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Rukumali Accused, v. The Emperor Opposite Party.

Calcutta High Court
Dec 13, 1917
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Rokum Ali (Appellant)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, Rokum Ali, was convicted by the 4th Presidency Magistrate under section 9 of Act I of 1878 (possession of opium without a licence). The Magistrate sentenced him to nine months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300. The prosecution's case rested primarily on the evidence of Excise Officers—Inspector Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta, Sub-Inspector Kiran Chandra Guha and Mojjum Hossein—together with a diver (Abdul Aziz) who recovered a bundle of opium from the river and a jamadar (Tookal Ali Guasi). The Superintendent of Excise (Raha) also gave evidence about an admission by the Appellant that he had been in possession of opium and was transporting it for shipment.

The Appellant called several Customs Officers who contradicted the prosecution by saying the Appellant was arrested on the shore (not in the boat) and that no opium was in the boat. The Magistrate disbelieved the defence witnesses, finding discrepancies in their accounts and attributing their testimony to jealousy and disappointment that the Excise Officers had secured the case. The principal question on appeal was whether the Court should prefer the evidence of the Excise Officers over the statements of the Appellant and his witnesses.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the posting register from the Customs Preventive Service was admissible in evidence, in light of an asserted claim of confidentiality or privilege.
  2. Whether statements made at a conference (in the presence of Mr. Boyd and others) could be withheld on the ground of privilege under section 124 of the Evidence Act.
  3. Whether the confession (admission) by the Appellant to the Superintendent of Excise was admissible under section 24 of the Evidence Act, or whether it should be excluded for being the product of inducement, threat or promise.
  4. Whether the evidence of the Excise Officers should be preferred to the contradictory evidence of the defence witnesses, including Customs Officers and other defence witnesses.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The Excise Officers testified that they boarded the Appellant's boat at Prinsep's Ghat just before 9 p.m., that two other men jumped into the river, that the Appellant threw a bundle into the river and was arrested on the boat, and that another bundle containing opium was found in the boat.
  • The prosecution relied on the subsequent recovery by divers of a bundle from the river containing a large quantity of opium (total seized between 50 and 60 seers).
  • The Superintendent of Excise gave evidence of an admission by the Appellant that he was in possession of opium and intended it for shipment; the prosecution contended this confession was admissible and not the product of inducement, threat or promise.
  • The prosecution opposed exclusion of the posting register and the evidence about the conference as being privileged; they contended those materials were not matters of State or otherwise privileged under sections of the Evidence Act invoked by the defence.

Appellant's / Defence's Arguments

  • The defence called Customs Officers who testified that the Appellant had been arrested on the shore (not in the boat) and that no opium was found in the boat, thereby challenging the prosecution's account.
  • The defence sought to put in the posting register to show Preventive Officers were at or near Prinsep's Ghat on the night in question, but the witness (Mr. Fitzgerald) initially declined to produce the book on the ground it was confidential; the defence asserted this claim of privilege had been put forward at the instance of the prosecution.
  • The defence sought to question Mr. Boyd about whether Inspector Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta had made a particular admission at a conference; Mr. Boyd treated the conference as confidential and invoked what the opinion describes as an asserted privilege under section 124 of the Evidence Act.
  • The defence contended that the confession evidence was produced at a late stage and implied that its late production could undermine its reliability.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in distinct analytical steps, addressing admissibility issues first and then the comparative credibility of the competing accounts.

  1. Admissibility of the posting register:

    The Court held that the posting register entry at issue could not be excluded as a privileged State matter under sections such as 123 or 162 of the Evidence Act. The entry was merely a note of times when particular Preventive Officers were ordered to be at their stations and did not relate to matters of State that the Evidence Act would protect. Although Mr. Fitzgerald initially declined to produce the book citing confidentiality, the Court found that no valid question of privilege arose with respect to that posting entry. The register was produced and placed in evidence; it only established that officers were ordered to be at particular places at particular times and did not definitively place them at the precise moment of the alleged arrest.

  2. Privilege claim as to Mr. Boyd's evidence (conference):

    The defence relied on Mr. Boyd's statement that he treated the conference as confidential and thus claimed privilege under section 124 of the Evidence Act. The Court rejected the asserted privilege to the extent that it would exclude from evidence a subordinate officer's statement that he had made a particular statement in the hearing of several persons at that conference. The Court indicated that what one of the subordinate officers said in the hearing of several people at the conference could not be withheld under section 124. Consequently, the Court intimated it would record evidence on these points; Mr. Boyd and the other witness were further examined before the Court, but neither could recall or definitively testify that Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta had made the particular statement attributed to him.

  3. Confession to the Superintendent and admissibility under section 24:

    The defence argued the confession to the Superintendent (Raha) was inadmissible. The Court applied section 24 of the Evidence Act and found no suggestion of inducement, threat or promise that would exclude the confession. The Court also addressed the late production argument: the confession was first elicited in cross-examination of Inspector Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta (26th September); Mr. Raha gave evidence on 3rd October about the confession. The Court found no delay sufficient to cast doubt on the Superintendent's testimony or to suggest he was called merely to bolster a failing case.

  4. Assessment of competing factual narratives:

    The Court reviewed the prosecution narrative (boarding the boat, two men fleeing, Appellant throwing a bundle into the river, another bundle found in the boat, subsequent recovery of a bundle by divers containing opium) and found the prosecution evidence "perfectly clear" regarding the recovery of opium. The pivotal factual issue was whether the Appellant was the person who threw a bundle into the river and was arrested on the boat in possession of the other bundle.

    The Court accepted the learned Presidency Magistrate's credibility determinations against the defence witnesses. It observed that the discrepancies identified by the defence counsel in the prosecution evidence were, in the Court's view, not real discrepancies but merely differences in witness knowledge about particular points. By contrast, the Court found serious inconsistencies in defence evidence and detected motives (jealousy and disappointment of Customs Officers at being deprived of a seizure and possible reward) that could explain their testimony. The Court specifically found the testimony of Mr. Thomson to be improbable and concluded he had "deliberately come to support what was a false case."

    Additional defence witnesses (a taxi-driver and a constable) were treated with scepticism because the inspector had not taken the taxi number, the taxi-driver's identity and corroboration were not established, and the constable did not make a contemporaneous report nor clearly show he was on duty at the relevant place and time.

  5. Conclusion of analysis:

    On balance, the Court found no reason to disbelieve the prosecution witnesses, and it found the learned Presidency Magistrate's rejection of the defence witnesses to be justified by the discrepancies, improbabilities, and possible motives identified in the defence testimony. The Court therefore concluded the conviction was correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED

Implications and direct effects:

  • The conviction of the Appellant for being in possession of opium without a licence (under section 9 of Act I of 1878) is affirmed.
  • The sentence imposed by the learned Presidency Magistrate (nine months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300) is held to be appropriate; the Court stated the punishment did not appear to be too severe.
  • The Appellant is ordered to surrender to his bail and serve out the remainder of his sentence.
  • The opinion contains no citation of precedential case law and does not purport to create a new legal precedent; its reasoning rests on application of statutory evidentiary provisions (sections 24, 123, 124 and 162 of the Evidence Act are discussed) and on credibility findings specific to the facts of the case.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed. (Signed: Chitty, J.; Smither, J. concurred.)

Show all summary ...

Chitty, J.:— The Appellant Rokum Ali was convicted by the 4th Presidency Magistrate of an offence under sec. 9 of Act I of 1878, that is to say, of being in possession of opium without a license, and was sentenced nine months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300. The case for the prosecution depended on the evidence of the Excise Officers—Inspector Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta, Sub-Inspector Kiran Chandra Guha and Mojjum Hossein. There is also the evidence of Abdul Aziz, the diver who recovered a bundle of opium from the river and of Tookal Ali Guasi, a jamadar. On the second day of hearing Rai Saheb S.K Kaha, the Superintendent of Excise, was also called and he spoke to an admission made by the Appellant in which he confessed to being in possession of the opium and explained that he was taking it for shipment on a steamer on account of a Chinaman whom he suggested the Superintendent should endeavour to arrest. The Appellant called on his behalf a number of Customs Officers—three of whom deposed, directly contrary to the story for the prosecution, that the Appellant had been arrested not iu the boat, as alleged by the Excise Officers, but on the shore, and that no opium was in fact found in the boat. The learned Presidency Magistrate disbelieved the evidence of these witnesses pointing out a number of discrepancies in their statements and also finding that they had come forward to give false evidence in consequence of their jealousy and chagrin at having been deprived of the case by the Excise Officers. The only question before us is whether the evidence of the Excise Officers is to be preferred to the statements of the Appellant and his witnesses.

A question, however, of law arose with regard to the admissibility of two pieces of evidence with which it will be convenient first to deal. Mr. Fitzgerald, the Inspector of Customs, was called and was asked to corroborate the statements from the posting register in order to show that the Preventive Officers were in fact at or near Prinsep's Ghat on the night in question, i.e, 22nd to 23rd August. This was disallowed. The recollection of the learned Counsel and Pleaders on either side is not the same with regard to what took place in the Police Court; but it appears from Mr. Fitzgerald's statement that he declined to put in the book as it was a confidential book. The defence now say that this plea of privilege was put forward by him at the instance of the prosecution. However that may be, it is obvious that no question of privileges could arise in respect of this posting register. There might be entries in that book which were privileged and could not be disclosed, but the entry in question is merely a note of the times when particular Preventive Officers were ordered to be at their stations. It is obvious, therefore, that it did not refer to matters of State which could be excluded from disclosure under secs. 123 or 162 of the Evidence Act. The other question was also one of privilege in regard to Mr. Boyd's evidence. Mr. Boyd, the Superintendent of the Customs Preventive Service, was called and the defence wished to find out from him whether or not Inspector Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta had made a particular admission on the morning of the 24th when admittedly Mr. Boyd and Mr. Raha had a conference and the witnesses Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta, Thomson and Fitzgerald were present. Mr. Boyd appears to have stated that he treated what took place at that interview as confidential; in other words, he claimed privilege under sec. 124 of the Evidence Act. As to this, again, there can be no question of privilege. What took place between Mr. Raha and Mr. Boyd might possibly be privileged under that section, but that one of the subordinate officers had made a statement regarding the events of that particular night in the hearing of the various people at that conference could not possibly be withheld from the Court under that section. We accordingly intimated that we would record the evidence of these two witnesses on the two points referred to. They were called before us on Tuesday last and further examined. Their examination did not carry the case any further as neither of them remembered what had taken place, nor could they say definitely that Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta had, in fact, made any such statement. This posting register was produced and put in. That, too, does not carry the case very much further as it only shows orders that particular officers should be at particular places at particular times. There seems to be no reason to suppose that these Customs Officers were not at or near Prinsep's Ghat some time or another on the night in question. They obviously interfered to some extent in the proceedings; but that does not mean that they were there precisely at the point of time, i.e, 9 p.m or just before, when the Appellant was arrested by the Inspector of Excise.

The evidence of the prosecution witnesses shows that, acting on the information of an informer, the Inspector of Excise came up from Babughat in a boat to Prinsep's Ghat arriving there just before 9 p.m Just off the Prinsep's Ghat he came alongside the boat in which were the Appellant and two other Mahomedans. The other two Mahomedans at once jumped into the river and swam away. The Appellant is said to have taken up a bundle in the boat and thrown it into the water. He was then arrested by the Inspector and another bundle containing opium was found in the boat. He was then put under arrest and brought to the shore. On the shore another man was certainly arrested but he was let go for want of anything to incriminate him. The Appellant was detained at the Ghat, to which the Inspector's taxi had come, for some hours, while the Excise Officers sent for divers and eneavoured to recover the bundle which was thrown into the river. It was not recovered that night and the Appellant was accordingly removed in custody. Early the next morning the divers, after long operations, were successful and the second bundle was recovered and was found to contain a large quantity of opium. The amount of opium seized altogether amounted to between 50 and 60 seers. The Appellant's case as stated in his plea to the Magistrate on 26th September, was that he had been arrested on the, shore and that no opium was, in fact, found on the boat. To corroborate this plea the witnesses for the defence were called. The only question is whether they can possibly be believed.

The evidence for the prosecution is perfectly clear and it cannot be disputed that the opium was found on that night in the manner stated by them. The only question really is whether the Appellant was the man who threw one of the bundles into the river and was arrested on the boat in possession of the other one. There seems to be no reason to disbelieve the statements of these witnesses who have given their evidence very fairly. It was argued that if there were discrepancies in the defence evidence there were equal discrepancies in that for the prosecution. The discrepancies, however, which the learned counsel endeavoured to point out, seem to be really no discrepancies at all. They amount rather to a statement by one witness on a particular point and an admission by another witness that he did not see or had no knowledge of the fact deposed.

There is also the important evidence for the prosecution of the Superintendent of Excise. It was stated that the confession made by the accused to him on the 24th was inadmissible in evidence. There is, however, no suggestion of anything like inducement, threat or promise which would shut it out under sec. 24 of the Evidence Act. Then it was argued that the evidence of that confession was produced at a very late stage. The first hearing of the case was on 26th September. On that day in the cross-examination of the Inspector Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta it was elicited not only that the Appellant had made an admission to him but also that he had made a further admission to Mr. Raha. Mr. Raha was not that day present in Court. He attended, however, at the next hearing, i.e, 3rd October, and gave evidence with regard to this confession by the accused. There does not seem to have been such delay as would cast a doubt on the accuracy of the Superintendent's statement. There is no reason to suppose that he was called at the late stage to bolster up what might be a failing case; nor that he would deliberately come forward to perjure himself for the mere sake of obtaining a conviction against the Appellant.

Turning to the evidence of the defence, the learned Presidency Magistrate has pointed out a number of inconsistencies in their statements which are more serious. It is unnecessary for us to recapitulate them at this stage. It is sufficient to say-that the view that the Magistrate has taken on this point appears to be quite correct.

The most important witness called for the defence is Mr. Thomson. I am sorry to have to say it, but it does appear to me that he has deliberately come to support what was a false case. The evidence which he gave is altogether improbable and incredible. At one time he says that the Excise Officer offered to give him the case and be a witness against the accused. At another time he says that he found no opium in the boat, that the accused was not arrested in the boat, that he was arrested on the shore, that there was really no case against the accused and that there was, therefore, no case for either the Excise Authorities or the Customs Authorities to take up. At the same time he says that he complained to Mr. Boyd that he had been done out of a big haul by the Excise Officers. If there was no such case, it does not appear how he could have been “done out of a big haul.” Also he does not explain how or why, if there was a case against some man other than the Appellant, the Appellant should have been arrested and a false case preferred against him while the true culprit was let go. The reason for these Customs Officials coming forward is not far to seek. The Magistrate at once detected it and his opinion appears to be correct. They were disappointed that the Excise Officers should have made this capture and thus deprived the Customs Officers of a possible reward. We ascertained from Mr. Boyd that rewards are given in those cases and that, while there is no fixed scale for rewards, the officers may reasonably expect to be rewarded, more or less, in proportion to the quantity of the” opium or other article seized.

There is another witness to whom we should refer, viz., the taxi-driver. It is to be regretted that the Inspector of Excise did not take the number of his taxi-cab; but it does not appear that the witness Eahman Ali was really the driver of the taxi which was at Prinsep's Ghat on that night. It would be very easy, no doubt, to get a taxi-driver to come forward and give evidence to this effect. He does verify his statements in any way. So also the defence witness No. 7, Jadu Nandan Roy, Constable, who states that the accused was made over into his custody. It is an extraordinary thing, if he was there at that time and had the accused in his charge, that he made no report of the circumstance; nor is it shown that he was in point of fact on duty at Prinsep's Ghat. He states that he really was on duty that night at Babughat, that he came to Prinsep's Ghat and there saw the Inspector Dinesh Chandra Sen Gupta and the others.

On the whole evidence, there can be no doubt that the conviction of the accused is correct, and, under the circumstances, the punishment does not appear to be too severe. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The accused must surrender to his bail and serve out the remainder of his sentence.

Smither, J.:— I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

S.C.M
Appeal dismissed.