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Bank Of Bengal v. Sarat Chandra Mitra .
Digest of the Judgment (Atkinson, J. with Manuk, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
Sarat Chandra Mittra obtained a decree for Rs. 2,000 against Raghunath Prasad. The decree-holder sought to execute that decree by attaching property alleged to belong to Raghunath Prasad which was then in the custody of the Bank of Bengal.
In 1910 Raghunath Prasad entered the service of the Bank of Bengal as Treasurer at the Patna Branch. As a condition of employment he executed a security/fidelity bond dated 23rd May, 1910, and deposited (a) Government promissory notes amounting to Rs. 20,000 as cash security and (b) a mortgage-deed on immovable property (Arrah) for Rs. 30,000.
The Bank alleged that Raghunath Prasad had been guilty of default/dereliction of duty, causing loss to the Bank, and relied on clauses 8 and 9 of the bond to realise the securities and to retain interest as collateral. The judgment-creditor, Sarat Chandra Mittra, applied to the First Subordinate Judge of Patna to attach the Rs. 20,000 Government promissory notes and the interest that had accrued in the Bank's hands.
The Subordinate Judge held that the Government promissory notes and the accrued interest were attachable but subject to the Bank's lien; however, by precepts/orders dated 8th June and 16th July, 1917 the Subordinate Judge also prohibited the Bank from disposing of the securities and interest. The Bank of Bengal sought revision of those orders before the court that produced this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the First Subordinate Judge of Patna had jurisdiction to attach securities (Government promissory notes and accrued interest) that were in the custody of the Bank of Bengal whose head office was at Calcutta but which carried on banking business at Patna.
- Whether the Government promissory notes and the interest accrued thereon were attachable in execution of the decree, and if so, whether they were attachable subject to the Bank's lien under clauses 8 and 9 of the security bond dated 23rd May, 1910.
- Whether the Subordinate Judge's precepts/orders (8th June and 16th July, 1917) that restrained the Bank from realising or disposing of the securities and interest were valid or whether they unlawfully fettered the Bank's right to enforce its lien.
Arguments of the Parties
Bank of Bengal (applicant in revision)
- The Bank contended that the property sought to be attached was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna Subordinate Court (because the promissory notes were kept at the Bank's head office in Calcutta) and therefore not subject to attachment by that Court.
- The Bank argued it was an excess of jurisdiction for the Patna Subordinate Court to attempt to attach property in the hands of a person (or office) not permanently residing or amenable to the jurisdiction of that Court.
- Counsel for the Bank (Mr. Hasan Imam) argued earlier that clause 9 required interest installments to be claimed in Calcutta (i.e., that Raghunath Prasad would have to go to Calcutta to obtain interest payments), thereby supporting the view that obligations and property were to be treated as situated outside Patna.
Sarat Chandra Mittra (judgment-creditor/applicant in execution)
- Sarat Chandra Mittra sought to attach (a) the Rs. 20,000 Government promissory notes deposited by Raghunath Prasad with the Bank and (b) the interest which had accrued and was then in the Bank's hands, to satisfy his decree.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Begg, Dunlop & Co. v. Jagannath (Calcutta High Court) | The test whether an executing Court can attach property in the hands of a third party: ask whether the judgment-debtor, as creditor, could have sued the garnishee in the Court where execution is sought. | The court applied this test and distinguished the earlier case (where the garnishee was a firm doing business only in Calcutta) from the present case (a bank with a branch and business in Patna). The court concluded that because the Bank of Bengal carried on business at Patna and the judgment-debtor could have sued the Bank in Patna, the securities were constructively within Patna's jurisdiction and attachable subject to the Bank's lien. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by stating the general territorial principle: a court's power to enforce its decrees is limited by its territorial jurisdiction. Ordinarily, property genuinely outside the executing Court's jurisdiction and in the hands of a third party not amenable to that Court cannot be attached without transferring the decree to the jurisdiction where the property is located. Two factual conditions make that rule applicable: (1) the property is bona fide outside the original Court's jurisdiction and (2) the property is in the hands of a third party not residing or amenable to the executing Court.
The court noted exceptions: fraudulent removal of property to defeat execution (which would allow proceedings to recover the property) and certain mortgage-decree related sales of land where some mortgaged property remains within the original jurisdiction.
Applying precedent (Begg, Dunlop & Co. v. Jagannath), the court adopted the test whether the judgment-debtor could have sued the garnishee in the executing Court. The court held that a corporation such as a bank "resides" wherever it carries on its business and may be sued in any jurisdiction where it carries on its business for causes of action arising there.
On the facts the Bank of Bengal maintained a local branch in Patna and the contract with Raghunath Prasad was concerned with his duties at the Patna Branch. Consequently, even though the physical custody of the Government promissory notes was at the Bank's head office in Calcutta, in law the Bank was resident and carrying on business within Patna's jurisdiction, and the securities were therefore constructively within Patna for attachment purposes.
Turning to clause 9 of the fidelity bond, the court analysed its ambiguity. Clause 9 gave the Bank power to suspend payment of interest in the event of loss caused by Raghunath Prasad's want of fidelity. The court reasoned that the purpose of permitting suspension would be frustrated unless the Bank could retain accumulated and accruing interest as collateral security for the main loss. The court therefore construed clause 9 as creating the Bank's right to retain interest accumulated after suspension as collateral security, i.e., as part of the fund available to meet the Bank's loss.
Given the Bank's entitlement to a lien over both the principal securities and the accumulated interest, the court held that any attachment by the judgment-creditor must be subject to that lien: the creditor could only attach the residue remaining after the Bank's claim for loss had been satisfied.
Finally, the court found that the specific precept of 8th June and the order of 16th July, 1917, which prohibited the Bank from disposing of the securities or realising them to enforce its lien, went too far and unlawfully fettered the Bank's rights. Those orders therefore could not stand and were declared void/inoperative to the extent that they limited the Bank's enforcement of its lien.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The application in civil revision by the Bank of Bengal is dismissed.
The court's dispositive orders and immediate legal consequences (as explicitly stated in the opinion) are:
- The respective properties specified in clauses 8 and 9 of the fidelity bond (the Government promissory notes and the interest accruing thereon) are liable to attachment by the Court of the First Subordinate Judge of Patna, but such attachment is subject to the Bank of Bengal's general right of lien in respect of those properties.
- The precept dated 8th June, 1917 and the order dated 16th July, 1917 insofar as they purport to prohibit or restrain the Bank from asserting or exercising its general right of lien upon those securities are declared illegal, void, and without force and effect.
- The only property available for attachment by Sarat Chandra Mittra to satisfy his decree is the residue, if any, of the properties mentioned in clauses 8 and 9 after the Bank's claim (for loss or damage attributable to Raghunath Prasad) has been fully satisfied and discharged.
- The Bank of Bengal is ordered to pay the costs of the hearing of this revision application: five gold mohurs to the respondent.
The opinion confines its effect to the parties and the orders at issue: it affirms the Subordinate Judge's substantive conclusion (that the securities are attachable subject to the Bank's lien) but corrects the subordinate court's injunctive orders that unlawfully restrained the Bank's lien. The court did not purport to lay down a broader new precedent beyond applying established principles (territorial limits and the Begg test) to the facts.
Disposition: Application dismissed. Costs awarded against the Bank of Bengal (five gold mohurs).
Atkinson, J.:— This application comes before us in revision from an order made by the learned First Subordinate Judge of Patna, dated 1st June 1918. It is necessary to shortly set out the facts of the case before we consider the legal questions arising for our determination. One Sarat Chandra Mittra obtained a decree for Rs. 2,000 against Raghunath Prasad; and the decree-holder, Sarat Chandra Mittra, seeks now to attach certain property alleged to be the property of Raghunath Prasad in the hands of the Bank of Bengal.
2. In the year 1910 Raghunath Prasad was taken into the service of the Bank of Bengal as a Treasurer; his duties were restricted to acting as Treasurer in the Patna Branch of the Bank of Bengal. Prior to Raghunath Prasad's entry into the service of the Bank the Bank required that he should enter into a fidelity bond for the due and faithful performance of his duties and required security in cash for the sum of Rupees 20,000 and a mortgage on immovable property to the extent of Rupees 30,000. In pursuance of this arrangement Raghunath Prasad deposited with the Bank of Bengal Government promissory notes for the sum of Rupees 20,000 and a mortgage-deed on property situate at Arrah for Rs. 30,000. The terms of the contract made between the parties, that is to say, Raghunath Prasad on the one hand and the Bank of Bengal on the other, are embodied in the security bond, dated 23rd May, 1910.
3. The Bank of Bengal contend that Raghunath Prasad has not faithfully discharged his duties within the terms of the bond, and that he has been guilty of default and breach of duty and that he has involved the Bank in substantial loss and damage, and that they are therefore in the events that have happened, entitled under the provisions of cls. 8 and 9 of the bond itself to realise the security deposited with them to cover their loss and the they are also entitled to retain so much of the interest as has accrued thereon since suspension by way of collateral security, in the event of Government securities deposited with the Bank proving insufficient, to cover the Bank's total loss. The judgment-creditor, Sarat Chandra Mitra, in the suit in which he obtained his decree before the First Subordinate Judge of Patna, instituted an application seeking to attach in execution of his decree the Rs. 20,000 Government promissory notes deposited as security with the Bank; and also to attach so much of the interest as may have accrued on the Rs. 20,000 and now admittedly in the Bank's hands. The learned Subordinate Judge decided that the Government promissory notes lodged by Raghunath Prasad with the Bank were attachable sublet to the Bank's lien. He also held that the accrued interest in the hands of the Bank was attachable; and that interest did not form part of the Bank's security to cover any loss or damage that the Bank might have sustained owing to any default or breach of duty committed by Raghunath Prasad acting in his office as Treasurer of the Patna Branch of the Bank of Bengal. On the hearing of the aforesaid application for attachment the Bank of Bengal intervened, and they claimed before the learned Subordinate Judge that he had no jurisdiction whatsoever to attach the Government paper money in the custody of the Bank and deposited with them by way of security, nor was the learned Judge entitled to attach the interest in their hands which formed collateral security against any loss they might incur by reason of any defalcations on the part of Raghunath Prasad. The learned Judge decided against the contention of the Bank and held that the main security and the interest are liable to attachment; and I on 8th June the learned Judge issued a precept against the Bank which expressly prohibited the Bank from disposing of the interest accrued and in their hands, and from realizing the Government promissory notes deposited with the Bank by Raghunath Prasad. The Bank of Bengal was prohibited and restrained by a further order, dated 16th July, 1917 from parting with, or disposing of, the said property in their possession to any other person.
4. The contention of the Bank, as argued before us, is that the property sought to be attached is outside the jurisdiction of the Patna Subordinate Court; and, therefore, not subject to attachment; and further that it was an excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Patna Subordinate Court to seek to attach property in the hands of a party residing permanently beyond and without the jurisdiction of such Court; and that thus the First Subordinate Judge of Patna had no jurisdiction to attach either of the denominations of property in question.
5. Speaking generally, it is an accepted principle of international jurisprudence that the jurisdiction of a Court in enforcing execution of its decrees is restricted by its territorial limitations.; That is to say the jurisdiction of a Court is circumscribed by and co-extensive with its territorial limits. Thus a Court desiring to seize or attach the property of a judgment-debtor outside its jurisdiction, and where such property is in the hands of, or custody of another, also outside the jurisdiction such property sought to be attached in said of the executing Court can only be reached by a regular method of procedure which has been prescribed by the rules of the CPC, and similar codes which prevail in all countries, viz., the decree of the executing Court must be transferred to the local limits of the jurisdiction of the external Court within which the property sought to be attached is for the time being. This rule of law only applies when the two following facts concur: (1) when the property sought to be attaced is bona fide without the jurisdiction of the original Court whose decree is sought to be enforced, and (2) when the property sought to be attached is in the hands of a third party not amenable to or permanently residing within the jurisdiction of the executing Court.
6. I say property bona fide without the jurisdiction of the original Court, because I conceive that the above rule of law would not apply if property was fraudulently or surreptitiously removed from one jurisdiction to another for the purpose of defeating the right, authority and power of the executing Court in the execution of its decrees. In such a case a proceeding could be brought against persons within the jurisdiction from which the property was removed, which would in its operation and effect secure the recovery of the property attempted to be made away with and placed outside the jurisdiction of the original Court merely to defeat its jurisdiction and the execution of its decrees. An exception to the general principle may exist with reference to the jurisdiction of a Court to sell land outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction in pursuance of a mortgage decree, provided some portion of the mortgaged property is within the jurisdiction of the original Court which grants the decree.
7. The law thus stated is in harmony and accord with the same principles laid down in the learned judgment of the Judges of the Calcutta High Court in the case reported as Begg, Dunlop & Co. v. Jagannath(1) and in which case all the authorities are reviewed with the greatest care, and with the principles of law as authoritatively laid down by that decision we respectfully concur. The fundamental distinction between the case reported as Begg, Dunlop & Co. v. Jagannath and the present case is that in the former the garnishee or debtor of the judgment-debtor, whose debt was sought to be attached, was a firm carrying on business in Calcutta, and only in Calcutta, and that the debt that was due to the judgment-debtor was payable in Calcutta, and nowhere else; and thus it was held that the Court had no jurisdiction to attach a debt payable to the judgment-debtor outside its jurisdiction by a person not amenable to its jurisdiction. In this case we have a great banking corporation, having its head-office at Calcutta with subordinate branches throughout the rest of India, where it carries on its banking business. In Patna itself, within the jurisdiction of the Court of the First Subordinate Judge of Patna, the Bank of Bengal have a local branch where they carry on their trade or business of banking and with reference to which the contract that was made between the Bank and Raghunath Prasad was solely conversant. A corporation may be said to reside wherever it carries on its business, irrespective of the location of its head office, and if a corporation such as a Bank has branch offices in fifty separate and distinct jurisdictions, it can and may be sued in any one of such jurisdictions for the enforcement of a right in respect of which a cause of action exists within the limits of each independent jurisdiction.
8. The test to be applied in such cases is to be found accurately stated at p. 116, 39 Calcutta [Begg, Dunlop & Co. v. Jagannath] already referred to above. The learned Judges there say: the test to be applied is whether the judgement-debtor, as creditor, could have sued the garnishee as his debtor in the Court in which the execution proceedings were commenced. In this case I put the specific question to learn-counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and the respondent. Could, Raghunath Prasad have sued the Bank in Patna for default in paying to him the interest due on the Government securities lodged with the Bank had there been no default to justify its suspension? and the answer was in the affirmative. I apprehend no other answer could in law and fact have been given; because it is clear to demonstration that in the contigency put, the right to sue the Bank in Patna would have undoubtedly existed at the suit of Raghunath Prasad.
9. Take another illustration to test the, question of jurisdiction. Assuming the, contract of service to have come to an end without any default on the ??? of Raghunath Prasad; and the Bank refused for no good and sufficient cause to return to Raghunath Prasad the government securities held by them, could Raghunath Prasad have sued the Bank at Patna for the return and recovery of the securities retained by them? Of course he could. Mr. Hasan Imam in the earlier portion of his argument contended that Raghunath Prasad would have been forced to go to Calcutta to demand payment of each instalment of the interest as it fell due on the securities held by the Bank, in pursuances of cl. 9 of the security bond. This argument is, in our opinion, untenable; and I think it may fairly be said that Mr. Hasan Imam abandoned this contention in the latter portion of his argument addressed to us. Applying these recognized tests, it may be generally stated, as a broad and genera proposition, that the jurisdiction of an executing Court to attach moveable property belonging to a judgment-debtor in the hands of another or under his control, or a debt due by him is correlative and co-extensive with the right which the judgment-debtor himself would have had to sue for the recovery of his property or his debt as against; his debtor or trustee.
10. In the present case the mere removal of the securities by the Bank to the Head Office at Calcutta and their retention there by the Treasurer or Secretary of the Bank for the time being by consent of the parties, would not defeat the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Court at Patna to attach such securities at the suit of a judgment-creditor of Raghunath Prasad, subject to the lien of the Bank. The removal of the securities to Calcutta was merely a precautionary act for the better custody of the Government securities committed to the Bank's charge; and upon which they undoubtedly had and claimed to exercise a lien. Though the security notes deposited with the Bank were physically at the Head Office of the Bank in Calcutta, in the eye of the law they were constructively within the jurisdiction of the Patna Courts for the purpose of attachment, inasmuch as the Bank had a residence within the jurisdiction of the Patna Subordinate Court and carried on their business therein.
11. Thus it appears to us that the securities held by the Bank under cl. 8 of the security bond, dated 23rd May, 1910, are attachable at the instance of Sarat Chandra Mitra by the Court of the First Subordinate Judge of Patna but subject to the lien of the Bank thereon. No order however is capable of being maintained which would limit, restrict or prohibit the due and reasonable exercise by the Bank of its right to enforce its lien upon the securities deposited with it as and when occasion might arise. The learned Judge by his precept of the 8th June and his order of 16th July, 1917 has gone too far I would refer to the precept of the 8th June, which prohibits and restricts the Bank from disposing of the security deposited with them. The order of the 8th June was followed by an order of the 16th July, which was still more prohibitive and mandatory in its terms. Neither of these orders can stand. The learned Judge in the judgment which he delivered on the 1st June made a very proper declaration in the view we take of the law applicable to the facts of this case. He merely stated in the course of his judgment that so far as the security itself was concerned, that is the Government paper security, it was attachable subject to the lien of the Bank. In other words all that in effect is attachable at the suit of the judgment-creditor of Raghunath Prasad, Sarat C. Mitra, is whatever residue of the capital moneys representing the security deposited with the Bank may be available, after the Bank's claim in respect of the loss or damage that they have sustained by reason of the default and infidelity of Raghunath Prasad has been completely satisfied. But in the exercise of the Bank's right of lien, it is not competent for the Subordinate Court at Patna to restrict the Bank in he due exercise of their rights with regard to the enforcement of their lien and the realization of the securities upon which that lien is based. Therefore the order of the learned Judge, dated 16th July, 1917, is wrong in form. It goes too far; and he cannot, in our opinion, enjoin or prohibit the Bank by his order from realizing their security; if the securities are in fact capable of being realized by the Bank. This disposes of the first contention addressed to us.
12. Mr. Hasan Imam's main argument was based upon the fact that the security deed contemplated that the Government promissory notes tendered as security were to be handed over to the Secretary or Treasurer of the Bank at Calcutta and retained by him there, and that thus it was property outside the jurisdiction not liable to attachment. With that view we cannot agree, and for the reasons I have already stated, inasmuch as the Bank carries on its trade or business at Patna, and has a residence or place of business in Patna; and, therefore, even though the physical possession of the securities may be with the Bank at Calcutta, constructively in the eye of the law the Bank is within the jurisdiction of the Patna Court and the property which they hold is liable to attachment subject to their lien. The other question that arises for determination is whether the interest payable on the securities deposited and now accumulated in the hands of the Bank, since suspension of its payment, is attachable. Cl. 9 of the security deed has created for us some difficulty as to its true interpretation, and construction. The clause is by no means clear or free from doubt. The drafting of this clause leaves much to be desired in the ??? of proper conveyancing. The difficulty created by Cl. 9 is the omission to state precisely and expressly what the parties to the security bond obviously intended that the deed should express.
13. By Cl. 9, Raghunath Prasad, so long as he observed good faith and acted with fidelity towards his employers, would have been entitled to receive the accruing interest upon the securities deposited with the Bank when it fell due. Cl. 9 gives the Bank a power of suspending the payment of the interest to Raghunath Prasad in the event of loss or damage accruing to the Bank by reason of the want of fidelity on the part of Raghunath Prasad in the due discharge of his duties. The interest payable to Raghunath Prasad was to be paid or credited to him so long as good faith was observed. When the Bank sustained damage then the right of suspension accrued. What was the object of giving the Bank the power to suspend payment of interest? We think, considering the scope and tenor of the deed, and bearing in mind its object and design, that it must have been the intention of the parties to the deed to provide that the Bank's right to suspend payment of the interest, when default occurred, coupled with it the right to retain the accumulated interest and such as might accrue after suspension; and that thus it was clearly intended and the true meaning of the fidelity bond is that the interest so accumulated and accruing should from a fund, as collateral security, in the event of the main security proving insufficient to discharge the total loss or damage sustained by the Bank; otherwise Cl. 9 would be meaningless.
14. Why should the Bank have the power to suspend payment and yet retain the accumulated and accruing interest in their hands, but in respect of which they were to have no claim? We have carefully considered the argument addressed to us contra on behalf of the respondent; but with that argument we cannot agree. Thus we think that in this case having regard to the form, scope and phraseology of the security bond itself, the Bank is entitled to retain the interest accumulating and accruing after suspension as collateral security for the main debt. The interest in the Bank's hands is, in our opinion, liable to attachment; but attachable subject to the lien of the Bank. The judgment-creditor will therefore only be able to attach, to satisfy his decree, whatever residue may remain over either of the principal security or of the interest that has accrued or may accrue thereon after the Bank's total loss has been satisfied.
15. The difficulty in this case has been created by the action of the Bank itself. Mr. Hasan Imam contends that it would have been open to the Bank to say that they themselves were satisfied that a loss had been sustained and to have realised forthwith out of the securities at their disposal a sufficient sum to cover their loss; leaving it to Raghunath Prasad to sue them for an account or to challenge the validity of, their claim to realize the security deposited with the Bank. However the Bank did not adopt the course suggested; and up to the present time owing to the action of the Bank the amount of the loss or damage sustained by them at the hands of Raghunath Prasad has not been ascertained. The Bank could have elected to have acted in the manner indicated; but they preferred to assert their right to sue Raghunath Prasad and claim a declaration of their right to realize and declaration of their right to realize and accumulated thereon in satisfaction of their loss. For these reasons, we think the order of the learned Judge in substance was right but in form it was wrong. The order of the learned Judge must therefore be modified to this extent, that the respective properties comprised in and appropriated by cls. 8 and 9 of the security bond of 23rd May, 1910 will be attached subject to the Bank's general right of lien in respect of both such properties; and the order of 16th July, 1917 and the precept of 8th June, 1917 prohibiting or injuncting the Bank in the exercise of the enforcement of their right of lien as against such properties are hereby set aside and are declared to be inoperative and ??? legal.
16. Therefore this application made in civil revision to us by the Bank has failed. The entire difficulty that has arisen in this case has been occasioned by the Bank's own mistake and in disregard of their apparent and legal rights; therefore we direct that the Bank of Bengal do pay the sum of five gold mohurs to the respondent as and for the costs of the hearing of this application. The application of the Bank of Bengal is dismissed; and we order that the respective denominations of property specified in cls. 8 and 9 of the fidelity bond, dated 23rd May, 1910, are liable to attachment without restriction or prohibition upon the Bank's general right of lien in respect thereof; and that in so far as the precept of the 8th June, 1917 and the order of 16th July, 1917 purport to limit and fetter the Bank, in the assertion and exercise of their general right of lien upon the aforesaid securities, the same are illegal, void;1 and without force and effect; and that the only property available for attachment at the instance of Sarat C. Mitra is the residue, if any available, of the respective properties mentioned and set forth in cls. 8 and 9 of the security bond after the claim of the Bank has been fully satisfied and discharged.
17. Manuk, J.:— I entirely agree with the judgment of my learned brother and have nothing to add.
V.S/R.K
18. Application dismissed.
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