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Narain v. King-Emperor

Patna High Court
Mar 21, 1946
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — Narain Sahi (Appeal on Insanity Plea)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Narain Sahi, aged 28, was convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Dumka for the murder of his wife, Musammat Chinta Kumari (aged 20), and his son, Kamdeb (aged 2¼), and was sentenced to transportation for life. The facts as found by the trial court and recited in the opinion show that on 11 October 1944 the appellant and his wife had an altercation; shortly after the appellant fetched an axe and the wife and child were subsequently found dead with incised wounds and an axe lying nearby. A cousin (Ramrachha Sahi) and other relatives witnessed relevant parts of the occurrence and discovered the bodies. The appellant was later found wearing blood-stained clothes; he allegedly confessed to several villagers while being taken from a relative's house and was brought to the police station.

The appellant raised a plea of insanity at trial. Four assessors who sat with the Additional Sessions Judge recorded a finding of not guilty under section 302, Penal Code, which the opinion interprets as representing a view that the appellant was insane at the time. The trial judge rejected the plea of insanity but mitigated the sentence (not imposing the full penalty). The appellant appealed the conviction and sentence; the present opinion (Bennett, J., with Meredith, J. concurring) addresses that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, at the time of committing the acts, the appellant was of unsound mind (i.e., whether the accused discharged the initial burden of showing unsoundness of mind).
  2. If the appellant was of unsound mind, whether the unsoundness was of such degree and nature as to satisfy the tests of legal insanity under section 84, Penal Code — specifically, whether by reason of such unsoundness he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (defence)

  • The appellant raised the plea of insanity at trial (section 84, Penal Code). Evidence was led about his prior and recent mental condition from family members and acquaintances: examples include statements by Meghlal Sahi (p.w.2), Begru Sahi (p.w.3), Badri Sahi (p.w.6) and Pandit Gaya Prasad (p.w.11) describing periods of muteness, incoherent talk, excitability, episodes resembling melancholia or epilepsy, and a generally poor mental condition for the preceding two years.
  • At various stages (committal, section 342 examination) the appellant denied having committed the murders; in his committal statement he expressed that he would not cross-examine witnesses or cite witnesses and asserted he had not killed his wife and son.
  • The defence relied on the prior and contemporaneous testimony about his mental condition to contend he was legally insane at the time of the acts.

Prosecution / Respondent's Position (as reflected by evidence)

  • Witness testimony and physical evidence show deliberate and coherent acts surrounding the offence: the appellant fetched an axe from his room, threatened a cousin (Ramrachha) to prevent interference, closed the verandah door from the inside, and ran away thereafter; an axe was found near the bodies; the appellant was later seen walking away and was found wearing the same blood-stained clothes at his maternal uncle's house.
  • Medical and supervisory observations during custody (Dr. P.A. Singh, p.w.23; Dr. D.N. Ray, p.w.1) stated that during periods of observation the appellant showed nothing to lead them to suppose he was of unsound mind and that in their opinion he was of sound mind and capable of making his defence.
  • On the facts recited, the prosecution case (as reflected in the judgment) treated the killing as established beyond reasonable doubt and relied on conduct and confessions inconsistent with legal insanity under section 84.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the legal question as a two-step inquiry under section 84, Penal Code: (1) whether the accused was of unsound mind at the time of the act; and (2) if so, whether that unsoundness was of such degree and nature as to meet the legal tests of incapacity to know the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law.

On the first issue (unsoundness of mind): the court concluded that the appellant had discharged the burden of showing that he was of unsound mind at the time of the killings. The court relied upon the testimony of relatives and acquaintances describing past and recent mental disturbances — for example, periods when the appellant was "mute", talked incoherently, laughed without reason, became angry when disturbed, had an unstable mental condition over the preceding two years (p.w.2, p.w.3, p.w.6, p.w.11), and other indicia of mental disorder. The court regarded these matters, together with the lack of sufficient motive and the appellant's subsequent conduct (notably continuing to wear the blood-soaked clothes), as pointing to unsoundness of mind.

On the second issue (legal incapacity under section 84): the court emphasised that the legal test — incapacity to understand the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law — is narrower than medical notions of insanity and must be decided by ordinary rules of evidence and logical inference. The court examined contemporaneous acts and demeanour: the appellant's deliberate fetching of an axe, his threat to Ramrachha to prevent interference, closing the verandah door behind him, his immediate flight from the scene, his request (to villagers) to be allowed to wash blood-stained clothes before returning, and his confession to villagers that he had killed his wife and child.

These deliberate, purposive actions, the court held, "combine effectively to rebut any inference that might otherwise arise as to his incapacity at the time of knowing the nature of his act, that it was wrong and that it was contrary to law." Thus, although the appellant was found to have been of unsound mind, the court concluded that the unsoundness was not of such a degree as to meet the legal test of incapacity under section 84.

The court also noted medical observations made while the appellant was under custody (Dr. P.A. Singh and Dr. D.N. Ray) that did not find indications of unsoundness during periods of observation; these observations formed part of the evidence relevant to the second issue.

The trial judge's approach of rejecting the plea of insanity while mitigating the sentence (because of the appellant's disturbed mind) was described by Bennett, J. as appropriate in the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The conviction and sentence (transportation for life) are confirmed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is to leave in place the trial court's conviction of the appellant for the murders and the sentence of transportation for life.
  • The court records that the appellant was found to have been of unsound mind but that the unsoundness did not satisfy the legal tests in section 84, Penal Code; therefore the plea of legal insanity failed.
  • The bench directed that a copy of the judgment be forwarded to the Local Government and suggested (without making a specific formal recommendation as to final disposition) that it may be appropriate for the authority concerned to keep the person under observation in prison and to have periodic reports on his mental condition, particularly prior to any release. The opinion does not purport to establish any new legal precedent; it applies statutory tests under section 84 to the facts of the case.

Judges: Bennett, J. (delivering the principal opinion); Meredith, J. (concurring). Appeal dismissed.

Show all summary ...

Bennett, J.:— The appellant, Narain Sahi, aged 28, has been convicted of the murder of his wife, Musammat Chinta Kumari, aged 20, and his son, Kamdeb, aged 2¼, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Dumka, and sentenced to transportation for life.

The facts of the case as disclosed by the evidence are as follows:—

The appellant is the son of Begru Sahi (p.w 3). Begru Sahi and his three brothers, Nandlal Sahi, Karu Sahi and Meghlal Sahi (p.w 2) live with their respective families in the same house at Paljori, police-station Madhupur, in the Deoghar Sub-division of Dumka District. On the west of the inner angan of this house there is a closed verandah in front of a room where the appellant lived with his family, and another verandah in front of the kitchen, which lies to the south of the inner angan. The appellant had always lived upon cordial terms with his wife who was a woman of good moral character, and he was stated to have been very fond of his young son. Shortly before 9-30 on the 11th of October, 1944, the appellant and his wife were having their breakfast in the southern verandah, when Ramrachha Sahi, aged 14, son of Karu Sahi and, therefore, a first cousin of the appellant, came home from a school for his breakfast. Ramrachha Sahi heard an altercation going on between the appellant and his wife about some money for which the appellant had asked his wife to enable him to go to his maternal uncle's house at Binjhi Pipra. Following this altercation, the appellant came out of the southern verandah, went to his own room on the west of the angan and came out with an axe. Ramrachha asked him where he was going with the axe. The appellant threatened him if he interfered and returned to the southern osara, the door of which he closed from the inside. In answer to very leading questions in cross-examination Ramrachha said that at that time the appellant looked like a made man and that his eyes were red. Ramrachha then heard cries from the appellant's wife and ran out towards a pond where his aunt, Musammat Nunumani, wife of Ramcharan Sahi (p.w 20), and Musammat Janki (p.w 5), the wife of Badri Sahi (p.w 6), a son of Nandlal Sahi, had gone to bathe. Nunumani and Janki, who were returning from the pond, heard Ramrachha's outcry. All three of them then saw the appellant running away from the house towards the east. They went to the verandah of the southern room, which was then open, and saw the appellant's Wife and son lying dead in a pool of blood with injuries on their persons, and an axe lying on the floor. Ramrachha Sahi's two younger brothers, Ramcharan and Ramsaran, returned from school on hearing his outcry and he then sent them to village Behnon, about half a mile south of village Paljori, to fetch their father Meghlal Sahi. Meghlal Sahi returned with his brother Karu and he and Karu both saw the two dead bodies and the axe lying near by. Meghlal Sahi then went to village Kapsa, about half a mile east of his village, to search for the appellant. He did not find him, and from there he went to Madhupur police-station, 8 miles distance, and lodged a First Information at 4-30 a.m In the fird-beyan Meghlal Sahi gave the hearsay account of the occurrence, which had been given to him by his son Ramrachha, and added:

“The motive for the murder is nothing except that the mind of Narain sometimes used to become affected and deranged”.

At about 10 a.m Tilakdhari Sahi (p.w 14) and Amir Sahi (p.w 15) were sitting at Tilakdhari's shop at Kapsa, half a mile east of the village Paljori, and saw the appellant walking fast towards the east, though from his gait Tilakdhari did not suspect that anything untoward had occurred.

The following morning Badri Sahi (p.w 6) the deceased's father, Kesho Mandai (p.w 7), Hargauri Mirdha (p.w 8, tendered), Ganesh Mandai (p.w 9, tendered) went to Binjhi Pipra to search for the appellant at the house of his maternal uncle. They found the appellant there sleeping in the open verandah and wearing the same blood-stained clothes which he were at the time of the crime. These blood stains were subsequently certified to be those of human blood. These four persons asked the appellant to go home, but he declined to do so immediately, saying he desired first to take his bath and wash his clothes. He was not allowed to do so, however, and was brought back to Kapsa, where Meghlal Sahi and the chowkidar were sent for and took him to Madhupur police-station. On their way back from Binjhi Pipra to Kapsa, the appellant told the four abovementioned witnesses that he had killed his wife and son.

On the 13th of October, 1944, Dr. P.A Singh (p.w 23), Assistant Surgeon, Deoghar, held a post mortem examination on the dead bodies of the appellant's wife and son. The wife's body was covered with blood and rigor mortis was absent. He found 8 incised wounds on various parts of the head, neck and shoulders. On the person of the appellant's son, Kamdeb, he found 5, incised wounds also on his neck and shoulder regions. Dr. Singh stated that the injuries on both of them had been caused by some sharp cutting instrument, such as the axe that had been found lying near the bodies.

The evidence as to the previous mental history of the appellant was as follows:

(a) Meghlal Sahi (p.w 2), the appellant's uncle, stated:

“The accused used not to look after the affairs of the house. He used often to remain mute. He used not to mix with people. When disturbed by others he used to grow angry and talk loudly. His son used not to remain with him very often. Sometimes the accused remained in the state just described by me, and at other times he remained in a normal state”;

(b) Begru Sahi (p.w 3), the appellant's father, stated:

“My wife died about 12 or 18 years ago. She used to have epileptic fits. The mental condition of the accused was not good during the last two years. I had taken him to Purulia for treatment, but he ran away from that place. He had once run away from, home and I brought him back from Burdwan”;

(c) Badri. Sahi (p.w 6), the appellant's first cousin, stated:

“Before the occurrence the accused's mind was somewhat unbalanced. Some times at night he used to go out of the house”;

(d) Pandit Gaya Prasad (p.w 11), a teacher in a Sanskrit Pathshala, who lived in the same house as the appellant and his relatives, but who was not otherwise related to them, stated:

“The accused used to talk incoherently and used to laugh without any reason-He was in the same state of mind a day or two before the occurrence. He sometimes used to get excited when disturbed. Sometimes he used to keep quiet. He had no epileptic fits in my presence”.

Dr. P.A Singh (p.w 23) gave evidence that he was the Superintendent of Deoghar Sub-jail and that he kept the appellant under his observation from the 14th to the 20th October, 1944, to ascertain if he was or was not of sound mind and that during that period he found nothing which would lead him to suppose that the appellant was of unsound mind.

Dr. D.N Ray (p.w 1), at that time the Jail Superintendent of Dumka Jail, stated that the appellant was in jail custody and under his observation from the 19th of May, 1945, to the 4th of June, 1945, that he did not find him to be of unsound mind and that in his opinion he was of sound mind and capable of making his defence.

In his examination by the Committing Magistrate, the appellant stated—

“I live with Meghlal Sahi, who is my uncle. There is sufficient room and space. For 7 or 8 years there had been a dispute between me and the other members of my family. I wanted to divide the share but they did not agree to it. They also sometimes wanted to beat me and beat me as well.

On the date murder was committed I had gone to my mother's brother's house. My father was at Purulia. Five persons of the village. Kese Mandai, Badri Sahi, Megho Sahi, Hargauri and Ganesh Mandai went and spoke to me that my wife and son were murdered. I said that I would not go as Meghlal Sahi would kill me also. But they said that they would not allow this to be done and asked me to accompany them. I went and they took away my clothes and shirt and caused me to wear another dhoti. I have never killed them (wife and son). Is there any one who can kill his wile and son? I shall not now cross-examine the witnesses nor shall I cite witnesses, there were some blood marks in my clothes. My finger was cut”.

In his committal order the Committing Magistrate stated:

“I think it would be better for the ends of justice to keep him under further medical observation for I have often noticed him in the dock vacantly smiling within himself”.

At the trial the appellant was examined under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, as follows:—

“Q.—Did you on the 11th October 1944, murder your wife Chintamani and your son Kamdeb at Parjori?

A.—I have not teen married. I did not commit murder as I have not been married.

Q.—You have heard the evidence of the witnesses: Have you got anything to say?

A.—The constable arrested me and the Suh-Inspector of Police of Madhupur arrested me.

Q.—Do this shirt (Ex. III) and dhoti (Ex. II) and the shoe (Ex. IV) belong to you and have these been taken from your body?

A.—These articles do not belong to me.”

Dr. P.A Singh (p.w 23) stated that the symptoms described as abovementioned by p.ws 2, 3, 6 and 11 may be present in a melancholic, and that melancholia and acute mania may occur at different times in an insane person, and that homicidal mania may occur suddendly.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge after a careful review of the evidence, came to the conclusion that it had been proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the appellant did, in fact, kill his wife and child. In this Court that finding was not and could not be seriously disputed. The evidence to that effect was overwhelming.

The only issue on appeal, therefore, is as to the state of the appellant's mind at the time he committed the acts in question.

The plea of insanity was raised before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The four assessors, who sat with the latter, found that the appellant was not guilty under section 302, Penal Code. Having regard to the overwhelming evidence as to the commission of the act, this finding must, I think, represent the view that the appellant at the time he killed his wife and child was insane.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge found that the appellant's mind was in a far from normal state when he killed his wife and son, but that the facts that the appellant beforehand dosed the door of the verandah behind him and that thereafter he ran away to his maternal uncle's house, show beyond doubt that he knew what he was doing was wrong and contrary to law, and, he, therefore, rejected the plea of insanity. In view, however, of the evidence as to the appellant's state of mind, he did not think that the full penalty of the law should be exacted. In that, I think that lie took the right course.

Where a plea of insanity is raised under section 84, Penal Code, the Court has to consider two issues. Firstly, whether the accused has established that at the time of committing the act he was of unsound mind. If the does not succeed in this preliminary issue, the plea fails. Secondly, if he was of unsound mind, whether he has established that the unsoundness of mind was of a degree and nature to satisfy one of the knowledge tests laid down by the section.

Whether or not an accused at the time he committed the act was of unsound mind is a matter of inference from his previous and contemporaneous acts, statements and demeanour and from any other relevant evidence as to insanity in his ancestors or relations, as to particular illnes affecting the mind and from any medical evidence that may be tendered. Mere eccentricity is not enough, there must be enough to show that at the material time the accused was suffering from some definite or recognisable form of mental disease.

In this case, I am of opinion that the accused has discharged the burden upon him of showing that at the time he killed his wife and child he was of unsound mind. By reason of the excitability due to the unsoundness of his mind, he was prompted to take a terrible and savage revenge upon his wife and then upon his child for his wife's refusal to give him money for the purpose of a visit to his maternal uncle. Insufficient or no motive is not, in itself sufficient evidence of legal insanity, but it is, of course, a factor, and an important, factor to be taken into consideration together with the other facts and circumstances of the case in determining whether or not the accused was at the time of unsound mind. Here, the lack of sufficient motive considered in the light of his previous mental history and his act in continuing to wear the clothes soaked in the blood of his wife with whom his relations had always been cordial and of the child of whom he was very fond show, in my opinion, that the appellant was not of sound mind when he committed the acts in question.

I turn, therefore, to the second, issue as to whether his unsoundness of mind was of a, degree and nature to satisfy one of the knowledge tests laid down by the section, namely, whether by reason thereof he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. It is this test which distinguishes legal from medical insanity. In considering this issue, it is essential to bear in mind that to such an extent are the great majority of lunatics able to appreciate the nature of their acts and to distinguish between right and wrong, to such an extent are they guided by the same motives, desires and emotions as are sane persons, that it is both just and necessary to apply to the evidence of their acts, demeanour and statements the same standards of logical inference as we ordinarily apply to those of sane persons. Once that is recognised and the decision upon this second issue thus falls to be decided by the ordinary-rules of evidence and logic, the task of a Court in dealing with, what is otherwise a fearsome and complicated subject becomes a straightforward one. In this case, the deliberation of the appellant in fetching the axe, his threat to Ramrachha if he intervened, his closing of the door behind him before he committed the crimes, his running away thereafter, his request to be allowed to wash his blood-stained clothes before returning with his relatives and his confession to them that he had killed his wife and child, all combine effectively to rebut any inference that might otherwise arise as to his incapacity at the time of knowing the nature of his act, that it was wrong and that it was contrary to law.

I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

I would at the same time direct that a copy of the judgment be forwarded to the Local Government. I do not make any specific recommendation as to how the appellant should be dealt with. In similar circumstances and in another place and capacity, I have often ordered that such a person should be kept under observation for sometime whilst in prison and that a report should be made from time to time, and more particularly immediately prior to his release, upon his mental condition and it may be that such a course will recommend itself to the authority concerned.

I would order that the conviction and sentence be confirmed and the appeal be dismissed.

Meredith, J.:— I agree to the order proposed. In my, opinion the appellant failed to discharge the onus which lay upon him to bring his case within the ambit of section 84, of the Penal Code. On the contrary, the evidence taken as a whole appears to me to indicate that he did know the nature of his act, did know it was wrong, and did know it was contrary to law.

Appeal dismissed.
S.H