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Forbes v. Peterson
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Adelaide Elizabeth Forbes (the deceased) made a will dated 23 January 1938, disposing her estate in three equal parts among her three children: Oswald Vernon Forbes (the applicant), Mrs. Violet Geraldine Peterson, and Mrs. Esme Earle (with remainder to her children). It is alleged that on 1 June 1939 the deceased executed a codicil which (a) removed Mrs. Peterson as an executor and substituted F. O. O'Neill, and (b) altered the distributive shares (reducing Mrs. Peterson's share from one-third to one-sixth and increasing Oswald Forbes's share from one-third to one-half).
The will and the codicil came into the hands of Oswald Forbes. Affidavits verifying the will and the codicil were sworn before officers of the Chief Court of Oudh in June 1939. Mrs. Peterson applied to the Chief Court of Oudh (Lucknow) for probate of the will on 11 July 1939 and sought production of the will and codicil; citations issued under s.207(1) and s.276 of the Indian Succession Act. Mrs. Peterson also filed a caveat in the Calcutta High Court on 26 July 1939 before proceedings for probate commenced there.
Oswald Forbes applied for probate in the Calcutta High Court (application handed in on 28 July, filed 3 August 1939). Proceedings then ran concurrently: probate proceedings were conducted in the Chief Court of Oudh and in the Calcutta High Court. In the Oudh Court trial, evidence was called and on 30 November 1939 Yorke J. granted probate of the will to Mrs. Peterson "with effect throughout British India", holding that the caveator (Mr. O'Neill) had failed to prove the codicil. An appeal to a Bench of the Chief Court of Oudh by Mr. O'Neill was dismissed on 8 April 1940 (the Bench observed that the original will and codicil had been brought to the Oudh Court and Mr. O'Neill was present).
Mrs. Peterson applied in the Calcutta High Court to have an issue tried preliminarily as to maintainability in view of the Oudh proceedings; Ameer Ali J. stayed the Calcutta application by Oswald Forbes sine die, with liberty to bring it on if the Oudh probate was revoked. There was also an interim restraining order (until 1 July 1940) restraining distribution by the Oudh grantees in a manner that would adversely affect persons having rights under the codicil. Oswald Forbes appealed Ameer Ali J.'s order; the appeal is the subject of the present opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Calcutta High Court should proceed with an application for probate (including the codicil) when the Chief Court of Oudh has already granted probate of the will and that grant has been affirmed on appeal.
- Whether, and to what extent, the Calcutta High Court must exercise the discretion conferred by s.271 of the Indian Succession Act to refuse probate applications that could be more justly or conveniently disposed of in another district.
- Whether a party who was cognizant of probate proceedings in another competent court (here, Mr. Forbes and his agent/counsel) and who stood aside is precluded (by estoppel, res judicata or analogous principles) from seeking a conflicting grant in this Court.
- How principles of inter-court comity (avoiding conflicting concurrent jurisdictions) apply where two competent tribunals might make contradictory grants of probate over the same testamentary documents and estate.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant (Oswald Vernon Forbes)
- Mr. Forbes contended that the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction under s.270 of the Indian Succession Act because part of the deceased's property (money and shares) was in Calcutta, and therefore the Court must hear and determine his application for grant of probate (including the codicil), even if that resulted in a conflict with the Oudh Chief Court's grant.
- Implicitly, Mr. Forbes relied on his right to pursue probate in Calcutta for assets located there and argued the Calcutta proceedings should continue notwithstanding the Oudh Court's action.
Respondent / Other interests (Mrs. Violet Geraldine Peterson and Mr. F. O. O'Neill as caveator)
- Mrs. Peterson sought recognition and enforcement of the Oudh Chief Court's grant of probate and maintained that the Oudh proceedings were the more natural and convenient forum (the deceased resided at Lucknow, most immoveable and movable property was in Oudh).
- Relying on the fact that the Oudh Chief Court had already tried and finally determined the matter (including an appeal), Mrs. Peterson contended the Calcutta Court ought to defer, observing comity and avoiding conflicting grants that would frustrate the testatrix's intentions.
- Mr. O'Neill (the caveator) had participated in the Oudh proceedings and propounded the codicil there but failed to prove it; he was present and cited in the Oudh Court and his appeal to the Oudh Bench was dismissed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dwijendra Nath Sarma Purkayastha…Petitioner, v. Goloke Nath Sarma Purkayastha…Objector | If a party is cognizant of probate proceedings and chooses to stand by and allow them to be concluded in his absence, he will not be allowed subsequently to reopen or have the grant revoked. | Quoted and applied as authority for the proposition that Mr. Forbes and Mr. O'Neill, having been cited or otherwise cognizant of the Oudh proceedings and given opportunity, cannot now successfully seek to reopen the matter in Calcutta so as to create conflicting grants. |
| Jopson v. James | Principles of comity between concurrent jurisdictions: consider priority in time and the extent of relief obtainable; avoid real or apparent conflicts between equally competent tribunals. | Used to support the Court's reliance on comity — that the Oudh Chief Court (being the more natural and convenient forum and earlier in time) ought to be respected and the Calcutta Court should avoid producing conflicting grants. |
| In the goods of Lucy C. Miller, deceased | Practice of the Probate Court requiring that codicils be proved in the Court from which probate of the will has been obtained (i.e., codicils to be proved where the will's probate issued). | Treated as persuasive guidance: the Court noted the English practice as a useful guide (though not binding) in deciding it was inappropriate for Calcutta to proceed while the Oudh Court's grant stood. |
| Kurrutulain Bahadur v. Nuzbat-ud-Dowla Abbas Hossein Khan (observations of Sir Arthur Wilson) | Referenced as authority relied upon in other cases regarding probate law of India (the opinion notes that Sir Arthur Wilson's observations are frequently relied on when seeking exceptional propositions of probate law). | Mentioned in the context of other authorities; the court observed that appellant did not dispute the correctness of the Dwijendra Nath statement of law despite reliance on Sir Arthur Wilson's observations in related cases. |
| Ramanandi Kuer v. Kalawati Kuer | Referenced as a case in which earlier observations (including those of Sir Arthur Wilson) were repeated or considered on probate law. | Mentioned as part of the authorities discussed by the concurring judge (Panckridge, J.) when addressing the appellant's reliance on previous observations; used to situate the Dwijendra Nath principle within the wider jurisprudential context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a stepwise analysis anchored in statutory discretion, the facts of prior adjudication in the Oudh Chief Court, and principles of inter-court comity:
- Jurisdictional facts and priority: the deceased resided at Lucknow (Oudh Province); 8/9ths of the estate was in Oudh, 1/9th in Calcutta. Proceedings in the Oudh Court were the first instituted and had been finally determined there (probate granted by Yorke J. and confirmed on appeal).
- Statutory discretion under s.271 of the Indian Succession Act: the Court emphasized that when an application for probate is made in a district where the deceased had no fixed abode, the Court has discretion to refuse the application if the matter can be more justly or conveniently disposed of elsewhere. The Calcutta High Court also possesses that discretion and may exercise it in the present circumstances.
- Effect of the Oudh Chief Court's grant: the Court concluded the Oudh Chief Court was a "High Court" within the meaning of s.273 (and relevant statutes), and its grant of probate "with effect throughout British India" stands until revoked by that Court or the Privy Council; it is not for the Calcutta Court to set aside that grant.
- Doctrine precluding re-opening: reliance was placed on the Dwijendra Nath line of authority to the effect that a party who was cognizant of probate proceedings and allowed them to be concluded in his absence cannot thereafter reopen them. The Court observed that both Mr. Forbes and Mr. O'Neill had been cited or otherwise aware of the Oudh proceedings and had opportunities to participate; Mr. Forbes in particular was represented and financed activity in Oudh but was not a formal party.
- Comity and avoidance of conflict: drawing on Jopson v. James and English practice, the Court stressed the importance of avoiding any real or apparent conflict between two competent tribunals. Given the priority in time, the locus of the deceased's residence and bulk of the assets in Oudh, and the finality of the Oudh determinations so far as they could be determined without Mr. Forbes' cooperation, the Oudh Court was the more appropriate forum.
- Guidance from English probate practice: the Court cited the practice (In the goods of Lucy C. Miller) that codicils are to be proved in the Court that granted probate of the will as a persuasive guide reinforcing the conclusion that Calcutta should not proceed to produce a conflicting grant while the Oudh grant stands.
- Final application of discretion: for these reasons the Court held that Ameer Ali J. properly exercised the discretion available under the Succession Act and observed comity in staying the Calcutta application sine die, subject to liberty to proceed if the Oudh grant were revoked.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The order of Ameer Ali J. staying the Calcutta proceedings sine die (with liberty to bring them on if the Oudh probate is revoked) and the interim restraint were upheld. Costs were awarded against Mr. O. V. Forbes personally. The decree dismissing the appeal was certified for two counsel.
Implications (direct effects stated in the opinion)
- The Oudh Chief Court's grant of probate in favour of Mrs. Peterson stands until revoked or annulled by that Court or the Privy Council; the Calcutta High Court will not proceed with a conflicting grant while the Oudh grant remains in force.
- Mr. Forbes (and Mr. O'Neill insofar as he was cited and appeared) face the consequence that a party cognizant of prior probate proceedings who allows them to conclude may be precluded from obtaining a later, conflicting grant in another competent forum.
- The Court emphasised the exercise of statutory discretion (s.271) and the principle of comity between courts to avoid the absurdity and frustration of a testatrix's intentions that would follow from conflicting grants of probate.
No statement in this summary invents facts beyond those expressly contained in the provided opinion.
Derbyshire, C.J:— This is an appeal from an order of Ameer Ali J. dated June 21, 1940, whereby he stayed an application by Oswald Vernon Forbes made to this Court for the grant to him of probate of the will of his mother, Adelaide Elizabeth Forbes, and a codicil alleged to have been made with reference to the will. The order was as follows:—
The application is stayed sine die with liberty to bring it on upon notice to the other parties in the event of the probate granted by the Lucknow Court being hereafter revoked.
There was also an interim order restraining the executor and executrix of the said will—of which probate had been granted by the Oudh Chief Court at Lucknow—from distributing the estate in such a manner that persons having rights under the codicil may be adversely affected. The interim order restraining distribution was stated to hold good until July 1, 1940.
The facts leading up to this application are as follows:—
The deceased Adelaide Elizabeth Forbes was a widow, who died at Dehra Dun in the United Provinces whilst on her way to Mussoorie on June 6, 1939. She had resided for some time previous to her death at “Dilkusha House”, Lucknow, in the province of Oudh and had immoveable property in the province of Oudh and moveable property consisting mainly of money and shares in companies. Altogether the property was stated to be valued at about nine lakhs of rupees, eight lakhs of this was situate in the province of Oudh and about one lakh, consisting of money and shares in companies, was held by the deceased's banks or other agents in Calcutta.
The deceased had three children, namely, Oswald Vernon Forbes, the present applicant, Mrs. Violet Geraldine Peterson, a married daughter, and Mrs. Esme Earle, another married daughter.
The deceased made a will on January 23, 1938, whereby she devised and bequeathed one-third of her estate to the applicant Oswald Vernon Forbes, one-third of her estate to Mrs. Violet Geraldine Peterson, and the other one-third to her other daughter Mrs. Esme Earle for life with the remainder to her children. The applicant and Mrs. Peterson were named as executors in that will.
It is alleged that on June 1, 1939, that is five days before her death, the deceased executed a codicil to the said will whereby Mrs. Peterson was removed from the office of executor under the will and Mr. F.O O'Neill—a barrister substituted in her place. The codicil also purported to reduce Mrs. Peterson's share from one-third to one-sixth and increase the share of Oswald Vernon Forbes, the applicant, from one-third to one-half.
On June 23, 1939, Mr. Stewart, an official of the Imperial Bank at Lucknow who was a witness to the will, swore an affidavit before the Commissioner of Affidavits, Chief Court of Oudh, verifying the will and stating that he saw the testatrix sign it. On June 27, 1939, Murli Dhar Raumiar and N.N Shivpuri, who were witnesses to the codicil, swore affidavits before the Deputy Registrar of the Chief Court of Oudh stating that they saw the deceased sign the codicil.
We are told that the will and codicil had both come into the hands of Oswald Forbes and that, the codicil was “produced” by him on July 4, 1939.
On July 11, 1939, Mrs. Peterson applied to the Chief Court of Oudh at Lucknow for grant of probate of the will and on July 12 she asked for a summons against Oswald Forbes and Mr. O'Neill for production of the will and codicil. On the same date, namely July 12, upon an application by Mrs. Peterson in the Oudh Court under s. 276 of the Indian Succession Act the following order was made:—
Let citations issue to Messrs O.V Forbes and F.O O'Neill, Munshi S. Aziz-un-Nabi and B. Shayama Charan. As it is said that the original will and codicil are in the possession of Mr. Forbes or Mr. O'Neill, it is ordered under s. 207(1) of the Indian Succession Act that these gentlemen be required to produce the said will and codicil. Let the citation to Mr. Forbes issue immediately.
The summons was served on Mr. O'Neill, who wrote on the back of it—
The two documents noted overleaf, viz., the will of Mrs. A.E Forbes dated January 23, 1938 and the codicil executed by Mrs. A.E Forbes, dated June 1, 1939, were handed over to Mr. O.V Forbes many days ago for transmission to Calcutta and are not now in my possession….
On the back of the summons was also written—
I regret that I am unable to produce either the will or the codicil noted overleaf as neither document is now in my possession.
Both documents are in Calcutta in connection with my application for probate made in Calcutta.
O.V Forbes, July 17, 1939.
On July 25, 1939, Mrs. Peterson applied at Lucknow for the case to be proceeded with and for the issue of citations on Oswald Forbes and Mr. O'Neill, and the Oudh Court ordered: “Let citations issue as ordered before.”
On July 26, Mrs. Peterson filed a caveat in the Calcutta High Court. It should be noted that at that time no proceedings had been started in the Calcutta High Court in respect of the probate.
On August 3, Oswald Forbes applied in the Calcutta High Court for grant of probate of the will and codicil; from a stamp on the face of the application it appears that it was handed in to the Court on July 28.
On August 9, Mrs. Peterson's attorneys filed an affidavit in the Calcutta High Court in support of the caveat.
On August 12, Mrs. Peterson took out a summons in the Calcutta High Court for stay of the High Court's proceedings in respect of the probate.
On August 23, Oswald Forbes took out a summons to have the matter set down as a contentious Cause and on August 29, 1939, the High Court set down the matter as a contentious cause.
On August 30, 1939, Mrs. Peterson made an application before Panckridge, J. in the Calcutta High Court to stay the Calcutta proceedings under s. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also on the ground that the application of Mr. Forbes for, probate did not comply with the requirements of s. 279(1) of the Indian Succession Act in that it did not state that (to the best of his belief) no application had been made to any other Court for probate of the same will.
Panckridge, J. dismissed the application for stay with the result that probate proceedings in the Calcutta High Court went on. There were thus on August 30 two sets of proceedings for probate going on at the same time, namely, (a) in the Oudh Court for probate of the will and (b) in the Calcutta High Court for probate of the will and codicil.
On September 26, Oswald Forbes signed a vakâlâtnâmâ in favour of a Mr. Walford who is a barrister, practising in the Oudh Court. In that vakâlâtnâmâ Oswald Forbes appointed Mr. Walford as his vakil in the Oudh Court probate proceedings and stated that as regards the acts done by Mr. Walford “all these when done and performed by him shall be acceptable or admissible to me as acts done by me personally.”
On the same date, namely September 26, Mrs. Peterson made an application to the Oudh Court for the appointment of a receiver; this was opposed by Mr. Forbes and Mr. O'Neill who applied for a stay of the Oudh Court's proceedings under s. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Oudh Court made no order on the application for the appointment of a receiver but fixed an early date for the hearing of the probate proceedings.
On October 13, in further proceedings at the Oudh Court Mr. Stewart, who had previously sworn an affidavit in support of the will, gave verbal evidence in Court stating that he witnessed the signature of the deceased on the will dated January 23, 1938. Counsel for the caveator (Mr. O'Neill) stated that he was not prepared to cross-examine the witness at that stage.
On the same date, namely October 13, Mr. O'Neill gave evidence in the Oudh Court stating that he signed a caveat dated October 13, 1939, in respect of the will and that he intended to oppose the application for probate and on that account had filed the caveat. He admitted the genuineness of the will but stated “I propound the codicil in opposition to the will.”
It must be noted that Mr. O.V Forbes has never been a formal part to the proceedings at the Oudh Court.
On October, 18, the Oudh Court framed this issue—“Was the codicil dated. June 1, 1939— “propounded by the caveator—executed by Mrs. A.E Forbes whilst of a sound disposing mind?”
On November 20, 1939, Mr. O'Neill signed a vakâlâtnâmâ in favour of Mr. Walford and on the back of the vahâlâtnâmâ was this endorsement:—
All fees to be paid by Mr. O.V Forbes and not by me.
I agree to this.
F. Owen O'Neill.O.V Forbes,
20-11-1939.November 28, 1939.
On November 24, Mr. Walford applied to the Oudh Court for an adjournment to enable him to produce his evidence and the learned Judge appointed November 30 as the day for the hearing of the matter stating—
I shall be sitting alone on Thursday next, November 30. The caveator must be ready with his evidence and the documents which he wishes to prove on that date. Mr. Walford draws my attention to the difficulty of getting the documents in question from the Calcutta High Court. The office will furnish Mr. Walford with any letter that he requires.
On November 27, 1939, Mr. Walford handed in a note to the Oudh Court stating that Mr. O.V Forbes had assured him that the money for procuring the attendance of witnesses from Calcutta would be sent to them.
On November 30, Mr. Walford applied to the Oudh Court for the attendance of the two witnesses to the codicil—Raumiar and Shivpuri.
On November 30, 1939, Yorke J. of the Oudh Court granted probate of the will dated January 23, 1938, to Mrs. Peterson “with effect throughout British India” and in the course of his order he said—
As the caveator has failed to produce his evidence and there is no evidence before me which affords any support to the grounds for the refusal of grant of probate set forth in the caveat and affidavit, I must hold that the caveator has failed to satisfy the Court that the codicil said to be dated June 1, 1939, propounded by the caveator was executed by Mrs. A.E Forbes while of a sound disposing mind. The caveator has in fact failed to prove the codicil at all, and there is nothing before the Court except the original will which, it is common ground between the parties, was duly executed by the late Mrs. Forbes.
On April 8, 1940, there was an appeal to a Bench of the Chief Court of Oudh by Mr. O'Neill against the grant of probate of the will and that appeal was dismissed. In the course of the judgment the learned Judges said:—
We may mention that on October 13, 1939, Mr. L.C Bose, Superintendent, Testamentary Department, Calcutta High Court, brought the original will and codicil to this Court and Mr. O'Neill was present in Court and his statement was recorded on oath on that date. If he wanted to prove the codicil, it could have been detained.
On April 30, 1940, Mrs. Peterson applied to the Calcutta High Court for an order that the issue relating to the maintainability of the present suit in this Court in view of the proceedings and judgment of the Chief Court of Oudh be tried as a preliminary issue before any other issues are tried in the case. That application was opposed by Mr. Forbes who is the only person that has applied for the grant of probate of the will and codicil in the Calcutta High Court and Ameer Ali, J. made the order which is now appealed against.
The present position is that probate of the will of Mrs. Forbes has been granted to Mrs. Peterson in the Oudh Chief Court by a Judge thereof and that grant has been confirmed by a Bench of that Court on appeal; Mr. O'Neill was a party to those proceedings and further was cited there and was present. He is clearly bound by the grant made by the Oudh Chief Court.
Mr. O.V Forbes was not a party to the Oudh Court proceedings, but was undoubtedly taking an interest in them as he was represented by his counsel and was financing Mr. O'Neill in his activities there. Moreover, he was cited like Mr. O'Neill and has acknowledged in an affidavit in these proceedings that he received the citations.
We have not before us the citations to either Mr. Forbes or Mr. O'Neill, but one form of citation is mentioned in the Succession Act, viz., “to come and see the proceedings before the grant of probate” [section 283, sub-sec. (1)(c)]. The effect of the citation is set by Mookerjee and Beachcroft JJ. in Dwijendra Nath Sarma Purkayastha…Petitioner, v. Goloke Nath Sarma Purkayastha…Objector, .:—
It need not be disputed that if a party is cognizant of the proceedings for probate or letters of administration and chooses to stand by and allow the proceedings to be concluded in his absence, he will not be allowed to come in afterwards and have the grant revoked or the proceedings reopened.
Both Mr. Forbes and Mr. O'Neill will have to face that doctrine if they go again to the Oudh Chief Court and ask for a grant of probate in respect of the will and the codicil; but the consequence of their application to that Court I leave to that Court if such an application is made.
The question is: should Mr. Forbes under the citation as related above be allowed to make a similar application to this Court? If this Court should go further with the present application and it is decided in Mr. Forbes' favour it would mean that a grant of probate of the will and the codicil might be made to Mr. Forbes. There would then be probate in the. Oudh Court of the will in favour of Mrs. Peterson and probate in this Court of the will and codicil to Mr. Forbes: in that event Mrs. Peterson could not safely execute the testatrix's will as authorised by the Oudh Court, nor could Mr. Forbes as authorised by this Court; so that the testatrix's will whether expressed in the will alone or in the will read with the codicil might never be executed. That would frustrate the testatrix's intention; it would be an absurd position.
Mr. Forbes says that whatever the consequences, he is in law entitled to go on, since the deceased left property in the jurisdiction of this Court and we have under s. 270 of the Succession Act jurisdiction to grant probate, and that we must hear and determine this application for grant of probate, whether it results in an impasse or a conflict between this Court and the Chief Court of Oudh.
I am satisfied that the Oudh Chief Court is a High Court within the meaning of s. 273 of the Succession Act [see the General Clauses Act, 1897, s. 3(24) and the Oudh Courts Act, 1925] and had jurisdiction to grant probate of this will “with effect throughout British India.” That grant can in my view only be revoked or annulled by the Oudh Chief Court or the Privy Council, and until so revoked or annulled it stands good.
I also think that since part of the property of the deceased is lying in Calcutta, the Calcutta High Court would have jurisdiction in a proper case to make a grant of probate of a testamentary document left by the deceased—see s. 270 of the Succession Act. Whether we are bound to exercise such jurisdiction in this case is another matter.
Section 271 of the Succession Act provides that—
When the application is made to the Judge of a district in which the deceased had no fixed abode at the time of his death, it shall be in the discretion of the Judge to refuse the application, if in his judgment it could be disposed of more justly or conveniently in another district…….
This Court has at least the discretion given by the Act to the Judge of a district. The deceased testatrix resided at Lucknow in the Oudh Province. It has never been suggested that she lived at any time in Calcutta.
It is contended that Panckridge, J. on August 30, 1939, exercised his discretion in this application and permitted it to go on, and that it must go on. What Panckridge, J. did was to exercise his discretion on the facts as they existed on August 30. At that time both sets of proceedings—those in the Oudh Court and those in the Calcutta High Court—were proceeding and nothing had been Anally determined in either.
I cannot agree that this Court is deprived of its discretion under s. 271 because Panckridge, J. exercised it on August 30, 1939, so as to permit the Calcutta proceedings to go on. In my view that discretion is exercisable by the Court whenever the Court is placed in the position of having to decide what order is to be made upon the application for probate of the will and codicil. Certainly no Judge would exercise it to the contrary effect whilst the facts remained the same.
When Ameer Ali J. heard the application now in question the Oudh Chief Court had granted probate of the will to Mrs. Peterson and an appellate bench of that Court had confirmed the grant, after giving Mr. Forbes full opportunity to see and hear the proceedings and propound the codicil—which he failed to do.
I am not sure, that Mr. Forbes after his citation and consequent behaviour in the Oudh Court is not estopped in this Court from proceeding further; but I will deal with the matter on broader grounds. At present there is every prospect of a conflict between the Oudh Court, which is indubitably seised of the matter, and this Court.
In the case of Jopson v. James, there were simultaneous proceedings in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia and in the Chancery Court of the Palatine of Lancashire for the winding up of a partnership arranged in England to work mines in Nova Scotia. The Palatine Court restrained the plaintiff in the Nova Scotia proceedings from prosecuting those proceedings and that plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal in England against that injunction. The Court of Appeal dissolved the injunction and in doing so discussed the comity of Courts in such circumstances. Farwell L.J at pp. 828 and 829 said:—
The existence of concurrent jurisdiction render very necessary the observance of a comity between those jurisdiction the disregard of which would lead to most unfortunate friction. Two points appear to me to be usual in considering whether the Court should have regard and defer to a jurisdiction with which it may come into conflict or whether the Court can fairly expect that other jurisdiction to defer to it. One is priority in time, and the other is the extent of the relief asked for or obtainable in the other jurisdiction.
Kennedy L.J said at p. 829:—
In my opinion, it is very important for the public weal to avoid, wherever it is possible to avoid, any real, and even any apparent conflict of jurisdiction between two Equally competent tribunals.
And later—
In this case, apart from the inconvenience, I myself attach great value to a perfect exercise of comity in these matters…………………and speaking with great respect, I regret that the Vice-Chancellor thought it right to allow any proceedings to go on in his own Court, and more than that at a certain stage grant an injunction against the plaintiff in the Colonial Court, to restrain him from pursuing that which was the more natural and at least equally convenient Court.
In the present proceedings the Oudh Chief Court was the more natural and more convenient Court. The deceased never lived in Calcutta but lived and died in the jurisdiction of the Oudh Court; all her immoveable property and 8/9ths of her moveable property was in that Court's jurisdiction; the other. 1/9th was in Calcutta but could be transferred from Calcutta to Lucknow with very little effort and trouble. Again the Oudh Court proceedings were the first to be started and they have been finally determined as far as it was possible to determine them finally without Mr. Forbes' assistance—which he deliberately withheld.
By s. 2(b) of the Succession Act a “codicil” is “an instrument made in relation to a will, and explaining, altering or adding to its dispositions and shall be deemed to form fart of the will.” Probate of this will has been granted by the Oudh Court.
In the case of In the goods of Lucy C. Miller, deceased, Sir James Hannen, the President of the Probate Court in England, dismissed an application to prove in London the codicil to a will made in Antigua by a lady who had a house in Antigua and one in England in these words:—
It is the practice of this Court to require that codicils must be proved in the Court from which the probate of the will has been obtained. I must therefore refuse this motion, and leave the applicant to obtain probate of the codicil at Antigua.
This decision may not bind this Court which has to administer probate matters in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Statute law, but it is a good guide.
Mr. Forbes could have obtained all the relief he was entitled to in the Oudh Court, but deliberately neglected to pursue his claim there. He may so far as this Court is concerned again apply to the Oudh Court: whether he is successful is a matter for the Oudh Court.
I am satisfied that Ameer Ali J., exercising the, discretion which he has under the Succession Act, and also exercising his right to observe the comity of Courts, was correct in making the order appealed from.
This appeal must be dismissed with costs against Mr. O.V Forbes personally.
Certified for two Counsel.
Panckridge, J.:— I concur in the decree to be made dismissing the appeal.
In my opinion the learned Judge would have been fully entitled to answer the issue “Are these proceedings barred by res judicata or principles analogous thereto?” in the affirmative, and thereupon to dismiss the petition for probate of the will and codicil.
Indeed I think this would have been the more logical course, in view of the opinion expressed by him that the probate granted by the Chief Court was unrevoked, and, as far as the appellant was concerned, was unrevocable.
When it is sought to justify some more than usually astonishing proposition with regard to the probate law of India, the observations of Sir Arthur Wilson in Kurrutulain Bahadur v. Nuzbat-ud-Dowla Abbas Hossein Khan, repeated in Ramanandi Kuer v. Kalawati Kuer, are relied on. But when I asked Mr. S.M Bose for the appellant whether he contended that in view of the latter case the statement of the law in Dwijendra Nath Sarma Purkayastha…Petitioner, v. Goloke Nath Sarma Purkayastha…Objector, . must be considered as incorrect, he replied that such was not his contention. In that case the Court stated:—
It need not be disputed that if a party is cognizant of the proceedings for probate or letters of administration and chooses to stand by and allow the proceedings to be concluded in his absence he will not be allowed to come in afterwards and have the grant revoked or the proceedings re-opened. This principle has been repeatedly recognised in this Court.
The learned Judges also expressed the opinion that this is in accord with the rule followed in England.
I see no reason to doubt that in a case like the present one, when the situation is not complicated by the existence, of an infant or of a pardânashin beneficiary, the law in India is substantially the same on this point as in England. The latter is thus summarized in Tristram and Coote's Probate Practice, 18th Edn., 397:—
With these exceptions (the existence of a latter will and fraud), probate in solemn form cannot be impeached by any person who has been a party to the action whether as plaintiff, defendant, intervener, or party cited, or who has been privy thereto. And it is to be observed that a person having an interest need not be a party to a probate action to be bound by its result. If he was cognizant of it and was content to stand aside while others contested the action he is precluded from reopening the case.
Further, although I should hold that the Chief Court of Oudh is a High Court for the purposes of the Succession Act, and that “civil proceedings” in s. 3(24) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, is used in contradistinction to criminal proceedings, and includes testamentary proceedings, yet even if the Chief Court of Oudh be not a High Court, and if accordingly the grant of the Chief Court is not covered by the proviso to s. 273, in my opinion the grant of probate made by it is, until revoked or annulled, conclusive proof, certainly as against those cited if not against all the world, that the grantee has established his title as executor of the deceased's last will and testament. Where the Court granting the probate is not a High Court, the grant is not effective with respect to assets beyond the limits of the province in which the Court is situated; but this only means that with regard to other assets the grantee must apply to the appropriate Court for a grant of letters of administration with the will annexed, to which in my opinion he has an indisputable right.
It can never have been the intention of the legislature to sanction a system so productive of inconvenience and embarrassment as one under which competing grants are possible.
Appeal dismissed.
Attorneys for appellant: Victor Moses & Mehta.
Attorneys for respondent: Fowler & Co.
S.M
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