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Raghubar Dayal v. Panna Lal
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a second appeal arising from a suit originally instituted by the appellant, Seth Raghubar Dayal, in the court of an Assistant Collector of the first class at Jhansi seeking ejectment of Panna Lal and others from certain agricultural plots. The appellant asserted he was the lambardar of the mahal in which the plots lay and that the defendants were trespassers. Panna Lal claimed possession as a co-sharer in the mahal; other defendants said Panna Lal alone was in possession and they were not in possession.
The Assistant Collector framed an issue on Panna Lal's proprietary title and referred it to the civil court. The civil court found that Panna Lal was a co-sharer. Despite that finding, the Assistant Collector appears to have believed the finding adverse to Panna Lal and passed a decree for ejectment. Panna Lal appealed to the Civil Judge, who set aside the Assistant Collector's decree and dismissed the suit. This second appeal reached the High Court on a reference by two Judges of the Full Bench due to a difference of opinion between this Court and the Board of Revenue on a question of law.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a lambardar can bring a suit under section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, for the ejectment of a person who is a co-sharer in the mahal (i.e., whether s.180 allows a lambardar to sue a co-sharer for ejectment).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant contended that a lambardar could sue a co-sharer for ejectment under section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.
- It was urged that the earlier Full Bench decision in Sultan Ahmad Khan v. Jalal-uddin (under section 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926) was no longer good law because the language of the current statute (section 180) had been altered.
- Reliance was placed on section 245 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, which sets out the powers of the lambardar (including powers to collect rents and to settle and eject tenants), to support the claim that a lambardar has authority to eject.
Respondent(s)' Position (as presented in the opinion)
- Panna Lal claimed to be a co-sharer in the mahal (i.e., a proprietor/shareholder), and thus not a mere tenant or trespasser.
- Other defendants asserted that Panna Lal alone was in possession and that they themselves were not in possession.
- Implicitly, and as developed by the Court, the legal position advanced against the appellant's claim was that section 180 is intended to regulate landlord-tenant relations and does not permit a lambardar to eject a co-sharer who is in possession as a proprietor; remedies between co-sharers are civil remedies (joint possession, removal of obstructions, or partition).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sultan Ahmad Khan v. Jalal-uddin | Whether a lambardar could sue a co-sharer for ejectment under section 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926; the Full Bench held that he could not. | The Court noted this Full Bench decision and observed that although it is not necessary to re-open that question now, the principles of that decision are consistent with the present conclusion under section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 — i.e., a lambardar cannot sue a co-sharer for ejectment in the revenue forum under the tenancy statute. |
| Tej Singh v. Khem Chand (Board of Revenue decision) | Decision of the Board of Revenue considered on relations of co-sharers; the opinion was referred to by the parties and the Court. | The Court considered and distinguished the Board's decision. It reaffirmed the general law that co-sharers are like tenants-in-common (each has a share in every part) and emphasized that appointment of a lambardar as agent does not deprive co-sharers of proprietary rights. The Court treated the Board's decision as considered but not controlling when read against the statutory scheme and ordinary law of co-sharers. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis focused on statutory interpretation of section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and on the legal character of co-sharers in a mahal.
Key points of the Court's step-by-step reasoning:
- Textual interpretation of section 180: the Court highlighted the language of sub-section (1) — particularly the phrase “without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant” — and sub-section (2), which deals with the consequences if no suit is brought or no decree executed. From this, the Court concluded that s.180 is directed at disputes between persons where one is or claims to be a landholder and the other claims to be in possession as a tenant.
- Legal character of co-sharers: the Court restated the established principle that co-sharers in a mahal are in the position analogous to tenants-in-common — each co-sharer has a share in every part of the mahal and a right to use any part so long as he does not permanently exclude others.
- Appropriate remedies between co-sharers: when one co-sharer takes permanent possession so as to exclude others, the proper remedies are civil actions — a suit for joint possession, an action for removal of constructions causing exclusion, or a suit for partition. These are civil remedies for disputes between proprietors.
- Scope of the tenancy statute: absent clear and definite statutory provision to the contrary, the Court refused to read s.180 as enabling a lambardar to eject co-sharers. The Court reasoned that if s.180 were given such effect, it would divert proprietary disputes between co-sharers into the revenue jurisdiction, excluding the civil courts from what had traditionally been their domain (suits about proprietary title and rights between co-proprietors).
- Role and powers of the lambardar: the Court observed that while section 245 grants certain powers to the lambardar for management and collection of rents, this does not convert the lambardar into the sole proprietor nor strip co-sharers of their proprietary rights. A lambardar acts as agent of the co-sharers for certain statutory purposes; agency does not extinguish the proprietorship of the co-sharers.
- Distinguishing prior decisions: the Court referred to the Full Bench decision in Sultan Ahmad Khan v. Jalal-uddin (under s.44 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926) which had held a lambardar could not sue a co-sharer for ejectment. The Court indicated that the present statutory provision (s.180) is not materially different in effect for this purpose and that the earlier conclusion aligns with the proper interpretation of s.180. The Board of Revenue decision in Tej Singh v. Khem Chand was considered but did not lead the Court to alter its conclusion.
- Conclusion from the analysis: a lambardar is not entitled to eject a co-sharer by means of a suit under section 180; disputes between co-sharers about use and enjoyment of the land are for civil courts and, if necessary, for partition proceedings.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the decree of the Assistant Collector for ejectment was set aside by the Civil Judge and that result is affirmed — the appellant's attempt to eject Panna Lal (a co-sharer) by proceedings under the tenancy statute failed and the appeal is dismissed with costs in favour of the respondent(s).
- Statutory and jurisdictional consequence: the Court held that section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 is intended to address landlord-tenant relationships (persons entitled to admit as tenant versus those claiming tenancy or wrongful tenancy). It does not permit a lambardar to use that statutory provision to eject a co-sharer who is in possession as a proprietor. Accordingly, disputes between co-sharers over use, enjoyment or exclusion from khudkasht land should be resolved in civil courts (for remedies such as joint possession, removal of obstructions, or partition), not by invoking s.180 in the revenue forum.
- No widening of revenue jurisdiction: the Court expressly rejected an interpretation that would convert every dispute between co-sharers or every suit for possession in a mahal into a revenue matter under s.180, which would unduly displace civil jurisdiction over proprietary disputes.
- Precedential note: the opinion treats the Full Bench decision in Sultan Ahmad Khan v. Jalal-uddin as consistent with the present conclusion and did not consider it necessary to overturn that authority; the decision reinforces the boundary between tenancy (revenue) remedies and proprietary (civil) remedies as between co-sharers.
Judges: Allsop, A.C.J. (delivering the principal opinion), Verma, J. (concurring), Malik, J. (delivering a concurring judgment), Wali-ullah, J. (agreeing), and Sinha, J. (agreeing). By the Court: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Allsop, A.C.J:— This is a second appeal against a decree of the Civil Judge of Jhansi. The suit which has given rise to the appeal was instituted in the court of an Assistant Collector of the first class in Jhansi by the appellant, Seth Raghubar Dayal, in order to obtain the ejectment of Panna Lal and others from certain agricultural plots upon the ground that the plaintiff was the lambardar of the mahal in which the plots lay and that the defendants were trespassers. Panna Lal claimed to be in possession as a co-sharer in the mahal. The other defendants alleged that Panna Lal was alone in possession and that they were not in possession at all. The learned Assistant Collector framed an issue upon the question of Panna Lal's proprietary title and sent it to the civil court for decision. The decision was that Panna Lal was a co-sharer in the mahal. The learned Assistant Collector seems in error to have thought that the finding was against Panna Lal and he passed a decree for ejectment. Panna Lal appealed to the Civil Judge who set aside the decree of the learned Assistant Collector and dismissed the suit.
The second appeal has been referred by two learned Judges of this Full Bench because of a difference of opinion upon a question of law between this Court and the Board of Revenue. The case of this Court in which the opinion was expressed was Sultan Ahmad Khan v. Jalal-uddin(1). The question which arose in that case was whether a lambardar could sue a co-sharer for ejectment in a revenue court under the provisions of section 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. The decision of this Court was that he could not do so. The decision turned upon the terms of section 44 of the Act which, in so far as they are relevant, are that “a person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land without the consent of the landholder shall be liable to ejectment.” The landholder as defined in that Act was the person to whom rent was payable. This Court held that all the co-sharers including the lambardar were landholders because the rent was ultimately payable to all of them in proportion to their shares in the mohal although the lambardar might, in some circumstances, have the right in the first instance to collect it. I do not think that it is necessary for us now to go into the question whether that decision was right, although I think that it was. The law is now contained in section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, which is not exactly in the same terms as section 44 of the Act of 1926. The present section is as follows:—
“(1) A person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land otherwise than in accordance with the provision of the law for the time being in force and without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled, or when the joint consent of more than one person is required on the suit of any one or more of such persons, and also to pay images, which may extend to four times the annual rental value calculated in accordance with the sanctioned rates applicable to hereditary tenants.
(2) If no suit is brought under this section or a decree obtained under this section is not executed the person in possession shall on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit or for the execution of such decree, as the case may be, become a hereditary tenant of such plot or plots.”
In my judgment this section is intended to apply to persons one of whom is or claims to be a landholder and the other of whom claims to be in possession as a tenant. I would draw attention to the words “admit him as a tenant” in the first sub-section and to the whole of the second sub-section. We have been referred to the decision of the Board of Revenue in the case of Tej Singh v. Khem Chand. It has always been held that co-sharers in a mahal are in the same position as tenants-in-common in English law, that is, each co-sharer has a share in every part of the mahal and each co-sharer is entitled to use any part just as much as any other co-sharer provided that he does not permanently exclude the other co-sharers. If a co-sharer takes permanent possession of a part of the land in such a way as to prevent other co-sharers from making use of it, the remedy for the other co-sharers is to obtain a decree against him for joint possession or for the removal of any constructions which he may have made and which lead to their exclusion or to obtain a decree for partition. It is obvious that persons who agree to share any property or acquiesce in the sharing of it must have such relations with each other that they can amicably arrange for the use or enjoyment of that property by them all in a reasonable manner. If such relations do not exist the only course for them is to separate and partition the property. There is nothing in my judgment in the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, which disturbs the ordinary law about the relations of co-sharers or tenants-in-common. In the absence of any definite statutory provision I cannot hold that one of the co-sharers, as a lambardar, is entitled to exclude all or other co-sharers from the use of land by taking possession of it himself; nor would I hold in the absence of any such definite provision that the right of co-sharers to use and enjoy land which is their common property should be the subject of decision in a revenue court. If we were to take the contrary view the logical result would be that all suits for possession against trespassers over land in revenue mahals would lie under section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, and that the jurisdiction of the civil courts would be excluded. I may point out that a mahal is not an abstraction but an area of land and it would consequently follow that all suits against trespassers over land in a mahal except possibly over the village site would lie in the revenue court, that is, that all suits about proprietary title in mahals or estate consisting of several mahals would be instituted, in the first instance, in the revenue court, although the actual question of proprietary title might be referred as an issue to the civil court. It has never been understood that a dispute between two persons claiming proprietary title in a revenue mahal should be instituted in revenue courts. There is no logical distinction between isolated plots and the whole area of land in a mahal. Our attention has been directed to the provisions of section 245 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, which defines the powers of lambardars and in particular to that part of the section which says that the lambardar is entitled to do all acts incidental to the proper management of the estate with a view to the common benefit. I do not think that this right of management extends to the ejectment by the lambardar of other co-sharers from their khudkasht. We have considered the decision of the learned Members of the Board of Revenue in the case of Tej Singh v. Khem Chand. With reference to it I must say, in the first instance, that a proprietor who appoints an agent does not thereby loss his proprietary-title. Consequently, although the lambardar may be the agent of the co-sharers for certain purposes, he does not thereby become the sole proprietor so as to deprive them of then proprietary rights. I also do not see why the result of our decision should be that a lambardar is not entitled to collect rents in accordance with the statute in certain, circumstances. He would be entitled to collect the rents as the statutory agent of the other co-sharers. The co-sharers might, by agreement, appoint some agent or attorney to collect rents on their behalf. That would not mean that the agent or attorney would become the landholder or that he would acquire proprietary rights against the co-sharers. In my judgment, where a question arises between co-sharers, including among them the lambardar, about the manner in which the co-sharers should use or enjoy the land, that is a question which would properly be decided by a suit in a civil court and, in the last resort, if no satisfactory arrangement could otherwise be secured, by a suit for partition.
No question of jurisdiction has been raised in the case before us, but I certainly think that a lambardar is not entitled to eject one of the co-sharers by means of a suit under section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939.
I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.
Verma, J.:— I concur.
Malik, J.:— The facts have been fully set out in the judgment of the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice? The point for decision in this case is whether a lambardar can bring a suit under section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939 for ejectment of a co-share? who has taken possession of land which had been in the possession of certain tenants from which they had been ejected. In the case of Sultan Ahmad Khan v. Jalal-uddin a Full Bench of this Court had held that such a suit did not lie under section 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926. Under that section a landholder could file a suit for ejectment of a person who had taken possession of the holding without the consent of the landholder. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the above case is no longer good law as the language of section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, has been altered and now a suit for ejectment can be filed against a person who has taken possession of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and “without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant” at the instance of the person so entitled. Reliance is also placed on section 245 of the Act which sets out the powers of the lambardar. The lambardar, in accordance with the provisions of that section, is not only entitled to collect rents and other dues but is also entitled to settle and eject tenants. But it must be remembered that he does all this on behalf of the entire body of co-sharers. He is constituted an agent on their behalf and the co-sharers do not cease to be co-sharers and as such co-owners of the property merely because there is a lambardar. The U.P Tenancy Act, as the other Tenancy Acts preceding it, was primarily intended to regulate the relations between landlords and tenants or persons wrongly claiming to be tenants. The rights as between landlords inter se are governed by certain stray provisions here and there, but there are no complete set of provisions governing their relationship. A co-sharer may no doubt, if he enters into a contract with the entire body of co-sharers or with the lambardar as representing them, become a tenant of the body, though he as a co-sharer is also a member of that body; but the tenancy in such a case would only arise by contract. As regards any plot of land in the village, every co-sharer has got equal rights according to the extent of his share. If a co-sharer peacefully takes possession of some land which is vacant, he does not thereby become either a tenant or a trespasser. If such land is cultivated by him, it may become his khudkasht as defined by section 3, sub-section (9) of the Act. Section 180 of the Act was intended to regulate the relations between landlords and tenants or persons wrongly claiming to be tenants, but where a person is in possession of the holding as a proprietor or as a co-sharer, no question of his ejectment under section 180 as a trespasser can arise.
For the reasons given by me above and for the reasons given in the judgment of the Hon'ble A.C.J, with which I agree, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Wali-ullah, J.:— I agree.
Sinha, J.:— I agree.
By the Court:— The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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