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Hossainara Begam v. Rahimannessa Begam
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit to enforce two mortgage securities executed by Akbar Shiko. On 9 June 1894 Akbar Shiko executed a mortgage bond in favour of Amir Jan for Rs. 200 at 24% per annum, repayable 16 October 1894. On 24 September 1894 he executed a second mortgage in favour of Ali Ashgar and Ali Naki for Rs. 200 at the same rate, repayable 14 March 1896. On 17 February 1896 Amir Jan assigned his security to Ali Ashgar and Ali Naki, making them holders of both securities.
Akbar Shiko died on 3 July 1896 leaving an infant daughter and son (the present defendants). Ali Naki applied to be guardian of the infants and, in 1897, took out letters of administration to the mortgagor's estate. Ali Ashgar died on 11 October 1897; Ali Naki initially took out a succession certificate for his debts, but in 1902 a plaintiff procured letters of administration to Ali Ashgar's estate.
On 22 October 1906 the plaintiff, as administrator of Ali Ashgar, commenced the present action to recover Rs. 1,524 on both securities, joining the mortgagor's infant son and daughter as defendants and naming Ali Naki as a pro forma defendant (alleging he refused to join as plaintiff). Ali Naki asserted he had been ready to join; on 20 December 1906 his name was transferred from pro forma defendant to plaintiff.
The original Court entered a decree for sale against the defendants; the District Judge affirmed that decision on appeal. The mortgagor's heirs (now appellants) appealed to the present Court. The appellants advanced four principal grounds of defence and appeal: (1) that letters of administration taken out by one mortgagee extinguished the mortgage debt; (2) that the suit was improperly framed and should have been brought against the administrator rather than the heirs while administration continued; (3) that limitation barred part of the claim; and (4) that interest should not be recoverable after the date the administrator received assets sufficient to satisfy the debt.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the taking out of letters of administration by one of two joint mortgagees (who thereby received assets) extinguished the entire mortgage debt or only the share of the mortgagee-administrator.
- Whether the suit could properly be maintained against the heirs of the mortgagor while the estate remained vested in the administrator, or whether the administrator should have been made a defendant.
- Whether the claim (in whole or in part) was barred by limitation, in particular by reason of the transfer of a pro forma defendant to plaintiff shortly before the expiration of the limitation period.
- Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to interest on the mortgage securities after the date on which one mortgagee, acting as administrator, had assets sufficient to repay the mortgage debt.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments
- The grant of letters of administration to one of the mortgagees extinguished the entire mortgage debt because that mortgagee, as administrator, had assets which he could retain to pay himself; possession of assets equates to payment.
- The suit was improperly framed and should have been instituted against the administrator (Ali Naki) rather than against the heirs, as the estate was vested in the administrator and the administrator held funds capable of satisfying the mortgage debt.
- The claim (at least in part) was barred by limitation, particularly if the plaint is treated as presented when Ali Naki was transferred to the category of plaintiff (which was shortly before the expiry of twelve years from the due date of the first mortgage).
- Even if principal were recoverable, no interest should be allowed after the date when Ali Naki, as administrator, had assets sufficient to repay the mortgage debt.
Respondent's (Plaintiff / Mortgagee Representative) Arguments
- The plaintiff instituted the action to recover Rs. 1,524 upon both securities and originally joined the co-mortgagee Ali Naki as a pro forma defendant; Ali Naki was later added as plaintiff.
- Reliance was placed upon authority such as Francis v. Harrison to justify the framing of the suit against the heirs (as argued by respondent's counsel), though the Court examined the applicability of that authority.
- Respondent resisted the appellants' contentions on limitation, framing of the suit and extinguishment; the original Court and the District Judge overruled the defendants' contentions and decreed for sale (a position upheld below but challenged on appeal).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Wankford v. Wanhford (1608) 1 Salkeld 299, 305 | Supports the principle that where a creditor becomes administrator and has assets he may retain to pay himself, the debt may be extinguished. | Accepted as supporting the general proposition that possession of assets by an administrator-creditor may amount to payment and thus extinguishment (subject to limits discussed). |
| Williams on Executors (10th ed.), Vol. I (text authority) | Textual statement cited regarding extinguishment when creditor is made executor/administrator and has assets. | Used to frame the general doctrine; Court treated the text as not controverted for the limited proposition asserted. |
| Lowe v. Pekhett (1855) 16 C.B. 500 | Doctrine that extinguishment by appointment of creditor as executor/administrator requires legal assets presently available; equitable assets not presently available do not operate as release. | Distinguished on facts; cited for the narrower proposition that only legal assets presently available effect such an extinguishment. |
| Richards v. Molony (1850) 2 Ir. Ch. Rep. 1 | Held that if one of two obligees is appointed executor and receives assets adequate to discharge the debt, the debt may be extinguished as to both. | Noted to support appellants' contention but Court observed it was subsequently overruled and thus unreliable as authority for the broad proposition. |
| In re Carew (1854) 4 Ir. Ch. Rep. 112 (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ireland) | Overruled Richards v. Molony; held payment to one of two trustees/executors does not extinguish debt as against the beneficial owners or other creditors. | Relied upon to reject the broad contention that appointment of one obligee as executor/administrator who receives assets extinguishes the rights of other obligees; Court found this view well founded. |
| Barber Maran v. Ramana Goundan (1897) I.L.R. 20 Mad. 461 | Authority (Madras) suggested that payment to one joint creditor may discharge all when they appear as joint creditors on the instrument. | Court found the proposition too broadly formulated and declined to accept it as a general rule for the present facts. |
| Harihar Pershad v. Bholi Pershad (1907) 6 C.L.J. 383, 394 | Equity presumes obligees on a money bond to be tenants in common, not joint tenants; discharge by one obligee does not bar action by another for his share. | Applied to support the view that payment to one of two joint-mortgagees does not necessarily discharge the entire debt; each mortgagee intended to lend his own money. |
| Matson v. Dennis (1864) 4 De J. & S. 345 | Principle that equity presumes each mortgagee has a separate interest and will not relieve a mortgagor who pays one mortgagee and not the others contrary to redemption terms. | Grouped with other cases to support the rule that payment to one mortgagee does not discharge the rights of the others. |
| Vickers v. Cowell (1839) I Beav. 529 | Same general equity principle regarding separate interests of mortgagees. | Used as supporting authority for the same equitable presumption. |
| Smith v. Sibthorpe (1887) 34 Ch. D. 732 | Supportive authority undermining an opposite rule; affirms equitable presumption of separate interests. | Included among authorities to show that payment to one mortgagee does not discharge all. |
| Powell v. Brodhurst [1901] 2 Ch. 160 | Further authority supporting the limitation of Wallace v. Kelsall and endorsing separate interests principle. | Relied on to show Wallace v. Kelsall's authority had been shaken and to support separate-interests approach. |
| Wallace v. Kelsall (1840) 7 M. & W. 246 | Earlier authority on joint creditor payment question (implicitly contrasted with later authority). | Not applied; the Court noted later authorities had weakened its weight. |
| Steeds v. Steeds (1889) 22 Q.B.W. 537 (Wills J., citing Morley v. Bird) | Doctrine that although mortgagees take a joint security, each intends to lend his own money and to take back his own share. | Applied to support the conclusion that payment to one mortgagee does not necessarily discharge others. |
| Morley v. Bird (1798) 3 Ves. 628 | Early statement of the principle that each mortgagee means to lend his own money and take back his own. | Cited through Steeds v. Steeds to bolster the separate-shares presumption. |
| Sitaram v. Shridhar (1903) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 292 | Illustration of the presumption that each mortgagee has a distinct share and cannot discharge the whole by payment to one. | Applied as precedent consistent with the Court's view for the present facts. |
| Tamman Singh v. Lachhmin Kinwari (1904) I.L.R. 26 All. 318 | Similar authority supporting the separate share presumption among mortgagees. | Relied on in the same way as Sitaram to confirm principle. |
| Clegg v. Rowland (1866) L.R. 3 Eq. 368, 373 | Example where trustee is wholly uninterested and beneficiaries must be parties; relates to trustee representation issues. | Cited as an instance contemplated by Order XXXI, Rule 1 CPC where beneficiaries may be made parties when trustee is uninterested. |
| Beresford v. Ramasubba (1889) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 197 | Example where trustee has an interest adverse to beneficiary, justifying making beneficiaries parties. | Used to illustrate cases where Order XXXI, Rule 1 may permit joining beneficiaries. |
| Francis v. Harrison (1889) 43 Ch. D. 183 | Held a mortgagee who is trustee and who has become bankrupt cannot properly represent beneficiaries who are necessary parties to foreclosure action. | Respondent relied on it; Court found the principle inapplicable to present facts and noted its subsequent modification in England and commentary in Jaggeswar Dutt v. Bhuban Mohan Mitra. |
| Jaggeswar Dutt v. Bhuban Mohan Mitra (1906) I.L.R. 33 Cal. 425, 437 | Reference noting that the English rule in Francis v. Harrison has been practically modified since that decision. | Cited to show Francis v. Harrison's principle had been limited or modified elsewhere and therefore did not support the framing of the suit here. |
| Morley v. Hurley (1856) 25 Beav. 253 | Case relied upon below to justify the form of the suit (as argued by respondents below). | Court found reliance on this case by lower courts erroneous in the present context. |
| Abdul Rahaman v. Amir Ali (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 612 (Full Bench) | Decision concerning substitution of an assignee as a party to pending litigation (relied on for limitation argument). | Held inapplicable to the circumstances here; Court rejected the limitation point based on this authority. |
| Pyari Mohan v. Kedar Nath (1899) I.L.R. 26 Cal. 409 (Full Bench) | Shows that a suit commenced by one mortgagee need not be improperly framed where a co-mortgagee is joined as a pro forma defendant who was allowed to be made plaintiff. | Relied upon to rebut the claim that transfer of a pro forma defendant's name to plaintiff made the plaint a fresh plaintiff addition under Limitation Act. |
| Nagendrabala Dehya v. Tarapada Acharjee (1908) 8 C.L.J. 286 | Authority that transfer of a pro forma defendant to plaintiff cannot be treated as addition of a new plaintiff under Section 22 Limitation Act. | Applied to reject limitation argument based on the transfer of Ali Naki's name from pro forma defendant to plaintiff. |
| Khadir Moideen v. Rama Naik (1892) I.L.R. 17 Mad. 12 | Similar authority on the effect of transferring a pro forma defendant to plaintiff for limitation purposes. | Used alongside Nagendrabala Dehya to support the limitation conclusion. |
| Adams v. Gale (1740) 2 Atk. 106 | Cited in support of the proposition that an executor/administrator with assets is bound to satisfy his own debt and equity may deny interest if he permitted his own debt to run. | Referred to in discussing whether interest should be allowed after administrator had assets; Court declined to decide finally but noted the equity principle. |
| Page v. Lloyd (1831) 5 Peters 304 (U.S. Supreme Court) | Majority held executor/administrator with assets should satisfy his own debt; omission to do so does not extinguish debt but may disentitle him to interest. | Cited as supportive authority for equitable principle regarding administrator-creditor's duty to pay and possible consequences for interest entitlement; Court reserved final determination on interest question. |
| Robinson v. Gumming (1742) 2 Atk. 409 | Authority relied on in Page v. Lloyd regarding executor/administrator obligations. | Referenced indirectly through Page v. Lloyd to indicate longstanding equitable principles on administrator-creditor duties. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded issue by issue, adhering closely to the authorities and statutory framework cited in the record.
First, on the question whether appointment of a mortgagee as administrator extinguished the entire mortgage debt, the Court accepted the limited proposition that when a creditor takes out administration and has assets in his hands adequate to pay the debt, there may be extinguishment as to the share he is able to retain. The Court recognized authorities (and a text) supporting that proposition. However, it carefully considered whether that doctrine applies where one of two joint mortgagees becomes administrator. The Court distinguished Lowe v. Pekhett as establishing that only legal assets presently available effect extinguishment, and it noted that Richards v. Molony, which supported the appellants, had been overruled by In re Carew. On principle and authority (including Harihar Pershad and other mortgage cases), the Court adopted the presumption that where multiple persons advance money on a mortgage they have separate interests — each intends to lend his own money and to take back his own share — and therefore payment to or retention by one does not extinguish the rights of the other. The Court concluded that appointment of Ali Naki as administrator could extinguish or affect Ali Naki's own right (in so far as assets in his hands satisfied his share), but it did not extinguish the right of action of the other mortgagee's representative (the plaintiff-administrator of Ali Ashgar).
Second, on the framing of the suit, the Court held that because administration vested the estate in Ali Naki under Section 4 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, and because the administrator held the equity of redemption and funds with which the mortgage may be satisfied, the proper defendant for enforcement of the mortgage (so far as the non-administrator mortgagee's share was concerned) was the administrator. The Court relied on Order XXXI, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and illustrative authorities (Clegg v. Rowland; Beresford v. Ramasubba) to show that while beneficiaries may sometimes be made parties, there was no reason here to proceed against the heirs rather than the administrator. The Court found the suit improperly framed against the heirs and that failure to join the administrator was fatal.
Third, on limitation, the Court held the appellants' contention lacking in substance. It rejected reliance on Abdul Rahaman v. Amir Ali as inapplicable, and relied on Pyari Mohan v. Kedar Nath and other authorities to conclude that transfer of a pro forma defendant's name to that of plaintiff should not be treated as the addition of a new plaintiff under Section 22 of the Limitation Act; therefore the action was not barred by limitation as contended.
Fourth, on interest, the Court observed that the equitable principle advanced by the appellants — that an administrator with assets sufficient to pay should repay his own debt and may forfeit interest if he does not — is supported by Adams v. Gale and Page v. Lloyd. However, because of its conclusions on the first two grounds (extinguishment only applies to the administrator's share; suit improperly framed against heirs), the Court did not finally decide whether interest should be disallowed from the date assets became available to the administrator. The Court noted that a question might arise later whether the administrator could still exercise a right of retainer and whether equity might deny interest from the date sufficient assets were available.
Finally, the Court took account of the factual circumstances (the administrator having assets available but allowing interest to accumulate at 24% and the apparent attempt to enforce a large aggregate sum against infants) and concluded that justice did not compel assisting the administrator and co-mortgagee in this litigation against the infant heirs while the estate remained vested in the administrator.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decrees below. The Court directed that the suit be dismissed.
DISPOSITION: The appeal is allowed; the decree of the Courts below is discharged and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiffs' action as framed against the heirs fails; the administrator (Ali Naki) cannot rely on his position to have extinguished the other mortgagee's right, and the non-administrator mortgagee's claim was improperly prosecuted against the heirs rather than the administrator. The suit is dismissed with costs.
- No broad new legal principle was laid down by this judgment; the Court applied and reconciled existing authorities and statutory rules to the facts. Where the opinion does not discuss wider precedent-setting implications, the immediate consequence is the dismissal of the suit and the reassertion of existing principles concerning (a) the limited effect of creditor-administrators on joint creditors' rights, and (b) the requirement to proceed against an administrator while the estate remains vested in him.
1. This is an appeal on behalf of the defendants in a suit to enforce two mortgage securities. There is no controversy is to the circumstances under which the plaintiffs seek to recover the disputed amount, and they may be briefly narrated. On the 9th June 1894, Akbar Shiko, the father of the two defendants, executed a mortgage bond in favour of one Amir Jan. The principal sum advanced was Rs. 200 and carried interest at the rate of 24 per cent, per annum. The loan was repayable on the 16th October 1894. On the 24th September 1894, the mortgagor executed a second mortgage in favour of Ali Ashgar and Ali Naki as security for a loan of Rs. 200 which carried interest at the same rate, and was made repayable on the 14th March 1896. On the 17th February 1896, Amir Jan, the first mortgagee, transferred his security to the second mortgagees Ali Ashgar and Ali Naki. The result was that the second mortgagees thus became the holders of both the first and second securities. On the 3rd July 1896, the mortgagor, Akbar Shiko, died leaving, as his heirs, an infant daughter and an infant son who are the defendants in the present litigation. Immediately after this, Ali Naki, one of the mortgagees who was apparently related to the mortgagor, was, upon his own application, appointed guardian of the person and property of the infant son and daughter of the mortgagor. In 1897, Ali Naki also took out letters of administration to the estate of the mortgagor. The materials on the record indicate that at the time of the institution of the present suit he had not ceased to act as administrator, though on the 2nd March 1906, he was discharged from his office of guardian of the person and property of the infants. On the 11th October 1897, the other mortgagee, Ali Ashgar, died. Ali Naki, who was related to him, took out a succession certificate to collect the debts due to his estate, but in 1902 the plaintiff took out letters of administration. On the 22nd October 1906, that is a few days before the expiry of twelve years from the date on which the mortgage money due under the first security was repayable, the plaintiff as administrator to the estate of Ali Ashgar commenced the present action for recovery of Rs. 1,524 upon both the securities. She joined as defendants the son and daughter of the mortgagor Akbar Shiko. She also joined as a pro forma defendant the co-mortgagee Ali Naki, upon the allegation that he had refused to join as a plaintiff. The mortgagee thus made a pro forma defendant, pleaded that he had always been ready to join the plaintiff, whereupon, on the 20th December 1906, his name was transferred from the category of pro forma defendant to that of plaintiff. The claim was resisted by the son and daughter of the mortgagor, substantially on four grounds; namely, first, that the claim was barred by limitation; secondly, that the suit was not properly framed as it ought to have been instituted against the administrator Ali Naki; thirdly, that the mortgage debts had been extinguished inasmuch as administration to the estate of the mortgagor had been granted in favour of one of the two mortgagees, who as administrator received ample funds for repayment of the debt; and, fourthly, that even if the principal sums were shown to be recoverable, the claim for interest could not be sustained. The original Court overruled all these contentions and made the usual decree for sale against the defendant. Upon appeal, the learned District Judge, has affirmed this decision. The defendants have now appealed to this Court, and on their behalf the decision of the District Judge has been assailed on four grounds: namely, first, that the effect of the grant of letters of administration to one of the mortgagees, was to extinguish the entire mortgage debt; secondly, that the claim could not be sustained against the heirs of the mortgagor, so long at any rate,, as the administration 'continued in force; thirdly, that the claim is, in part at least, barred by limitation, because if the plaint is deemed to have been presented on the day when Ali Naki was transferred from the category of defendant to that of plaintiff, the suit was clearly instituted after the lapse of twelve years from the due date on the first mortgage; and, fourthly, that even if all these objections fail, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any interest on the mortgage securities after the date of the appointment of Ali Naki as administrator to the estate of their father and as guardian of their own persons and properties.
2. In support of the first ground taken on behalf of the appellants, it has been argued that if a creditor takes out letters of administration to the estate of his debtor, although this alone may not operate as an extinguishment of the debt, if the debtor has assets which the creditor may retain to pay himself, it is extinguishment, for possession of assets amounts to payment. This contention has been sought to be supported by reference to a passage from Williams on Executors, 10th edition, Vol. I, page 1058, and to the decision in Wank ford v. Wanhford (1608) 1 Salkeld 299, 305. This position need not be controverted, and may be maintained on the principle that there is an extinguishment of the debt if the person who is to receive the money is also the person who ought to pay. To put the matter in another way, if there are no assets, the administrator is not the person who ought to pay, though he is the person that is to receive the debt which is thus not extinguished except upon the supposition that the administrator has assets which he may retain to pay himself. The doctrine would be applicable to this case, notwithstanding the decision in Binns v. Nichols (1866) L.R. 2 Eq. 256 and Dexter v. Arnold (1823) 3 Mason 284, because, in so far as the estate vested in an administrator in this country is concerned, there is not, in this respect, a distinction between real estate and personal estate. The question, however, which requires consideration here is, whether this doctrine is applicable when the person who takes out administration is one of two joint creditors. The learned Vakil for the defendants-appellants has invited us to give an affirmative answer upon the authority of the decisions in Lowe v. Pekhett (1855) 16 C.B. 500 and Richards v. Molony (1850) 2 Ir. Ch. Pep. 1. The first of these cases is clearly distinguishable, and is an authority for the proposition that the doctrine of extinguishment of a debt by reason of the appointment of a creditor as the administrator to the estate of his debtor, has no application unless the administrator has in his hands legal assets presently available; the existence of equitable assets, not presently available, does not operate as a release or extinguishment of the debt. No doubt, in that case, whereas two persons were appointed executors, the debt was payable to one of them only; but the decision was founded on the ground that the assets of the testator which came into the hands of the creditor executor were not legal assets presently available, and the rule could not be applied that
"if tire testator makes his creditor his executor the action shall be released, but the debt remains for which he may retain."The second case, however, Richards v. Molony (1850) 2 Ir. Ch. Pep. 1, upon which the learned Vakil for the appellant relies, does appear to support his contention. In that case it was ruled by Lord Chancellor Brady that the principle, that where the obligee in a bond becomes executor of the obligor and receives assets adequate to discharge the debt, it is extinguished, is applicable where one only of two obligees is appointed one of several executors of the obligor; it was further ruled that this principle prevails in law as well as in equity and is applicable albiet the obliges are trustees. It is to be observed, however, that although this case is mentioned as an authority in Williams on Executors (vol. 1, page 1059), it has been subsequently overruled by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ireland in the lease of In re Carew (1854) 4 Ir. Ch. Rep. 112. There an obligor in a bond, with notice of the trust, appointed one of the two obligees who were trustees, as executors, and devised his real estate to him subject to his debts. The executor received personal assets sufficient to pay the bond debt, but wasted them. It was ruled that the debt was not extinguished and might be enforced against the real estate. Blackburn J., who delivered the opinion of the Judicial Committee, held with the concurrence of Lord Chancellor Brady, Mohanan C.J., Keatinge J., and Napier J., that the case of Richards v. Molony (1850) 2 Ir. Ch. Rep. 1 had been erroneously decided. This Conclusion was founded on the ground that as payment to one of the creditors trustees could not operate to release the debtor, there could not be constructive satisfaction of the rights of those beneficially entitled to the money, merely because one of the trustees had been appointed executor of the debtor. In our opinion, this view is manifestly well founded on principle. The learned vakil for the appellants has, however, contended upon the authority of the decision of the Madras High Court in Barber Maran v. Ramana Goundan ( 1897) I.L.R. 20 Mad. 461 that where there are several persons who on the face of the instrument of mortgage are joint creditors, payment to one of them is a good discharge as against all (Jones on Mortgages, Section 135, 958). This proposition, in our opinion, is too broadly formulated. As was pointed out by this Court in the case of Harihar Pershad v. Bholi Pershad ( 907) 6 C.L.J. 383, 394, when a claim is on a money bond to two or more obligees, the presumption at equity is that the obligees are tenants in common, and not joint tenants of the debt, with the consequence that the discharge by one obligee cannot be set up as a defence as against the other obligee suing for his share of the debt. The principle applicable to the case before us appears to be that payment to one of two joint-mortgagees A does not necessarily operate as a discharge of the debt in so far as the other mortgagee is concerned. Equity presumes that several persons together making an advance upon the security of a mortgage have separate interests in the money, and accordingly withholds relief from the mortgagor when in disregard of the terms of the proviso for redemption, he has made a payment to one mortgagee and not to both : Matson v. Dennis (1864) 4 De J. & S. 345, Vickers v. Cowell (1839) I Beav. 529, Smith v. Sibthorpe ( 1887) 34 Ch. D. 732, Powell v. Brodhurst [1901] 2 Ch. 160, which must be taken to have considerably shaken the authority of Wallace v. Kelsall (1840) 7 M. & W. 246. In the case before us, we must apply the doctrine stated by Wills J. in Steeds v. Steeds (1889) 22 Q.B.W. 537, citing from Lord Alvanley M.R. in Morley v. Bird (1798) 3 Ves. 628, 631, that although the mortgagees take a joint security, each means to lend his own money and to take back his own. There is nothing to indicate that the intention of the parties was that each of the persons in whose favour the mortgage obligation was created, was a creditor for the whole. Consequently, t it cannot be presumed that the payment to one would liberate the debtor against all the creditors : on the other hand the presumption is that each was a creditor for his own share and could not give a discharge for the whole obligation : Sitaram v. Shridhar ( 1903) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 292, and Tamman Singh v. Lachhmin Kinwari ( 1904) I.L.R. 26 All. 318. On principle as well as on authority, therefore, we must hold that in the case before us the appointment of one of the mortgagees as administrator to estate of the mortgagor did not extinguish the right of action of the mortgagee other than the one who was so appointed administrator and had assets in his hands sufficient to satisfy his share of the mortgage debt. The first point urged on behalf of the appellants must consequently succeed in part, that is, in so far as the mortgagee administrator Ali Naki is concerned but it must be overruled in so far as the representative of the other mortgagee is concerned.
3. In So far as the second ground urged on behalf of the appellants is concerned, it has been argued that the mortgagee other than he administrator who alone, in the view we take, is competent to sue to recover his share of the mortgage money, was bound to bring his suit not against the heirs of the mortgagor but against the administrator in whom the estate of the mortgagor is vested. This argument is, in our opinion, well-founded. The effect of the appointment of Ali Naki as administrator to the estate of the deceased was to vest in him the estate under Section 4 of the Probate and Administration Act of 1881. The object of the mortgage suit is to cut off the equity of redemption which is now vested in the administrator as the legal representative of the mortgagor. He is, besides, the person in possession of funds by means of which the mortgage debt may be satisfied. It is difficult to appreciate how, under these circumstances, the claim may be enforced against the son and daughter of the mortgagor. It may be conceded that under Order XXXI, Rule 1 of the. Civil Procedure Code of 1908, in all suits concerning property vested in an administrator or a trustee, although the administrator represents the beneficiaries and it is consequently not ordinarily necessary to make them parties to the suit, yet the Court may, if it thinks fit, order them or any of them to be made parties. This clearly contemplates cases, when for instance as in Clegg v. Rowland (1866) L.R. 3 Eq. 368, 373, the trustee is wholly uninterested in the case, or as in Beresford v. Ramasubba (1889) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 197, the trustee has an interest adverse to that of the beneficiary. But clearly in the case before us there is no conceivable reason why the mortgagee other than the administrator should not seek to enforce his security against the property in the hands of the administrator. Reliance was placed by the learned Vakil for the respondent upon the ease of Francis v. Harrison (1889) 43 Ch. D. 183, where it was ruled that a mortgagee who is a trustee of Ids mortgage for the beneficial A owners of the mortgage money, and who has become bankrupt cannot, as defendant to a foreclosure action by a prior mortgagee, properly represent the beneficiaries who are necessary parties to the action notwithstanding Order XVI, Rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883. This principle has clearly no application to the circumstances of the case before us, But it is worthy of remark, as pointed out in, the case of Jaggeswar Dutt v. Bhuban Mohan Mitra (1906) I.L.R. 33 Cal. 425, 437, that since the date of this decision the rule in England has been modified, so as practically to overrule it, We must hold, therefore, that the suit has been improperly framed and cannot be maintained against the son and daughter of the mortgagor. The objection was urged by the defendants at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings, but was overruled on erroneous grounds, and it was supposed that the cases of Morley v. Hurley (1856) 25 Beav. 253, and Francis v. Harrison (1890) 43 Ch. D. 183, justify the frame of the suit. It is impossible at the present stage to make the administrator a defendant to the suit, because any suit now instituted against him would be successfully met by the plea of limitation. We therefore allow the second objection to prevail and hold that the suit is not maintainable against the heirs of the mortgagor, because the administrator has not been joined as party defendant.
4. In so far as the third point taken on behalf of the appellants is concerned, it is unnecessary to consider it in detail in the view we take of the first and second grounds, but we may observe that there is obviously no substance in this objection. What is contended by the learned vakil for the appellants is that on the date the pro formal defendant had his name transferred from the category of defendant to the category of plaintiff, the claim was barfed by limitation in so far as the first security of the 9th June 1894 was concerned and should to that extent have been dismissed. There is, however, no foundation for this contention which is sought to be supported by the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Abdul Rahaman v. Amir Ali (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cale. 612. But that decision which relates to the case of substitution of an assignee as a party to a pending litigation has clearly no application to the case before Rs. The decision of the Full Bench in Pyari Mohan v. Kedar Nath (1899) I.L.R. 26 Cale. 409, shows that the suit, though it was commenced by one mortgagee cannot be said to have been improperly framed when the co-mortgagee was joined as a pro forma defendant who was thus afforded ample opportunity to have his name transferred to the category of plaintiff. Nor can it be contended that Section 22 of the Limitation Act operates as a bar, because as pointed out in the cases of Nagendrabala Dehya v. Tarapada Acharjee (1908) 8 C.L.J. 286 and Khadir Moideen v. Rama Naik (1892) I.L.R. 17 Mad. 12, the transfer of the name of a pro forma defendant to that of the plaintiff cannot rightly be treated as the addition of a new plaintiff within the meaning of Section 22 of the Limitation Act. We must consequently hold that there is no substance in the objection of limitation urged on behalf of the appellants.
5. In support of the fourth ground urged on behalf of the appellants, it has been contended that even if a decree for the principal amount can be made in favour of the mortgagees, they ought not to be allowed any interest from the date when, upon appointment as administrator, one of the mortgagees had ample assets placed in his hands to satisfy the mortgage debt. In support of this proposition, reliance has been placed upon the case of Adams v. Gale (1740) 2 Atk. 106. In the view we take of the first two grounds advanced on behalf of the appellants, it is unnecessary to decide this question. But we may point out that the contention is obviously based on principles of justice equity and good conscience, and is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Page v. Lloyd (1831) 5 Peters 304. The majority of the Court there decided, on the authority of Lord Hardwicke in Robinson v. Gumming (1742) 2 Atk. 409, 411, that an executor or administrator was bound, if he had assets in his hands, to satisfy his own debt, but that if, as a matter of fact, lie had omitted to do so, the debt would not be extinguished;, although he might, if he paid debts not on interest and permitted his own to run on interest, disentitle himself to interest. It has been stated to us that at the time of the commencement of the present action one of the mortgagees was still in possession of the estate of the mortgagor as administrator. A question may consequently hereafter arise whether it may not be open to him still to exercise his right of retainer. If such question arises, the position may possibly be maintained that no interest should be allowed upon the mortgage debt from the date when sufficient assets became available to the administrator for repayment of the mortgage money. It is unnecessary, however, in the present proceedings to adjudicate upon this matter finally. It is sufficient for us to hold that in so far as the mortgagee administrator is concerned, he is not entitled to maintain this action, while in so far as the other mortgagee is concerned, the suit is improperly framed; it has been erroneously constituted, because he has sued not the administrator but the son and daughter of the mortgagor who cannot be rendered liable so long as the estate continues to be vested in the administrator. In this view, the suit must obviously fail. We may add that we do not regret this conclusion, because it is plain from the circumstances that a desperate attempt has been made by the administrator and his co-mortgagee to prejudice the position of the infant representatives of the mortgagor. Though the administrator had assets in his hands available for the full satisfaction of the mortgage debt, he has allowed the interest to accumulate for the reason, no doubt, that the interest was at the high rate of 24 per cent, per annum. The administrator should undoubtedly have satisfied the mortgage debt as soon as sufficient assets became available for the purpose, and no Court of justice will assist him in his endeavour, through his co-mortgagee, to realise from the infants Rs. 1,524 when the principal sum advanced was only Rs. 400.
6. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed, the decree of the Courts below discharged, and the suit dismissed with costs throughout.
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