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Sagarmal Agarwala v. Emperor

Patna High Court

Jul 22, 1943

Judgment

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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was convicted by a First Class Magistrate of Chaibassa under Rule 81(4), Defence of India Rules, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 and, in default, rigorous imprisonment for six months. On appeal the Sessions Judge of Manbhum Singhbhum affirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to a fine of Rs. 200 and, in default, rigorous imprisonment for six months. The petitioner filed this application in revision against that decision.

The prosecution case is that on 15 December 1942 the petitioner sold sugar to P.W.1 (Hashim) at Rs. 23 per maund, whereas the controlled price was Rs. 14-4-0 per maund, thereby contravening Rule 81(2)(b), Defence of India Rules. P.W.1 reported the matter to the Sub-Inspector at Chakradharpur, who recorded the first information, investigated, recorded further evidence of witnesses and submitted a written charge-sheet under Rule 81(4), Defence of India Rules.

The defence asserted that the petitioner had not effected the sale and that the sale had been made by the firm Padam Sukh Chogalal; the accused produced an employee of that firm and documents (counterfoils and entries in the firm's rokar) in support.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether there was compliance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 130(1), Defence of India Rules (requirement of a report in writing by a public servant before taking cognizance).
Whether the provisions of Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code were contravened by relying on the police diary / Sub-Inspector's statement to contradict prosecution witnesses.
Whether there was reasonable doubt as to the identity of the firm which effected the dealing in sugar (i.e., whether identity doubts undermine the conviction).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

There was no compliance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 130(1), Defence of India Rules (no proper written report by a public servant).
The provisions of Section 162 CrPC were contravened because the Sessions Judge relied on the police diary/Sub-Inspector's account to contradict prosecution witnesses.
There exists reasonable doubt about the identity of the firm which sold the sugar, suggesting the petitioner may not have been the seller.

Prosecution's Case

The petitioner sold sugar to P.W.1 at a price above the controlled rate (Rs. 23 vs. Rs. 14-4-0 per maund), thereby contravening Rule 81(2)(b).
The Sub-Inspector recorded the first information, investigated the matter, recorded evidence of witnesses and submitted a written charge-sheet—constituting a written report by a public servant under Rule 130(1).
Evidence (including testimony of P.W.1 and corroborative witnesses) supports the finding that the petitioner was the seller who charged the excessive price.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each of the three points argued on behalf of the petitioner in turn:

On Rule 130(1), Defence of India Rules (which provides that no court shall take cognizance except on a written report of a public servant): the court found that after P.W.1 reported the matter the Sub-Inspector recorded the first information, investigated the matter and, upon completing the investigation, submitted a regular written charge-sheet containing the prosecution details. The court concluded that this constituted a written report by a public servant and therefore there was sufficient compliance with Rule 130(1).
On Section 162 CrPC (which restricts use of statements made to police in certain ways): the court observed that during cross-examination the accused had elicited from prosecution witnesses that they had not named the accused during investigation. The Sub-Inspector's testimony (presumably based on the case diary) indicated the contrary. The court held that the contention that Section 162 was contravened was not well-founded in fact or law. The court explained that any discrepancy was for the court of fact to weigh; the appellate court's decision to give less weight to the discrepancy did not justify interference in revision once the court of fact had considered the whole record and concluded the petitioner was the seller.
On the identity of the firm: the court held that which firm owned the sugar was immaterial. The relevant question was whether the petitioner sold the sugar at a price higher than law permitted. Both courts below had strongly found that the petitioner had sold at the prohibited price. Given that finding, the court found no merit in the submission about firm identity.

The court repeatedly emphasized that the assessment of evidentiary weight and resolution of contradictions lay with the court of fact and that this revisional court would not disturb the factual findings reached after consideration of the complete record.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED.

Holding: The court dismissed the petitioner's revision application and thereby left intact the conviction and the sentence as modified by the Sessions Judge (conviction affirmed; sentence reduced to a fine of Rs. 200 and, in default of payment, rigorous imprisonment for six months).

Implications: The direct effect is that the appellate order of the Sessions Judge stands and the petitioner's attempt to set aside conviction on the grounds raised in revision fails. The opinion does not announce or establish any novel legal principle beyond applying the cited rules and established roles of courts of fact; no new precedent was set in this opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner in this case was convicted by a Magistrate of the first class of Chaibassa under R. 81(4), Defence of India Rules and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 and in default to rigorous imprisonment for six months. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge of Manbhum Singhbhum affirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to one of fine of Rs. 200 only and in default of payment of the fine rigorous imprisonment for six months. Hence this application in revision. The prosecution story shortly stated is that on 15th December 1942, the petitioner sold sugar to P.W 1 Hashim at the rate of Rs. 23 per maund though the controlled price was only Rs. 14-4-0 per maund and thereby contravened R. 81(2)(b), Defence of India Rules. P.W 1 had at once reported the matter to the Sub-Inspector of police at Chakradharpur where the purchase had been effected and the Sub-Inspector after recording the first information appears to have investigated the case at once with the result that after recording the evidence of the first informant and several other persons who had figured as eye-witnesses to the transaction submitted charge-sheet against the accused under R. 81(4), Defence of India Rules.

2. The defence, on the other hand, was that the petitioner had not sold the sugar in question at all and that as a matter of fact the sale had been effected by the firm called Padam Sukh Chogalal and in support of the defence version the accused examined an employee of the firm as also adduced in evidence certain documents in the shape of counterfoils and entries in the rokar of the firm. In this Court three points have been argued on behalf of the petitioner, namely, (1) that there has been no compliance with the mandatory provisions of R. 130(1), Defence of India Rules; (2) that the provisions of Section 162 of the Cr PC, have been contravened; and (8) that there is a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the firm with which the dealing in sugar took place. As to the first submission, in my opinion, there is no substance. The relevant rule, namely, 130(1), Defence of India Eules provides:

“No Court or tribunal shall take cognizance of any alleged contravention of these rules, except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such contravention made by a public servant.”

3. In this case after the Sub-Inspector of police had recorded the first information alleged by the purchaser of sugar, he made his own investigation into the truth of the allegations made therein. After completing his investigation he submitted a regular written charge-sheet giving all the details for the prosecution of the petitioner.

4. Hence there was a report in writing of a public servant upon which the petitioner was prosecuted. Hence, in my opinion there has been a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the rule in question. On the second question, my attention has been drawn to the evidence in cross-examination of P.Ws 2 and 3 whose evidence has been used as corroborative of the prosecution case as lodged by the first informant. In the course of the cross-examination it was suggested to these witnesses that as a matter of fact they had not named the petitioner to the investigating officer though the latter deposed in Court (presumably on the basis of the entries in the case diary) that these witnesses had actually named the petitioner to the Sub-Inspector of police. It is argued that the learned Sessions Judge has used the police diary, or the statement of the Sub-Inspector based as it is on the police diary, in complete disregard of the provisions of Section 162 of the Cr PC. In my opinion this contention is not well-founded either in fact or in law. It was the accused who brought it out during the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses that they had not named the accused during the investigation. That statement they wanted to use in their favour at the trial. It may be that the lower appellate Court has not given as much weight to this discrepancy as the appellant before the lower appellate Court would have wished that Court to do, but that is a matter for the Court of fact to decide and if the final Court of fact has come to the conclusion on a consideration of the entire evidence in the record that it was the petitioner who really had sold the sugar in question to the first informant, this Court cannot interfere in revision with that finding.

5. As regards the third submission, it is enough to gay that the question as to which firm it was to which the sugar belonged is wholly immaterial. The only question with which the Court had to deal was whether or not the petitioner had sold the sugar at a price higher than that he could legally have charged. The finding of both the Courts is very strong on that point namely that it was the petitioner who sold the sugar at a price which he was not entitled to charge under the law. That being the position, in my opinion, there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed.

R.K

6. Application dismissed.