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Ram Prasad Ojha And Another v. Maheshanand Pandey Opposite Party.

Patna High Court
Nov 26, 1946
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter is a revision petition against an appellate order of the Additional Collector of Shababad, which upheld an order of the Land Revenue Deputy Collector directing prosecution under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) for offences under Section 471 of the Penal Code (forgery). The underlying dispute arose from mutation proceedings before the Land Revenue Deputy Collector in which petitioner 2, Ramanuj Pandey, and an applicant, Jaisrani Kuer (wife of petitioner 1, Ram Prasad Ojha), and others claimed title under separate sale deeds said to have been executed and registered on 3–8–1943 and 7–8–1943 respectively.

The sale deeds and other supporting documents (including a Mahadanama and various handnotes) were alleged by opponents (including the purported vendors Mahesha Nand Pandey and his wife Adhikari Kuer) to be forgeries. Expert evidence produced at the mutation proceedings conflicted: one expert said the thumb-impressions were genuine; another said they were block impressions. The Land Revenue Deputy Collector rejected the mutation applications by order dated 9-4-1945. Appeals on possession were dismissed by the Collector and Commissioner, the latter observing that possession evidence alone could decide the matter even though the genuineness of the sale deeds remained in dispute.

Subsequently, Mahesha Nand Pandey and Adhikari Kuer applied for prosecution of persons connected with the mutation proceedings; the Land Revenue Deputy Collector, under S. 476 CrPC, ordered prosecution of two of the persons now before this Court: Ramanuj Pandey and Ram Prasad Ojha. This petition in revision challenges that appellate order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court had jurisdiction under Section 476 CrPC to direct prosecution of Ram Prasad Ojha when the offence under Section 471 Penal Code (forgery) pertained to a document (the sale deed in favour of Jaisrani) with which Ojha had no connection.
  2. Whether Section 476 CrPC can be invoked to prosecute a person who is not a party to the original proceeding when a party to that proceeding is alleged to have committed an offence in respect of a document produced in the proceeding (interaction between S. 195 and S. 476 CrPC).
  3. Whether the Courts below complied with the requirement under Section 476 CrPC to consider whether a prosecution was necessary in the interests of justice (i.e., whether the record shows that the Courts applied their minds to that question), and whether a prima facie case or a reasonable prospect of conviction existed to justify sending the matter to criminal courts.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as represented in the opinion)

  • Ram Prasad Ojha relied on the rule in 24 Pat. 174 (a Division Bench decision) that Section 476 CrPC must be read with Section 195(1)(b) and (c) CrPC. The contention derived from that authority is that S.195 creates a bar to institution of prosecution in specified classes of cases and S.476 provides the procedure to remove that bar; consequently, a Court has jurisdiction under S.476 only when under S.195 a bar exists (i.e., the alleged offender is a party to the proceeding with respect to a document produced or given in evidence).
  • According to this argument, if the alleged offender is not a party to the original proceeding (or has not engaged with the particular document), the bar under S.195 does not arise and S.476 cannot be invoked against that person.

Opposite Party's Arguments (as represented in the opinion)

  • The opposite party relied on 55 Bom. 461 to submit that although Sections 195 and 476 are related, the scope of S.476 is wider: once the Court gains jurisdiction under S.195 (because a party to the proceeding is alleged to have committed an offence), S.476 empowers the Court to deal with the offence as a whole and it is not confined to proceeding only against the party; the Court may also complain against non-parties who participated in the commission of the offence.
  • Applied to the facts, it was argued that since Ramanuj Pandey (a party) was alleged to have committed an offence, the Court had jurisdiction to proceed under S.476 against Ram Prasad Ojha as well, even though Ojha was not a party in relation to that particular document.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
24 Pat. 174 That Section 476 CrPC must be read with Section 195(1)(b) and (c) CrPC; S.195 creates a bar to prosecution in certain classes and S.476 provides the procedure to remove that bar. The Court relied on the principle to conclude that S.476 jurisdiction arises only where S.195's bar exists; applied to Ram Prasad Ojha it meant no jurisdiction under S.476 in respect of a document with which he had no connection.
55 Bom. 461 That although S.195 and S.476 are connected, the scope of S.476 is wider; once jurisdiction arises under S.195 (because a party is implicated) the Court may proceed against non-participants who aided the offence. Cited by the opposite party to argue the Court could proceed against Ram Prasad Ojha because Ramanuj Pandey (a party) was alleged to have committed an offence; the Court considered but found the precedent not applicable to the facts regarding Ojha.
55 Cal. 1312 Authority supporting that the question whether prosecution is necessary in the interests of justice must be considered by the Court under S.476. Placed among authorities establishing that courts must consider the necessity of prosecution under S.476; used to frame the standard of review in revision.
A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 352 One of the authorities asserting that the Court must consider whether prosecution is necessary in the interests of justice under S.476. Used with other Calcutta decisions to show the requirement that the point be considered by the Court when ordering prosecution under S.476.
A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 147 Another authority that supports the requirement that the necessity of prosecution be considered under S.476. Relied on to demonstrate the established position that the Court must address the interests-of-justice question before directing prosecution.
56 Mad. 157 Authority cited for the same proposition (requirement to consider necessity of prosecution under S.476). Grouped with other decisions to show the established approach required of courts under S.476.
A.I.R. 1937 Pat. 534 Authority cited for the same proposition (requirement to consider necessity of prosecution under S.476). Used as part of the jurisprudential background requiring courts to consider the interests-of-justice question.
A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 705 Authority that an absence of an express finding does not necessarily invalidate an order if the record shows the Court applied its mind to the point. The Court cited this to explain that while express findings are desirable, a reviewing court may infer consideration from the record; used to determine whether the appellate courts had applied their minds.
58 Cal. 1117 Cited to show that the finding of a mere prima facie case may be insufficient in some contexts. The Deputy Collector's order was assessed against this standard; the Court noted the Deputy Collector found a prima facie case but referenced 58 Cal. 1117 to observe that prima facie alone may be insufficient in some circumstances.
58 Cal. 965 Authority holding that where a grave offence is alleged it would be unreasonable to conclude the court did not consider the necessity of prosecution. Used to support the proposition that in grave fraud allegations the reviewing court may infer consideration of the interests-of-justice question from the record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a two-part analysis corresponding to the two petitioners.

Jurisdictional analysis concerning Ram Prasad Ojha

  1. The Court examined the interplay between Section 195(1)(c) CrPC and Section 476 CrPC as articulated in 24 Pat. 174: S.195 creates a bar to prosecution for certain offences committed by parties to proceedings in relation to documents produced or given in evidence; S.476 supplies the procedure to remove that bar where appropriate.
  2. The Court observed that S.195's bar applies only where the alleged offence is committed "by a party to the proceeding" in respect of a document produced in that proceeding. If the alleged offender is not a party with respect to that document, S.195's bar does not arise and hence S.476 would not be engaged in relation to that person.
  3. Applying the facts: the offence against which the case against Ram Prasad Ojha depended related to the sale deed in favour of Jaisrani Kuer. Ramanuj Pandey had nothing to do with that particular document. Thus, since Ojha was not implicated in respect of the document underlying the offence alleged against him, the bar under S.195 did not operate in respect of Ojha and S.476 could not be properly invoked against him.
  4. Consequently, the Court concluded that the direction under S.476 against Ram Prasad Ojha was without jurisdiction and must be set aside; the complaint against him was withdrawn.

Substantive review concerning Ramanuj Pandey

  1. The Court noted the limits of revision under Section 115 CPC and recognized that it could interfere only on limited grounds (e.g., jurisdictional error, material irregularity).
  2. The principal complaint was that the lower Courts did not expressly consider whether prosecution was necessary in the interests of justice as required by S.476 CrPC. The Court reviewed authorities establishing that the question must be considered, but that the absence of an explicit finding does not automatically vitiate an order if the record demonstrates the Court applied its mind.
  3. The Court examined the record of the mutation proceedings and the Land Deputy Collector's judgment: the Deputy Collector had reached a definite finding that the documents were forged and preferred the opinion of one expert over another. The Court observed that the expert evidence relied upon by the Deputy Collector contained statements requiring serious consideration, but the expert had not been cross-examined in detail and the grounds for his opinion were not fully set out in the record.
  4. Recognizing those deficiencies, the Court stated that it was not necessary at that stage to resolve the expert-opinion issues fully. Instead, the appropriate inquiry was whether a serious case had been made out and whether there was a reasonable chance of conviction such that, in the interests of justice, the matter should proceed to criminal courts.
  5. On that test the Court found the conditions were satisfied in respect of Ramanuj Pandey: there was a serious allegation of grave fraud, the Deputy Collector had made findings of forgery based on evidence and expert opinion he preferred, and there existed a reasonable prospect of conviction. Therefore the Court was unwilling to interfere with the order committing Ramanuj Pandey to prosecution.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • Ram Prasad Ojha — Petition Allowed: The direction under Section 476 CrPC ordering his prosecution was held to be without jurisdiction and the complaint against him was withdrawn.
  • Ramanuj Pandey — Petition Dismissed: The revision petition was dismissed and the order directing prosecution under S.476 CrPC (for alleged offences under S.471 Penal Code) against him was upheld: the Court found a serious case and a reasonable prospect of conviction, and in the interests of justice the matter should go to the criminal courts.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that prosecution proceedings will continue against Ramanuj Pandey in the criminal courts, while the complaint against Ram Prasad Ojha has been withdrawn and no prosecution will proceed against him on that basis.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle; it applies established principles concerning the interaction of S.195 and S.476 CrPC and the standard for committing matters to criminal courts (serious case and reasonable chance of conviction). The decision therefore resolves the application of those principles to the specific facts rather than creating a new precedent.
D.R

Order accordingly.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a petition in revision against an appellate order of the Additional Collector of Shababad, upholding an order of the Land Revenue Deputy Collector of Shababad under Section 476 of the Cr PC directing the prosecution of the petitioners of offences under S. 471, Penal Code. The case arises out of mutation proceedings before the Land Revenue Deputy Collector in which petitioner 2, Ramanuj Pandey, and Jaisrani Kuer, wife of Ram Prasad Ojha (petitioner 1), and other persons were applicants. The claim of Jaisrani Kuer was based upon a sale deed said to have been executed by the opposite party, Mahesha Nand Pandey and his wife, Adhikari Kuer, on 3-8-1943, and registered on 7-8-1943. Ramanuj Pandey claimed under another sale deed purporting to have been executed by Mahesha Nand, and executed and registered on the same day as the other sale deed. Separate applications were made by Jaisrani Kuer and Ramanuj Pandey for mutation; but the cases were dealt with analogously by the Land Revenue Deputy Collector. The mutation was opposed, among others by Mahesha Nand and his wife, Adhikari Kuer, on the allegation that there was no such sale as alleged, and that both the sale deeds were forgeries. In support of Jaisrani's sale deed, certain other documents were put forward by the applicants, namely, a Mahadanama (Ex. 1), under which Adhikari Kuer purported to enter into an agreement for the sale of the property, and number of handnotes, purporting to have been executed by Adhikari Kuer, which are said to have formed part of the consideration for the sale deed. All these documents and the two sale deeds purported to bear the thumb-impressions of the executant.

2. Evidence was entered into before the Land Registration Deputy Collector both on the question of possession and of the genuineness of the safe deeds. Amongst other evidence adduced on the latter point, there are the depositions of two expert witnesses, according to one of whom the thumb impressions are genuine, while according to the other they are not genuine, but are impressions made by means of blocks. Both points were decided by the Land Registration Deputy Collector against the applicants, and he, accordingly, rejected the applications by his order dated 9-4-1945. Appeals against this order to the Collector and the Commissioner were dismissed on the point of possession; but the Commissioner also made a reference to the sale deeds in the following terms:

“There is overwhelming evidence to show that the petitioners are not in actual possession and, on that ground alone, the application must be rejected even though it may be conceded that on the basis of the sale deed, on the genuineness of which two handwriting experts differed, the petitioners may claim a semblance of title.”

3. The present proceedings started on the application of Mahesha Nand Pandey and Mt. Adhikari Kuer, who asked for the prosecution of eleven persons connected with the mutation proceedings. The Land Registration Deputy Collector rejected the petition except as to the present petitioners, one of whom, as I have mentioned, was an applicant for mutation. The other, Ram Prasad Ojha, was merely the husband of an applicant, and deposed as a witness in the case. It is probable that he also acted on her behalf in the case, because, in his order under S. 476, the Land Registration Deputy Collector says that “these people” (meaning thereby the two petitioners) produced the sale deeds and handnotes, and put them in Court as evidence.

4. On behalf of petitioner, Ram Prasad Ojha, it is urged that his case falls within the rule laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in 24 Pat. 174.1 It was decided in that case that Section 476 of the Cr PC must be read along with S. 195, sub-s. (1), cls. (b) and (c) of the Code, that the latter section creates a bar to the institution of a prosecution in certain classes of cases, and that the former section provides the procedure by which alone that bar, when it exists, may be removed. In their Lordships' opinion, a Court has jurisdiction to proceed under S. 476 only when under S. 195 a bar to prosecution for the particular offence exists. The offence with which we are concerned is one under S. 471, Penal Code, which is one of the sections mentioned in cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 195. This provides a bar to a prosecution where such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to a proceeding in any Court. There is no bar if the offence is committed by somebody who is not a party to such proceeding. Hence if such an offence is committed by some one, who is not a party to such a proceeding, no occasion arises for proceedings under S. 476 and the provisions of that section do not come into operation at all.

5. On behalf of the opposite party, my attention is drawn to the decision in 55 Bom. 461.2 It was pointed out there that, although the two sections are connected with each other, the scope of S. 476 is somewhat wider than that of S. 195, it is true that, by reason of S. 195, the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed under S. 476 arises only when the offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to the proceeding. Once the Court gets jurisdiction however, and proceeds under S. 476, it is empowered to deal with one offenee as a whole, and is not bound to confine its complaint only to the party, and may complain also against a person who is not a party but who has participated in the commission of the offence. It is urged that in the case before me, Ramanuj Pande, a party to the mutation proceeding, was alleged to have committed an offence, and, therefore, the Court had jurisdiction to proceed also against Ram Prasad Ojha. I cannot agree that the facts of the Bombay case are applicable to the present case for the two petitioners are being proceeded against in respect of different offences, although both the offences happen to be under the same section. Under S. 195, cognizance, except on the complaint of the Court concerned, is prohibited of an offence under S. 471, Penal Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court “in respect of a document produced, or given in evidence, in such proceeding.” The document, on which the case against Ram Prasad Ojha depends, is the sale deed in favour of Jaisrani. Ramanuj Pandey pad nothing whatever to do with that document, land it cannot be suggested that he has committed any offence in respect of that document. Hence, so far as that offence is concerned, the bar under S. 195 does not arise and the Court has no jurisdiction under S. 476, and as regards the other document jurisdiction under S. 476 exists, but the offence alleged does not touch Ram Prasad Ojha. I have, therefore, no doubt that, so far as Ram Prasad Ojha is concerned, the direction under S. 476 is without jurisdiction, and must be set aside.

6. As regards the second petitioner, the position is quite different. This is a petition in revision, and I can only interfere in the limited circumstances set out in Section 115 of the CPC No question of jurisdiction arises, and the main contention is that the Courts below committed a material irregularity by not considering, as required by Section 476 of the Cr PC whether a prosecution was necessary in the interests of justice. It is well established that this point must be considered by the Court: 55 Cal. 1312,3 A.I.R 1930 Cal. 352,4 A.I.R 1933 Cal. 147,5 56 Mad. 157 and A.I.R 1937 Pat. 534.7 The failure to come to an express finding on the point, however, does not necessarily render the order invalid. It is sufficient if the record shows that the Court applied its mind to the point: A.I.R 1930 Cal. 7058 and 58 Cal. 11179 and in a case where a grave offence is alleged to have been committed it has been held that it would be unreasonable for the Court to take the view that the point was not considered: 58 Cal. 96510 In the last resort, the point may be considered by this Court in revision, if it does not appear to have been considered by the Courts below.

7. The Land Deputy Collector has ordered the prosecution on the finding that a prima facie case has been made out—a finding which was considered insufficient in 58 Cal. 1117 at P. 1122. The Additional Collector does not seem to have considered even whether a prima facie case has been made out. I have, therefore, perused the record of the mutation proceedings and the judgment of the Land Deputy Collector in that case. In that case, the Deputy Collector came to a definite finding that the documents in question were forged. That finding was based on several grounds, many of them observations of the Deputy Collector himself. Also it was based on the opinion of an expert whose evidence the Deputy Collector preferred to that of the expert on the other side. On a perusal of the evidence of the expert relied on by the Deputy Collector, I find that there are certain statements in it which require the serious consideration of the Courts—statements which I refrain from discussing because such a discussion on the insufficient materials appearing on the record may prejudice the accused. The expert was not cross-examined in detail, and the grounds on which he based his opinion are not set out at any length or with all the necessary particulars. The materials necessary for coming to a finding as to whether the opinion expressed by him is correct or not are, therefore, not before the Court. At present, however, it is not necessary to come ta a finding on this point. It is only necessary to see whether there is a serious case made out and whether there is a reasonable chance of a conviction. It appears to me that these conditions are satisfied in this case and, as the allegation is one of a serious fraud, it is necessary, in the interests of justice, that the matters should be taken to the criminal Courts, I, therefore, find myself unable to interfere. On the above grounds, I allow the petition of the petitioner Ram Prasad Ojha, and withdraw the complaint as against him. The petition of Ramanuj Pandey is dismissed.

D.R

8. Order accordingly.