufficiently specific; when in a proceeding under sec. 133, instituted against a number of persons, it is alleged that various unlawful obstructions have been caused upon a public way, it is essential that the order should state accurately, with regard to each person, the specific obstruction made by him, which he is required to remove, unless it is alleged that all the persons are jointly responsible for all the obstructions mentioned. No person can be called upon, under sec. 133, to remove an obstruction not caused by himself. In the case before us, there is no allegation that the unlawful obstructions imputed to the Opposite Party had been caused by all of them jointly; on the other hand, from the report of the President Panchayet it seems that different persons had caused different obstructions. In these circumstances, a joint initial order, which does not specify what obstruction each person called upon to show cause has made, followed by a joint order absolute, which does not specify what each member of the Opposite Party is required thereby to do, cannot be supported. As was pointed out by Jenkins, C.J, in Kalimohan v. Nakari Chandra, an order issued under sec. 133 should not be vague and indefinite or ambiguous, but must be such that the persons to whom it is directed may be able to learn from its terms what it is that they are to do for the purpose of complying with it. This is no trivial matter, for, under sec. 140, disobedience to the order renders the defaulter liable to serious penal consequences, namely, to a prosecution under sec. 188, Indian Penal Code.
We accordingly accept the recommendation of the Sessions Judge and set aside the order of the Magistrate dated the 24th March 1916.
S.C.M
Order set aside.
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