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Gopinathan Nair (A.) v. N. Radha Bai And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was employed by the first respondent and claims to have left the employment on 19 September 1981 after 13 years of service. On 29 May 1982, the petitioner filed an application (exhibit P1) claiming gratuity for his service, which was admittedly beyond the prescribed period under the Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1973. No application for condonation of delay accompanied this initial filing. Subsequently, on 1 August 1984, the petitioner filed an application (exhibit P3(a)) with an affidavit (exhibit P3) seeking condonation of the delay in filing exhibit P1. The first respondent objected, contending the petitioner was not entitled to gratuity as he had voluntarily abandoned his service in August 1981 to join Government service.
The second respondent directed the first respondent to pay gratuity of Rs. 1,229.60 to the petitioner. On appeal, the third respondent reversed this order, leading to the present original petition challenging the appellate authority’s decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to gratuity despite filing the application beyond the prescribed period under the Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1973.
- Whether the petitioner’s service was validly terminated by resignation or abandonment as per Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act.
- Whether the delay in filing the gratuity application can be condoned in absence of sufficient cause.
- The legal effect of filing an application for condonation of delay after a significant lapse of time and its impact on the validity of the initial gratuity claim.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The petitioner contends that he resigned on 19 September 1981 and is entitled to gratuity for 13 years of service.
- He claims to have filed an application for gratuity (exhibit P1) and later sought condonation of delay (exhibit P3(a) and P3 affidavit).
- The petitioner attempted to explain a delay of four months in filing the initial gratuity application but did not address the longer delay in filing the condonation application.
First Respondent’s Arguments
- The first respondent contended that the petitioner voluntarily abandoned service in August 1981 to join Government employment without informing the employer.
- They argued that the petitioner is not entitled to gratuity as per Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, which excludes gratuity entitlement for employees who abandon service.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the petitioner’s claim under the Payment of Gratuity Act and the Kerala Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1973. It noted that Section 4 of the Act excludes gratuity entitlement for employees who abandon service, and the petitioner failed to provide evidence of valid resignation or termination under the Act. The court emphasized the procedural requirement under Rule 7 that an employee must file a gratuity application within 30 days of termination and under Rule 10 that an application to the controlling authority must be filed within 90 days, subject to condonation for sufficient cause.
The petitioner’s initial gratuity application (exhibit P1) was filed late, and the subsequent application for condonation (exhibit P3(a)) was filed more than two years later without any sufficient explanation for the delay. The court found the petitioner’s affidavit attempted only to justify a four-month delay in filing the initial application, failing to address the over two-year delay in seeking condonation.
The court rejected the second respondent’s approach that the condonation application related back to the date of the initial application, clarifying that the initial application can only be considered valid from the date the delay is condoned. Since no sufficient cause was shown, the application remained invalid. The appellate authority’s reversal of the gratuity order was upheld as legally sound.
Holding and Implications
The court’s final decision is DISMISSED the original petition, upholding the appellate authority’s order denying gratuity to the petitioner.
The direct effect is that the petitioner is not entitled to gratuity due to failure to comply with statutory timelines and absence of evidence for valid resignation. No broader legal precedent was established by this decision.
1. Petitioner was an employee under the first respondent. He claims to have left the employment on 19 September, 1981, after putting in 13 years of service. By exhibit P1 application, dated 29 May, 1982, the petitioner claimed gratuity for the services rendered by him to the first respondent. The said application was admittedly filed beyond the period prescribed by the Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1973. The petitioner did not file any application to condone the delay along with exhibit P1. On 1 August, 1984, he put in exhibit P3(a) application supported by exhibit P3 affidavit praying for condoning the delay occasioned in filing exhibit P 1. The first respondent, by exhibit P 2 objection, dated 20 October, 1982, raised a contention that the petitioner is not entitled to any gratuity because he had voluntarily abandoned his service from August 1981, for joining Government service.
2. The second respondent, by exhibit P4 order directed the first respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 1,229.60 towards the gratuity due to the petitioner. On appeal by the first respondent, the appellate authority, the third respondent, reversed the same by exhibit P5 order. Hence, this original petition.
3. The petitioner would contend that he resigned from the service of the first respondent on 19 September, 1981, and so he is entitled to gratuity since he had put in 13 years of service. In exhibit P2, the first respondent had taken a contention that the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned his service in August 1981, and entered Government service without even informing the matter to the employer. It is admitted by the petitioner that he has not got a copy of the resignation letter. He had not been called upon by the first respondent to produce the resignation letter alleged to have been sent by him. When the first respondent had specifically averred in the counter that the petitioner took up employment in Government service in August 1981, the petitioner at least ought to have given the date of his joining the Government service. As per S. 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, an employee who abandoned the post is not entitled to any gratuity. The employee claiming gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act should establish that his case falls in one of the categories enumerated in Sub-sec. (1) of S. 4. Only on such proof he can maintain a petition under the Act. In the instant case, as there is no evidence regarding the resignation, the appellate authority had come to the conclusion that there was no termination of the service on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act. I do not find any ground to interfere with the said finding.
4. Even on the petitioner's own showing he left the service on 19 September, 1981. Exhibit P1 application was filed on 20 May, 1982. Before approaching the second respondent the petitioner ought to have claimed gratuity from his employer. Rule 7 of the Kerala Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1973, enjoins on an employee to file an application before the employer in form 1 within thirty days of the termination of the employment. Though the petitioner stated in exhibits P1 and P3 that such an application was filed, there is no evidence to substantiate this contention. In this original petition the petitioner has not stated that such an application was filed before the employer. As per rule 10 of the rules, the employee should file an application in form N to the controlling authority for issuing direction under S. 7(4) of the Act to the employer to pay the gratuity. That rule further provides that the said application should be filed within 90 days of the occurrence of the cause for the application. It means that the application in form N should be filed within 90 days of termination of the employment. Proviso to Cl. (1) of rule 10 states:
“Provided that the controlling authority may accept any application under this sub-rule on sufficient cause being shown by the applicant, after the expiry of the specified period.”
The specified period mentioned therein is the period of 90 days from the date of termination of the employment. An application filed after expiry of that period can be accepted by the controlling authority only if the applicant shows sufficient cause for the delay. In other words, the establishment of sufficient cause for the delay is a condition precedent for accepting the application by the controlling authority. Only on such establishment of the condition precedent can the controlling authority accept the application. The result is that the application filed beyond the period of 90 days fixed in Cl. (1) of rule 10 can be considered to be a valid application only after the controlling authority was satisfied of the cause for the delay. According to me, the application filed after the expiry of 90 days can be treated as a valid application only after the delay is condoned.
5. In the instant case, exhibit P 1 was filed on 20 May, 1982. The petitioner admits that the said application was one filed out of time. Exhibit P3(a) application for condoning the delay was filed only on 1 August, 1984. That is more than two years and two months after the main application, exhibit P1, which itself was filed out of time. Exhibit P3(a) petition was supported by exhibit P3 affidavit. Nothing was stated in that affidavit for condoning the delay of more than 2.5 years in filing exhibit P3(a). The averments in the affidavit show that the petitioner was trying to explain the delay of four months occasioned in filing exhibit P1. Actually, he ought to have explained the delay of 2.5 years and not four months. Therefore, I hold that the petitioner did not show any cause, much less sufficient cause, for the delay in filing the application.
6. The second respondent proceeded on the basis that the application for condonation of delay, exhibit P3, will relate back to the date of exhibit P1. I find it difficult to accept this position. Exhibit P1 can be considered as a valid application only with effect from the date on which exhibit P3 was allowed. In the instant case, the petitioner has not given any valid explanation for the delay of two and a half years. His attempt was to explain the delay of nearly four months in not filing exhibit P1 within 90 days of the alleged resignation, as prescribed by the rules. In this view, the second respondent was clearly in error in thinking that the delay was only of four months. This mistake has now been rectified by the third respondent. The approach made by the third respondent was perfectly legal and I find no ground to interfere with the same either.
7. In view of what has been stated above, I find no merit in this original petition. It is accordingly dismissed.
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