- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
John Samuel v. State Of Kerala
Summary of Legal Opinion: Criminal Revision Petition No. 11 of 1982
Factual and Procedural Background
The revision petitioner was the sole accused in C.C. No. 245 of 1980 tried by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Karunagappally. He, a driver employed by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, was charge-sheeted under Sections 304-A and 279 of the Indian Penal Code for allegedly driving KSRTC bus KLX 1285 rashly and negligently on 9-9-1980 at about 6:10 a.m., causing grievous hurt to one Sivanandan and resulting in his instantaneous death.
The First Class Magistrate convicted the petitioner on both counts on 21-12-1981. Sentences were: for S. 304-A, imprisonment till the rising of the Court for the day and a fine of Rs. 500/-, default one month’s imprisonment; for S. 279, a fine of Rs. 100/-, default seven days’ imprisonment.
The petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1982 in the Sessions Court at Quilon on 29-1-1982. On 4-2-1982 the Sessions Judge suspended the sentence of imprisonment and remitted the fine. On 5-2-1982 the Sessions Judge issued a notice to the petitioner, purportedly under S. 399(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, invoking suo motu revisional power to show cause why the Magistrate’s sentence should not be enhanced; the suo motu revision was numbered Crl. R.P. No. 11 of 1982. The petitioner was directed to appear on 17-2-1982, which he did.
Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1982 and Criminal R.P. No. 11 of 1982 were posted to 3-3-1982; the order sheet records "no sitting" on that date and does not record any further posting. On 5-3-1982 the Sessions Judge purportedly took up the matter, cancelled the petitioner’s bail bonds for his alleged absence, and issued a non-bailable warrant and notice to the sureties. The petitioner filed the present revision petition challenging the 5-3-1982 order and the authority of the Sessions Judge to take suo motu revision in the manner done.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Sessions Judge had jurisdiction under Section 399(1) Cr.P.C. to exercise suo motu revisional powers in the manner he did (i.e., when the Sessions Judge had not called for the record of the magistrate’s proceedings).
- Whether the order of the Sessions Judge dated 5-3-1982 cancelling bail bonds and issuing a non-bailable warrant and notice to the sureties was regular and valid given the lack of a posting on that date.
Arguments of the Parties
Revision Petitioner's Arguments
- The Sessions Judge lacked power to take suo motu revision in the manner exercised under S. 399(1) because that provision permits revisional action only where the Sessions Judge has called for the record; in the present case the records were not called for by the Sessions Judge when he purported to exercise revision on 5-2-1982 / 5-3-1982.
- The cancellation of bail and issuance of a non-bailable warrant on 5-3-1982 was irregular and illegal because the order sheet does not show the case being posted to 5-3-1982; consequently the petitioner was not bound to appear on that date and the sureties had no duty to produce him.
Respondent / Public Prosecutor
This opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's or Public Prosecutor's legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Baby (1981 K.L.T. 27) | Distinction between revisional powers of the High Court under S. 401(1) (which include cases that "otherwise come to its knowledge") and the Sessions Judge under S. 399(1) (limited to proceedings the record of which has been called for by the Sessions Judge). | The court treated the principle as general and applicable to the present facts: because the Sessions Judge had not called for the records, he exceeded his jurisdiction in invoking suo motu revision. |
| Siddegowda v. K. Siddegowda (1976 Crl. L.J. 1967) | If a Sessions Judge is to exercise powers under S. 399, the records must have been called for by him; records coming to his knowledge otherwise do not permit exercise of S. 399 powers. Also notes that "called for by himself" can mean either suo motu calling for the record or on an application by a party (S. 399(3) contemplates applications). | The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the Sessions Judge could not validly exercise suo motu revisional powers without calling for the record; absence of such calling rendered the exercise unauthorized. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two linked strands: (a) factual-administrative inquiry into the proceedings leading to the 5-3-1982 order, and (b) statutory-legal interpretation of the scope of revisional powers vested in the Sessions Judge under S. 399(1) vis-à-vis the High Court under S. 401(1).
Factual/administrative findings:
- The court examined the record and noted that the case had been posted to 3-3-1982 with the notation "no sitting" and that there was no entry in the order sheet showing any adjournment or posting to 5-3-1982. Consequently, there was no record that the petitioner was obliged to appear on 5-3-1982 and no duty on the sureties to produce him on that date. On that basis the court found the Sessions Judge's act of cancelling bail bonds and issuing a non-bailable warrant on 5-3-1982 to be irregular and illegal.
- The court further observed that when the Sessions Judge purported to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction, the Sessions Court did not have the magistrate's records in its possession (the records were received only on 9-3-1982). Thus, the revisional action appears to have been taken without the Sessions Judge having called for the record.
Statutory/legal interpretation:
- The court compared S. 399(1) (concerning Sessions Judge's revisional power) and S. 401(1) (concerning High Court's revisional power). It emphasized that S. 399(1) permits the Sessions Judge to exercise such powers "in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by himself," whereas S. 401(1) extends the High Court's powers to proceedings "the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge."
- Because S. 399(1) omits the phrase "otherwise comes to its knowledge," the Sessions Judge's revisional jurisdiction is narrower and is limited to proceedings where he has called for the record. The court treated the omission as significant and determinative of limited jurisdiction.
- The court relied on prior decisions (State v. Baby and Siddegowda v. K. Siddegowda) which endorsed the same distinction and principle: a Sessions Judge cannot exercise revisional jurisdiction under S. 399(1) unless he has called for the record himself (either suo motu by calling for it or pursuant to an application under S. 399(3)).
- Applying that principle to the present facts—where no record had been called for by the Sessions Judge at the time of the alleged revisional act—the court concluded that the Sessions Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in invoking suo motu revisional power and therefore the orders made on 5-3-1982 were unauthorised.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Criminal Revision Petition is allowed.
The court specifically ordered:
- The order passed by the Sessions Judge on 5-3-1982 cancelling the bail bond of the revision petitioner and issuing a non-bailable warrant and notice to the sureties is quashed and will stand cancelled.
- The revision petitioner shall be permitted to continue on bail on the same terms and conditions previously ordered by the Sessions Judge prior to the cancellation of the bail bond; notices to the sureties are cancelled.
- All further proceedings in Criminal Revision Petition No. 11 of 1982 are cancelled.
- The learned Sessions Judge is directed to take up Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1982 and dispose of it on the merits within one month of receipt of the records; the court office is directed to forward the records to the Sessions Judge, Quilon immediately.
- The revision petitioner (as appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1982) is directed to appear before the Sessions Judge on the 20th of the month as specified in the order.
Implications:
The direct effect of the decision is to restore the petitioner's bail status and to nullify the Sessions Judge's 5-3-1982 orders issued without jurisdiction. The decision clarifies and applies existing distinctions in revisional jurisdiction between the Sessions Judge (S. 399(1)) and the High Court (S. 401(1)) as established in prior authorities cited in the opinion. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying and following earlier decisions; its practical consequence is limited to quashing the unauthorised revisional proceedings and directing the appeal to be heard on its merits.
End of summary (based exclusively on the provided opinion).
1. Revision petitioner was the sole accused in C.C No. 245 of 1980 which was tried and disposed of by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Karunagappally. The petitioner, who was the accused in that case, was charge-sheeted for having committed offences punishable under S. 304-A and 279 of the Indian Penal Code. He was a driver in the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation and the allegation against him is that on 9-9-1980 at about 6.10 a.m he drove K.S.R.T.C bus KLX 1285 in a rash and negligent manner through the National Highway and caused it to his against one Sivanandan near Kaichundipalaka Mukku in Karunagappally causing grievous hurt to him and resulting in his instantaneous death. The First Class Magistrate convicted him under both counts and sentenced him under S. 304-A to imprisonment till the rising of the Court for the day and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment to undergo imprisonment for one month. For the offence under S. 279 he was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default to suffer imprisonment for 7 days. The conviction and sentences were on 21-12-1981. Against the conviction and sentence the revision petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1982 before the Sessions Judge, Quilon on 29-1-1982. On 4-2-1982 the sentence of imprisonment alone was suspended and fine was remitted. On 5-2-1982 the Sessions Judge issued notice to the revision petitioner presumably under S. 399(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code in exercise of the suo motu revisional power to show cause why the sentence awarded by the Magistrate for the offences under Ss. 304-A and 279 of the Indian Penal Code should not be enhanced. The revision petitioner was directed to enter appearance on 17-2-1982. The suo motu revision was numbered as Crl. R.P No. 11 of 1982. The revision petitioner appeared on 17-2-1982. Thereafter Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1982 and Criminal R.P No. 11 of 1982 were posted to 3-3-1982. On that date there was no sitting. From the order sheet it is not seen that the case was adjourned to any other date. But it is seen that on 5-3-1982 the Sessions Judge took up the case, cancelled the bail bonds of the revision petitioner on account of his absence and issued non-bailable warrant and notice to the sureties. It is against this order that the revision petition has been filed. So also the revision petitioner challenges the authority of the Sessions Juge to take suo motu revision in the manner in which he has done.
2. I heard the revision petitioner's counsel as well as the Public Prosecutor. From the records I was not able to find that the case has been posted to 5-3-1982. The previous posting was on 3-3-1982 and it is recorded that there was no sitting on that date. If the case was adjourned to any other date that would have been noted in the order sheet. Without any further posting the Sessions Judge seems to have taken up the case on 5-3-1982 and passed the orders mentioned above. If there was no posting on 5-3-1982 the revision petitioner was not bound to appear on that date and his sureties had no duty to produce him also on that day. Evidently the order passed by the Sessions Judge on 5-3-1982 is irregular and illegal.
3. The main contention raised by the revision petitioner was that the Sessions Judge was not having the power to take up suo motu revision in the manner in which he has done. S. 399(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code reads:
“In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by himself, the Sessions Judge may exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under sub-section (1) of S. 401.”
4. Sub-Section (1) of Section 401 reads:
“In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Ss. 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by S. 307 and, when the Judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by S. 392.”
5. The re is difference between the revisional powers of the High Court under S. 401(1) and the revisional powers of the Sessions Judge under S. 399(1), both of which include suo motu revisional powers. It is true that under S. 399(1) it is provided that the Sessions Judge may exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under sub-section (1) of S. 401. Those are the powers mentioned in S. 401 namely, “exercise of any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by Ss. 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Sessions by S. 307.” On dealing with the revisional powers of the High Court under S. 401(1) what is stated is “in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge.” “Otherwise comes to its knowledge” is absent while describing the revisional powers of the Sessions Judge under S. 399(1). What S. 399(1) provides is only that the Sessions Judge may exercise revisional powers in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by himself. There/ore, the Sessions Judge may not be entitled to invoke revisional jurisdiction by “otherwise comes to its knowledge.” The revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge is limited to any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by himself.
6. This aspect of the matter has been considered by a Division Bench of this court in State v. Baby (1981 K.L.T 27). The Division Bench expressed the following opinion:—
“Powers of revision are conferred both on the High Court and the Sessions Judge. There is however, a marked difference between S. 399(1) which deals with the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge and S. 401(1) dealing with the powers of revision vested in the High Court. Under S. 399(1) the Sessions Judge is competent to exercise powers of revision only in the case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by himself, either suo motu or on motion by somebody. The powers of the High Court under S. 401 are wider. In addition to powers of revision in cases mentioned in S. 399(1) the High Court is empowered to exercise powers of revision in cases which otherwise come to its knowledge. The omission to include cases which otherwise come to his knowledge in S. 399(1) has its own significance. It means that a Sessions Judge has power to exercise revisional jurisdiction only in a proceeding, the record of which has been called for by himself and not in cases which come before him in the ordinary course of procedure. In the instant case, the records were not called for by the Sessions Judge but they were sent to that Court for trial of the case based on the committal order. The learned Second Additional Sessions Judge was therefore correct in his view that he had no power to exercise revisional jurisdiction in the instant case.”
7. Though that case happend to be decided in a different context, the principle laid down is a general one and it is applicable to the facts of the present case also. In that case the records came to the Sessions Judge by committal by the Magistrate. In this particular case when the suo motu revisional power was exercised on 5-2-1982 the records were not with the Sessions Judge either by himself calling for it or otherwise. He had only the appeal memorandum and copy of the judgment produced along with it by the appellant-accused. From the papers it is seen that records were received by the Sessions Judge only on 9-3-1982. Therefore, evidently this is a case in which the suo motu revisional power was exercised without the records being called for by the Sessions Judge.
8. The same view has been expressed by the Karnataka High Court in the decision in Siddegowda v. K. Siddegowda 1976 Crl. L.J 1967, when it held:
“If the Sessions Judge has to exercise powers under S. 399, the records must have been called for by himself. If the records of any proceeding come to the knowledge of the Sessions Judge in a manner otherwise than by calling for the records by the Sessions Judge, he cannot exercise the powers under S. 399. The words ‘called for by himself occurring in S. 399(1), cannot however, be taken to mean ‘suo Motu’ and not on the filing of a revision petition by an aggrieved party. This aspect is absolutely clear when sub-section (3) of S. 399 is taken into consideration, because sub-section (3) contemplates an application for revision being made before a Sessions Judge on behalf of any person and exercise of powers under S. 399.”
9. In this case nobody moved the Sessions Judge under S. 399(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Going by the principles laid down in the two decisions cited above it has to be found that the Sessions Judge has exceeded the limits of his jurisdiction in invoking the suo motu revisional powers in the manner in which he has exercised the same. Therefore, Criminal Revision Petition No. 11 of 1982 has to be quashed as being unauthorised.
10. In the result the Criminal Revision Petition is allowed. The order passed by the Sessions Judge on 5-3-1982 cancelling the bail bond of the revision petitioner and issuing non-bailable warrant to him and notice to the sureties will stand cancelled. The revision petitioner will be permitted to continue on bail on the same terms and conditions as ordered by the Sessions Judge previous to the cancellation of the bail bond. Notice to the sureties also will stand cancelled. All further proceedings in Criminal Revision Petition No. 11 of 1982 also will stand cancelled. The learned Sessions Judge will take up Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1982 and proceed to dispose of the same on the merits within one month of receipt of records by him. The office will see that the records are forwarded to the Sessions Judge, Quilon immediately. The Revision Petitioner, in his capacity as the appellant before the Sessions Judge, Quilon in Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1982, will appear before the Sessions Judge on the 20th of this month.
11. The Criminal Revision Petition is allowed. Issue carbon copy of this order to the parties on usual terms.
12. Allowed.
Alert