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Andrew Yule And Co. And Others v. A.H Skone And Others Opposite Parties.

Patna High Court
Jan 14, 1919

1. The facts of this case have been most clearly stated in the admirable judgment of the learned Deputy Magistrate, Mr. Kshitis Chandra Sarkar. They are that there is in the estate of the Maharaja of Chota Nagpur a village, named Keri, of which one of the Tolas is Bhageya. The village excluding the Tola of Bhageya was given in Brahmottar to one of the priestly caste many years ago and was later the subject, of a lease by the Brahmottadar to one Pickard. That lease contemplated the actual holding in direct possession of all fallow lands within the area covered by the lease and also the right to the minerals lying beneath the surface of the land covered by the lease. It has been found as a fact that Mr. Pickard made boring and sent coal obtained by such borings to Calcutta for analysis and that he sank a shaft which is still in existence and generally speaking, exercised, up to the time when he gave a lease to one Skone, the right granted to him under the lease given by the Brahmottadar. It has been found as a fact that after Pickard transferred his rights to the Skones, the present second party, that second party continued to be in direct possession of the property, which was the subject of the lease given by the Brahmottadar, up to the year 1912. In 1914, in view no doubt of the decision of the Judicial Committee that presumably a Brahmottadar has no power to dispose of anything below the surface granted to him, Messrs Andrew Yule and Co. obtained a grant of the mining rights of the whole of Mouzah Keri from the Maharaja of Chota Nagpur and the Kumar, who had certain rights as a Khorposhdar in the village. In pursuance of the title conveyed by the lease granted by the Maharaja and the Kumar, Andrew Yule and Co. built a bungalow in Tola Bhageya and began to take coal from certain outcrops, which the learned Deputy Magistrate has distinctly found to be a part of the Tola Bhageya. They also made preparations for entering upon all the other Tolas of village Keri with a view to enforce the right to dig for coal therein. Upon this it was reported by the police that a breach of the peace was imminent. The Magistrate thereupon issue proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr PC and after investigating the question whether a breach of the peace was imminent or not came to the conclusion that but for his action there would have been a breach of the peace. He thereupon decided that on the strength of the undisputed possession up to 1912 and the absence of any evidence of a disturbance of the possession between 1912 and the date of the proceedings, the second party was entitled to an order restraining the first party from interfering with his possession in the village Keri, excluding the Tola of Bhageya to which the second party made no claim. Against that order an application was presented by Mr. Das for the setting aside of the order, on the ground that it was made without jurisdiction. This application was admitted and now comes before me for disposal.

2. The first point taken by Mr. Das is, that the Magistrate, having been required by S. 145 to decide who was in actual possession of the property, was required to come to a finding as to who was in possession at the time on the actual date of the issue of his order or two months prior thereto; and that in deciding only who was in possession five years prior to that order, he failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law and has not in fact disposed of the case at all. The order therefore being made without a proper determination of the real issue in the case, should be set aside.

3. The second line taken by Mr. Das is, that in accordance with the universal rule of civil law, where title and possession go together over a part of the property, the possession over a part is possession over the whole property covered by the title. The learned Magistrate has himself recorded that probably the civil Courts will now hold that Andrew Yule and Co., who were the first party, had a better title than the second party. On the strength of that decision it is argued that the decision that Andrew Yule and to being in possession of Bhageya, a part of the property covered by their title, and having admittedly a good title over the whole of Keri, the possession of Bhageya, is in the eye of the law, possession of the whole village Keri, and that, therefore an order made upon this finding should have been in favour of Andrew Yule and to and that the order made against Andrew Yule and Co., was on the finding without jurisdiction. Thirdly, it is argued that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to enter into these proceedings at all, and that if indeed mining rights can be the subject of proceedings under Ch. 12, Code of Criminal Procedure, they should be taken under S. 147, which is expressly designed for a consideration of the rights claimed by persons not as owners of the property in dispute, but as claiming a subservient right to use the property in dispute in a particular manner.

4. I should not personally be prepared to enter at all upon either of the questions raised by the first two arguments put forward by Mr. Das. It has always been my view that, when a Magistrate has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case and devotes his judicial mind to a consideration of the points which he is required to determine, any error of law with regard to the interpretation of the words of the section which he is applying is not an error in the exercise of his jurisdiction but an error which would in the ordinary course be subject to an appeal. Such errors are not subject to superintendence, but inasmuch as there are instances in which the Courts have interfered with matters of this description upon a hypothesis, that if possession is not legally sufficient to warrant an order under S. 145, the granting of the order is made without jurisdiction. I would note briefly that on these two points the Magistrate has not, in my view, committed even a legal error. The Court has found as a fact that Mr. Pickard made a shaft and was in possession of it up to the year 1912. That shaft is still in existence and no one has done anything to put Mr. Pickard or his successors out of possession. Possession was taken under what seemed at the time an undisputed title and possession acquired in such circumstances would continue to be a legal possession until destroyed by some overt act. It has been found as a fact that this act of possession, the making of a shaft, is the only act of possession that has ever been committed on so much of the property as was covered by Mr. Pickard's lease. This finding, in my opinion, furnished good ground for holding that on the date of the order under S. 145, Pickard's successor was in possession of the property covered by this title.

5. It remains to discuss whether a mining right comes within the provisions of S. 145 or S. 147. The matter has been argued in this Court upon the basis of an analogy between mining rights and rights exercised by other classes of persons entitled to make use of land not belonging to themselves. I am of opinion that upon a plain reading of the words of the section, mining rights must reasonably be regarded as falling within the definition of the term land. It will be remembered that in the earlier Code, S. 530 ran very much in the same terms as the present S. 145, that is to say, that the old section gave jurisdiction to a Magistrate in a case of all disputes concerning land or the boundaries of land within the limitation of his jurisdiction. In the intermediate Code, that of 1878, the words house, water, fisheries, crops and other produce of land were omitted and the section ran “disputes concerning any tangible immovable property or the boundaries thereof;” and on the strength of this alteration in the law, Field, J., Beverley, J., concurring, held in the case of Pramatha Bhusana Deb Roy v. Doorga Churn Bhattacharji(1) that the Code must now be regarded as limited to actual tangible property and not to incorporeal rights exercisable over such property. This was followed by MacDonell, J., Beverley, J., concurring, in the case of Krishna Dhone Dutt v. Troilokia Nath Biswas(2). These two decisions were frequently followed in the Court in Calcutta with the result that in 1898 the framers of the new Code found it necessary to reinstate in the Code of 1898 the words omitted from the Code of 1878.

6. It follows, I think, on this consideration of the law, that the present S. 145 is intended to cover all profits derivable from land or water, and in particular fisheries as providing profits taken from water, Surely if a fishery be regarded as yielding a profit to be taken from water, a mining right must be regarded as yielding a profit to be taken from land.

7. I decline therefore to interfere with the orders made by the learned Deputy Magistrate and reject this application.

V.S/R.K

8. Application rejected.