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Narayanan Nair v. John Kurien
Factual and Procedural Background
A suit instituted approximately twenty years ago seeks a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove portions of a sun-shade and window shutters encroaching upon the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff, John John, was residing at Madras when the suit was filed, but the plaint was signed by his brother Kurian, who claimed to be authorised by John John to institute the suit. The defendants challenged Kurian’s authority to act as the plaintiff’s agent. The trial court initially decreed the suit after rejecting the defendants’ contentions, and the district court dismissed the appeal. However, the High Court allowed the second appeal and remanded the case for fresh disposal, focusing on whether Kurian was duly authorised under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). After remand, the trial court found Kurian authorised and decreed the suit without addressing merits, considering them already decided. The appellate court concurred with the finding of authority but remanded the case again for consideration of merits. The appellants challenge this second remand order in the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the person who signed the plaint, Kurian, was the duly authorised agent of the plaintiff, John John, as required under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether compliance with Rule 24 of the Travancore Cochin Civil Rules of Practice (requiring written authority and affidavit) is necessary to constitute valid authorisation.
- Whether oral authorisation suffices to satisfy the requirement of “duly authorised” under Order 6 Rule 14 CPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Kurian is not the authorised agent of the plaintiff to institute the suit.
- Any authorisation must comply with Rule 24 of the Travancore Cochin Civil Rules of Practice, which mandates written authority and an affidavit verifying the signature and reasons for inability to sign by the party.
Respondent's Arguments
- Compliance with the civil rules of practice is not indispensable for authorisation under Order 6 Rule 14 CPC.
- Oral authorisation is sufficient to constitute due authorisation under the substantive law.
- There is reliable material, including an affidavit by the plaintiff, affirming Kurian’s authority to institute the suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal Jute Mills v. Jewraj Heeralal, AIR 1943 Calcutta 13 | Oral authorisation suffices for due authorisation under Order 6 Rule 14 CPC. | Supported the view that written authority is not indispensable. |
| Subbiah Pillai v. Sankarapandiam Pillai, AIR 1948 Madras (Vol. 35) 369 | Oral authorisation valid under Order 6 Rule 14 CPC. | Referred to in support of oral authorisation sufficiency. |
| Sarju Prasad v. Badri Prasad, AIR 1939 Nag 242 | Oral authorisation valid for signing pleadings. | Reinforced the principle of non-necessity of written authority. |
| Netram v. Bhagwan, AIR 1941 Nag 159 | Oral authorisation as valid authorisation. | Supported the prevailing view on authorisation under Order 6 Rule 14. |
| All India Reporter Ltd. v. Ramachandra, AIR 1961 Bombay 292 | Affirmed the sufficiency of oral authorisation under Order 6 Rule 14 CPC. | Discussed and adopted the preponderant view favouring oral authorisation. |
| Lyakku Mathoo v. Julius, AIR 1962 Kerala 19 | Absence of written authority considered a defect where plaintiff resides abroad. | Distinguished on facts; proviso to Order 6 Rule 14 held inapplicable where plaintiff resides abroad permanently. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the requirements of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permits pleadings to be signed by a person duly authorised by the party if the party is unable to sign. The court rejected the appellants' contention that the Travancore Cochin Civil Rules of Practice (Rule 24) mandating written authority and affidavit must be complied with, holding that these rules do not restrict the substantive law under Order 6 Rule 14 CPC. The court emphasized that the proviso to Rule 14 does not insist on written authorisation, and oral authorisation is sufficient. This view is supported by multiple precedents from various High Courts. The court found reliable material, including an affidavit by the plaintiff affirming Kurian’s authorisation to institute the suit. Consequently, the court held that Kurian was duly authorised and that the plaint was validly signed. The court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the appeal.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The court held that Kurian was duly authorised to sign the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal challenging the remand order was dismissed with no costs. The direct effect is that the plaint is valid and the suit may proceed accordingly. The decision does not establish new precedent but affirms the established principle that oral authorisation suffices under Order 6 Rule 14 CPC and that procedural rules requiring written authority do not override this substantive provision.
1. A litigation which commenced two decades ago is still away from its terminal periphery. During its chequered history, This case reached the high court on an earlier occasion. This is the second time that this court is called upon to decide this case. The only question to be determined now is whether the person who signed the plaint is the duly authorised agent of the person who figures as the plaintiff therein. If the answer is in the negative, The suit is liable to be dismissed for want of valid plaint.
2. The suit is for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove portions of a sun - shade and window - shutters projecting into the property of the plaintiff. The name of the plaintiff as shown in the plaint is john john who was residing at madras when the suit was instituted. But the plaint has been signed by his brother kurian who claims that john has authorised him to institute the suit. The defendants contended, Inter alia, That kurian is not the authorised agent of the plaintiff. Other contentions raised regarding the merits of the case are not very material for the purpose of this appeal. It is enough to point out that the trial court first repelled the contentions of the appellants and decreed the suit and the district court dismissed the appeal, But the second appeal filed in this court was allowed and the case was remitted to the trial court for disposal of the suit afresh. The question which this court considered earlier was whether the signatory in the plaint is a recognised agent of the plaintiff as envisaged in 0. 3 r. 2 of the code of civil procedure (for short'the code'). This court then held that the said rule has no application in this case. However, This court remanded the case to the trial court for disposal of the suit after deciding the question whether the person who signed the plaint has been duly authorised as provided in 0. 6 r. 14 of the code. After remand, The trial court found that kurian was authorised by the plaintiff to institute the suit. Upon this finding, The trial court decreed the suit without considering the other contentions on merits as the learned munsiff took the view that other issues concerning merits of the suit has already been determined before the remand. The appellants again went in appeal, But the appellate court ibis time, After concurring with the trial court's finding that kurian is the duly authorised agent of the plaintiff, Remanded the case to the trial court for disposal of the suit after considering the merits of the case. The said remand order is challenged by the appellants in this appeal.
3. 0. 6 r. 14 of the code reads thus:
"pleading to be signed. Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any) : provided that where a party pleading is, By reason of absence or for other good cause, Unable to sign the pleading, It may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf".
what is meant by the expression "duly authorised" in the aforesaid rule? learned counsel for the appellants contended that any authorisation without compliance with r. 24 of the travancore cochin civil rules of practice (which was in force when the suit was instituted) cannot be recognised in law as the special rule under the civil rules of practice prescribed a particular mode to make the authorisation. (rule 23 of the kerala civil rules of practice is identically worded and hence reference to one of them would be sufficient). The said rule in the civil rules of practice reads as follows:
"signing or verification by agent. If any proceeding which, Under any provision of law or these rules, Is required to be signed or verified by a party is signed or verified by any other person on his behalf, A written authority in this behalf signed by the party except in the case of persons under disability, Shall be filed in court, With an affidavit by such person verifying the signature of the party, And stating the reason of his inability to sign or verify the proceeding".
no written authority has been produced either by the plaintiff or by kurian in support of the case that kurian has been duly authorised to institute the suit. Nor has kurian filed an affidavit verifying the signature of the plaintiff stating the reasons of plaintiff's inability to sign in the plaint. The particular rule in the civil rules of practice (quoted above) applies only to cases where proceedings are required to be signed or verified by parties concerned. The said rule need not be imported to a case where plaint or written statement can be signed, As sanctioned by the substantive law, By any other person duly authorised by the party concerned. 0. 6 r. 14 permits such a course to be adopted in making the pleadings. The scope of 0. 6 r. 14 is not to be curtailed or restricted by unduly reading of civil rules of practice into it. Nor could the sanction offered by the substantive law be stultified by resort to the rules framed under such law. The proviso in r. 14 (of 0. 6) does not insist on production or even creation of a power of attorney or written authorisation. There is nothing in the said provision suggesting that a written authorisation is indispensable for the proper compliance thereof. Case law seems to be very much in support of the view that even oral authorisation would be sufficient to constitute due authorisation. (vide bengal jute mills v. Jewraj heeralal, Air 1943 calcutta 13; subbiah pillai v. Sankarapandiam pillai, Air 1948 madras (vol. 35) 369; sarju prasad v. Badri prasad, Air 1939 nag 242; and netram v. Bhagwan, Air 1941 nag. 159. Those decisions were referred to and discussed in detail by a division bench of the bombay high court in all india reporter ltd. V. Ramachandra (air 1961 bombay 292). The bombay high court, In concurrence with the preponderant view held that oral authorisation is good enough to constitute a valid authorisation under 0. 6 r. 14 of the code. In lyakku mathoo v. Julius (air 1962 kerala 19) absence of a written authority was considered to be a defect in constituting due authorisation, But the said decision can be distinguished on facts since the suit was instituted on behalf of a plaintiff residing abroad permanently. Raman nayar, J. (as be then was) has observed in the said decision that in such cases the proviso to 0. 6 r. 14 does not apply. The upshot of the discussion is that there is compliance with the requirements in 0. 6 r. 14 of the code if there is satisfactory material to show that the signatory in the plaint had the authority of the plaintiff to to sign the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff and such authority need not necessarily be in writing.
4. In this case there is reliable material to show that the plaintiff had. In fact, Authorised the signatory to institute the suit. Both the courts below have referred to an affidavit sworn to by the plaintiff in support of i. A. 550/71. The plaintiff has stated in categorical terms in the said affidavit that his brother kurian has been authorised by him to institute and prosecute the suit. The said material is more than sufficient to show that as a matter of fact kurian has been authorised by the plaintiff to institute the suit. As such, The person who signed the plaint must be held to have valid authority to sign the plaint. There is no reason to interfere and hence the appeal is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.
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