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Monomohan Moitra v. Gobinda Das Chowdhury

Calcutta High Court
Sep 7, 1950
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by the Defendant (the tenant) of Premises No. 215, Lansdowne Road arising from an ejectment suit instituted by the Plaintiff on determination of a monthly tenancy by a notice to quit. The Plaintiff's case was that the tenancy commenced on 16 November 1943 at a monthly rent of Rs. 150 under an order of the Rent Controller dated 26 November 1943; the Plaintiff served a notice requiring vacation on expiry of 15 September 1944; and because the Defendant did not vacate the Plaintiff instituted the suit on 23 April 1945, at which date the Calcutta House Rent Control Order (the House Rent Control Order) was in operation. The Plaintiff alleged the Defendant was a defaulter and not entitled to protection under the House Rent Control Order and that permission of the Rent Controller had been obtained.

The Defendant's (tenant's) defence, so far as material to this appeal, was that he was not a defaulter because he had deposited the rent with the Rent Controller.

By the time the suit was tried the House Rent Control Order had been replaced by the Calcutta Rent Ordinance (Bengal Ordinance No. V of 1946) which came into operation on 1 October 1946. The Subordinate Judge held that, although the tenant was technically in default under the earlier House Rent Control Order for irregular deposits of rent, the tenant was entitled under s. 12(4)(b) of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance to pay all arrears within one month of the Ordinance's commencement, which he had done; hence the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. On appeal the Additional District Judge reversed that decision and remanded the case for fresh trial on the footing that the rights of the parties were to be governed by the Calcutta House Rent Control Order (the law in force when the suit was instituted). The tenant (Defendant) then filed the present appeal against the Additional District Judge's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the rights of the parties must be determined by the law in force on the date of institution of the suit (the Calcutta House Rent Control Order) or by subsequent instruments (the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946 or the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act (Act XXXVIII of 1948)).
  2. Whether the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, being an executive order, could affect the substantive rights of the parties created by statutes.
  3. Whether s. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act (under which Rule 81(2)(b) of the Defence of India Rules was framed) is invalid because it delegates legislative power from the Central Legislature to the Central Government, which the Appellant contended was impermissible.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The tenancy began on 16 November 1943 at Rs. 150 per month under an order of the Rent Controller of 26 November 1943.
  • The Plaintiff served a notice to quit expiring 15 September 1944 and, since the Defendant did not vacate, instituted the ejectment suit on 23 April 1945 when the Calcutta House Rent Control Order was in force.
  • The Defendant was a defaulter and therefore not entitled to protection under the House Rent Control Order; permission of the Rent Controller had been obtained.

Defendant/Appellant's Arguments (as raised by Mr. Sen)

  • The Calcutta House Rent Control Order lapsed after 30 September 1946 and rights could not be determined under it after its lapse; instead they must be determined by the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946 or by the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948.
  • The Calcutta House Rent Control Order is merely an executive order and therefore cannot affect substantive rights created by statutes.
  • The House Rent Control Order is invalid because it was promulgated under Rule 81(2)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, framed under s. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act; and s. 2(1) is invalid because it provides for devolution of legislative power from the Central Legislature to the Central Government, which the Appellant argued was impermissible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving Illustration of the ordinary rule that a suit is to be tried by the law as it stood on the date of institution. The Court invoked this principle to hold that the rights of the parties are governed by the law in force when the suit was instituted (the House Rent Control Order), unless a later law expressly or by necessary implication applied to pending suits.
Delhi Cloth Co. v. Income-Tax Officer Same general rule as above regarding the law applicable on the date of institution of the suit. Used together with other authorities to support the conclusion that the Calcutta Rent Ordinance did not govern pending suits instituted before its commencement.
Sylhet Loan and Banking Co., Ltd. v. Syed Ahmad Mojtoba Same general rule: suits are tried by the law as at the date of institution. Relied upon to reinforce the proposition that subsequent measures do not ordinarily affect pending suits.
Haveliram Chetty v. Maharaja of Morvi Authority for the view that the Central Legislature may empower the Central Government to make rules and such delegation is not invalid; delegation of legislative power is not necessarily impermissible. The Court cited Kania, J.'s reasoning in this case to reject the appellant's contention that s. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act was invalid because it delegated legislative power improperly.
Harkishan Das v. Emperor Full Bench of the Lahore High Court affirmed the view that delegation under the Defence of India Act was valid. Referenced as a supporting authority for the validity of the delegated legislative power under s. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act.
King-Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee Authority holding that Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules was validly framed under s. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act. Invoked to support the conclusion that rules made under s. 2(1) (and thus Rule 81 under the same provision) are validly made and that the appellant's attack on s. 2(1) could not be sustained.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a sequential, issue-focused manner.

  1. Applicable law for pending suits: The Court applied the ordinary rule (illustrated by the cited precedents) that a suit is to be tried by the law in force on the date of institution unless a later law expressly or by necessary implication applies to pending actions. On that basis the Court examined whether the Calcutta Rent Ordinance (1946) or the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act (1948) made provisions applicable to pending suits.
  2. Analysis of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance (1946): The Court analyzed s. 12 of the Ordinance, noting that s. 12 provides that no decree of ejectment shall be made so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent "allowable by this Ordinance" and that s. 12(4)(b) gives a one-month period from commencement to pay arrears due before commencement. The Court held that s. 12 plainly contemplates cases where no suit had been instituted before the Ordinance; it does not speak to tenants against whom a suit for ejectment had already been instituted. The Court also considered s. 26 of the Ordinance (proceedings commenced under the House Rent Control Order to be deemed commenced under corresponding provisions of the Ordinance once the Order ceased) and rejected its applicability, reasoning that a suit for ejectment is a suit under the general law and not a proceeding under the House Rent Control Order.
  3. Analysis of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948: The Court compared s. 12(1) and s. 12(1)(b) of the Act with s. 12 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance and found the language to correspond. For the same reasons given regarding the Ordinance, the Court held s. 12 of the 1948 Act did not apply to the facts because it addresses tenants paying rent "allowable by the Act" and gives a one-month period for arrears where there had not been a prior instituted suit. The Court also examined s. 18 of the 1948 Act (power to rescind or vary pre-Act decrees for ejectment to give effect to the Act if the court is of opinion the decree would not have been made had the Act been in operation). The Court found s. 18 inapplicable because, in the present matter, there was no decree for recovery of possession — the Additional District Judge had remanded the suit to be tried under the House Rent Control Order.
  4. Conclusion on applicable law: Given the foregoing statutory analysis, the Court concluded that the decision of the lower Appellate Court (Additional District Judge) that the suit was to be tried under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order (the law in force on the date the suit was instituted) was correct.
  5. Validity of the House Rent Control Order and the delegation issue: The Court addressed the challenge to the Order's validity on the ground that it was an executive order made under Rule 81(2)(b) of the Defence of India Rules framed under s. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act. The Court observed that while the House Rent Control Order is an executive order, it was made by the executive in exercise of delegated authority, and therefore its force depends on the validity of the delegation. The Court reviewed authorities (Haveliram Chetty v. Maharaja of Morvi; Harkishan Das v. Emperor; King-Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee) holding that the Central Legislature may empower the Central Government to make rules and that such delegation under s. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act has been upheld. On that basis the Court rejected the appellant's contention that s. 2(1) (and rules made under it) were invalid.
  6. Practical observation: The Court noted, before addressing the merits of the delegation challenge, that it was unclear what advantage the tenant would obtain by invalidating an executive order that substantially limits landlords' rights and was promulgated to protect tenants. Notwithstanding that observation, the Court proceeded to consider and reject the legal points advanced.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications:

  • The Court held that the rights of the parties are governed by the Calcutta House Rent Control Order (the law in force on the date the suit was instituted) because neither the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946 nor the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948 applied to pending suits under the facts of this case.
  • The Court held that the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, although an executive order, was promulgated under valid delegated authority (s. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act and rules made thereunder) and that the appellant's attack on the validity of that delegation could not be sustained in light of the cited authorities.
  • The direct practical effect is that the Additional District Judge's decision remanding the suit for trial under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order is affirmed and the tenant's appeal is dismissed with costs. The opinion did not indicate that a new legal precedent was created beyond the Court's application of existing authorities to the facts before it.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Lahiri, J.:— This is an appeal by the Defendant who is a monthly tenant in respect of Premises No. 215, Lansdowne Road and it arises out of an action in ejectment on determination of the tenancy by a notice to quit. The case of the Plaintiff is that the tenancy of the Defendant commenced on the 16th November, 1943, at a monthly rent of Rs. 150 under an order of the Rent Controller dated 26th November, 1943, that the Plaintiff served a notice asking the Defendant to vacate on the expiry of 15th September, 1944, but as the Defendant did not vacate the Plaintiff instituted the suit on 23rd April, 1945, on which date the Calcutta House Rent Control Order was in operation. The Plaintiff alleged that as the Defendant was a defaulter he was not entitled to the protection of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order and that the permission of the Rent Controller had been obtained. The defence of the Defendant so far as it is material for the purposes of the present appeal was that he was not a defaulter inasmuch as he had deposited the rent with the Rent Controller.

2. At the time the suit was brought to trial the Calcutta House Rent Control Order had been replaced by the Calcutta Rent Ordinance (Bengal Ordinance No. V of 1946) which came into operation on 1st October, 1946. Sec. 12 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance provides that no decree for ejectment shall be made so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent “allowable by this Ordinance” and sub-sec. (4)(b) provides that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit of that section unless in the case where any rent has accrued due before the commencement of the Ordinance he has paid within one month of such commencement all arrears of rent due by him to the full extent allowable by that Ordinance.

3. The learned Subordinate Judge who tried the suit held that the Defendant was technically in default under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order because, on one occasion he deposited rent for two months and on another occasion he deposited rent for four months whereas under the House Rent Control Order rent for every month was payable on the date fixed by the agreement between the parties and, in the absence of any agreement, on the 15th day of the following month. But the learned Subordinate Judge further held that under sec. 12 (4) (b) of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance the Defendant was entitled to pay up all arrears within one month from the commencement of the Ordinance, i.e, from 1st October, 1946, and as the Defendant had paid up all arrears within that time he could not be said to be a defaulter under the Rent Ordinance. In this view of the case the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. On appeal by the Plaintiff the learned Additional District Judge has reversed that decision and remanded the case for fresh trial on the footing that the rights of the parties are to be governed not by the Calcutta Rent Ordinance but by the Calcutta House Rent Control Order which was in force on the date of the institution of the suit. Against this decision the tenant Defendant has filed the present appeal. Mr. Sen appearing in support of the appeal has raised the following points before us:—

(1) The Calcutta House Rent Control Order lapsed after 30th September, 1946, and after the lapse of the House Rent Control Order the rights of the parties could not be determined thereunder and must be determined by the Rent Ordinance of 1946 or by the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act (Act XXXVIII) of 1948.

(2) The Calcutta House Rent Control Order is merely an executive order and as such it cannot affect the substantive rights of the parties created by statutes.

(3) The Calcutta House Rent Control Order is invalid inasmuch as it was promulgated under Rule 81 (2) (b) of the Defence of India Rules which in its turn was framed under sec. 2 (1) of the Defence of India Act and it is argued that sec. 2 (1) of the Defence of India Act is invalid inasmuch as it provides for devolution of legislative power by the Central Legislature to the “Central Government which is not permissible under the law.

4. With regard to the first point raised by Mr. Sen it is to be noticed that the ordinary rule of law is that a suit is to be tried by the law as it stood on the date of the institution of the suit unless some new law applies expressly or by necessary intendment. See Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving(1), Delhi Cloth Co. v. Income-Tax Officer(2) and Sylhet Loan and Banking Co., Ltd. v. Syed Ahmad Mojtoba(3). It is, therefore, clear that the rights of the parties in the case before us will be governed by the Calcutta House Rent Control Order unless there is anything in the Calcutta Rent Ordinance or the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act which makes its provisions applicable to pending actions either expressly or by necessary implication. Sec. 12 of the Ordinance has been relied upon by the Appellant in this connection; but we find nothing in sec. 12 to make it applicable to pending actions. Sec. 12 (4) (b) no doubt gives a period of one month from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance to pay up all arrears which accrued due before the commencement of the Ordinance; but this provision evidently applies to a case where no suit has been instituted prior to the commencement of the Ordinance. Moreover, sec. 12 protects tenants who pay rent to the full extent “allowable by the Ordinance.” It does not say anything in respect of a tenant against whom a suit for ejectment has already been instituted. The only other section of the Ordinance to which reference has been made by the learned Advocate for the Appellant is sec. 26 which provides that proceedings commenced under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order shall on the said Order ceasing to be in operation, be deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provision of the Ordinance. A suit for ejectment against a tenant cannot, in our judgment, be said to be a proceeding under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order but a suit under the general law. In this view of the matter we cannot hold that sec. 26 of the Ordinance has any application to the facts of the present case.

5. It remains for us to consider whether the tenant is entitled to the benefit of any of the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1948, which came into operation on the 1st December, 1948. Sec. 12 (1) (b) of the Act gives a period of one month to the tenant to pay up all arrears which accrued due before the commencement of the Act and sec. 12 (1) provides that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Act unless he pays the rent “allowable by the Act.” The language of the relevant provisions of sec. 12 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act very nearly corresponds to the language of sec. 12 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance and for the reasons we have already given in respect of the latter we hold that sec. 12 of the Act of 1948 does not apply to the facts of the present case. Sec. 18 of the Act of 1948 confers upon the Court the power to rescind or vary a pre-Act decree for ejectment to give effect to the provisions of the Act if the Court is of opinion that the decree would not have been made if the Act had been in operation on the date of the decree. In the case before us there has been no decree for recovery of possession; the suit has been remanded by the Appellate Court to be tried under the provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order.” We accordingly hold that sec. 18 of the Act of 1948 has no application to the facts of the present ease. For the reasons given above we hold that the decision of the lower Appellate Court to the effect that the suit is to be tried under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order is correct and the first point raised by the Appellant fails.

6. We have now to consider the second and third points raised by the Appellant. Before proceeding to discuss the merits of these points we must confess that we fail to see how the Appellant will be benefited if these points are accepted by the Court. The House Rent Control Order makes serious encroachments on the rights of the landlord and was promulgated entirely for the protection of the tenant. We cannot realise what advantage the tenant will gain by challenging the validity of the provisions which are entirely meant for his protection. But as the points have been argued before us we proceed to record our views on the merits of those points.

7. With regard to the second point raised by the Appellant it is to be observed that the Calcutta House Rent Control Order is undoubtedly an executive order but at the same time it is an order made by the executive in exercise of delegated authority and if the delegation be valid the orders promulgated by the executive authority of the Province will have the force of law.

8. Therefore the real question is whether the delegation of legislative authority to the executive Government under sec. 2 (1) of the Defence of India Act (1939) is valid. This brings us to the consideration of the third point raised by the Appellant. The Appellant has argued that sec. 2 (1) of the Defence of India Act which delegates legislative power to the executive and Rule 81 of the Defence of India Exiles which was framed in exercise of the delegated authority are invalid. This attack on the validity of sec. 2 of the Defence of India Act cannot in our judgment be maintained. The point was elaborately considered by Kania, J., in the case of Haveliram Chetty v. Maharaja of Morvi(4). At p. 902, Kania, J., after reviewing all the relevant authorities observes as follows:—

“These authorities clearly show that the Central Legislature having plenary power, within the limits prescribed, by the Constitution Act, has authority to empower the Central Government to make rules and such action is not considered invalid. They further show that the contention urged on behalf of Respondent No. 1 that there can be no delegation or devolution of legislative power is unsound.” This view of sec. 2 was also taken by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of Harkishan Das v. Emperor(5).

9. In the case of King-Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee(6) the Judicial Committee held that Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules was validly framed under sec. 2 (1) of the Defence of India Act.

10. In view of the authorities cited above we cannot accept the third point urged by the appellant.

11. As all the points raised by the appellant fail, this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.

A.K.D.G