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Md. Shamim Ansari v. State Of Bihar & Ors.

Patna High Court
Apr 25, 2002
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed in 1976 as a driver in the Bihar State Sugar Development Corporation. Over time the Corporation's financial condition deteriorated and it became unable at times to pay salaries. As a response, personnel were proposed to be sent on deputation to Government departments.

In June 1999 the petitioner requested deputation. The Relief & Rehabilitation Department of the Government of Bihar sought employees for certain posts, including driver. The Corporation forwarded the petitioner's name (for driver) and Barkatullah Khan's name (for peon). By office order (memo no.1651 dated 16.8.99) the Deputy Secretary posted both on deputation "till further orders." The Corporation relieved them by order dated 18.8.99 and they joined the Government department on that date. Subsequent office orders (dated 4.9.94 and 24.9.99) accepted their joining and approved payment of salary on the basis of last pay certificates.

By office order dated 15.3.2000 the deputation of the petitioner was terminated with immediate effect and he was asked to return to the Corporation; the same order requested the Corporation to send another Class IV employee (Muktinath Singh) on deputation to the department.

The petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the office order dated 15.3.2000 insofar as it terminated his deputation and directed his return to the Corporation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the termination of the petitioner's deputation by the office order dated 15.3.2000 was valid and sustainable.
  2. Whether, given the factual matrix (employees sent out because the Corporation had effectively ceased to function), the petitioner's presence in the Government department should be treated as an ordinary deputation (where a deputationist has no right to the post) or as a form of rehabilitation that attracts different legal protection.
  3. Whether the termination amounted to unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory action contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Y.V. Giri)

  • The arrangement was not an ordinary deputation but effectively a case of rehabilitation because the Corporation had for all practical purposes ceased to function; staff were being sent out to other departments as a measure of survival/rehabilitation of employees.
  • In the circumstances it was unrealistic to treat the petitioner as retaining a lien on a post at the failing Corporation and the legal position applicable to ordinary deputation (no right to the post) should not be mechanically applied.
  • The petitioner was singled out unreasonably and unfairly for return whereas other deputationists (e.g., Barkatullah Khan) were retained and the department had asked for another Class IV employee — facts indicating continuing need for drivers.

Respondent's Arguments (as in counter affidavits and submissions by Mr. Suresh Kumar, J.C. to S.C.V.)

  • The petitioner, being on deputation "till further orders," had no right to the post in the Government Department; once deputation was terminated the petitioner had to leave and rejoin the Corporation.
  • The deputation was terminated on the basis of the Minister's IOU dated 26.11.99 directing the petitioner's return "on account of his whimsical absence from duty."
  • The department validly took advantage of the "till further orders" status to terminate the deputation; in exigencies Class IV employees knowing driving were employed as drivers.
  • Following bifurcation of the State and creation of Jharkhand, two of the five driver posts were allocated to Jharkhand leaving only three driver posts in Bihar (supplementary counter affidavit).
  • Reliance was placed on Md. Serajuddin v. State of Bihar, 2001 (2) P.L.J.R 594 for the proposition that deputationists do not have a right to the post.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Md. Serajuddin v. State of Bihar, 2001 (2) P.L.J.R 594 Reiterates the legal position that normally a deputationist has no right to the post to which he is deputed. The court acknowledged the principle in Md. Serajuddin but held that the decision was not applicable to the facts of the present case because the petitioner's deputation was not an ordinary deputation but rather resembled a rehabilitation placement.
Amarnath Singh (CWJC No. 3513 of 1994; single judge judgment dated 12.9.97; LPA No.1566 of 1997 dismissed 22.4.98; SLP No.00312 of 1999 dismissed 1.2.1999) In circumstances where employees were sent out from a failing corporation for rehabilitative placement, treating them as ordinary deputationists and terminating their placement on collateral/unproved complaints (and discriminating between deputationists) is unsustainable; the Government cannot render an employee effectively unemployed by terminating such deputation while retaining others. The court treated the Amarnath Singh line of decisions as closely analogous on facts and applied that reasoning to hold the present termination unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory. The court found the Amarnath Singh decisions fully applicable and decisive in favor of the petitioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook the following analytical steps, as expressed in the opinion:

  1. The court accepted the general legal principle that ordinarily a deputationist has no right to the post to which he is deputed; it acknowledged the Md. Serajuddin decision which reiterates that position.
  2. The court then examined whether the present case fitted the ordinary concept of deputation. It found that the factual matrix — employees being sent out because the parent Corporation had effectively ceased to function and to protect employment — meant this was not an ordinary deputation but a rehabilitative placement situation.
  3. The court compared the present facts with a previously decided, closely similar case (Amarnath Singh) in which employees from a failing Corporation were placed in Government departments and where one such deputation was terminated while another deputationist was allowed to remain. In Amarnath Singh the High Court held that terminating deputation on the basis of unproved complaints (using them collaterally) and in a discriminatory manner was unsustainable; appellate and Supreme Court review attempts were dismissed.
  4. The court found that in the present case staff were retained on deputation (e.g., Barkatullah Khan) and the department had sought another Class IV employee, which supported the petitioner's claim that the department continued to need personnel and that singling him out was arbitrary.
  5. Given the close factual similarity with Amarnath Singh, and the principled objection to using the "till further orders" deputation status as a means to render a rehabilitated employee effectively unemployed on the basis of collateral complaints, the court concluded that the impugned order was not just, reasonable or fair for purposes of Articles 14 and 21.
  6. The court therefore quashed the impugned order but explicitly left open the respondents' right to initiate regular proceedings (e.g., disciplinary action) if they so advised, provided such proceedings are taken in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed to the extent that the impugned order dated 15.3.2000 (Annexure 8) terminating the petitioner's deputation is quashed.

Consequences and practical implications as set out by the court:

  • The impugned order terminating the deputation was held to be neither just, reasonable nor fair within the meaning of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and is quashed.
  • The quashing of the order prevents the respondents from relying on that order to remove the petitioner from his placement; however, the respondents remain free to initiate regular proceedings (for the alleged "whimsical absence from duty" or other matters) against the petitioner if they so choose, and any such proceedings must be conducted in accordance with law.
  • No order as to costs was made by the court.
  • The court applied and followed prior authority (Amarnath Singh); the judgment does not purport to lay down a novel principle of law beyond its application of existing decisions to the facts before it.

Note: This summary is limited to the contents of the provided opinion and does not add facts or legal conclusions beyond those articulated by the court in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner was appointed in 1976 as a driver in the Bihar State Sugar Development Corporation. He was working there when the Corporation (like many other Corporations and Boards in this State) started going down the hill. By and by its financial position became from bad to worse and at one stage the Corporation was not even able to pay salary to its employees. In those circumstances, an idea appears to have been mooted to send out the employees of the Corporation on deputation to different Government departments.

2. According to the petitioner in June, 1999 he too made a request for being sent out on deputation. At that time a request was received in the Corporation from the Relief & Rehabilitation Department, Government of Bihar asking for employees on deputation to work on certain posts, including the post of driver. The Corporation forwarded the names of the petitioner (for the post of driver) and another employee, namely, Barkatullah Khan for the post of peon. Thereupon the Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Department of Relief & Rehabilitation issued an office order under his memo no. 1651, dated 16.8.99 (Annexure 2) posting the petitioner and Barkatullah Khan on deputation, till further orders, as driver and peon respectively. The petitioner and Barkatullah Khan were then relieved by the Corporation by order, dated 18.8.99 (Annexure 3) and they gave their joining in the Government department on the same date. By an office order, dated 4.9.94 issued by the Government Department the joining of the petitioner (and Barkatullah Khan) was accepted with effect from the fore-noon of 18.8.99 By another office order, dated 24.9.99 approval was granted for payment of salary to the petitioner (and Barkatullah Khan) on the basis of their last pay certificates. The petitioner was working there when by office order, dated 15.3.2000 his deputation in the Government department was terminated with effect from the date of issuance of the order and he was asked to go back to the Corporation. By the same order, the Corporation was requested to send the services of one Muktinath Singh, a Class IV employee on deputation to the Government department.

3. This writ petition has been filed challenging the office order, dated 15.3.2000 in so far as it terminates the petitioner's deputation and sends him back to the Corporation.

4. In the writ petition, it is stated that there were five posts of driver, three of which were duly filled up and against the remaining two posts, peons and other Class IV employees were being made to work. It is asserted by the petitioner that not only there were vacancies in the post of driver but the department, in fact, needed more employees as would be evident from the fact that Barkatullah Khan was retained on deputation and the department had also asked the Corporation to send another Class IV employee Muktinath Singh on deputation. According to the petitioner, he was unreasonably and arbitrarily singled out for being sent back to the Corporation.

5. The respondent authorities have filed a counter affidavit and a supplementary counter affidavit. The central theme of the counter affidavit is that the petitioner, being on deputation, had no right to the post and he must leave once the department took the decision to end his deputation. In the counter affidavit, it is further stated that the Minister, Relief & Rehabilitation by his I.O.U, dated 26.11.99 had directed for the return of the petitioner to the Corporation “on account of his whimsical absence from duty” whereupon the department terminated his deputation taking advantage of the fact that the petitioner was inducted on deputation till further orders. In the counter affidavit it was admitted that there were five posts of driver but it was stated that Class IV employees knowing driving were employed as drivers in exigencies of the situation.

6. In the supplementary counter affidavit, it is stated that following the bifurcation of the State and the creation of the State of Jharkhand, two out of the five posts of driver were allocated to Jharkhand and the Department was now left with only three posts of driver.

7. Mr. Suresh Kumar, J.C to S.C.V took the same line of resistance as indicated in the counter affidavit. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was on deputation and his deputation was till further orders. He, therefore, had no right to the post in the Government Department of Relief and Rehabilitation and once his deputation was terminated, the only course open to him was to leave the department and to go and rejoin the Corporation.

8. In support of his submissions, Mr. Suresh Kumar relied upon a decision of this court in Md. Serajuddin v. State of Bihar, 2001 (2) P.L.J.R 594.

9. Mr. Y.V Giri, learned Senior counsel appearing in support of this writ petition, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner came to work in the Government department not on deputation in the ordinary sense of the term and it was more a case of rehabilitation than deputation. According to the petitioner, the Corporation in which he was appointed and in which he was previously working had for all intent and purposes ceased to exist as a functioning organisation and when the Corporation had reached a stage where its survival had become doubtful, a suggestion was made to send out its surplus staff to different Government departments and Government bodies. It was in those circumstances that the petitioner and Barkatullah Khan came to work in the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation. In the present state of the Corporation, it would be futile and un-realistic to suggest that the petitioner continued to have lien on the post held by him there. In these circumstances, it would be unreasonable and unfair to view this matter as an ordinary case of deputation and to non-suit the petitioner on the basis of the decision relied upon by the State.

10. I find considerable substance in the submissions made by Mr. Giri.

11. It is well settled that normally a deputationist has no right to the post and the decision in Md. Serajuddin (supra) simply reiterates that legal position but that decision has no application to the facts of this case and there is force in Mr. Giri's submission that the case of the petitioner was not a case of deputation in the ordinary sense of the term.

12. The submissions made by Mr. Giri appear to be fully supported by another set of decisions in a case much similar on facts to the case in hand. Two employees of the Bihar State Agro Industries Dev. Corporation Limited were sent on deputation to the Department of Transport, Govt. of Bihar under similar circumstances. The deputation of one of them, namely, Amarnath Singh was terminated and he was sent back to the Agro Industries Corporation. He came to this court in CWJC No. 3513 of 1994 challenging the action of the Government in terminating his deputation and asking him to go back to the Agro Corporation. In that case too, the Government sought to justify its action by taking the plea that the deputationist had no right to the post. The action of the Government was further sought to be justified on the ground that complaints were received against the concerned deputationists.

13. A learned single judge of this court allowed the writ petition by judgment and order, dated 12.9.97 The learned Judge turned down the Government's contention that the deputationists had no right to the post pointing out that in the circumstances in which the employees from the Agro Dev. Corporation were sent to the Government department, it was not a case of deputation in the ordinary sense of the term. The court further pointed out that the primary reason for not keeping the concerned employee in the department was that certain unproved complaints had been received against him. The court took the view that it might have been open to the Government to proceed against the concerned employee in a disciplinary action on the basis of those complaints but the action of the Government to terminate the depuation and, thus, to render him, for all practical purposes without employment, using the complaints collaterally was not sustainable in the eyes of law. It was also pointed out that the action of the Government was discriminatory inasmuch as the concerned employee was sent back to the Corporation while another deputationist was allowed to continue in the department.

14. The Government's appeal being L.P.A No. 1566 of 1997 preferred against the judgment and order passed by learned single Judge was dismissed by a reasoned order, dated 22.4.98 and a petition for special leave being S.L.P No. 00312 of 1999 met with a similar fate when it was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 1.2.1999

15. The case of the employee from the Agro Dev. Corporation appears to be very similar to the case of the present petitioner. Both were sent on deputation to Government department in similar circumstances. The deputations in both the cases were terminated for similar reasons; in the case of the employee of the Agro Dev. Corporation there were complaints received against him; in the present case the Minister of the Department had complained about the petitioner's ‘whimsical absence’ from duty. In both the cases though the deputation of the concerned employee was terminated, others working on deputation were allowed to continue.

16. For all these reasons, I find and hold that the decisions in the case of Amarnath Singh applies fully to the facts of this case and this writ petition too must be allowed in the same terms. The impugned order at Annexure 8 to the writ petition is held to be neither just, reasonable or fair within the meaning of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The impugned order cannot be sustained and is, therefore, quashed. This will, however, not prevent the respondents from initiating a regular proceeding. If they are so advised, against the petitioner for his alleged whimsical absence, in accordance with law.

17. This writ petition is, thus, allowed to the extent indicated above but without any order as to costs.