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Mahidar v. Ralyani Prasad
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from execution proceedings on a decree obtained on 25 March 1930 in the Purulia Court for about Rs. 28,000 against Kalipada Roy and Purnendu Narain Singh. Kalipada Roy had died and the appellant is his son. Several unsuccessful attempts to execute the decree occurred in 1930, 1932 and 1933. An execution case begun on 9 July 1935 was dismissed on part satisfaction in May 1936.
On 18 June 1936 the decree-holder applied for transfer of the decree for execution to the Subordinate Judge at Asansol with a certificate of non-satisfaction; an order to prepare and send that certificate was passed and the certificate was prepared on 25 June 1936 (exhibit 2). A copy of the order and the certificate were received by the Asansol court on 4 July 1936. The Asansol court returned the certificate to Purulia on 4 March 1937 because no execution application was made there.
On 6 July 1939 the decree-holder filed another application for execution before the Purulia court, seeking execution against heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor (including arrest) and seeking attachment of movable properties described as situated outside Purulia's jurisdiction. The Purulia court noted that the decree had been transferred to Asansol on 6 July 1936 (the office was under a mistaken impression about dates) and adjourned the matter. The decree-holders sought leave to amend and, at their request, notices under CPC Order XXII, r.3 and Order XXI, r.22 were issued (served by affixing). On 9 December 1939 judgment-debtors objected under section 47 CPC that the execution was barred by limitation and that a succession certificate was required because the original decree-holder had died.
The Subordinate Judge initially held on 16 May 1940 that the execution was barred by limitation because the 6 July 1939 application was not in accordance with law and had asked relief the court could not grant; he therefore concluded amendment could not cure limitation and that a succession certificate need not be afforded an opportunity. On appeal, this Court affirmed dismissal of execution only on the ground that the decree-holder had no right to execute without a succession certificate and refrained from expressing an opinion on limitation (order dated 18 September 1941).
After obtaining a succession certificate on 27 October 1941 the decree-holders filed the present execution application. The judgment-debtors again objected, principally that the present application is barred by limitation because the earlier (6 July 1939) execution application was time-barred having been commenced more than three years after a "final order" in the step-in-aid/transfer process (the date disputed being 25 June 1936 vs. 6 July 1936), and that the 6 July 1939 application was not in accordance with law (court lacked competence to grant the relief sought).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the decree-holder's execution application filed on 6 July 1939 (and the subsequent amendment) was barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, given the earlier events in 1936 relating to transfer/step-in-aid of execution.
- Whether the 6 July 1939 application was "an application in accordance with law" for the purpose of restarting limitation (Article 182 and related provisions), given that it sought relief the executing court arguably had no power to grant (arrest of heirs; attachment of movables outside territorial jurisdiction).
- Whether the amendment of the 6 July 1939 application (allowed 4 August 1939) operated retrospectively to make the 6 July filing a valid application for limitation purposes, or whether the amendment constituted a new application made after limitation had run.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (judgment-debtor) — arguments summarized
- Mr. P.R. Das argued that the date of the "final order" in the step-in-aid/transfer application cannot be treated as later than 25 June 1936; therefore an execution application filed on 6 July 1939 was beyond the three-year period and barred by limitation.
- He also argued the 6 July 1939 application was not an application "in accordance with law" because (a) no succession certificate had been obtained at that time and (b) the executing court was incompetent to grant the relief sought (arrest of heirs; attachment of movables outside its territorial jurisdiction). He contended the application only became lawful when amended on 4 August 1939, but that amendment date was still more than three years after 6 July 1936.
- Earlier, an objection on res judicata ground was raised (that the prior order finding limitation was conclusive), but that point was not pressed because the appellate court had not decided the limitation point previously.
Respondent / Decree-holder (as represented in argument and earlier rulings) — arguments summarized
- The learned Advocate-General for the respondent contended that the order made on 18 June 1936 was a judicial decision disposing of the transfer question and that the case was only to be finally disposed of on 6 July 1936; relying on Husain Ashgar Ali (Judicial Committee) he argued that such a judicial order can give a fresh starting point for limitation.
- Before the Subordinate Judge it was held (by that judge) that the 6 July 1939 application had been entertained by a court that had jurisdiction to entertain it, that the presence of prayer(s) beyond the court's competence was immaterial because the court could have granted partial relief (for example, by transferring the decree to Asansol), and that the final order in 1936 was passed on 6 July 1936.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chutterput Singh (Calcutta High Court, Full Bench) | Transmission of a decree by the Court is a ministerial act of the officer and not a judicial act; an application for transmission is not a revival of the decree. | The Court relied on this to hold that the transmission/ certificate-of-non-satisfaction process was ministerial and that the final ministerial act occurred on 25 June 1936 (date certificate prepared and signed), not on 6 July 1936. |
| Banku Behari Chatterji (Judicial Committee) | Approved correctness of the Calcutta Full Bench view that transmission is ministerial (as described in the opinion). | Cited to reinforce that the order of transmission/dispatch was ministerial and therefore the operative date was when the ministerial act occurred (25 June 1936). |
| Husain Ashgar Ali (Judicial Committee) | Holds that when an appellate court makes a judicial order finally disposing of an appeal, such an order gives a new starting point for limitation (Article 182(2) of Act of 1908). | The Advocate-General relied on it to argue 18 June / 6 July 1936 created a new starting point; the Court considered but rejected its applicability because the 1936 action was ministerial, not a judicial disposal. |
| Firm Johar Mal-Paran Ram | Defines "in accordance with law" in Article 182(5): an application must be for something the executing court is competent to do; an application for relief the executing court cannot grant is not "in accordance with law". | The Court applied this principle to hold the 6 July 1939 application (seeking arrest of heirs and attachment of movables outside jurisdiction) was not in accordance with law and therefore could not start limitation. |
| Amrit Lal (Division Bench of this Court) | Accepted the view that "in accordance with law" means an application for something the executing court is competent to do (as applied in Firm Johar Mal). | Referred to as supporting authority for the interpretation of "in accordance with law". |
| Sreenath Chakravarty (Calcutta case; Mukherji, J.) | Suggested that an application which seeks relief the court cannot grant may still count for limitation purposes so long as the court has jurisdiction to entertain the application. | The Advocate-General relied on this view; the Court expressly declined to accept its correctness and explained that subsequent authorities and the Court's own decisions do not follow that approach. |
| Sital Prasad Shukul | Held that where decree-holder asks executing court to do something it is not empowered to do, such an application cannot give a starting point for limitation. | The Court invoked this decision to support the proposition that the 6 July 1939 application could not save limitation because the executing court lacked power to grant the relief sought. |
| Maharaja of Bobbili v. Sree Rajah Narasaraju (Privy Council) | Held that an application for execution presented to a court which had no jurisdiction to execute the decree was not a step-in-aid of execution. | Referred to as supporting authority that a court without jurisdiction cannot be used to start limitation by means of an execution application. |
| Prem Chand Dey v. Mokhoda Debi | Authority noting that if the executing court neither at the time of the suit nor at the time of execution had jurisdiction over the property, the application would be bad. | Cited within discussion of Chandmal Marwari to distinguish circumstances where the original court had or had not jurisdiction at relevant times. |
| Chandmal Marwari | Discussed whether the court which passed the decree may be applied to for execution even in respect of property outside territorial jurisdiction and whether such an application can save limitation. | The Court considered Chandmal Marwari but distinguished it because in that case the court at Purulia had jurisdiction at the time of the suit and at the time of application; here Purulia lacked jurisdiction over the properties/relief sought. |
| Sakti Nath Roy Choudhury (Calcutta case) | Dissented from the dictum in Sreenath Chakravarty and stated the executing court must have jurisdiction to sell immovable property either at the date of suit or at the date of application. | Relied on to support the view that the executing court must have jurisdiction at suit or application date; the Court regarded this as the proper view. |
| Jagannath Das | Held that an application to amend a pending execution application made after the decree has become time-barred cannot be entertained. | Applied to conclude that a post-expiry amendment does not revive a time-barred application; supported the conclusion that the 4 Aug 1939 amendment could not validate the July filing if limitation had already run. |
| Raja Kalyani Prasad Singh Deo Bahadur (unreported, 27 Mar 1944) | Principle: if a second application constitutes a substantial departure from the first, the second must be treated as a new application (fresh), not a continuation. | Used to conclude that the amendment in the present case was a substantial departure (new properties sought) and therefore amounted to a new application made after the limitation period. |
| Mt. Khodaijtul Kubra (Chief Justice's decision) | Held that an execution application which failed to describe the properties to be attached is not "in accordance with law" for purposes of Article 182(5). | Invoked to show that applications lacking clear description of required steps/properties cannot be step-in-aid of execution; analogous to present case where the amended petition sought wholly different properties. |
| Gajanand Shah | Distinguished correction-of-misdescription (which may be continuation) from substitution of a totally different property (which is a fresh application). | Applied to conclude that the amendment here substituted wholly different properties and therefore was a fresh application, not a continuation of the 6 July 1939 filing. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in two principal stages corresponding to the two main contested points: (1) the date of the "final order" in the 1936 step-in-aid/transfer process and (2) whether the 6 July 1939 application (and its 4 August 1939 amendment) were "in accordance with law" so as to constitute a step-in-aid of execution that could start or save the period of limitation.
1. Date of the final order: The Court examined the nature of the transfer order and the acts performed. It held that the transmission of the decree with a certificate of non-satisfaction is a ministerial act — not a judicial act — relying on the Calcutta Full Bench decision in Chutterput Singh and the approval of that reasoning by the Judicial Committee in Banku Behari Chatterji. Because the certificate was prepared and the order signed on 25 June 1936 and the papers were sent out under the Judge's hand on that date (and received by Asansol on 4 July 1936), the Court concluded the final ministerial act occurred on 25 June 1936. The Court thus rejected the Advocate-General's argument (based on Husain Ashgar Ali) that the operative date was 6 July 1936 because the judge used the words "put up on 6th July" or later "let the case be disposed of"; those words were held not to convert a ministerial act into a judicial disposal.
2. Whether the 6 July 1939 application was in accordance with law: The Court held that an application for execution must be one which seeks some relief that the executing court is competent to grant. Relying on Firm Johar Mal-Paran Ram (and supporting authorities Amrit Lal and decisions of other Judges), the Court adopted the view that "in accordance with law" means the application must seek relief the court has power to grant. The Court therefore rejected the Sreenath Chakravarty approach (which would focus on whether the court could "entertain" the application) and accepted the approach of Sital Prasad Shukul and the Privy Council in Maharaja of Bobbili that an application seeking relief the court is not empowered to give cannot be a step-in-aid of execution that starts limitation.
Applying that principle to the facts, the Court noted it was not disputed that the executing Purulia court had no authority to arrest the heirs or to attach and sell the movables described as being outside its territorial jurisdiction. Since the 6 July 1939 application sought such relief, it was not "in accordance with law" and therefore could not save or start limitation.
3. Effect of the 4 August 1939 amendment: The Court examined whether the amendment could relate back so as to validate the 6 July filing. It applied the line of authority exemplified by Jagannath Das, the unreported Raja Kalyani Prasad Singh Deo Bahadur decision, Mt. Khodaijtul Kubra and Gajanand Shah. Those authorities were used to articulate two related points: where an amendment merely corrects a description of property it may be a continuation of the original application, but where the amendment substitutes or adds wholly different properties (a substantial departure) the later application must be regarded as a fresh application. Here the decree-holder's amendment introduced different immovable properties which were not merely corrections of the initial petition; the Court concluded the amendment constituted a new application filed after limitation had run and could not be treated as relating back to 6 July 1939.
Conclusion of reasoning: On both the date question and the "in accordance with law" question the Court found in favour of the appellant: (a) the operative final date for the 1936 ministerial act was 25 June 1936, and (b) the 6 July 1939 application was not in accordance with law and the subsequent amendment was a fresh application made after limitation had expired. The learned Subordinate Judge's contrary conclusions on these points were therefore erroneous.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Appeal allowed; the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is set aside and the execution proceedings are dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The execution proceedings on the decree (the subject of these proceedings) are dismissed and the earlier order of the Subordinate Judge is set aside.
- Reasoning basis: The dismissal rests on two findings — (a) the final ministerial act in the 1936 transfer/step-in-aid process occurred on 25 June 1936, and (b) the 6 July 1939 application was not "in accordance with law" because it sought relief the executing court could not grant; the later amendment was a fresh application filed after limitation had expired.
- Precedential effect: The Court applied and elaborated existing authorities to the facts. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond the application of cited authorities; it resolves the parties' rights by applying established precedent to these facts.
Manohar Lall, J.:— This appeal by a judgment-debtor arises out of a proceeding in execution of a decree. The judgment-debtor objected that the decree sought to be executed was barred by limitation, but the learned Subordinate Judge has taken the contrary view. This is the principal question for determination in this appeal.
A few dates are necessary to appreciate the point raised.
On the 25th, of March, 1930, the decree-holder opposite-party obtained in the Purulia Court a decree for about Rs. 28,000 against Kalipada Roy and Purnendu Narain Singh. The appellant is the son of Kalipada Roy who is now dead. In the years 1930, 1932 and 1933 infructuous attempts were made to execute this decree. On the 9th of July, 1935, another execution case was started but it was dismissed on part satisfaction in May, 1936. On the 18th of June of the same year the decree-holder made an application to the court at Purulia that the decree should be transferred to the court at Asansol with a certificate for non-satisfaction. On that very date the court passed this order:
“This is an application for transfer of the decree to the court of the subordinate Judge of Asansol on the ground that the judgment-debtor has got no properties moveable or immoveable within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this court. Prepare certificate of non-satisfaction and send it to the Subordinate Judge of Asansol through the District Judge of Burdwan as prayed for and put up on 6th July, 1936 for further orders”.
In pursuance of this order the office prepared a certificate for non-satisfaction on the 25th of June, 1936 (exhibit 2). On the same date the Subordinate Judge of Purulia signed the order, exhibit 1, in which after reciting that the decree-holder has applied for a certificate to be sent to the Subordinate Judge at Asansol it stated:
“It is ordered that a copy of this order be sent to the Subordinate Judge, Asansol, through District Judge, Burdwan, with a copy of the decree and of any order which may have been made for execution of the same and a certificate of non-satisfaction”.
This order and a certificate of non-satisfaction were received by the court at Asansol on the 4th of July, 1936 (see exhibit 7, column 1). The decree-holder did not make any application for execution before the court at Asansol and therefore that court returned the certificate to the Subordinate Judge at Purulia on the 4th March, 1937, (see exhibit 7, last column). On the 6th of July, 1939, the decree-holder made another application for execution of the decree to the court at Purulia. In that application the execution was sought against the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor, Kalipada Roy, by their arrest. The moveable properties which were sought to be attached were described in that application as being situated without the jurisdiction of the Purulia court. On receiving this application the Subordinate Judge passed this order:
“Register. It appears that the decree under execution has been transferred to Sub-Judge's court, Asansol for execution on 6th July, 1936 and no result thereof has yet been received. The execution is against the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor but there is also a prayer for arrest. Further the moveables sought to be attached are not within the jurisdiction of this court”.
The matter was directed to be put up on the 18th of July, 1939, in presence of the pleader of the decree-holder. It may be noticed that the office was under a wrong impression that the decree under execution had been transferred to the court at Asansol on the 6th of July, 1936, although as a matter of fact the transfer was made on the 25th June, 1936. It also appears that although the court at Asansol returned the certificate of non-satisfaction on the 4th of March, 1937, the office at Purulia omitted to notice this fact. On the 18th of July, 1939, the decree-holders filed a petition in which they stated that they desired to amend the petition for execution by inserting a list of immoveable properties of the judgment-debtors which were within the jurisdiction of this court. They prayed for 21 days' time to get the petition amended. In the meantime at their request notice under Order XXII, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure was directed to be issued to the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor. The notice was served by fixing it to the house of the judgment-debtors on their refusal to accept it. On the same date the decree-holders filed a verified petition for attachment and sale of the immoveable properties of the judgment-debtors which were then described in the application and prayed that this may be treated as a part of the execution petition. The court allowed the prayer. As the natural guardian for the minor judgment-debtor did not appear, the court directed that Babu S.N Ojha, a pleader, may be appointed guardian ad litem of the minor and the notice was directed to be issued to all the judgment-debtors under Order XXI, rule 22. These notices were served on the guardian ad litem and also on the authorised agent of judgment-debtors 1 and 2 but they refused to accept the notices. On the 9th of December, 1939, the judgment-debtor objected under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the execution was barred by limitation and that the decree-holder had no right to execute it without obtaining a succession certificate as the original decree-holder had died since the passing of the decree. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the execution was barred by limitation on the 16th May, 1940. He took the view that the original application for execution that was filed on the 6th of July, 1939, cannot be deemed to be an application in accordance with law because it asked for a relief which the executing court was not competent to grant, and further that at the time of the amendment which was allowed by the court later on, the decree had become barred by limitation. In that view he held that it was not necessary to give the decree-holder an opportunity to apply for a succession certificate. Against this decision there was an appeal to this Court which affirmed the order dismissing the execution but only on the ground that the decree-holder had no right to execute the decree without obtaining a succession certificate. The learned Judges refrained from expressing any opinion as to whether the execution was or was not barred by limitation by their order, dated the 18th of September, 1941.
On the 27th of October, 1941, after obtaining a succession certificate the decree-holders filed an application for execution of the decree which is the subject of these proceedings. The judgment-debtors objected that the decree-holder is precluded from executing the decree on the principle of res judicata because the order in the previous execution case that the execution was barred by limitation was conclusive between the parties. This objection was obviously ill-founded because the appellate Court, as already observed, did not dismiss the application on this ground. This objection has not been accordingly pressed before us. The serious objection taken was that the application was barred by limitation because the previous execution case started on the 6th of July, 1939, was beyond the prescribed period of limitation having been started more than three year's from the 25th June, 1936, that being the date of the final order passed on the application to take step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, and further that this application for execution was not in accordance with law firstly because the decree-holders had not then obtained a succession certificate, and secondly because the court was not competent to grant the relief which the decree-holder sought for in that application and it was contended that the application can be treated to have become a good application only on the 4th of August, 1939, but that was more than three years from the 6th of July, 1936 also.
The learned Subordinate Judge overruled these contentions. He held: (1) that the application for execution of the decree which was dismissed because of the non-production of the succession certificate, as was the view taken by the High Court, was a step-in-aid of execution; (2) that the application of the 6th of July, 1939, having been entertained by the executing court who had jurisdiction to entertain it saved limitation and that it was immaterial that it contained a prayer which the court was not competent to grant because the court could have granted a partial relief by transferring the decree for execution to the court at Asansol where the moveables mentioned in the petition of execution were to be found; (3) that the final order in the application for transfer of the decree in 1936 to the court at Asansol was passed on the 6th of July, 1936, and not on the 25th June or the 4th of July, 1936. Accordingly he held that all the objections of the judgment-debtors were “quite frivolous”. Hence the appeal to this Court.
Mr. P.R Das, who appeared for the appellant, argued that the date of the final order passed in the application to take the step-in-aid of execution cannot be taken to be a date beyond the 25th June, 1936, and therefore the application filed on the 6th of July, 1939, was barred by limitation. He also argued that the application of the 6th of July, 1939, was not an application in accordance with law and that the application became in accordance with law only on the date when it was amended on the 4th of August, 1939, and this was more than three years from the 6th of July, 1936.
These two serious contentions must be examined separately.
In order to determine the date of the final order the prayer in the application of the 18th of June, 1936, must be kept in view. That application was not an application for execution of the decree but was an application asking the court, to transfer the decree for execution to the court at Asansol with a prayer for non-satisfaction of the decree. It was held by the Calcutta High Court in the Full Bench case of Chutterput Singh that an application for transmission of a decree from the High Court to a district court was not by itself a revival of the decree within the meaning of the Act inasmuch as it was a mere ministerial act of an officer of the Court and not the judicial act of a Judge. The correctness of this decision was approved by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Banku Behari Chatterji. The order of transmission sought for and the order of transmission when actually made is purely a ministerial act. In this case the transmission of the decree with a certificate of non-satisfaction was ordered to be made on the 18th of June, 1936, and the certificate of non-satisfaction was prepared on the 25th June, 1936, and a copy of the order transferring the decree and the certificate of non-satisfaction were all ordered to be sent out under the hand of the Judge on the 25th June, 1936, and as stated already the papers were received by the Asansol court on the 4th July, 1936. In my view, therefore, it follows clearly that the final order on the application to take step-in-aid of execution in this case was passed on the 25th June, 1936, and not on the 6th of July, 1936.
The argument of the learned Advocate-General who appeared for the respondent is based upon the view that the court when moved on the 18th of June, 1936, was actually deciding judicially the prayer of the decree-holder and sought to seek support from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Husain Ashgar Ali that when an order is judicially made by an appellate court which has the effect of finally disposing of an appeal, such an order gives a new starting point for the period of limitation prescribed by Article 182(2) of the Act of 1908. It was, therefore, argued that the order of the 18th of June, 1936, was not a final order effectively disposing of the application for transfer of the decree because the court observed in that order that the matter should be put up before him for further orders on the 6th of July, 1936. On this date the order of the court was, after reciting that a certificate for non-satisfaction has been granted and sent to the Subordinate Judge of Asansol through the District Judge of Burdwan,
“Let the case be disposed of”.
It will be noticed that here also the court says that a certificate of non-satisfaction has been granted and it has been sent to the Subordinate Judge at Asansol. The words
‘let the case be disposed of’
cannot, in my opinion, be treated as a final order. The case did not require any disposal judicially; it was a purely ministerial act and the ministerial act had been performed several days before the 6th of July, 1936.
The second contention raised on behalf of the appellant is also sound. In order to get a new starting point of limitation the application for execution must be in accordance with law.
The identical question was decided by this Court in Firm Johar Mal-Paran Ram. Fazl Ali, J. (as he then was) accepted the view of the Allahabad High Court that “the expression applying in accordance with law means applying to the court to do something in execution which by law that court is competent to do, and that it does not mean applying to the court to do something which either to the decree-holder's direct knowledge in fact or from his presumed knowledge of the law he must have known that the court was incompetent to do. This is the view which was accepted by a Division Bench of this Court also in Amrit Lal and as at present advised I am not prepared to dissent from it. The words ‘in accordance with law’ which occur in Article 182(5) are general and cannot be construed to mean only ‘in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure’.” Dhavle, J. came to the same conclusion. In that case the decree sought to be executed was only against the father and it provided that the loan incurred by the father was not binding on the sons Nevertheless the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree by arrest of the sons and it was held that such an application was not in accordance with law.
The learned Advocate-General strongly relied on the case of Sreenath Chakravarty where it was observed that an application in which the decree-holder applies for execution to a court for a relief which it is not competent to grant, e.g, by executing a decree against immoveable properties situated outside its territorial jurisdiction, such an application can be called in aid by a decree-holder to save limitation, because “the question is not whether the court has jurisdiction to execute the decree but whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the application, in other words whether the application for execution made in that court in such circumstances will count as an application for execution for the purposes of limitation”.
This Court however has not accepted the correctness of this view. In Sital Prasad Shukul it was held that where a, decree-holder asks the executing court to do a thing which the court is not empowered to do, e.g, transfer of the decree for execution to the court of a Munsif who had no jurisdiction to execute the decree, such an application cannot give a starting point for limitation. The learned Judges pointed to the case of the Privy Council in Maharaja of Bobbili v. Sree Rajah Narasaraju where it was held that an application for execution presented to a court which had no jurisdiction to execute the decree was not a step-in-aid of execution.
The Calcutta case was directly referred to in Chandmal Marwari and this has been relied on by the learned Advocate-General. But in that case the suit was instituted in 1911 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum sitting at Purulia for possession of certain land situated in the Subdivision of Dhanbad. The suit was decreed but on appeal the defendant was successful and the suit was dismissed with costs. Sometime after the defendant applied for execution of the decree for costs in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum sitting at Purulia. In 1917 the Lieutenant Governor by notifications established the Subordinate Judge's court at Dhanbad and fixed the local limits of its jurisdiction as the executive Subdivision of Dhanbad and its local limits ceased to be included in the local limits of the Subordinate Judge of Purulia. These notifications were passed during the pendency of the appeal which was disposed of by the Privy Council in 1931. In these circumstances the defendant applied in 1931 for execution of the decree for costs in the court of the Subordinate Judge sitting at Purulia by selling lands situated in Purulia outside the Subdivision of Dhanbad. Objection was taken to the execution on the ground that the proper court in which the execution should have been started was the court of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Dhanbad and not the Subordinate Judge sitting at Purulia. The learned Chief Justice observed that “the suit was instituted in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Purulia and the decree was passed by that court, and the mere fact that for administrative purposes the court of the Subordinate Judge is now divided between the Subordinate Judge and the Additional Subordinate Judge does not make the court of the Subordinate Judge at Purulia any the less the court of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum nor does it prevent it from executing the decree” and observed at page 29: “If it had been the fact that the court of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum sitting at Purulia neither at the time of the suit nor at the time of the application for execution had jurisdiction over the property against which execution was asked for, it is clear that the application would have been bad [see Prem Chand Dey v. Mokhoda Debi]. That is not the case. Both at the time of the suit and at the time of the application for execution the court at Purulia, had jurisdiction over the property now sought to be sold” and then made this observation that “the decree-holders had always and still have the right to apply as of course to the court which passed the decree for its execution even if it be in respect of property outside the territorial jurisdiction of such court and even if execution by such court could be no more than execution by transmission to another court. Such an application can be entertained by such a court and if made within time would save limitation”. The learned Chief Justice was not required to seek in aid the decision in the Calcutta case because he had already found that the execution case was instituted in the proper court which at the time of the suit had jurisdiction over the property sought to be attached.
The Calcutta High Court in a later case [Sakti Nath Roy Choudhury] has dissented from the dictum of Mukherji, J. in the case of Sreenath Chakravarty. After elaborately considering the case-law the learned Judges have pointed out that the consistent view of the Calcutta High Court has been that in order to have jurisdiction to execute a decree against immoveable properties, the executing court must have jurisdiction to sell either at the date of the suit or at the date when the application for execution is made. With respect I think that this view is the proper view to take.
Here it was not disputed that the executing court had no power to execute the decree by the arrest of the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor [Firm Johar Mal's case] nor had it jurisdiction to attach and sell the moveable properties which were mentioned in the execution petition itself as being situated outside the limits of the court's jurisdiction. The entertainment of such an application in my opinion cannot give a starting point of limitation because the court could not grant any relief to the decree holder, and when this fact was brought to the notice of the decree-holder he did not pray for the transfer of the decree to the court at Asansol but stated that he wants to amend his application for execution by inserting therein some immoveable properties which are situated within the jurisdiction of this court.
The question then is whether by the amendment of such an application which was granted, on the 4th August, 1939, the application could be treated to have been filed on the 6th of July, 1939.
It has been held by this Court in Jagannath Das that, an application for amendment of a pending application for execution made after the decree sought to be executed has become time tarred cannot be entertained. Now here there was no pending execution but the application for execution was incompetent in the view which I have already taken and the subsequent amendment sought to make if a competent application.
In an unreported case of this Court [Raja Kalyani Prasad Singh Deo Bahadur] decided by the learned Chief Justice to which my learned brother was a party on the 27th March, 1944, it has been held in similar circumstances that the principle which applies, in such cases is that “if by making the new application the decree-holder has substantially abandoned the prayer made in his original application and the second application is a substantial departure from the original application and the second application must be regarded as a new application” and pointed out that in the case before the learned Judges “the principal prayer in the first application was to proceed by attaching and selling the immoveable properties possessed by the judgment-debtors. It is true there was a reference to two other modes of execution, namely attachment of moveable properties and the arrest of the judgment-debtors but these were to be resorted to if the decree was not realised by the sale of the immoveable property. On the terms of the application these modes were not to be resorted to if the decree was realised by the sale of the immovable property” and then observed that as the judgment-debtors objected that the immoveable properties could not be sold by auction without the sanction of the Commissioner, the decree-holder filed a fresh application in which the substantive prayer now was to proceed against the moveable properties and he included a list of the moveable properties in that application. The learned Chief Justice observed that he had no doubt that this was a substantial departure from the terms of the first application and this application would not have been filed if the execution could have proceeded on the original application by the sale of the immoveable properties and that notwithstanding the fact that in drafting the second application care was taken to frame it in such a way as to show that the second application was merely supplementary to the first application, but having regard to the substance and not merely to the words which have been used in the two applications and also having regard to the prayers respectively made in them it must be held that the second application was in fact a new application. The observations in this case apply a fortiori to the facts of the present case. If the decree-holder could have secured the relief from the executing court by having the judgment-debtors arrested or by selling the moveable properties which he had mentioned in that application he would never have resorted to the application for amendment of the execution petition.
Reference may also be made to another case decided by the learned Chief justice [Mt. Khodaijtul Kubra]. In that case in the application for execution the prayer was that “upon the application being registered and after taking the proper steps and issuing the necessary processes the decretal amount be realised by the attachment and sale of the property which is the subject of talika”, but no inventory of the properties which the decree-holder wanted to be attached and sold was supplied in the execution application. It was held that such an application which did not at all contain the description of the properties to be attached was not one in accordance with law within the meaning of Article 182(5) and that when the application only stated in very general terms that the necessary steps may be taken without making it clear what steps were required to be taken, the application could not be treated as a step-in-aid of execution either.
The converse case is illustrated by [Gajanand Shah]. In that case the decree-holder by a subsequent application wanted to amend the application for execution by asking the court to delete a property which already was fully described in the execution petition and to substitute in its place another property with a totally different description. Fazl Ali, J. (as he then was) pointed out the true scope of Order XXI, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed that where the decree-holder wishes by means of a subsequent application merely to correct any mis-description of the property mentioned in his application for execution his application may be regarded as a continuation of that application, but where he tries to substitute a new property which is quite different from the property in the first instance it must be regarded as a fresh application for execution, and the decree-holder cannot be allowed after the expiry of the date of limitation to execute the decree against a property which was not specified in the application for execution as originally presented. Now these are exactly the facts of the present case. The decree-holder is not by the second application trying to give a clear and definite description of the property which he wanted to sell in the first execution petition of the 6th of July, 1939, but he is now asking the court to allow him to execute the decree against a wholly different property which was never mentioned in the first application at all.
For these reasons I am of opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge was in error in the view which he took, on both the points. The execution of the decree was barred by limitation. I would allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss the execution proceedings.
Beevor, J.:— I agree.
H.R.K
Appeal allowed.
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