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Velayudhan v. Secretary To Govt.

Kerala High Court
Mar 12, 1985
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Factual and Procedural Background

A vacancy for the post of Foreman arose on 22-12-1976. At that time, G.O. (MS) No. 13/75.DD dated 29-1-1975 (Ext. R1) governed appointments and, under that order, no one in service was entitled to promotion to the vacancy. The vacancy was notified to the Kerala Public Service Commission (PSC) on 17-1-1977. Subsequently, G.O. (MS) No. 91/78.DD dated 14-6-1978 (Ext. P1) amended the rules/methods of appointment such that persons in service (including the appellant) became eligible for promotion to Foreman.

The General Foreman informed the State (Ext. P2) that the appellant could be promoted, but the State took no action. The appellant filed an original petition claiming the vacancy and seeking to stay any direct recruitment appointment. Notice was ordered on 2-8-1978 and an interim stay of appointment was also ordered on that date. According to the State, that stay order was received on the afternoon of 11-8-1978. On the forenoon of 11-8-1978, the 2nd respondent — a candidate advised by the PSC — was appointed as Foreman. The appellant amended his petition to challenge that appointment (Ext. P3).

The State filed a counter-affidavit justifying the appointment on the ground that, on the date of occurrence of the vacancy, the appellant was not entitled to promotion and the vacancy had already been notified to the PSC before the appellant became eligible by reason of the subsequent Government Order dated 14-6-1978.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the original petition, holding that the PSC was justified in issuing its advice (dated 4-7-1978) based on tests and an interview (held on 20-6-1978) and that the appointing authority could validly appoint the candidate advised by the PSC. The appellant appealed from that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appointment of a candidate recommended by the Public Service Commission is invalidated by a subsequent amendment to the Government Order making persons in service eligible for promotion to the vacancy.
  2. Whether a person in service who becomes entitled to promotion by virtue of a Government Order issued after the vacancy was notified to the PSC can insist on appointment to the vacancy.
  3. On what date (the date of occurrence of the vacancy or a later date such as the date of appointment/recruitment) the eligibility for promotion or selection must be determined.
  4. Whether an appointment made after the PSC's advice but during the pendency of an interim stay order from this Court is invalid.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Government Order governing appointment to the post of Foreman was amended before the 2nd respondent (recommended by the PSC) was actually appointed; therefore the appointment violated the rules as they stood at the time of appointment and is bad in law.
  • Because the appointment of the 2nd respondent was made when there was already an interim stay order from this Court restraining appointment in the vacancy, that appointment is invalid on that ground as well.
  • The appellant should, therefore, have been appointed to the vacancy as he became eligible under the amended Government Order.

Respondent-State's Arguments (including arguments in counter-affidavit)

  • The appellant had no right to claim promotion on the date of occurrence of the vacancy; thus he could not insist on appointment to a vacancy that had already arisen and been notified to the PSC.
  • The vacancy had already been notified to the PSC before the appellant became entitled to promotion under the amended Government Order, and therefore the subsequent amendment cannot affect the recruitment process already set in motion by the PSC.

2nd Respondent's Arguments

  • The claim of the appellant must be considered with reference to the Government Order governing appointment as it stood on the date of occurrence of the vacancy (i.e., the relevant date is the date of occurrence of the vacancy for promotion claims).
  • A Government Order issued after the vacancy was notified to the PSC cannot affect a recruitment made by the PSC nor the appointment of a candidate recruited by it; hence the appointment of the 2nd respondent is not affected by Ext. P1.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
James Thomas v. Chief Justice (1977 KLT. 622 FB.) Promotions are generally to be decided with reference to the time of occurrence of the vacancy and not the time of making the appointment. The Court relied on this Full Bench statement to support the proposition that eligibility for promotion is ordinarily judged as on the date the vacancy arises.
Murugan v. State of Kerala (1982 KLT. Short Notes 45) Distinction between 'recruitment' and 'appointment': recruitment is the selection/enlistment process preceding appointment; appointment is the final stage; if recruitment processes are complete an amended rule may not prevent completing appointment. The Court cited this reasoning to explain that 'recruitment' and 'appointment' are distinct concepts and to show that completed recruitment processes carried out by the PSC should not be rendered futile by subsequent rule changes.
K.G. Gopalakrishna Pillai v. Teddy Roy Perira (O.P. No. 879 of 1973) Once Special Rules/qualifications and method of appointment come into force, appointments must conform to those Rules; the State cannot issue an executive direction inconsistent with such Rules (invoking Articles 14 and 16). The Court discussed this authority but held that the facts of that case were different from the present case and therefore its decision could not be applied here.
O.P. No. 879 of 1973 (confirmed in Writ Appeal No. 413 of 1975) The confirmation affirmed the judgment in O.P. No. 879 of 1973 regarding application of Special Rules and related promotions/appointments. The Court noted the confirmation but concluded that, because the factual matrix differed from the present matter, that authority was not applicable to the facts before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise analytical manner, applying established distinctions and principles drawn from precedent and the facts before it:

  1. Distinction between promotion and direct recruitment:
    • The Court emphasized the legal and practical difference between promotion (an internal entitlement determined by rules governing service) and direct recruitment (selection through PSC following a governmental notification).
  2. Relevant date for determining eligibility:
    • For promotion claims, eligibility is determined with reference to the date of occurrence of the vacancy — only those eligible on that date can claim promotion to that vacancy.
    • For direct recruitment, the relevant date for qualification is usually that specified in the recruitment/notification process; the date of occurrence of the vacancy is not decisive as in promotion cases.
  3. Effect of PSC recruitment once initiated:
    • The PSC is a constitutional functionary responsible for recruitment. Once the Government has notified a vacancy to the PSC and the PSC has undertaken the recruitment process (inviting applications, conducting tests/interviews, and advising candidates), that recruitment machinery cannot be brought to a halt by a subsequent amendment to the rules which would otherwise make internal candidates eligible.
    • In the present case, the vacancy was notified to the PSC on 17-1-1977; the PSC conducted its processes (including an interview on 20-6-1978) and advised the appointment of the 2nd respondent on 4-7-1978. Although a Government Order of 14-6-1978 (Ext. P1) made the appellant eligible for promotion, the appellant was not eligible on the date the vacancy arose or when it was notified to the PSC.
  4. Application of precedents and inapplicability of others:
    • The Court relied on James Thomas to reinforce that promotion eligibility is ordinarily judged as on the date of the vacancy.
    • The Court cited Murugan to explain that 'recruitment' and 'appointment' are different stages, and that completed recruitment steps cannot be nullified by a subsequent rule change.
    • The Court reviewed K.G. Gopalakrishna Pillai (O.P. No. 879 of 1973) and noted the principle that once special rules govern appointments further appointments must conform to them; however, the Court found those facts distinguishable and therefore that authority did not apply to the present facts.
  5. Conclusion of analysis:
    • Because the PSC had been notified and had completed recruitment steps prior to the appellant having any entitlement under the amended Government Order, the subsequent Government Order (Ext. P1) could not invalidate the PSC's recruitment or the State's appointment of the candidate advised by the PSC.
    • Consequently, the Single Judge's reasoning in upholding the appointment of the 2nd respondent was sound and required no interference.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Writ Appeal Dismissed.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The appointment of the 2nd respondent (the candidate advised by the Public Service Commission) to the post of Foreman is upheld.
  • The appellant's challenge to that appointment was rejected and the Single Judge's dismissal of the original petition was affirmed.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

The opinion does not discuss broader implications beyond the parties. The Court applied established principles concerning (a) the date relevant for assessing promotion eligibility (date of occurrence of the vacancy) and (b) the finality of a recruitment process initiated through the PSC; it did not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond the application of those principles to the facts of the case.

Show all summary ...

Narendran, J.:— A question of considerable importance in service law arises for consideration in this case. A vacancy was notified to the Public Service Commission as, when the vacancy arose, under the Government Order governing appointments to the vacancy, nobody in service was entitled to be promoted and appointed in the vacancy. But before the candidate recruited by the Public Service Commission was actually appointed in the vacancy, the Government Order governing appointments to the vacancy was amended and persons in service became entitled for promotion to the post. The question is whether the appointment of the Public Service Commission recruit is bad in law and, on the basis of the subsequent amendment to the Government order, any person in service who has become entitled for promotion can insist that he should be given appointment in the vacancy.

2. The petitioner in the original petition is the appellant in the writ appeal. The appellant is an Electrician in the Government Transport and Equipment Organisation, Muvattupuzha. He is a Diploma Holder in Electrical Engineering and has experience in Automobile Workshop. A post of for man became vacant from 22-12-1976. As per G.O (MS) No. 13/75.DD dated 29-1-1975 (Ext. R1), which governs the appointments in the establishment, nobody was entitled to be promoted and appointed in the vacancy. Hence, on 17-1-1977 the vacancy was notified to the Kerala Public Service Commission. Thereafter, by G.O (MS) No. 91/78.DD dated 14-6-1978 (Ext. PI) revised notifications and methods of appointments for the post of Foreman were fixed. After the issue of Ext. P1, the General Foreman of the establishment sent Ext. P2 communication to the 1st respondent-State pointing out that the appellant-petitioner can be promoted and appointed as Foreman in the vacancy. As the 1st respondent did not do anything in the matter, the appellant-petitioner approached this Court with the original petition claiming the vacancy of Foreman and also for staying the appointment, if any, of Foreman by direct recruitment. Notice on the original petition was ordered on 2-8-1978 On the very same date, this Court ordered an interim stay of appointment to the post of Foreman which, according to the 1st respondent, was received only on the afternoon of 11-8-1978. Before that, on the forenoon of 11-8-1978 the 2nd respondent, advised by the Public Service Commission, was appointed as Foreman. The appellant then amended the original petition to challenge the appointment of the 2nd respondent (Ext. P3).

3. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the 1st respondent-State justifying the appointment of the 2nd respondent and contending that the appellant has no right to claim the vacancy in question as on the date of occurrence of the vacancy the appellant was not entitled to be promoted and appointed in the vacancy and as the vacancy was already notified to the Public Service Commission before the appellant became entitled for promotion and appointment in the vacancy as per the Government Order dated 14-6-1978.

4. The learned Judge who heard the original petition, dismissed the same holding:

“Though the interview itself is subsequent to the amendment of the Rule, if appears to me that the Public Service Commission was perfectly right in issuing the advice on 4-7-1978 on the basis of the tests conducted by the Public Service Commission and the interview held on 20-6-1978. The second respondent having been so advised, I see no reason as to why the first respondent could not appoint him in the post for which the Public Service Commission has advised him.”

5. It is the above judgment of the learned Single Judge that the appellant has challenged in this writ appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that as the Government Order governing appointment to the post of Foreman was amended before the 2nd respondent advised by the Public Service Commission was actually appointed and, as the above appointment was against the rules of appointment as it stood on the date of appointment, the above appointment was bad in law and the learned Judge ought to have set aside the appointment and found that the appellant was the person who ought to have been appointed in the vacancy of Foreman. It was also pointed out that, at any rate, the appointment of the 2nd respondent made when there was already a stay order from this Court against appointment in the vacancy is bad for that reason also. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contended that the claim of the appellant for the post of Foreman has to be considered on the basis of Government order governing appointment to the post as it stood on the date of occurrence of the vacancy. It was also contended that the Government Order issued after the vacancy was notified to the Public Service Commission cannot affect the recruitment made by the Public Service Commission and the appointment of the candidate or candidates recruited. Hence, according to the learned counsel the appointment of the 2nd respondent is not hit by Ext. PI Government Order which makes the appellant entitled to be promoted as Foreman.

6. In James Thomas v. Chief Justice (1977 KLT. 622 FB.) one of the controversies that came up for consideration was whether the law to be applied was what was applicable on the date of occurrence of the vacancy or at the time of making the appointment. The Full Bench referred to the Government Order dated 28-9-1957 and held:

“This contains a clear indication that the general rule is to decide promotions with respect to the time of the occurrence of the vacancy and not of the making of the appointment.”

7. The Full Bench then referred to another Government Order dated 20-4-1959 and further held:

“In the light of these, we are of the view that there is no warrant to hold that eligibility for promotion must be judged with reference to the date of the appointment, and not of the occurrence of the vacancy. We think the general rule to be that promotions should be made vis-a-vis the date of occurrence of the vacancy and not of the date of making the appointment.”

8. In Murugan v. State of Kerala (1982 KLT. Short Notes 45) Khalid J. as he then was, has held:

“Therefore, appointment to the post is the last stage in a slow gradual process. The word ‘recruitment’ or recruited’ has a connotation entirely different from the word ‘appointment’. It is not necessary to seek the assistance of a dictionary for this purpose. Recruitment signifies enlistment, acceptance, selection or approval for appointment, all stages preceding appointment. The two words cannot be said to mean the same thing. Appointment takes effect when the person appointed for the first time discharges his duty. This is in contradistinction to the concept of the word ‘direct recruitment’. One is the finale of the process that starts from the other. The direction contained in the note that direct recruitment to the categories mentioned therein need be resorted to only in the absence of suitable hands. This clearly postulates the initiation of recruitment process and not the appointment culminating in the said process; in other words, if all the necessary processes had been completed the amended Special Rules do not prevent the appointment of a candidate in the select list even to a vacancy that arises after the Special Rules”.

9. In K.G Gopalakrihsaa Pillai v. Teddy Roy Perira (O.P No. 879 of 1973) Eradi, J., as he then was, has held:

“Even apart from the above aspect, after the qualifications and method of appointment to the posts of Foreman Instructors had been prescribed by Special Rules it was not open to the State Government to issue an executive direction that appointments for filling up the vacancies that had arisen prior to the coming into force of the Special Rules should be made not in accordance with the Special Rules but in accordance with the G.O Ext. P-2 which is totally inconsistent with the Special Rules. Once the Special Rules had come into force any appointment could thereafter be effected only in conformity with the provisions contained in the Rules irrespective of the question as to the date of occurrence of the vacancy which is sought to be filled up. Any departure from this principle would manifestly contravene the principle of equality before law enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution”.

10. In Gopalakrishna Pilla's case, on 21-12-1959 the Government issued Ext. P-2 order insisting that for the post of Foreman Instructors in the Craftsman Training Scheme, Diploma in Engineering is an essential qualification instead of the qualification of a certificate in Engineering which was being insisted. On the basis of this, certain certificate holders were denied promotions to the posts of Foreman Instructors. They filed original petitions before this Court. A Diploma Holder who was given only provisional promotion also approached this Court complaining that he was not given a regular promotion even though he had the qualification insisted by the G.O dated 21-12-1959. The State Government in the counter-affidavit filed took up the position that they were soon issuing special rules which will enable certificate holders also to be promoted as Forman Instructors and the promotions challenged in the original petitions were only temporary promotions and regularisation of those promotions will be made only after the issue of the special rules. Accordingly, this Court did not interfere with the promotions challenged in the original petitions and the original petitions were disposed of with a direction that special rules should be framed before 31-5-1970. Accordingly, special rules were framed and issued as per notification dated 29-11-1971. But, thereafter, on 23-11-1972 a Government Order was issued directing that the special rules would come into effect from 29-11-1971 and vacancies which arose before that should be filled up in accordance with the G.O dated 21-12-1959. It was under the above circumstances that O.P No. 879 of 1973 was filed. The judgment in O.P No. 879 of 1973 was confirmed in Writ Appeal No. 413 of 1975. But the facts of that case being different from the facts of this case, the decision in O.P No. 879 of 1973 affirmed in Writ Appeal No. 413 of 1975 cannot be applied in this case as the same is not applicable to the facts of this case.

11. A vacancy which arises in a higher cadre in a service has to be filled up either by promotion from the lower cadre in the same service or by direct recruitment. This depends upon the rules governing the matter. If it is a vacancy which has to be filled up by promotion from the lower cadre the eligibility has to be determined in accordance with the rules. Only those who were eligible on the date of occurrence of the vacancy can claim the post. Nobody who has no right to be promoted in that vacancy on the date of occurrence of the vacancy, even if he subsequently becomes entitled for the post, can have a legal right to insist that he should get the post. In the case of direct recruitment, the relevant date for determining whether a candidate is qualified or not is that which will be mentioned in the notification inviting applications. The date of occurrence of the vacancy will not at all be relevant as in the case of a promotion from the lower cadre in the same service. In Government service, filling up of a vacancy by direct recruitment in the normal course is through the Public Service Commission. The Government will notify the vacancy to the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Commission will invite applications, conduct the tests, interview the candidates, make the selection and advise the required number of candidates. The Government or the Appointing Authority, if the Appointing Authority is different, will issue appointment orders to the candidates advised by the Public Service Commission. In this case, the vacancy was notified to the Public Service Commission on 17-1-1977 and the Public Service Commission made the recruitment. The Public Service Commission advised the appointment of the 2nd respondent as per their letter dated 4-7-1978. Before that, by G.O (MS) No. 91/78.DD dated 14-6-1978 a revised method of appointment was fixed. As per this G.O the appellant-electrician could be promoted and appointed as Foreman. This is a right which the appellant had not at the time when the vacancy arose and when it was notified to the Public Service Commission. The Public Service Commission is a constitutional functionary which is invested with the responsibility of making recruitment to the State Government service. Once the machinery for recruitment has been set in motion by notifying the vacancy to the Public Service Commission it cannot be brought to a grinding halt by amending the special rules and making the recruitment a futile exercise. So, the Government Order dated 14-6-1978 which makes the appellant-electrician entitled for promotion as Foreman cannot stand in the way of the recruitment made by the Public Service Commission. The vacancy in question has to be filled by appointing the 2nd respondent who was advised by the Public Service Commission in spite of the fact that the Government Order dated 14-6-1978 provided for appointment by promotion of electricians as Foreman. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing the original petition does not call for any interference in this writ appeal. The Writ Appeal is hence dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

12. Dismissed.