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Ramcharan v. King-Emperor
Factual and Procedural Background
These consolidated appeals arise from convictions by the Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur, Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ibrahim, of six men for rioting and the murder of Pancham Jha. The incident occurred on 18 September 1942 on a small parcel of land in village Manki where a dispute over possession followed execution-sale acquisitions by Satnarain Singh. A panchayat set up by insurgents in a neighbouring village issued an award attempting to restore the land to Sheo Parsan Chaudhary, after which Sheo Parsan collected a mob that went to seize forcible possession. Pancham Jha (an elderly man) and his son Nageshwar were on the land with labourers cutting the marua crop when the mob arrived; Pancham Jha was attacked and later died from multiple wounds.
Many of those involved were tried before Sessions Judge Rai Bahadur Aghore Nath Banerji; most were convicted and appeals by those convicted were dismissed by Sinha and Beevor, JJ., on 9 February 1944. The appellants in the present appeals had absconded at the earlier trial; one, Satnarain Chaudhary, was apprehended or surrendered on 5 July 1943. At the subsequent trial before Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ibrahim, several appellants were convicted under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code; sentences of transportation for life were imposed on some. The present appeals challenge those convictions and the legal bases on which individual and constructive liability were found.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether members of an unlawful assembly who did not themselves inflict the fatal injury can be convicted of murder under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code (i.e., whether constructive liability under section 149 requires the same offence as the principal offender).
- Whether, on the facts of this case, the appellants (other than Kusheshwar Chaudhary) were liable for murder under section 149 or for lesser offences (such as rioting under section 147), applying the tests in the cases and legal principles cited.
- Whether Kusheshwar Chaudhary was properly convicted of murder as a principal (and, if not as principal in the first degree, whether he was at least guilty under section 34 as a joint participator).
- Whether the juvenile appellant Satnarain Chaudhary (alleged to have been about 12–13 years old at the time) is constructively guilty of murder under section 149 or liable only for a lesser sentence, given the timing and nature of his actions.
- What legal principle governs the situation where a principal commits a more serious offence (murder) and other members of the unlawful assembly might be guilty only of a different or lesser offence — in particular, the conflict between the decisions in Ram Prasad Singh v. King Emperor and Bhagwat Singh v. King Emperor and which is to be followed.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (as represented in the opinion)
- Mr. K.P. Varma (for some appellants) argued that Ramcharan Rai and Satnarain Chaudhary did not take part in the riot and were victims of a conspiracy to implicate them. He relied on alleged differences in evidence between the earlier trial (where some witnesses had not implicated certain individuals) and the later trial, and urged that the learned Sessions Judge erred in relying on witnesses disbelieved at the earlier trial.
- For Satnarain Chaudhary specifically, it was argued that his youth (medical opinion that he was about 14 at time of examination, implying he was 12–13 at the time of the riot) made it unlikely he would participate in such a violent riot and that assessors were inclined to acquit him.
- It was urged that certain witnesses (for example, those connected with the earlier trial) may have altered or given new evidence, and that there was an alleged motive (pressure from the Mahant of Patepur) for false incrimination of Ramcharan Rai — though the court found no evidence of such pressure on the record.
Respondent / Prosecution Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of specific arguments advanced by the prosecution; rather, the opinion summarizes the prosecution evidence and the findings of the Sessions Judge.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Prasad Singh v. King Emperor | Principle that if a member of an unlawful assembly is to be found constructively guilty under section 149, it must be of the same offence of which the principal is guilty; it is impermissible to convict the principal of one offence and other members of another, lesser offence under section 149. | The court regarded this decision as correct and binding. It followed Ram Prasad Singh in holding that members cannot be convicted under section 149 of a different offence than that of the principal; this authority governed the court's approach to the appellants' constructive liability. |
| Bhagwat Singh v. King Emperor | Decision in which a Division Bench altered convictions from section 302 read with section 149 to a lesser offence (section 326 read with section 149) where murder was committed by some members but individual perpetrators could not be identified. | The court (Shearer, J.) criticized and dissented from the principle as applied in Bhagwat Singh, holding that it was inconsistent with Ram Prasad Singh and earlier authority; the opinion declined to follow Bhagwat Singh. |
| Queen v. Sabid Ali (Queen v. Sobid Ali) | Interpretation of "in prosecution of the common object" in section 149: Phear, J.'s observations that some member might commit an offence which others may not be constructively liable for; and Ainsley, J.'s strict view that if the section applies the court is bound to convict of the particular offence. | The court relied on and discussed the observations in this case to analyse how the concluding words of section 149 should be construed and to show the limits of constructive liability; the opinion emphasized that Phear, J.'s observations do not go beyond recognising that some members might not be liable in particular circumstances. |
| Queen Empress v. Bisheshar | Explanation that section 149 is declaratory of an English common law principle that in a riot all are principals (principals in first and second degree) — it does not create a new offence but declares liability. | The court cited this authority to support the proposition that section 149 is declaratory of common law principles and to explain the historical approach to treating rioters as principals; this informed the court's analysis of whether all members shared the requisite common object. |
| Rex v. George Edward Pridmore | Approval by the Court of Criminal Appeal of the proposition (from Russell on Crimes) that where several persons engage in a common unlawful object, and one does an act which the others ought to have known was not improbable in the course of pursuing that object, all are guilty. | The court cited Pridmore as endorsing the Russell formulation and used it in discussing the "second part" of section 149 — whether the nature of the enterprise made murder a likely consequence that members ought to have foreseen. |
| Emperor v. Krishnarao Narayanrao | Illustrative case where the common object did not extend to killing certain persons; liability of some rioters was for grievous hurt rather than murder because the common object did not include killing those persons. | Used by Pande, J. to illustrate that where the common object is limited, some participants may be liable only for a lesser offence (e.g., grievous hurt under section 325) rather than murder under section 302 with section 149. |
| Jahiruddin v. Queen Empress | Statement that members of an unlawful assembly may share a community of object only up to a point; knowledge of what was likely to be committed in prosecution of that object varies among members, affecting application of section 149. | Cited by Pande, J. to support the view that different members may bear different liabilities under section 149 depending on their knowledge and share in the common object; the court used this to justify different punishments for different members. |
| Rex v. John Royce; Rex v. Salisbury; Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja | Historical common-law discussions about principal and accessory liability; illustrations of how English common law treated principals in first and second degree and apportionment of punishment. | These older authorities and historical references were invoked to explain the background of section 149 and related Penal Code provisions, and to argue against analogies relied on by Rowland, J. in Bhagwat Singh. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a multi-faceted analysis, addressing factual findings, the role of particular appellants, and the legal tests governing constructive liability under section 149 of the Penal Code.
Assessment of factual guilt for particular appellants
- Ramcharan Rai: The court found substantial evidence against him (including testimony that he struck a labourer with lathis and carried him away). The court rejected arguments that he was a victim of a conspiracy and accepted that he took an active part in the riot.
- Satnarain Chaudhary (the juvenile): Although medical and judicial impressions suggested he was very young (between about 12–15 at various times), the court found "a great deal of evidence" that he struck Pancham Jha with a lathi while Pancham was lying on the ground. However, the court analysed whether that conduct made him constructively guilty of murder under section 149.
- Kusheshwar Chaudhary: The court accepted that he was an active participant in the attack and was armed; while the Sessions Judge was not satisfied he inflicted the particular fatal wound attributed to bhala strikes, the court concluded he did take part in the attack and was guilty of murder.
Legal analysis of constructive liability under section 149
The court examined whether the murder was committed "in prosecution of the common object" of the unlawful assembly (the language of section 149). It considered two distinct routes under section 149:
- The first part: the act (murder) must be committed in prosecution of the common object — i.e., with a view to achieving that common object.
- The second part: even if an act goes beyond the common object, members may still be liable if the act was one which they knew (or ought to have realised) was likely to occur in the course of pursuing the common object (the "ought to have realised" test, echoing Russell/Pridmore).
Applying these tests to the facts, the court reasoned that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to drive Pancham Jha, his son and the labourers off the land and to cut and remove the crop. The persons on the field were unarmed and few in number. Given the paucity of resistance likely to be offered, the court concluded it was not reasonably to be said that every member of the assembly ought to have realised that murder was likely to be committed in the prosecution of that object. Hence, the court answered the key "ought to have realised" question in the negative.
On the precedential conflict (Bhagwat Singh v. King Emperor & Ram Prasad Singh v. King Emperor)
The court scrutinised Bhagwat Singh, which altered convictions from murder under section 302 read with section 149 to a lesser offence under section 326 read with section 149, and found it inconsistent with the earlier Division Bench decision in Ram Prasad Singh. The court held Ram Prasad Singh to be correct and binding. The court therefore rejected the approach that permitted convicting some members of an unlawful assembly of a lesser offence under section 149 when the principal was guilty of murder.
On application of section 34
For Kusheshwar Chaudhary the court concluded that, whether or not he inflicted a specific fatal wound, he was one of those who took part in the brutal attack; therefore, he was liable for murder and the provisions of section 34 (common intention/joint liability) applied. Kusheshwar's conviction was altered accordingly to section 302 read with section 34.
On Satnarain Chaudhary (juvenile)
The court accepted evidence that the boy struck Pancham Jha while Pancham was already on the ground; it also accepted the possibility either that Pancham was already dead or that the fatal assault had already been completed when the boy struck. On this basis the court held the boy was not constructively guilty of murder under section 149 (because his action did not contribute to the fatal assault nor did he participate in the fatal phase), and therefore should not be treated as guilty of murder to the same extent as those who committed the fatal blows.
Outcome of the legal analysis
- Because the test for constructive liability under section 149 (whether murder was committed in prosecution of the common object or whether murder was one that every member ought to have realised was likely) was not satisfied for most appellants, their convictions under section 302 read with section 149 could not be sustained.
- Kusheshwar Chaudhary was properly convicted of a murder-related offence; his conviction was varied to section 302 read with section 34.
- Other appellants were to be dealt with for rioting (section 147) where appropriate, and Satnarain's sentence reduced to the period already served given his youth and limited participation as found by the court.
Holding and Implications
Final Ruling: The appeals were dismissed except to the extent of the modifications set out by the court:
- Kusheshwar Chaudhary: Conviction altered from section 302 read with section 149 to section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code (i.e., convicted as a participant in the murder under common intention).
- Other appellants: Convictions under section 302 read with section 149 and sentences of transportation for life imposed at the trial were set aside. The appellants Ramcharan Rai, Charitar Gope, Jadunandan Raut and Anup Raut were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years each under section 147 (rioting).
- Satnarain Chaudhary (the boy): His sentence was reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone.
- Subject to the above modifications, the appeals were dismissed.
Implications:
- The court affirmed the binding authority of Ram Prasad Singh v. King Emperor: members of an unlawful assembly cannot be constructively convicted under section 149 of a different offence from that of the principal; if the principal is convicted of murder, the members, if liable under section 149, must be convicted of the same offence.
- The court expressly criticized and declined to follow the approach in Bhagwat Singh v. King Emperor to the extent that it permitted altering convictions to a different offence under section 149; the opinion treats Ram Prasad Singh as the correct approach.
- The decision clarifies and applies the tests for section 149 liability: (a) whether the murder was committed in prosecution of the common object, and (b) whether the nature of the enterprise was such that every member ought to have realized that murder was likely. On the facts, the court found the latter test not satisfied for most appellants.
- Direct consequence: the modification of convictions and sentences described above for the parties named. The court did not announce the creation of a new legal precedent beyond its reasoned preference for Ram Prasad Singh over Bhagwat Singh; rather, it applied and reconciled existing authorities to the facts before it.
Shearer, J.:— These, appeals, which have been heard together, arise out of a judgment of Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ibrahim, the Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur, convicting six men of rioting and murder. The not in which they are said to have been concerned took place on the 18th of September, 1942, and shortly afterwards a number of men were arrested and in due course put on trial before the then Sessions Judge, Rai Bahadur Aghore Nath Banerji. Most of these men were convicted and an appeal against their convictions and sentences was dismissed by Sinha and Beevor, JJ., on the 9th of February, 1944. The present appellants had absconded. One of them, namely, Satnarain Chaudhary, was apprehended on the 5th of July, 1943, that is, shortly before judgment was delivered by Rai Bahadur Aghore Nath Banerji. Most of these men were convicted and much later; most of them not until the middle or latter part of 1944.
The immediate cause of the not was the action of Pancham Jha and his son Nageshwar Jha and a number of labourers in cutting the marua crop standing on a small parcel of land in village Manki, to which the appellant Satnarain and most of the other appellants belong. This land was originally bakasht land, and in 1927 the landlord settled it with one Sia Chaudhary, who is the uncle of the appellant Satnarain Chaudhary. Subsequently, Sheo Parsan Chaudhary, the brother of Sia Chaudhary, took a conveyance of an eight annas interest in the estate in which this land is situated. Immediately afterwards Sheo Parsan Chaudhary mortgaged this property to one Satnarain Singh, the employer of Pancham Jha and Nageshwar Jha, who belongs to another village some considerable distance away from Manki. The mortgage money was not repaid, and Satnarain Singh in due course instituted a suit and obtained a decree in execution of which he had the mortgaged property sold and purchased it himself. The amount realised by the sale was insufficient to liquidate the debt and Satnarain Singh obtained a decree for the balance. In execution of this decree he brought to sale and himself purchased the raiyati interest of Sheo Parsan Chaudhary and his brother Sia Chaudhary in the land over which the not took place. In the course of the execution proceedings several persons appear to have put forward claims, asserting that they were in possession of the land on their own account and were not liable to be evicted by Satnarain Singh. These claims were, however, dismissed, and Satnarain Singh ultimately succeeded in obtaining possession of the land. Not long after the writ for delivery of possession was served, the insurrection of 1942 began, and in it the police-station at Katra, within the jurisdiction of which Manki is situated, was burnt down. A panchayat board was apparently set up by the insurgents in Berai, a village contiguous to Manki, and on the 25th of August, 1942, this panchayat board presumed to make an award under which Sheo Parsan Chaudhary was to pay the sum of Rs. 3,500 to Satnarain Singh, and Satnarain Singh was to reconvey the property he had purchased to Sheo Parsan Chaudhary. The award provided that the payment was to be made within a period of one month and provided further that, if Sheo Parsan Chaudhary was unable to make the payment, he was to have the option of conveying certain land to Satnarain Singh instead. Shortly afterwards, on the 14th of September, 1942, the members of the panchayat caused a letter to be sent to Satnarain Singh, requiring or requesting him to abide by the decision they had given. Satnarain Singh and his agent in Manki, Nageshwar Jha, apparently declined to comply with the wishes of the board. It was, no doubt, in consequence of this that on the 18th of September, 1942, Sheo Parsan Chaudhary collected a mob and went to take forcible possession of the land. As I have already said, Pancham Jha and his son Nageshwar Jha were on the land getting the marua crop cut when the mob arrived. Pancham Jha, when asked to quit the land, declined to do so, and thereupon he was attacked and killed. Three of the labourers were also more or less severely assaulted. Neither Mrs. Dharamshila Lall nor Mr. K.P Varma, who appear for the appellants, has attempted to contend that a riot of a serious kind did not in fact take place. Indeed, upon the evidence on the record it would be quite impossible to put forward any such argument. Mr. K.P Varma has, however, attempted to persuade us that two of his clients, namely, Ramcharan Rai and Satnarain Chaudhary, took no part in it and are the victims of a conspiracy. Ramcharan Rai does not belong to Manki but to Berai, and is the son of one Sukhdeo Rai. The latter was apparently one of those men who were tried by Rai Bahadur Aghore Nath Banerji and he was acquitted. Mr. Varma contends that the learned Sessions Judge was in error in relying on the evidence of certain witnesses for the prosecution when his predecessor had disbelieved the evidence of these witnesses in so far as they incriminated his father. There is, in my opinion, little or no force in this argument. For one thing, it would seem that the volume of evidence against the appellant. Ramcharan Rai is considerably greater than was the volume of evidence against Sukhdeo Rai at the earlier trial. Certain of the witnesses for the prosecution who had apparently said nothing at the earlier trial against Sukhdeo Rai gave evidence at the subsequent trial against his son Ramcharan Rai. Secondly, from the outset, a fairly prominent and active part in the riot has been ascribed to Ramcharan Rai, but not apparently to his father Sukhdeo Rai. Even in the first information it was said that Ramcharan Rai was one of those who had assaulted one of the labourers, Hazuri Raut, and had carried him away from the scene of occurrence. At this trial Hazuri Raut gave evidence against Ramcharan Rai and stated that he was one of the men who had struck him with lathis. Ramcharan Rai, as I have said, belongs to Berai, and the suggestion put forward on his behalf was that the Mahant of Patepur, who is the landlord of Berai, had been responsible for his being incriminated? It is said that Ramcharan Rai had consistently declined, to pay rent to the Mahant of Patepur and that in consequence the Mahant had to institute a number of rent suits against him. It is also said that relations between him and the Mahant had been so strained that the Mahant had applied for action to be taken against him under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no evidence of this on the record. Even, however, assuming that relations between Ramcharan Rai and his landlord, the Mahant of Patepur, had for some considerable time been strained, I can see no reason at all to suppose that was why Ramcharan Rai came to be incriminated. Berai is quite close to Manki and was the seat of the panchayat board which endeavoured to get Satnarain Singh to surrender this land to Sheo Parsan Chaudhary. There is nothing very unlikely in his having joined the mob which Sheo Parsant Chaudhary collected. Nageshwar Jha may, no doubt, hold some land under the Mahant of Patepur, but there is no good reason to suppose that he was amenable to pressure by the Mahant of Patepur and would at his instance have incriminated a man whom he knew to be innocent. Moreover, it would seem that Nageshwar Jha took steps to lodge a first information as soon as he possibly could. The police-station at Katra had been burnt down and in consequence Nageshwar Jha had to take the dead-body of his father, Pancham Jha, to Muzaffarpur on a bullock-cart. He reached Muzaffarpur and lodged a first information at I a.m, which makes it very unlikely indeed, and in fact almost impossible, that there was any consultation between him and any amlas of the Mahant of Patepur before he left the village. I am satisfied that the appellant Ramcharan Rai did in fact take part in this riot. The appellant Satnarain Chaudhary is the only son of Sheo Parsan Chaudhary who was the man directly and immediately responsible for the riot. He was apprehended or surrendered on the 5th of July, 1943 and shortly afterwards the Civil Surgeon was asked to report how old he was and stated that, in his opinion, he was fourteen. The learned Sessions Judge and the learned committing magistrate were apparently both of the opinion that, when they saw him, he was about fifteen years of age. If these estimates are correct, Satnaran Choudhary must have been a boy of between twelve and thirteen when the riot took place. Mr. K.P Varma says that it is very unlikely indeed that a boy of that age would take part in a riot, and points out that each of the assessors, who was satisfied as to the guilt of the other prisoners, was disposed to, acquit him. There is, however, a great deal of evidence against this boy and I agree with the learned Sessions Judge in thinking that it is impossible to reject it in its entirety and to assume that Nageshwar Jha, when he went to the police-station, took it into his head to incriminate Satnarain Chaudhary falsely and maliciously merely because he knew that would be likely to cause intense suffering to Sheo Parsan Chaudhary whose only son he is.
Pancham Jha was an old man of sixty-five and was most foully and brutally murdered. He was apparently attacked by several men, some of whom were armed with pharsas and others with bhalas. One of the former struck him a blow on the back, causing a wound 8½″ long and 3″ wide and cutting through no fewer than seven of his ribs. One of the latter, who was standing on the other side of Pancham Jha, drove his bhala deep into his side, cutting through the seventh rib and punturing both the stomach and the diaphragm. Another man, armed with a bhala, drove it into his back deep enough to cause damage to the left kidney. He was struck at least three more blows with pharsas, two of them on the head. The appellant Kuseshwar Chaudhary is said to have been responsible for the first of the two blows with bhalas which I have just described, and he was in consequence charged substantively with murder. The Assistant Surgeon, who conducted the post-mortem, had, it should be explained, expressed the opinion that either of the two wounds caused by bhalas, or the wound on the back caused with a pharsa, was by itself sufficient to cause death. The learned Sessions Judge was of opinion that the prosecution had not succeeded in showing that Kuseshwar Chaudhary was in fact responsible for one of these particular wounds. The learned Sessions Judge was, however, apparently satisfied that Kuseshwar Chaudhary was armed with a bhala and was one of those who took part in the attack on Pancham Jha, and it would, I think, be impossible to hold that Kuseshwar Chaudhary was one of the rioters and yet took no part in this attack. I am myself satisfied on the evidence that he did do so. In that view of the matter it is wholly immaterial whether he was directly responsible for any of the three wounds which, in the opinion of the Assistant Surgeon, was by itself sufficient to cause death. Any man who took part in this attack was in my opinion, quite clearly guilty of murder, as the attack was so brutal and violent one that an intention to cause death on the part of all who were concerned in it must be presumed. The provisions contained in section 34 of the Penal Code clearly apply. The appellant Satnarain Chaudhary is said to have struck Pancham Jha a blow with a lathi. It is not possible to suppose that this boy joined in the attack on Pancham Jha at the same time as the men who were armed with pharsas and bhalas fell upon trim. In fact the evidence of Ramgulam Sao and two or three of the other labourers is that this boy did not strike Pancham Jha until he was lying on the ground. Mr. K.P Varma has pointed out that the Assistant Surgeon who conducted the post mortem did not find any lacerated wound or other injuries, which might have been caused by lathis, on the dead-body. It is, however, possible that any outward mark produced by the blow which this appellant struck had disappeared before the post mortem. I think the evidence of Ramgulam Sao and the other labourers ought to be accepted and it ought to be held that for some reason or other this boy Went over to Pancham Jha as he was lying on the ground and hit him with a lathi. That he did in fact do this explains, I think myself, how he came to be incriminated. Is he then constructively guilty of murder in the same way as Kuseshwar Chaudhary, is, namely, by reason of the provisions contained in section 34 of the Penal Code? In my opinion, he is not, and that for two reasons. In the first place, Nageshwar Jha said that his father died instantaneously, and it is possible that when Satnarain Chaudhary went over to where he was lying and hit him with a lathi he was already dead. Secondly, even if life was not yet extinct, the fatal assault was already over. This boy cannot be said to have participated in it, and such injury as he subsequently caused cannot in any way have accelerated or, indeed, contributed at all to Pancham Jha's death.
The question then arises as to whether Satnarain Chaudhary and the remaining appellants, other than Kuseshwar Chaudhary, are guilty of murder under the provisions contained in section 149 of the Penal Code. At the original trial the accused persons were charged under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code but they were convicted under section 326 read with section 149 of the Penal Code, and, with the exception of two or three, who were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four or five years, were each sentenced to undergo rigosous imprisonment for two years. Rai Bahadur Aghore Nath Banerji, the learned Sessions Judge, did not set out at length his reasons for taking this course; but it may be presumed that he relied on the decision of Rowland, J. with which Varma, J., agreed, in Bhagwat Singh v. King Emperor. Speaking for myself, and with the greatest respect, that decision is, I think, on several grounds open to criticism. In the first place, it is, in my opinion, directly at variance with an earlier decision of a Division Bench of this Court. In Ram Prasad Singh v. King Emperor, a Sessions Judge had convicted one member of an unlawful assembly under section 302 of the Penal Code and had sentenced him to transportation for life, but had convicted the remaining members under section 304 read with section 149 of the Penal Code and had sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years each. These latter convictions were set aside on appeal on the ground that it was not open to the learned Sessions Judge to convict the remaining members of the unlawful assembly of a minor offence. Coutts, J. in dealing with the matter said this:—:
“I can find no authority, however, for convicting the principal offender of one offence and the rest of the members of the unlawful assembly of another offence, nor has the learned Assistant Government Advocate been able to refer us to any such case, and it seems to me clear from the section itself that if a member of an unlawful assembly is to be found constructively guilty of an offence under section 149 it must be the same offence of which the principal is guilty and not some other offence. If the members of an unlawful assembly are not guilty of the same offence as the principal, the only reason why they are not guilty is because they do not come within the terms of section 149. If then the rest of the appellants are not constructively guilty of the same offence as Ram Prasad, they cannot be found guilty under section 149 at all.”
It is true that in Bhagwat Singh v. King Emperor no member of the unlawful assembly had been convicted of murder. The reason, however, was that it had been impossible for the prosecution to show who the individuals were who had committed the murders. That murder was committed by one or more members of the unlawful assembly was conceded. That being so, in altering the convictions from one under section 302 read with section 149 to one under section 326 read with section 149 of the Penal Code, the Division Bench were doing exactly what another Division Bench had some years earlier decided could not, in law, be done. Secondly, Rowland, J. relied on certain observations of Phear, J. in the well known case of Queen v. Sabid Ali, which, he thought, went to support the view which he put forward. Unfortunately, Rowland, J. omitted to quote the observations on which he relied. It is true that Phear, J. pointed out that section 149 of the Penal Code had been drawn in such a way that some member of an unlawful assembly might, while the common object of that unlawful assembly was being prosecuted, commit an offence and yet the remaining members might not be constructively liable for it. I cannot, however, myself see that Phear, J. went any further than that and what he said was entirely correct. On the other hand, Ainsley, J., referring to the concluding words in section 149, had observed:—
“These last words are very stringent. If the section applies, the Court is bound to, convict of the particular offence.”
Although Phear, J. and most of the other learned Judges dissented from the view which Ainsley, J. took of the case, none of them made any comment on this remark of his, and Couch, C.J impliedly endorsed it by saying that “certainly in a case like this where, if the accused are found guilty they are liable to a sentence of death, if there is a reasonable doubt as to the view with which the gun was fired they ought to have the benefit of it”.
Lastly, as Edge, C.J pointed out in Queen Empress v. Bisheshar section 149 of the Penal Code creates no offence but is merely declaratory of a principle of the English Common Law. That principle is that in a riot all are principals, the rioter, who with his own hand commits the offence, being a principal in the first degree, and the other rioters Being principals in the second degree on the ground that by their presence they have aided and abetted the doing of the act. When it was sought to make certain rioters liable for an act done by another of their number, a common practice was to set out in the indictment the facts which it was intended to prove and to charge them specifically with having aided and abetted the rioter who did the act. In such cases the jury was often asked to find a special verdict; and when the special verdict was returned, the question that arose was whether or not, on the facts found by the jury, the prisoners were or were not principals in the second degree [see the summary of the argument in Rex v. John Royce]. If they were principals in the second degree, they were, of course, guilty of the same offence as the principal in the first degree. Not only that, but until comparatively modern and more merciful times, when it became not unusual “to apportion the punishment”, to borrow the expression used by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in an early Indian case, Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja, in which this matter was touched on, they were as a rule liable to and, indeed, invariably received, exactly the same punishment. Rowland, J., in support of the conclusion at which he arrived, referred to sections 35, 38 and 110 of the Penal Code. These sections are also declaratory of principles of the English Common Law, but principles very different to that underlying section 149. Section 110 deals with the case of the accessory before the fact who is not himself present at the fact. Now,
“at common law the offence of an accessory before the fact was regarded as so different from that of a principal in the second degree, that where a woman was indicted a an accessory before the fact, it was held that she could not be convicted of that charge upon evidence proving her to have been present aiding and abetting; it being clearly admitted to be necessary to charge a principal in the second degree with being present aiding and abetting”.
(See Russell on Grimes and Misdemeanors, 8th edition, Volume I, page 121).
Sections 35 and 38 deal with cases in which each of several persons is a principal in the first degree but they commit different offences inasmuch as some have done the act with one knowledge or intention and the others have done it With another knowledge or intention. In England, as far back as 1558, it was settled that where several men combine to kill another man, and some of them are actuated by malice aforethought and others are not, it is murder in the former but manslaughter in the latter [Rex v. Salisbury]. The argument from analogy is always dangerous; and in seeing any analogy between the principles underlying these sections and the principle underlying section 149, Rowland, J., if I may say so with respect, fell into an error.
The decision in Ram Prasad Singh v. King Emperor is, in my opinion, correct, and is, moreover, binding on me unless and until it is set aside by a larger Bench. It, therefore, follows that if, in my opinion, the appellants or any them are guilty under section 149 of the Code, I must convict them of murder and cannot impose a lesser punishment than transportation for life. Whether in some cases that sentence is too severe and ought to be respected, is a matter solely for the Crown to consider in exercise of its prerogative of mercy. On the other hand, the decision at the former trial that the members of this unlawful assembly were constructively liable for the act of those who killed Pancham Jha is not res judicata. The matter is one which I have to consider for myself and come to my own conclusion. There can be no doubt but that certain members of this unlawful assembly committed murder, and a murder of the most cruel and barbarous kind. Was this, murder committed “in prosecution of the common object” which words, as laid down in the Queen v. Sobid Ali, must be construed as meaning “with a view to the achievement of the common object”? The common object of the unlawful assembly was to drive Pancham Jha and his son and labourers off the land and to cut and remove the marua standing on it. If, when the mob reached the land, certain men in it had refrained from advancing further and others had made a rush at Pancham. Jha and his labourers and attacked them, the view which I should have been disposed to take would have been that those men who did nothing, had dissociated themselves from further prosecution of the common object, but that all of those who advanced on Pancham Jha and the labourers were constructively guilty of murder. On the evidence, however, it is clear that nothing of this kind actually happened. What appears in fact to have happened is that, when the mob reached the land, some men in it entered into an argument with Pancham Jha. What Pancham Jha said or did does not appear from the evidence, which is, I think, unfortunate but it is clear that certain men in the mob lost their tempers and, leaving the others, advanced on and attacked and killed him. The labourers who were assaulted would seem to have been assaulted subsequently and because they had protested at what had been done to Pancham Jha. Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ibrahim took the view that the appellants were guilty under the first part of section 149. It cannot be said that this view was an untenable one, but there is, I think, a certain amount of doubt on the point, and of that the appellants ought to have the benefit. If, then, the first part of section 149 does not apply, are the appellants guilty under the second part? Russell on Crimes and Misdemeanor, 8th edition, Volume I, page 119, contains the following:—
“It is submitted that the true rule of law is, that where several persons engage in the pursuit of a common unlawful object, and one of them does an act which the others ought to have known was not improbable to happen in the course of pursuing such common unlawful object all are guilty.”
Sir William Oldnall Russell was at one time Chief Justice of Bengal, and it would be interesting to know if this passage is to be found in the earliest editions of his work to which the authors of the Penal Code may have had access. In the 7th edition of the work no authority was apparently cited for the proposition. But, before the 8th edition appeared, it received the approval of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. George Edward Pridmore. It is true that was not a case of rioting; but the Court of Criminal Appeal was dealing with the principle of the Common Law which underlies section 149 of the Penal Code. Rai Bahadur Aghore Nath Banerji, differing on this point from Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ibrahim, appears to have thought that the accused persons were liable under the second part of section 149. What, apparently, weighed with him was that certain members of the unlawful assembly were armed with deadly weapons. This is, of course, a circumstance to which some regard must be had; but since the decision in Bhagwat Singh v. King-Emperor there is, I think, a danger of undue weight being attached to it. The evidence does not show that more than a very few men were armed with bhalas and pharsas, although a larger number would seem to have been armed with lathis. My experience of agrarian riots in Bihar, is that in almost every, mob some men are to be found armed with bhalas or pharsas and yet that in a great many cases these weapons are not used or, at any rate, are used in such a way that fatal consequences more frequently than not do not ensue. The question to which, in my opinion, Sessions Judges ought to address themselves in considering whether the second part of section 149 of the Penal Code applies is this “Was the nature of the enterprise, to borrow the expression used in Rex v. Pridmore, such that every member of the unlawful assembly ought to have realised that murder was likely to be committed?”. Now, in this particular case a panchayat board, set up by the insurgents in the adjoining village, had decided that Satnarain Singh should make over this land to Sheo Parsan Chaudhary. The mob, it seems to me clear, went to Manki for the purpose of enforcing this award. There were on the land an old man and his son and a small handful of labourers. These men were not armed; and although they displayed a reluctance to quit the land, they did not evince any intention to remain on the land and fight it out. In these circumstances, how can it reasonably be said that every member of this unlawful assembly knew, which must obviously be taken to mean ought to have realised, that there was a likelihood (which, if it does not mean a probability, at least means more than a possibility) that some of their number would commit murder? I have no hesitation myself in answering this question in the negative.
In the result then, I would alter the conviction of Kusheshwar Chaudhary from one under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code to one under section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code. I would set aside the convictions of the remaining appellants under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code and the sentences of transportation for life which had been imposed on them. The appellants Ramcharan Rai, Charitar Gope, Jadunandan Raut and Anup Raut are sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years each under section 147 of the Penal Code. Satnarain Chaudhary is still a mere boy, and I would reduce his sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone. Subject, however, to these modifications, I would dismiss the appeals.
Pande, J.:— I entirely agree and would like to make the following observations.
The appellants have been convicted for the offence of rioting and constructively for the offence of murder of one Pancham Jha under section 302 read, with section 149 of the Penal Code. The convictions are based on the following findings of the Sessions Judge:—
(1) “That, a large number of persons, who were armed with weapons, came up for depriving Satnarain Prasad Singh of the enjoyment of the right of possession of a portion of plot no. 81 and assaulting Pancham Jha and others and that in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly, of which they were members, they committed rioting”.
(2) “That the murder of Pancham Jha was committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly by one or more of its members and they must have known that the murder was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly”.
The evidence shows that plot no. 81 which is the scene of the occurrence, originally formed part of a raiyati holding of Sheo Parsan Chaudhary of village Manki. The holding had passed into the possession of Satnarain Singh by purchase in execution of his decree at a court sale and he had obtained delivery of possession of it through court. It has been found by the Sessions Judge that Satnarain Chaudhary has been in possession of the land and had grown mania crop in the field. About the time of the occurrence Pancham Jha and his son Nageshwar Jha were engaged in harvesting the crop with the help of five labourers. Sheo Parsan Choudhary went to the field with a big mob which is said to be of about 100 persons and four of these were armed with bhala and qarasa and the rest with lathi. Sheo Parsan asked the men to stop harvesting. Pane ??? refused to comply and apparently there ensued altercations between the two. Pancham was very brutally struck by sharp and pointed weapons in consequence of which he died in the field. It is for this offence of killing that the appellants have been convicted under section 149, Penal Code. It seems clear from the evidence that the main object of the unlawful assembly was to drive Pancham and his labourers off the field and to cut away the standing crop, obviously with a view to assert right of possession over the field. There is nothing in the evidence to show that Pancham or his men engaged in reaping, were in any way armed. The field in question is in mauza Manki. Sheo Parsan Chaudhary and the members of the mob are residents of mauza Manki and the adjoining mauza Berai. The members of the assembly must be well aware that only seven unarmed men engaged in reaping were to be driven off the field. In the circumstance, there was little likelihood of any effective resistance by the men in the field and so no violent use of arms could be in contemplation of, the members of the assembly. It is not clear from the evidence what led some members of the assembly to strike Pancham to death. Possibly Pancham's insolent behaviour or recalcitrant attitude might have enraged some easily exciteable members of the assembly to commit such brutal assaults on Pancham. At the post-mortem examination six injuries were found on the body of Pancham Jha and of these four were incised wounds and two were punctured wounds. The nature of injuries indicate that, the men armed with garasa and some of those armed with bhala struck him. The question is whether in this state of evidence all other members of the unlawful assembly are liable for the offence of murder under section 149 of the Penal Code. As was pointed out by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the well known case of Queen v. Sabid Ali, section 149 of the Penal Code is not intended to subject a member of an unlawful assembly to punishment for every offence which is committed by one or more of its members during the time they are engaged in prosecution of the common object. In order to bring a case within section 149 the act must be done with a view to accomplish the common object of the unlawful assembly, or it must be proved that the offence is one which the accused knew would be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. The principle of law on the subject is stated in Russell on Crimes thus:—
“If a murder is committed in prosecution of some unlawful purpose,…………… all persons who went, to give assistance, if need were in carrying the unlawful purpose into execution, are guilty of murder. But this applies only where the murder is committed in prosecution of some unlawful purpose, in which the combining parties united, and for the effecting whereof they are assembled; for unless this appears, though the person giving the mortal blow may himself be guilty of felonious homicide, yet the others who came together for a different purpose will not be involved in his guilt”. (8th Edition, page 116.)
The case of Emperor v. Krishnarao Narayanrao may be referred to in illustration of the principle. In that case the rioters first attacked M and it was not until B and after him T had arrived on the scene and had expostulated or interposed that, some of the rioters of whom the appellant was not proved to be one spontaneously attacked B and T and killed them. Their Lordships Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J and Aston, J. observed that if the common object was to kill B or T, the attack upon them would hardly have been deferred until B and T interposed. And on a consideration of the evidence their Lordships came to the conclusion that there was a common intention in which the appellant shared, to inflict grievous hurt on M and such hurt was actually inflicted. It was, therefore, held that the appellant was liable only far the offence of grievous hurt under section 325 with 149 of the Penal Code and not for the offence of murder.
In the present case the learned Sessions Judge has no doubt found that one of the common objects of the unlawful assembly was to beat Pancham Jha. But there is an obvious difference between such a finding and the finding that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to inflict injury of such a nature that death was its most probable consequence. In the circumstance of there being-little apprehension of any effective resistance by the men in the field the members of the unlawful assembly would hardly have contemplated such violent use of arms which might result in death of one or more of the opposers. Therefore it cannot reasonably be said that the murder was committed “in prosecution of some unlawful purpose in which the combining parties united and for the effecting whereof they are assembled”.
In Jahiruddin v. Queen Empress their Lordships Beverley and Banerjee, JJ., pointed out that members of an unlawful assembly may have a community of object only up to a certain point, beyond which they may differ in their objects, and that the knowledge possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object, will vary, not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object; and as a consequence of this, the effect of section 149 of the Penal Code may be different on different members of the same unlawful assembly. Here, therefore, such members of the assembly who inflicted the injuries resulting in the death of Pancham Jha may be held guilty for the offence of murder. Other members of the assembly who did not share in such object are liable for the offence of rioting only.
The learned Sessions Judge appears to have been largely influenced in his judgment by, what he describes, the members of the assembly being “heavily armed” and he, therefore, seems to have drawn the inference that the members of the assembly knew that murder was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly. The evidence, however, as I have stated above, shows that three of the members carried bhala and one only a garasa. This circumstance by itself hardly warrants the inference which the learned Sessions Judge seems to have drawn. There being no reasonable apprehension of any effective resistance by the men in the field the members of the assembly may reasonably have expected that mere show of their armed strength would be sufficient to drive the Men off the field, and at best in the event, of any recalcitrant attitude of the men a few simple strokes would be sufficient for the achievement of the object of the assembly. Therefore it cannot reasonably be said that the members of the unlawful assembly knew beforehand that murder was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly.
It follows from the above discussions that the convictions of the appellants under section 302 read with section 149, Penal Code, cannot be supported.
As to the emit of Kusheshwar Chaudhary there is ample evidence on the record to prove that he was an actual participant in the act resulting in the death of Pancham Jha. I, therefore, agree that he is liable for the offence under section 302 read with section 34, Penal Code.
The question whether other members of an unlawful assembly are liable for offence different from that actually committed by one or more of its members in the course of the occurrence does not seem to arise directly for decision of this case. It, however, arises incidentally as in a previous trial some of the accused involved in the occurrence were convicted for offence different from that which was actually committed, during the occurrence. Section 149 does not create any new offence. If merely declares the liability of other members of an unlawful assembly for act or acts done by one or more of their associates in prosecution of the common purpose. Therefore, the members other than the actual perpetrator of the crime are liable for the offence that is actually committed and not for a different offence which different members of the assembly in their individual judgment may have contemplated to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. The liability of the other members of the offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence rests upon the fact whether the other members knew beforehand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Such knowledge may reasonably be collector from the nature of the assembly, arms, or behaviour, at or before the scene of action. If such knowledge may not reasonably be attributed to the other members of the assembly then their liability for the offence committed during the occurrence does not arise. But when it may reasonably be held that other members of the assembly knew beforehand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object then such other members of the assembly are liable for the offence committed to the same extent as the actual perpetrator of the crime. Sir William Oldnall Russell says:
“the blow given under such circumstances is in point of law the blow of all, and it is unnecessary to prove which struck the blow”. (Russell on Crimes, page 117.)
My learned brother has discussed this matter at some length and I do not think I can add anything useful to it. For the above reason. I concur with my brother in dissenting, most respectfully, from the principle laid down in the case of Bhagwat Singh v. King Emperor and would follow the decision in Ram Prasad Singh v. King Emperor.
I agree to the orders proposed.
Order accordingly.
H.R.K
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