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Bhavani Pillai And Others v. Ammukkutti Pallai And Others
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit for redemption brought originally by five plaintiffs on behalf of their Nair tarwad known as Vazhapalli tarwad. The suit sought redemption of mortgages and purakkadoms affecting seven schedule properties and claimed damages and mesne profits. The lower court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. Plaintiffs 2 to 5, who are sisters and the legal representatives of their deceased mother (plaintiff 1), appealed the dismissal.
Chronology and relevant transactions (as found in the opinion): in 1070 Krishnan Parameswaran Pillai executed a mortgage for 5000 fanams (items 1–3); an assignment of that mortgage was obtained by John David in 1075. On 17-7-1075 John David obtained another mortgage for 5300 fanams (items 1–7) (Ext. B), which on its face was supported by consideration to the extent of 1300 fanams and reserved 4000 fanams purportedly payable later. Subsequent purakkadoms (Ext. C, D, E) were executed in favour of the mortgagee and later purchasers bought rights in execution (Ramakrishnan Chettiar) and transferred them (gift to Chellamma; later assignments including Ext. F to defendant 1). Oorumatom, the Jenmi, obtained decrees (O.S. 1045 and O.S. 1726 of 1110) for dues; Bhaskaran Nair purchased the equity of redemption in execution and later assigned it (Ext. X) to defendant 1. The lower court concluded that the equity of redemption was extinguished by the execution sale and subsequent assignment and dismissed the suit; this appeal followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit as framed on behalf of the Vazhapalli tarwad was maintainable given that the tarwad had long been divided into separate branches (i.e., does a divided Marumakkathayam tarwad permit suit on behalf of the whole tarwad)?
- If the tarwad was divided, whether the plaintiffs (as individual co-owners or co-sharers of the equity of redemption) were nevertheless entitled to maintain the suit and obtain a decree for redemption.
- Whether the equity of redemption of the plaint properties was extinguished by the execution sale in O.S. 1045 of 1110 and the subsequent assignment to defendant 1 (including whether Bhaskaran Nair acted as a benamidar for defendant 1).
- Whether Section 90 of the Trusts Act applies to compel defendant 1 to hold the equity of redemption on trust for the mortgagors (i.e., whether defendant 1 obtained an advantage by virtue of a fiduciary/mortgagee position by default which is in derogation of the mortgagors' rights).
- Whether Ext. B (the 1075 mortgage) was fully supported by consideration (i.e., whether the reserved 4000 fanams had been paid).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (Plaintiffs 2–5)
- Claimed that the properties belonged to the Vazhapalli tarwad and that they sued for and on behalf of that tarwad to redeem mortgages and recover possession.
- Asserted that even if the tarwad had divided, after extinction of Krishnan Parameswaran's branch the properties devolved on the two surviving branches and the members became co-owners/co-sharers of the equity of redemption; hence plaintiffs could sue individually for redemption.
- Contended that defendant 1, having taken assignment of mortgage rights and with specific directions/reservations in Ext. F to discharge Jenmi's claims, defaulted in those obligations (or used a benami purchaser) to procure the equity of redemption for herself; invoke Section 90 of the Trusts Act to assert that defendant 1 must hold the equity for mortgagors.
- Alleged that Ext. B was supported by consideration only to the extent of 1300 fanams and that the reserved 4000 fanams had not been paid.
- Sought redemption by deposit (prayer for deposit of 8450 fanams) and damages for silting and mesne profits.
Respondent (Defendant 1) and Defendant 2
- Contended that Vazhapalli tarwad had been divided and that plaintiffs and defendants belonged to different branches; hence a suit on behalf of the entire tarwad was not maintainable.
- Maintained that Ext. B was fully supported by consideration and that the equity of redemption had been validly sold in execution in O.S. 1045 of 1110 and acquired by Bhaskaran Nair and ultimately by defendant 1, extinguishing mortgagors' redemption rights.
- Denied that Bhaskaran Nair was a benamidar for defendant 1; asserted that after he legitimately purchased in execution he assigned his auction-purchaser's rights to defendant 1, making her full owner.
- Denied responsibility for arrears decreed in O.S. 1045 of 1110 beyond what was expressly reserved in Ext. F; denied any improper conduct or default that would attract Section 90.
- Denied claims for damages for silting and sought compensation for improvements if redemption were allowed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Velayudhan Nair v. Janaki, 1957 K.L.T. 222 | When a Marumakkathayam tarwad becomes divided there is no longer a tarwad on behalf of which a divided member can sue. | The court relied on this principle to hold that the suit as framed on behalf of the Vazhapalli tarwad (which had long been divided) was not maintainable. |
| Parvathi Amma v. Cheriyan, A.I.R. 1951 T.C. 94 | Dictum that it is not an absolute rule that a benefit acquired by a mortgagee must always be held in trust for the mortgagor; if the advantage was obtained by fraud or unfair practice it must be held for the mortgagor, but if acquired openly and fairly the mortgagee may keep it. | The court quoted and applied this dictum to evaluate whether defendant 1's acquisition of the equity of redemption was due to unfair conduct or was openly and fairly acquired; it concluded the latter. |
| Govindarajam Pillai v. Alagappa Chettiar, A.I.R. 1943 Madras 202 | Emphasises that Section 90 (Trusts Act) rests on a fiduciary relationship; to attract the section it must be shown (1) the party availed himself of his position, (2) he gained an advantage thereby, and (3) the advantage was gained in derogation of the interests of the person entitled to the property. | The court applied these requirements and found them unsatisfied because defendant 1 had not availed herself of a fiduciary position to cause the sale, nor had she gained the advantage by wrongful conduct; thus Section 90 did not apply. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of factual findings and legal applications, each rooted in evidence and documentary material produced in the trial:
- Existence and effect of division of tarwad: The court accepted the appellants' counsel's admission (supported by documentary evidence and witness testimony) that Vazhapalli tarwad had divided into separate branches prior to 1066 and that partitions between members of branches had occurred subsequently. Ext. B itself recorded that the properties had been allotted to Krishnan Parameswaran's branch and that upon its extinction the executants became entitled. Recorded judgments in earlier suits (Exts. XII and XIII) confirmed the divided status. From these facts the court concluded the suit framed on behalf of the Vazhapalli tarwad as a whole was not maintainable.
- Co-ownership/individual remedy argument: The appellants argued they could sue as co-owners of the equity of redemption. The court analysed ownership consequences after extinction and partitions: properties devolved as tenants-in-common among surviving branches and, after partition within a branch, common property would vest in individual members as tenants-in-common. The court therefore treated the maintainability issue separately from the merits of any claim that individual co-owners might have.
- The chain of mortgages, purakkadoms, execution sales and assignments: The court set out the transactional history—mortgages in 1070 and 1075, purakkadoms (Exts. C–E), execution sale to Ramakrishnan Chettiar, subsequent transfers (including Ext. F to defendant 1), Oorumatom's decree (O.S. 1045 of 1110) for Jenmi's dues, execution sale to Bhaskaran Nair (purchase of equity of redemption), and assignment (Ext. X) by Bhaskaran to defendant 1.
- Applicability of Section 90 (Trusts Act) and benami allegation: The court considered plaintiffs' contention that defendant 1 had caused a benami purchase to secure the equity of redemption and therefore must hold it on trust under Section 90. The court articulated the legal test (derived from authorities) that Section 90 is attracted where a fiduciary or trustee gains an advantage by virtue of that position and in derogation of the beneficiary's rights.
- Assessment of evidence on default and conduct: The court evaluated documentary and oral evidence about whether defendant 1 defaulted or otherwise caused the execution sale by failing to discharge Jenmi's dues. It accepted D.W.1's credible account that defendant 1 tendered the reserved amount (Rs.25/− i.e., 175 fanams) to the Jenmi, who refused it as insufficient; D.W.1 then informed the mortgagors and requested arrangements for payment, which they promised but did not fulfill. The court rejected P.W.1's inconsistent testimony and found no culpable default by defendant 1 that brought about the sale.
- Benami status of Bhaskaran Nair: The court found insufficient proof that Bhaskaran Nair was a benamidar for defendant 1. It noted inconsistencies in P.W.1's statements about their relationship, the absence of Bhaskaran Nair's evidence, evidence that he had means to purchase, and the execution diary showing regular execution proceedings. Thus the court concluded the execution purchase and subsequent assignment to defendant 1 were not clandestine or fraudulent.
- Application of authorities: Applying Parvathi Amma and Govindarajam Pillai, the court emphasised that Section 90 does not automatically apply to every advantage acquired by a mortgagee; it applies only where the advantage was obtained through breach of fiduciary duty or by taking unfair advantage of the mortgagor. Because defendant 1 had not been the mortgagee at the time arrears accrued, had taken steps to discharge what she was obliged to, had given due notice to the mortgagors, and had not otherwise acted unfairly, Section 90 did not apply.
- Consideration supporting Ext. B: The court examined the claim that the reserved 4000 fanams under Ext. B had not been paid. Considering the lapse of time (suit filed 47 years later), the chain of transfers, and the subsequent purakkadoms (Ext. C, D, E) which did not mention non-payment, the court found strong circumstantial reasons to conclude the reserved amount had been paid and that Ext. B was fully supported by consideration.
- Conclusion of legal effect: Because the execution sale and assignment were valid and not the product of defendant 1's wrongful conduct, the equity of redemption was held to belong to defendant 1; the plaintiffs and other members of the former tarwad had no right of redemption or to recover possession from her.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The decree of the lower court dismissing the plaintiffs' suit is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs to defendant 1.
Implications
- Direct effect on the parties: The court held that the execution sale of the equity of redemption (O.S. 1045 of 1110) and the subsequent assignment (Ext. X) vested the rights in defendant 1 alone; plaintiffs and other members of the defunct Vazhapalli tarwad have no right to redeem or recover possession of the plaint properties from defendant 1.
- No new legal principle was announced by this judgment; the court applied existing authorities (notably Parvathi Amma v. Cheriyan, Govindarajam Pillai v. Alagappa Chettiar and Velayudhan Nair v. Janaki) to the facts and found they did not support extending Section 90 relief in this case.
- The court expressly found Ext. B to be fully supported by consideration based on circumstantial and documentary evidence, rejecting a conclusive presumption of non-payment merely from the lack of production of a receipt after many years.
This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in that text.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Kumara Pillai, J.:— Against the decree in a suit for redemption which was brought by five plaintiffs for and on behalf of their tarwad and which has been dismissed by the court below plaintiffs 2 to 5 have filed this appeal. They are sisters, and plaintiff 1 was their mother. The mother died before the suit was dismissed, and plaintiff's 2 to 5 are her legal representatives.
2. According to the plaint allegations, plaint schedule properties, seven in number, belong to a Nair tarwad known as Vazhapalli tarwad, and the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 5 are members of two thavazhis in one branch of that tarward—one thavazhi consisting of the plaintiffs and defendant 5 and the other defendants 2 to 4. Defendants 3 and 4 are sisters, and defendant 2 is their brother. In 1070 Krishna Pillai Parameswaran Pillai of Vazhapalli tarwad executed a mortgage deed for 5000 fanams in respect of plaint schedule items 1 to 3 in favour of one Mallan Pillai Sankara Pillai, and one John David obtained an assignment of that mortgage in 1075. On 17-7-1075 John David obtained another mortgage from Vazhapalli tarwad for 5300 fanams in respect of plaint schedule items 1 to 7 (Ext. A is a copy of the assignment of the mortgage of 1070 and Ext. B a copy of the mortgage of 1075). Ext. B is supported by consideration only to the extent of 1300 fanams, and the balance mortgage amount of 4000 fanams recited in that mortgage deed as reserved with the mortgagee for subsequent payment to the mortgagors has not been paid. While John David was in possession of plaint schedule items 1 to 7 under these mortgages, Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai and Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai of Vazhapalli tarwad executed in his favour a purakkadom (Ext. C copy) for 1000 fanams on 21-8-1079 charged upon all the mortgaged properties. Subsequently, the mortgage and purakkadom rights were sold in execution of a decree against John David and purchased in court auction by one Ramakrishnan Chettiar who also got delivery of possession of the properties in pursuance of execution sale. After this court sale and delivery, Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai who was the karanavan of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 5 executed in favour of Ramakrishnan Chettiar two other purakkadoms one for 450 fanams in 1093 (copy Exhibit D) and another for 700 fanams in 1100 (Copy Exhibit E). Defendant 1 has obtained an assignment of the rights under the above mortgages and purakkadoms, and she is in possession of all the plaint schedule properties. Since defendant 2 who is the karanavan of the tarwad, was taking no stepts to redeem the mortgage plaintiffs have been compelled to bring the suit in order to protect the rights of the tarwad. When they issued a notice to defendant 1 seeking redemption of the mortgages and purakkadoms she replied that the equity of redemption of the plaint properties had been sold in execution of a decree and she had purchased the same in court auction and had thereby become the full owner of the properties and that plaintiffs were not therefore entitled to redeem the mortgages. On subsequent enquiry made by them plaintiffs learnt that on account of the mortgagee's failure to pay the dues payable in respect of the plaint properties to Oorumatom, the Jenmi of the properties, the said Matom obtained two decrees for the Jenmi's dues, namely, O.S 1045 and O.S 1726 of 1110 of the Trivandrum Munsiff's Court, that, although there was a direction to defendant 1 in the assignment taken by her that she should discharge the decree amounts in those two suits, she did not discharge the said amounts and with the intention of obtaining the equity of redemption also for herself she took an assignment of the said decrees benami for her in the name of one of her relatives, Bhaskaran Nair, and caused the equity of redemption to be sold in execution and purchased by him. The execution sale will not affect the right of the plaintiff's tarwad to the equity of redemption, and notwithstanding the execution sale the plaintiff's tarwad is entitled to redeem the mortgages. Plaintiff's are also entitled to get 1700 fanams from defendant 1 as damages on account of silting up of some of the plaint properties with sand. Plaintiff's brought the suit on the above allegations and prayed that a decree might be passed in favour of plaintiff 5 for depositing in court 8450 fanams as the price of redemption and redeeming and recovering possession of the plaint properties for and on behalf of her tarwad. A sum of 1700 fanams was claimed from defendant 1 on account of damages for waste, and mesne profits also were claimed at the rate of 140 paras of paddy per year from the date of the deposit of the price of redemption. Defendants 1 and 2 contested the suit. Defendant 1 contended that there was no Vazhapalli tarwad in existence as it had become divided, that plaintiff's and defendants 2 to 5 did not belong to the same branch, that plaintiff's and defendant 5 belonged to one branch and defendants 2 to 4 belonged to another branch, that these branches had become divided from each other about the year 1060, that even the two branches of the plaintiffs' and defendant 5 and of defendants 2 to 4 had effected partitions in 1096, 1104 and 1108, that there was no community of interest between the branch of plaintiffs' and defendant 5 and the branch of defendants 2 to 4, that the suit brought by the plaintiff's on behalf of the Vazhapalli tarwad was not therefore maintainable, that Krishna Pillai Parameswaran Pillai who executed the mortgage of 1070 belonged to a branch which had become divided from the branches of the plaintiff's and defendants 2 to 4 in 1060, that Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai was not the plaintiff's karnavan, that Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai and Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai who executed Ext. B had taken a Kanom for the plaint properties from Oorumatom in 1074 and they had special rights over those properties, that Ext. B was fully supported by consideration, that the equity of redemption of the plaint properties was sold in 1 execution of the decree in O.S 1045 of 1110 which was passed for arrears of michavarom and other dues payable to the Jenmi, that the said decree was passed even before the assignment taken by defendant 1, that Bhaskaran Nair who had taken the assignment of the said decree and purchased the equity of redemption of the plaint properties in execution, was not a benamidar for defendant 1 that after he purchased the properties in execution and obtained delivery of the same through court he assigned his rights to defendant 1 and she has thereby become the full owner of the properties, and that the plaintiff's were not therefore entitled to get a decree for redemption. She also denied that any damage was caused to the properties by silting up and contended further that in the event plaintiff's being given a decree for redemption she was entitled to get Rs. 1500 on account of the value of the improvements effected by her. Defendant 2 also filed a written statement in the case supporting the contentions of defendant 1 and denying that he was the karanavan of any undivided tarwad.
3. The lower court found that there was no Vazhapalli tarwad in existence on the date of the suit as the said tarwad had become divided into different branches at least before 1066, that the branch of the plaintiff's and defendant 5 and the branch of defendants 2 to 4 were themselves divided from each other, that even in each of these two branches, there were partitions inter se, that the suit brought by the plaintiff's for and on behalf of the Vazhapalli tarwad was not therefore maintainable, that Ext. B was fully supported by consideration, that the equity of redemption of the plaint properties was validly sold in execution of the decree in O.S 1045 of 1110, that Bhaskaran Nair who took the assignment of the said decree and purchased the equity of redemption of the plaint properties in execution thereof was not a benamidar for defendant 1, that the assignment which defendant 1 got from Bhaskaran Nair of the auction purchaser's right to the equity of redemption would not enure to the benefit of the mortgagors, and that on account of the execution sale in O.S 1045 of 1110 and the subsequent assignment of the auction purchaser's right taken by defendant 1 the equity of redemption of the plaint properties was extinguished and defendant 1 had become the full owner of the properties. As a result of these findings that court dismissed the suit with costs to defendant 1, and so the plaintiffs have filed this appeal.
4. At the time of hearing in this court it was admitted by the appellants' learned counsel that the Vazhapalli tarwad had become divided into different branches before 1066. He stated that after the said partition there were three different branches in the tarwad, namely, the branch of the plaintiffs and defendant 5, the branch of defendants 2 to 4, and the branch of Krishnan Parameswaran who executed the mortgage of 1070, and that the plaint properties were allotted in the said partition to Krishnan Parameswaran's branch. According to him, Krishnan Parameswaran's branch became extinct after 1070, and then the properties belonging to that branch devolved upon the two branches of the plaintiffs and defendant 5 and defendants 2 to 4, and the Karanavans of the said two branches subsequently executed Exhibit B in 1075. He also admitted that after the execution of Ext. B there were partitions in both the branch of the plaintiffs and defendant 5 and the branch of defendants 2 to 4. But he contended that, although on account of these partitions there was no undivided tarwad or even an undivided branch on the date of suit and even though the suit had been brought for and on behalf of the Vazhapalli tarawad as a whole which had ceased to exist long before the date of the suit, plaintiffs are competent to maintain the suit in their individual capacities and can be given a decree for redemption in this suit itself. The contention was that after the extinction of Krishnan Parameswaran's branch the properties belonging to that branch including the plaint properties had devolved on the branch of the plaintiffs and defendant 5 and the branch of defendants 2 to 4, that these two branches had renewed the mortgage of 1070 by executing Ext. B in 1075, that the result of the subsequent partitions in the branch of the plaintiffs and defendant 5 and the branch of defendants 2 to 4 would be to make the individual members of the two branches co-owners or co-sharers of the equity of redemption, and that as co-owners of the equity of redemption plaintiffs are entitled to redeem the mortgage and maintain a suit for redemption. It was also stated that plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 5 were the only co-owners of the equity of redemption on the date of suit, and so no prejudice also will be caused to the mortgagee by allowing redemption in this suit.
5. The admission of the appellant's learned counsel regarding the division of Vazhapalli tarwad into separate branches and the subsequent partitions between the members inter se of those branches is fully supported by the evidence in the case. In Ext. B, which is one of the mortgages sought to be redeemed and which was executed in 1075 by Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai and Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai, it was expressly stated that the mortgaged properties belonged to their tarwad and had been allotted to the share of Krishnan Parmeswaran's branch and that on the extinction of Krishnan Parameswaran's branch the executants had become entitled to the properties. P.W 1, who is the husband of plaintiff 2 and the only witness examined on the side of the plaintiffs, admitted in his cross-examination that Vazhapalli tarwad was divided into four separate branches about the year 1068 the branches being those of (1) Perumal Kochu, (2) Perumal Bhagavathi, (3) Perumal Easwari, and (4) Perumal Narayani that the plaintiffs belonged to Easwari's branch, and that Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai was the Karanavan of that branch. That defendants 2 to 4 belonged to another branch was also admitted by P.W 1. He further admitted that Exts. I and II are partition deeds executed by the memebers of Easwari's or Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai's branch. By Ext. I executed in 1096, that branch got divided into two separate thavazhis. The plaintiffs and one Achuthan Pillai belonged to the second thavazhi mentioned in Ext. I. A partition between the members of that thavazhi was effected by Ext. II in 1108. Exts. XII and XIII are certified copies of the judgment in two earlier suits in both of which Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai and Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai were parties and the question arose for decision whether their branches were divided from one another or belonged to a common undivided tarwad. In Ext. XII, the judgment in a suit of 1096, it was held that Vazhapalli tarwad had become divided into separate branches before 1066, and that Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai and Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai belonged to two separate branches. The fact that Krishnan Parameswaran's branch had become extinct is also mentioned in Ext. XII, and that fact is admitted by P.W 1 also. The finding in Ext. XIII also regarding the divided status of the parties was the same as the finding in Ext. XII. There can therefore be no doubt of the fact that Vazhapalli tarwad was not in existence on the date of suit and that it had got divided into separate branches and even the members of the branches had effected partition inter se long before this suit was instituted. It follows that the suit as framed, on behalf of the Vazhapalli tarwad as a whole, is not maintainable. When the properties which originally belonged to Krishnan Parameswaran's branch devolved after the extinction of that branch on the surviving branches, the surviving branches could have taken those properties only as tenants-in-common, with each branch having separate rights, and not as an undivided tarwad comprised of all the surviving branches. Likewise after the subsequent partition between the members of the plaintiff's branch, any common property left out of the partition would belong thereafter not to the branch as a whole and as constituting an undivided tarwad with respect to such property, but to the individual members or units of the branch as tenants-in-common and with each divided member or unit having separate rights to the property. As has been pointed out in Velayudhan Nair v. Janaki, 1957 K.L.T 222, when once a Marumakkathayam tarwad becomes divided there will be no tarwad on behalf of which a divided member can sue.
6. The appellant's learned counsel contended that, although the suit brought for and on behalf of Vazhapalli tarwad is not maintainable for the reason that the said tarwad was not in existence on the date of the suit, the plaintiffs can be given a decree in this suit for redemption as they are at present co-owners or co-sharers of the equity of redemption and all the other co-owners or co-sharers of the equity of redemption are parties to this suit. Defendant 1's answer to this contention is two-fold. One is that the equity of redemption has been extinguished by merger with the mortgage right and she has thereby become the full owner of the plaint properties, and the other is that all the co-owners of the equity of redemption have not been made parties to this suit. The main defence of defendant 1 to the suit—her real objection to the claim for redemption by the mortgagors or any one claiming under them—is that plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 4 have no right at all to the equity of redemption as the equity of redemption has been extinguished by merger with the mortgage right consequent on the execution sale in O.S 1045 of 1110 and the assignment which she (defendant 1) has taken of the auction purchaser's rights. The appellant's answer to this defence is that the equity of redemption has not been extinguished and that, although the equity of redemption was sold in execution of the decree in O.S 1045 of 1110 and defendant 1 has obtained an assignment of the auction purchaser's rights, there has been no merger of the equity of redemption with the mortgage right since the mortgagee was bound to pay the Jenmi's dues for which the decree in O.S 1045 of 1110 was obtained by the decree-holder thereof and defendant 1 was specially directed in the assignment deed, Ext. F, taken by her to discharge the said decree-debt and the assignment of the auction purchaser's rights taken by her (Ext. X) would therefore enure to the benefit of the mortgagors under Section 90 of the Trusts Act.
7. Both sides admit that the plaint properties were first mortgaged by Krishnan Parameswaran in 1070, and that after his death another mortgage, Ext. B, was executed in 1075 by Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai who belonged to the branch of defendants 2 to 4 and Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai who belonged to the branch of the plaintiffs in favour of John David. There was a direction in Ext. B that the mortgagee should pay the tax due to the Sirkar and the Jenmi . Subsequently Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai and Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai Jointly executed Exhibit C purakkadom in favour of John David in 1079, and in 1090 Ramakrishnan Chettiar purchased the rights under the mortgages of 1070 and 1075 and the purakkadom rights in execution of the decree he had obtained against John David. After the execution sale in his favour Ramakrishnan Chettiar took two more purakkadoms, Ext. D in 1093 and Ext. E in 1103, and then he executed a gift deed in favour of his daughter Chellamma conveying to her all the mortgage and Purakkadom rights he had. In 1110 Oorumatom, the Jenmi of the plaint properties, filed O.S 1045 of 1110, for the arrears of michavarom, accrued after 1106, the renewal fees payable in 1102 and Aradianthiram fees payable in 1106 and 1107 (see Ext. K, copy of plaint in O.S 1045) and obtained Ext. G. decree on 1-7-1110. Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai and Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai (i.e the two mortgagors) and Ramakrishnan Chettiar and his daughter Chellamma were defendants 1 to 4 in O.S 1045. After this decree was passed Chellamma executed Ext. F assignment on 23-9-1111 in favour of defendant 1 conveying to her the mortgage and purakkadom rights comprised in Exts. A to E. The consideration for Ext. F was 12450 fanams. It was stated in Ext. F that the Jenmi had filed two suits, O.S 1045 and O.S 1726 of 1110, for the arrears of dues payable to him and that the said suits were pending trial; and a sum of Rs. 25/- (fanams 175) out of the consideration for the assignment was reserved with defendant 1 for payment towards the discharge of the claims in those two suits. Ext. G and K show that O.S 1045 of 1110 was filed for the recovery of the dues payable in respect of present plaint items 1 to 3 (which were items 1 and 2 in that suit) and another property which was item 3 therein. On 5-2-1115 item 3 in O.S 1045 of 1110 was sold in execution of the decree therein and purchased by the decree-holder for a part of the decree amount. After the confirmation of this execution sale the decree-holder assigned the right to the balance decree amount to Bhaskaran Nair by Ext. VII dated 1-7-1115. Bhaskaran Nair then attached plaint schedule items 4 to 7 also, and for the balance decree amount due under Ext. G he purchased in execution of that decree the equity of redemption of plaint schedule items 1 to 7 subsisting after the mortgages of 1070 and 1075 and the purakkadoms Exts. C to E. This execution sale was on 4-12-1115, and about three years later Bhaskaran Nair executed Ext. X assignment in favour of defendant 1 on 11-8-1118 conveying to her the equity of redemption he had purchased in the execution sale.
8. The plaintiffs' case is that the mortgagee was bound both in law and under the terms of Ext. B to pay the claim sued for and decreed in O.S 1045 of 1110; that, as defendant I had obtained the mortgage right by the assignment, Ext. F, taken by her, besides the obligation she had as mortgagee to discharge the said decree-debt she was bound to discharge the same on account of the direction in Ext. F and the reservation of 175 fanams with her for the purpose; that with a view to obtain the equity of redemption also for herself she neglected her obligation and defaulted to discharge the decree-debt and obtained an assignment of the decree benami for her in the name of Bhaskaran Nair and caused the equity of redemption to be sold and purchased by him in execution and then took the assignment, Ext. X, from him of his nominal rights; that she has thereby gained an advantage in derogation of the rights of the mortgagors; and that the equity of redemption thus obtained by her has to be held by her for the benefit of the mortgagors under Section 90 of the Trust Act. It is also urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that even if Bhaskaran Nair was not a benamidar for defendant 1 the assignment of his rights obtained by her has to be held by her for the benefit of the mortgagors under Section 90 in as much as the execution sale and the purchase of the equity of redemption by Bhaskaran Nair were brought about by the default of defendant 1 to discharge the decree-debt as she was bound to do.
9. The direction in Ext. B regarding payment of the dues to the Sirkar and the Jenmi has been extracted in paragraph 8 above. What is directed in Ext. B to be paid by the mortgagee is only and nothing more. The term ordinarily means tax, and used in relation to the Sirkar it means the tax payable to the State. Used in relation to a Jenmi that term means the annual michavarom payable to him by the Kudiyan and does not include the renewal fee payable by the Kanomdar once in 12 years for renewal of the Kanom, which is of the nature of a capital payment and not a revenue payment, or Aradianthiram fee payable for certain special ceremonies in the Jenmi's family which is of the nature of a casual payment. In the absence of a special agreement the mortgagee is bound to pay only the annual michavarom and not the renewal fee and Aradianthiram fee, and the renewal fee and Aradianthiram fee have to be paid by the mortgagor. The mortgagee was not therefore bound to discharge the whole claim sued for and decreed in O.S No. 1045. Only for a part of the claim in that suit was the mortgagee liable, for the balance the mortgagors alone were liable. Further, no part of the arrears of michavarom claimed in O.S 1045, was caused by defendant 1. She obtained Ext. F assignment only in 1111. The arrears of michavarom claimed in that suit were for the years 1107 to 1110. The amount reserved with her under Ext. F was also wholly insufficient to pay the balance decree debt or even the arrears of michavarom. Even the arrears of michavarom amounted to several times the amount reserved with her under Ext. F for payment to the decree-holder in O.S 1045 of 1110. D.W 1, a retired Additional District Judge, who is the husband of defendant 1, swears that he tendered to the Jenmi the amount of Rs. 25 reserved with defendant 1 under the terms of Ext. F, that the latter refused to accept it because it was insufficient to discharge the whole decree amount and insisted on being paid the whole decree amount, that he therefore sent for defendants 1 and 2 and informed them of the refusal of the Jenmi to accept the amount of Rs. 25 and asked them to make necessary arrangements for discharging the decree and that although they promised to arrange for the discharge of the decree they did not pay any amount and discharge the decree debt. P.W 1's evidence about this matter is to say the least very unsatisfactory. Having regard to the nature of P.W 1's evidence and the extreme improbability of a person like D.W 1 giving false evidence in such a trivial matter, we believe D.W 1's evidence referred to above and are convinced that after taking Ext. F assignment defendant 1 did all that was possible for her to discharge the mortgagee's liability for paying the michavarom of the properties and her own liability to pay the amount reserved with her under the terms of Ext. F, and that she has not committed any default in this matter. D.W 1's evidence, which we believe, shows that defendant 1 had not even the least vestige of an intention to obtain an advantage over, or in derogation of the rights of, the mortgagors and that, therefore the properties were sold in execution she did everything that was possible for her to safeguard the mortgagors' rights without incurring further loss to herself for that purpose. She cannot be blamed if she was not prepared to advance further amounts and discharge also that part of the decree debt in O.S 1045 of 1110 which she was not bound to pay for protecting the interests of the mortgagors, especially after she had appraised them of all the facts.
10. It is also not possible to accept the plaintiff's case that Bhaskaran Nair was a benamidar for defendant 1. P.W 1 said at first that Bhaskaran Nair was defendant 1's brother. Later, he said that he was a cousin. D.W 1 denied that Bhaskaran Nair is defendant 1's brother. From his evidence it would appear that Bhaskaran Nair is a distant relative of defendant 1, being a member of the same tarwad. The allegation that Bhaskaran Nair had no means to take the assignment is also groundless, for he seems to be a Government servant getting a monthly pay of Rs. 80. Bhaskaran Nair's conduct in attaching item 4 to 7 and bringing to sale only the equity of redemption when he was entitled to sell the full right over the properties was referred to by the appellant's learned counsel as circumstance tending to show that he was a benamidar for defendant 1. No doubt this conduct would suggest that he did not desire to cause injury to defendant 1. That by itself would not amount to conclusive proof of the benami nature of the assignment taken by him. The burden to prove that the assignment taken by him was benami for defendant 1 was on the plaintiff's. They have not chosen to call and examine Bhaskaran Nair as a witness. P.W 1's evidence that Bhaskaran Nair is defendant 1's brother is absolutely false. Equally groundless is the allegation that he had no means of his own to take the assignment. Probably he might have discovered after he took the assignment that defendant 1 had a mortgage right in the plaint properties and then, as she was a member of his tarwad, he might have desired to cause no injury to her if he could realise his money otherwise, and so he might have attached plaint schedule items 4 to 7 also and sold the equity of redemption alone of all the plaint properties. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case we are not satisfied that Bhaskaran Nair was a benamidar for defendant 1. The execution diary shows that there was nothing clandestine or fraudulent in the execution proceedings and that it was after due notice to all the judgment-debtors, including the mortgagors, that Bhaskaran Nair purchased the equity of redemption on 4-12-1115. It was only about three years later, on 11-8-1118, that he sold his rights to defendant 1 by Ext. X.
11. Numerous cases were cited by the appellant's learned counsel in support of the proposition that when a mortgagee defaults to make a payment he was bound to make and the mortgaged property is consequently sold in execution of a decree or under the Revenue Recovery Act and the mortgagee either purchases it at the execution sale or the Revenue sale in the name of a benamidar for him or purchases it from a bona fide purchaser in execution, Section 90 of the Trusts Act would be attracted and the mortgagee has to hold the property for the benefit of the mortgagors and has to submit to redemption by them. This proposition is perfectly sound, but in the light of the conclusions we have arrived at above as to the facts of the present case it can have no application here. Section 90 does not strike down every advantage gained by a mortgagee. For attracting section 90 the advantage should have been gained by him availing himself of his position as a mortgagee or because he was the mortgagee and it must have been gained in derogation of the right of the mortgagor. As pointed out in Aggarwala's “Indian Trust Act”, 1954 Edition, (page 626), the basis of the rule stated in Section 90 is that a trustee ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of the trust, and a mortgagee is a constructive trustee for the mortgagor. It is because of his default to make the payment he was bound to make as a mortgagee that the mortgagee derives an advantage when he purchases the mortgaged property at the execution or revenue sale which takes place as a result of his default and it is because the advantage so gained by him is unfair and in derogation of the rights of the mortgagor that he is compelled by the Section to hold the advantage gained by the violation of the trust to the benefit of the persons who had reposed the trust to the benefit of the persons who had reposed the trust in him. In the present case, defendant 1 was not the mortgagee at the time the michavarom was allowed to fall into arrears nor when the suit for the arrears of michavarom was filed and decreed. She was not therefore bound as mortgagee to pay the arrears of michavarom for the realisation of which the plaint properties were sold. Nor was she bound as mortgagee to pay the renewal fee and Aradianthiram fee decreed in O.S 1045 of 1110. Apart from the direction in Ext. F to pay 175 fanams towards the discharge of the claims in O.S 1045 of 1110 and O.S 1726 of 1110 there was no obligation at all on the part of defendant 1, either in her capacity as mortgagee or by virtue of the liability undertaken by her under Ext. F, to pay any part of the decree amount in O.S 1045 of 1110. So far as the undertaking in Ext. F is concerned, she did everything she could do and it was not on account of her default but the default of the mortgagors themselves that she could not perform that undertaking. When she found that she could not perform the undertaking in Ext. F, because of the mortgagor's default she gave them due notice and requested them to arrange for the payment of the balance for which they were liable and thus enable her to perform her part of the undertaking, and although they promised to do so they defaulted subsequently. This, is not therefore a case in which the execution sale was brought about by the violation of any trust placed in defendant 1 either as a mortgagee or on account of the agreement in Ext. F, and she was also not liable for any part of the amount for which the properties were sold. As the sale was not brought about by any default of defendant 1 and the debt for which the properties were sold was not one for which she was liable, she had the right to purchase the properties at the execution sale like any other person even though by the time of the execution sale she had obtained the mortgage right. Therefore, whether Bhaskaran Nair was a benamidar for defendant 1 or not (our finding is that he was not a benamidar for her), neither the execution sale in his favour nor the assignment, Ext. X, executed by him in her favour would accrue to the benefit of the mortgagors.
12. The view we have taken above is supported by the decision in Parvathi Amma v. Cheriyan, A.I.R 1951 T.C 94; and Govindarajam Pillai v. Alagappa Chettiar, A.I.R 1943 Madras 202. In the former case the following dictum in 30 T.L.R 105 was quoted with approval and followed by Sankaran and Gangadhara Menon, JJ:
“It is not an absolute rule that a benefit or interest acquired by a mortgagee over the mortgaged property, in all cases and whatever the circumstances be, must be held in trust for the benefit of the mortgagor. If the mortgagee, by fraud or unfair or sharp practice, or behind the back of the mortgagor, obtains an advantage to the prejudice of the right of redemption, which, though not legally due under, has yet its root in, the mortgage, that advantage must be held for the benefit of the mortgagor. But it is open to the mortgagee to show that he acquired the advantage by the mortgagor's consent, or after a contest with him before the grant of the advantage, or otherwise so openly and fairly that he is equitably entitled to keep it”.
13. The observation in this dictum—“But it is open to the mortgagee to show that he acquired the advantage by the mortgagor's consent, or after a contest with him before the grant of the advantage, or otherwise so openly and fairly that he is equitably entitled to keep it” is peculiarly applicable to this case in the light of D.W 1's evidence that on the Jenmi's refusal to accept Rs. 25/- when he tendered it to him in pursuance of the recital in Ext. F and following the Jenmi's insistence that he should be paid the whole decree amount D.W 1 sent for the mortgagors and informed them of those facts and requested them to arrange for the discharge of the whole decree debt and that inspite of their promise to do so they did not make any arrangement to discharge the debt and so, the properties were ultimately brought to sale. We have already said that we believe the evidence of D.W 1. His evidence shows that it must have been with the mortgagors' consent or acquiescence that the properties were brought to sale, or at any rate, that it was openly and fairly that the execution sale took place, and defendant 1 obtained Ext. X assignment from the auction-purchaser of his rights under the court sale. In Govindarajam Pillai v. Alagappa Chettiar, A.I.R 1943 Madras 202, Krishnaswami Ayyangar J. laid emphasis on the breach of the fiduciary relationship between the mortgagor and the mortgagee being the most essential requisite for attracting section 90 to a purchase of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee. The learned Judge says at pp. 205 and 206 of the report in that case—
“Neither can the appellants derive any assistance from S. 90, Trusts Act. Though there is no express reference to it, it is clear that the relationships enumerated in the section are all of them of such a character that they may give rise to a conflict of duty and interest in certain circumstances; in other words, a fiduciary relationship is implicit in the section, and is the basic ground on which relief is to be afforded, provided of course the conditions laid down are satisfied. Before the benefit of the section can be demanded, it must be shown that (1) the party against whom relief is sought availed himself of his position, (2) he gained an advantage by so doing, and (3) the advantage was gained in derogation of the rights of the person interested in the property. It is perfectly plain to our mind that respondent 1 was in no sense in a fiduciary position in so far as the appellants are concerned. It is equally plain that, in purchasing the property at the revenue sale, he cannot be deemed to have availed himself of any special position he held. If, as we hold, these two conditions are not satisfied, the fact that he has gained an advantage to the prejudice of the appellants cannot afford them any ground of relief. When the Government brought the property to sale, any stranger could have purchased it and obtained a clear title incapable of being assailed by anybody. We cannot see why a mortgagee should be held to be in a worse position, so long as the sale was not due to any wrongful conduct on his part.”
14. We are in respectful agreement with these observations and hold that the same principles govern the present case also.
15. It follows that the execution sale of the equity of redemption of the plaint properties in O.S 1045 of 1110 and the assignment, Ext. X, of the rights under that sale executed by Bhaskaran Nair in favour of defendant 1 do not enure to the benefit of the mortgagors, that the rights under the said sale and assignment belong to defendant 1 alone, rand that, as she has obtained the equity of redemption of the plaint properties under the said sale and assignment neither the plaintiffs nor other members of the tavazhis of the defunct Vazhapalli tarwad have any right to redeem and recover possession of the plaint properties from her.
16. In the view we have taken about the right of defendant 1 to the equity of redemption it is not necessary to consider in this appeal whether all the co-owners of the equity of redemption—if the court sale in Bhaskaran Nair's favour and Ext. X are to be deemed as enuring to the benefit of the mortgagors have been impleaded in this suit. Although what has been said above is sufficient to dispose of the appeal, reference has to be made to one more question as there was considerable discussion at the Bar about it. According to the plaintiffs, Ext. B is supported by consideration only to the extent of 1300 fanams and the mortgagee has not paid the sum of 4000 fanams reserved thereunder with him for subsequent payment. The omission or inability on the part of defendant 1 to produce the receipt for payment of this amount has been commented upon by the appellant's learned counsel as proof conclusive of the non-payment of the amount. We are unable to accept this contention. The suit was filed in 1122, forty-seven years after the execution of Ext. B. The reserved amount had to be paid by the mortgagee John David. Ramakrishna Chettiar had to file a suit against John David for amounts due to him from the latter, and it was by the sale in execution of the decree in that suit that Ramakrishna Chettiar obtained the mortgage right. John David, whose mortgage right was thus attached and sold was not likely to give to his judgment-creditor at the time of the execution sale the receipt for the payment of 4000 fanams made by him. Ramakrishna Chettiar subsequently assigned his rights to Chellamma and it was from Chellamma that defendant 1 obtained Ext. F. In the circumstances, defendant 1's omission or inability to produce the receipt cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of non-payment of the amount. On the other hand, there are strong reasons to think that the amount of 4000 fanams reserved under the terms of Ext. B must have been paid. Four years after the execution of Ext. B Kali Pillai Velayudhan Pillai and Kali Pillai Krishna Pillai themselves executed Ext. C purakkadom in favour of John David. They were not likely to execute such a purakkadom if the recital in Ext. B had not been paid. There is also no mention of the alleged non-payment in Ext. C. In the purakadoms of 1093 and 1100 also (Exts. D and A) there is no mention of any non-payment of the amount reserved under Ext. B. From these circumstances we are satisfied, and we hold, that the reserved amount has also been paid and that Ext. B is fully supported by consideration.
17. For the reasons stated above, the decree of the lower court dismissing the plaintiffs' suit is confirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs to defendant 1.
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