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Narmadaben v. Competent Authority And Addl. Collector Ulc, Vadodara And Ors.

Gujarat High Court
Feb 19, 2002

JUDGMENT

R.M. Doshit, J.

1. to 3. xxx xxx xxx.

4. The petition requires to be rejected on both the grounds i.e., delay, latches and acquiescence and also on merits. Section 8(3) of the Act enjoins upon the competent authority to serve the draft statement in the manner as may be prescribed, on the person concerned. The manner in which such draft statement shall be served is prescribed under Rule 5 of the Rules. The said Rule 5 provides inter alia that the draft statement referred to under sub-section (1) of Section 8 shall be served together with the notice referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 8 on the holder of the vacant lands and all other persons, so far as may be known, who have or likely to have any claim to, or interest in the ownership, or possession or both of the vacant lands. Mr. Bhatt has strenuously urged that the words, 'person concerned occurring in sub-section (3) of Section 8 are required to be construed, keeping in view the above referred requirement under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 i.e., the words 'person concerned' should include not only the holder of the vacant land but also all other persons who have or are likely to have any claim to or interest in the ownership, or possession, or both, of the vacant lands. In the present case, the claim of the petitioner was put forth by the said Bharatbhai Chhotabhai before the Competent Authority. It was, therefore, known to the competent authority that the petitioner had a claim to the ownership and possession of the said lands. The petitioner was, therefore, entitled to a notice as envisaged in Section 8(3) of the Act. The said requirement is mandatory. Irrespective of the fact whether the petitioner had suffered any prejudice or not, the entire proceeding undertaken without issuance of notice to the petitioner is null and void. However, in the present case, the prejudice has in fact been caused to the petitioner. The impugned orders are, therefore, required to be quashed and set aside.

5. In the matter of Mohmad Islam & Anr. (supra) admittedly, the notice and the draft statement under Section 8(3) of the Act was not served upon the holder of the land. The Hon'ble High Court, considering the scheme of the Act held that, 'no notice was served on the petitioners. Hence, all the subsequent proceedings for determination of the surplus land and publication of the same was without jurisdiction'. Consequently, the order holding the land surplus and the final publication in the gazette were quashed.

6. It cannot be gainsaid that requirements under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act are mandatory. All subsequent proceedings undertaken without issuance of such notice would be without the authority of law and illegal. However, in the case before the Allahabad High Court, the writ petitioner was the declarant himself who complained of non-service of the notice and the draft statement under Section 8(3) of the Act. Besides, he had approached the Court at the stage where Notification under Section 10(1) of the Act was issued and published in the official gazette i.e., the excess vacant land had yet not vested in the State Government nor the possession thereof was taken over. On the facts of the case on hand, the said ruling shall have no applicability. In the present case, the writ petitioner is a daughter who has claimed a share in the property of her father, though she did not file the statement under Section 6 indicating her share in the property of her father, a claim in her behalf was put forth by the holder of the land-Bharatbhai Chhotabhai. However, no evidence was produced in support of the said claim i.e., it was not proved before the competent Authority or for that matter, even before this Court that the petitioner is the daughter of the said Chhotabhai Ghelabhai. Moreover, it is quite doubtful whether notice as envisaged under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act is required to be served upon the persons other than the person who has filed the Statement under Section 6 of the Act. The said sub-section (3) provides that the draft statement shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed on the person concerned together with a notice stating that any objection to the draft statement shall be preferred within thirty days of the service thereof. It should be noted that the Legislature has used singular i.e., the words 'person concerned'. The person concerned should, therefore, be necessarily the person who has filed statement under Section 6 of the Act. The said sub-section (3) also refers to the manner of service as may be prescribed i.e., as may be prescribed by the Central Government in exercise of the rule making power conferred by subsection (1) read with sub-section (2) of Section 46 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 46 of the Act empowers the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2) thereof provides for the matters in respect of which such rules may be made. Clause-E thereof reads thus, 'The manner of serving the draft statement under sub-section (3) of Section 8'. Hence, in my view, Section 8(3) read with Section 46(1) & 46(2) of the Act makes it clear that it is the manner of service alone for which the Central Government is empowered to make rule, i.e., the Central Government is not empowered to make rules with respect to the persons upon whom such service should be made. The person upon whom service is to be made is provided for in Section 8(3) of the Act itself. The submission is fallacious. No status can be construed on the basis of the language of the rules made thereunder. Rules made under any statute have to conform with the statute and not the vice versa. However, Rule 5 of the Rules not only provides for the manner in which the service should be made but also provides for the persons on whom such service should be made. I may repeat here that the Legislature had not empowered the Central Government to provide the persons on whom such service should be made. Hence, prima facie, it appears that the sub-clauses (ii) of Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Rules is ultra vires Section 8(3) of the Act. However, for the reasons given hereinafter, I am of the opinion that the petitioner was not entitled to service of draft statement or notice was envisaged in sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act. The question of validity of the above Rule 5(2)(a)(ii) does not require to be dealt with further.

7. Besides, as admitted, the petitioner was at the relevant time, a major and was already married. This Court in the matter of re-Ramagauri Harkishandas (supra) had an occasion to examine whether the married daughters could have a claim to a share in the joint family property of her father. After examining the provisions of the Hindu Law and the Hindu Succession Act and the Act, the Court has held that, 'Obviously, it envisages a notional partition and determination of shares that could be allotted on the appointed day, on the day on which holding of vacant land and surplus land has to be calculated under the Act, to those members of the family who are entitled to share on that date. Therefore, without determining the entitlement to the share on the partition, automatically the vacant land cannot be divided into physical number of adult members who could be legitimately considered to be constituting bigger body of Hindu Undivided Family. Moreover, it is to be seen that sub-sec. (7) only deals with a person who is a member of H.U.F. as discussed above. Married daughters cannot be treated to be member of H.U.F. of which their father is karta, as such. On marriage she ceases to be member of her father's family and becomes member of her husband's family.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule discharged.