Harries, C.J:— These 19 second appeals have been preferred by landlords from decrees of the learned District Judge of Patna affirming decrees of the learned Munsif of the first Court, Patna, dismissing suits brought by the landlords against various tenants. In all the suits brought by the landlords a claim was made for a declaration that an order of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 24th June 1938, reducing the rents of the tenants who were made defendants was ultra vires and of no effect. The learned Munsif who heard the suits at first instance held that the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer which was made under Section 112 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, was intra vires and accordingly dismissed the suits. These decisions were affirmed on appeal by the learned District Judge who dismissed all the appeals. Hence the present 19 second appeals.

2. The facts giving rise to the cases are the same and may be shortly stated as follows: The holdings of the various defendants in the suit were recorded in the record of rights as bhaoli occupancy holdings. In the year 1916 certain proceedings were instituted under Section 40 of the Ben. Ten. Act, for commutation of the rent of these various holdings, and on 5th July 1915, the parties compromised. By the terms of the compromise money rents were fixed for the various holdings, and it was also agreed between the landlords and the tenants that the rent so fixed would neither be enhanced nor reduced at any time in the future. It had been strenuously contended in these proceedings that the effect of that compromise was to convert the status of the tenants from occupancy tenants to that of fixed rate tenants. It appears that in the cases which have given rise to Second Appeals Nos. 665, 668, 672 and 674 there was another compromise in the year 1937, between the landlords and tenants.

3. In that year, rent suits were brought against the respondents to these appeals, and the claims of the landlords were compromised and a compromise decree passed in the terms of the agreement. In that compromise decree it was provided that the rent agreed upon should neither be enhanced nor reduced and the status of the tenants was declared to be Sharamoiyan. In the year 1937 after the compromise to which I have just made a reference proceedings were instituted by the authorities under Section 112 of the Bihar Tenancy Act. By a Government Notification No. 2814 of 19th June 1937, which is published in Part I, Bihar Gazette of 23rd June 1937, certain Deputy Collectors were empowered to settle rents in cases of money rents of occupancy raiyats. The Deputy Collector who had jurisdiction over the area reduced the rents of the varioul tenants though it was hotly contended before him that he had no jurisdiction to reduce such rents by reason of the fact that the holdings were not occupancy holdings but fixed rate holdings. The Deputy Collector, however, held the contrary and reduced the rents.

4. As provided by Section 104G of the Bihar Tenancy Act, appeals were preferred by the landlords to the Assistant Settlement Officer who was the superior revenue authority as prescribed by the Provincial Government. This officer, held that the holdings were fixed rate holdings and that the Deputy Collector who was empowered to reduce rent had no jurisdiction over such holdings. He accordingly reversed the decision of the Deputy Collector and upheld the landlords' contention that these rents could not be reduced. The tenants then preferred an appeal to the Settlement Officer who was entitled to hear appeals from the decisions of the Assistant Settlement Officer. The Settlement Officer upheld the landlords' contentions and affirmed the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer. The tenants did not attempt to appeal from the decision of the Settlement Officer, and it appears that they took no further action. The Assistant Settlement Officer, on the other hand, passed an order on 24th June 1938, by which he reviewed his earlier order and held that the holdings in question were not fixed rate holdings and reduced the rents as if they were occupancy holdings. The order in question is a short one, and it would be convenient to set it out in extenso. It is in these terms:

While checking the rent roll I find that in several cases of the commuted rents no reduction was allowed as by the compromise petition filed fixing the rents for ever. In these cases according to the recent: circular of the S.O I allow a reduction of 25 per cent, as they are not legally Sarah Moiyani cases. In other cases of rent I allow a reduction of 33½ per cent, and 37½ per cent, in case of rent at 20. Correct the rent roll accordingly.

Sd., J.K Saram, A.S.O

5. In the suits giving rise to these appeals this order has been challenged by the landlord-appellants who contend that it is ultra vires and null and void. In the Courts below it was urged that by the compromise in 1915 the status of the tenants had been changed to that of fixed rate tenants, and, therefore, the revenue authorities had no jurisdiction to reduce rents under Section 112 of the Bihar Tenancy I Act. The learned Munsif, however, was of opinion that the compromise did not affect the status of the tenants and that they remained occupancy raiyats in spite of the compromise. Accordingly, he held the revenue authorities had jurisdiction to reduce the rents under Section 112 of the Bihar Tenancy Act. The learned District Judge also took the same view. He was of opinion that the tenants could not, by any agreement, give up their rights to a reduction of rent by reason of the provisions of Section 178 of the Bihar Tenancy Act. Neither of the Courts however have seriously considered whether in the circumstances of this case the Assistant Settlement Officer could pass the order which he did. In my judgment he clearly could not pass the order of 24th June 1938 which is challenged in these cases.

6. The learned Deputy Collector had, in the first instance, reduced the rents. His decision might have been right or wrong, and the landlords challenged it and appealed from the decision as they were entitled to do to the Assistant Settlement Officer. That officer reversed the decision of the Deputy Collector, and his decision was again affirmed on appeal by the Settlement Officer. How could the Assistant Settlement Officer, in such circumstances, review his order? He certainly could not do so without reversing or dissenting from the opinion of a superior tribunal which had affirmed his view. The ground given by the Assistant Settlement Officer for reviewing his own decision is that he had received a circular from the Settlement Officer. What that circular contained we know not, as its contents have never been disclosed to the Courts throughout these proceedings, and further, we do not know whether this circular was a general one or whether it applied to these particular cases. It must be remembered that only a few months previously a Settlement Officer had held that the holdings in these cases were Sarahmoiyan holdings, the rent of which could not be reduced, and it is difficult to believe that any circular which he sent out affected these holdings. In any event even if the circular was intended to cover these particular holdings, no superior Court can direct an inferior Court to review its previous decision by sending a circular letter or any other order to it. The effective decision in this case was the decision, not of the Assistant Settlement Officer but of the Settlement Officer who had affirmed the decision of the former. It may be, though I do not hold it, that the Settlement Officer could review his own decision. But that is not what occurred here. It was suggested by Dr. P.K Sen that the circular may have amounted to a review by the Settlement Officer of his own decision. But, clearly, it could not amount to that because the circular contained some directions to the Court immediately inferior to the Settlement Officer. Obviously in that circular he did not review his own decision but called upon the inferior Court to adopt a certain course.

7. As I have said, it is by no means certain that this circular ever referred to these particular cases. But if it did so, it could never, give the Assistant Settlement Officer any jurisdiction to review his own decisions as those decisions had been affirmed by a superior tribunal, and obviously, if the decisions could ever be reviewed, they could only be reviewed by the superior tribunal. To hold that the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer in this case is with jurisdiction would be tantamount to holding that a Subordinate Judge could review his judgment when it had been affirmed on second appeal by the High Court. Obviously in this latter case the High Court might review its own decision, but the Subordinate Judge could not possibly do so, and he could not possibly do so in pursuance of any direction or circular which the superior Court might issue.

8. There can be no doubt that when these revenue Courts act with jurisdiction this Court cannot interfere. But it is clear that where they act without jurisdiction this Court can and must interfere. In the present appeals, the order which is challenged was one which the Assistant Settlement Officer could never, in the circumstances, make, and it was an order made wholly without jurisdiction, and is, therefore, ultra vires, null and void. Having regard to the view which we take on this question it is unnecessary to consider the further question as to whether these holdings were Sarahmoiyan holdings to which Section 112 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, and the notification made thereunder had no application. That question is left open as it does not arise in these appeals. The result therefore is that the decisions of the Courts below must be set aside and the suits of the landlords decreed. I would, therefore, allow each of these appeals, set aside each of the decrees of the Courts below and decree each of the plaintiffs' suits in full. The appellants are entitled to their costs in this Court from each of the respondents, but we fix the hearing fee at Rs. 5 in each case. The appellants are also entitled to their costs against each of the respondents in the lower appellate Court and in the Court of the learned Munsif.

Manohar Lall, J.:— I agree.

G.N

9. Appeals allowed.